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MODERN PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION

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PREFACE

Modern Philosophies of Education had hardly come off the press in 1939 before suggestions began to occur to the author as to how the volume might be amplified and clarified. In the decade that has elapsed since that time, many added suggestions have occurred to him and, happily, to others who have generously volunteered them for his use. The author is glad to make these improvements available in this revised edition.

The principal changes consist of the addition of three new chapters: Chapter III, The Nature of Human Nature; Chapter VI, Professional Ethics; and Chapter XV, Consensus among Philosophies of Education. Two former chapters, Philosophical Aspects of Educational Psychology and The Individual, Society, and Education, have been dropped. The first has been absorbed into the new chapter on The Nature of Human Nature, and the second has contributed part of its former content to the same new chapter and the rest to the chapter on Education and Politics, which thus becomes somewhat enlarged in scope over the previous edition. The new chapter on Professional Ethics, though short, should supply a needed philosophical discussion of a topic which is usually treated as so many dogmatic prescriptions. The new final chapter on Consensus among Philosophies of Education is an endeavor to correct what may be a false impression. After taking fourteen chapters to point out the differences between educational philosophies, the unwary reader is likely to think that only confusion and contradiction reign among educational philosophies, whereas, as a matter of fact, there is a promising area of agreement.

In addition to these new chapters, more than half of the old ones have been completely rewritten, and the remaining few have been extensively revised. Bibliographies have been brought up to date, and many of the items which formerly appeared as bibliographic references have been transferred to footnotes. An attempt has been made to simplify terminology throughout and to multiply practical illustrations of theoretical points. Cross references have been increased to show the interrelationships among various phases of educational philosophy. Finally, each chapter contains more subdivisions than formerly, which, with an altered format, should add greatly to the readability of the book.

In spite of these changes, the book remains substantially the same. Its main purpose still is a comparative study of the more important contemporary philosophies of education. The importance of such a presenta-

tion seems even greater today than it did ten years ago. The first half of the twentieth century has been a period of unprecedented activity in educational philosophy. Never before in educational history has so much been written and published in this field. The reason is not far to seek. Education has been at the crossroads as never before. The strife of political and economic systems has forced men to think with renewed vigor about the educational implications of these various systems. Furthermore, modern science, particularly psychology and biology, has generated such an intellectual revolution that educators have inescapably been driven to ponder its educational bearings. The more confusing these stirring events, the more have people turned to philosophy in search for a clarifying answer to their problems. Indeed, philosophy has not played so important a part in education since the time of Plato. At any rate, many are the educational philosophers today who are anxious to point the proper course at the crossroads. To a great extent, however, their own conflicting recommendations have but added to the general confusion. For this reason it is more necessary than ever to approach educational philosophy comparatively to see more precisely just where we are, what alternatives we have, and where they may lead.

In adding new material and giving new organization to the first edition of *Modern Philosophies of Education*, the author wishes to recognize his indebtedness to all those who made various suggestions for improvement. For much of the form and content of what appears in the final chapter on Consensus among Educational Philosophies, he is indebted to members of the Philosophy of Education Society, especially to its Committee on Consensus, with whom he has had the privilege of meeting for the past several years. The thinking of the committee composed of Louise Antz, George Axtelle, Kenneth Benne, Father William Cunningham, Raymond McCall, and Maurice Rowland, has been invaluable in enabling him to reach balance and perspective in this difficult area. This chapter, however, is not a report of that committee, and therefore the author must bear the brunt of any shortcomings it may have.

NEW HAVEN, CONN.
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JOHN S. BRUBACHER

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CHAPTER I

THE ROLE OF EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

The Occasion for Philosophy of Education

Teachers and parents may well feel confused these days over the great variety of opinion which obtains on the subject of education. Indeed there is such a contrariety of even expert advice that it seems as if the learned talk in a Babel of voices when they give directions on rearing the young. Distressing as this situation may be, it is not unusual. Quite the opposite, the situation seems to be one of long standing. Twenty-five hundred years ago no less a sage than Aristotle wrote:

As things are . . . mankind are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether we look to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or moral virtue. The existing practice is perplexing: no one knowing on what principle we should proceed—should the useful in life, or should virtue, or should the higher knowledge be the aim of our training; all three opinions have been entertained. Again about the means there is no agreement: for different persons, starting with different ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally disagree about the practice of it.¹

Aristotle and his contemporaries found it difficult to agree on a fitting sort of education for the young because contemporary social conditions were in a state of accelerated change. Political institutions were shifting from aristocratic to democratic forms. A commercial economy was rapidly lifting Greece to a position of leadership in the eastern Mediterranean. National preeminence brought in its wake international conflict and ultimately international war. Foreign trade and war, to say nothing of domestic political strife, gave rise to a whole new crop of ideas among the Greeks. In the field of education the fundamental question arose whether the traditional educational stereotype would longer fit the new world into which the Greeks were moving or whether new times demanded a revision of their educational ideal.

The situation in the twentieth century—not to mention intervening centuries—has been much the same. The political structure has been very fluid. Monarchistic institutions have given way to democratic ones, and democratic ones in turn have been beset by fascistic and communistic

¹ ARISTOTLE, *Politics*, Book VIII, Chap. 2.

ones. Industrial economies have rapidly outstripped agrarian and commercial ones. International war not once but twice has tested men's political and economic ideologies. Reinforced by the remarkable development of science the intellectual turnover of ideas has never been so great. Consequently people today, as twenty-five hundred years ago, are raising the age-old questions about how to educate their children for the dynamic social conditions in which they live. If their answers are confused and faltering, there should be no occasion for surprise; uncertain times give rise to uncertain answers.

Some think that the only way to train for changing times is to meet them with an education that is itself "progressive," one which believes that the aim of education should be the constant reconstruction of experience. Others hold that the only way to train for times like the present is through a program of traditional or "essential" studies which, selected for their perennially enduring values, afford a large measure of stability by counteracting change. If one meets the challenge of our times as the "progressive" suggests, it will be advisable to be constantly rearranging the curriculum according to its usefulness in meeting each crisis as it arises. If one proceeds as the "essentialists" suggest, one will select his curriculum by a yardstick of value which transcends mere current utility. Moreover, as Aristotle noted, conflict in educational practice today extends beyond the question whether the curriculum should be chosen for its pragmatic or intrinsic values and entails differences of means or method as well. If one is teaching perennial values, he will very likely be more authoritarian in his methods than he will where he is accustomed to hold his values tentatively, depending on how they work out practically in the changing scene. Again, if one is teaching perennial values which transcend time, perhaps he will pay less regard to spontaneous pupil interest and more to the discipline emanating from effort put into studying what the younger generation ought to be interested in. On the other hand if the teacher is eager to keep abreast of the times, he will probably take spontaneous interest on the part of his pupils as a major criterion of the vitality of his instruction and shift the curriculum to be sure to generate it. Giving the pupil and his interests an authentic part in choosing the curriculum seems proper to many because it assures them that they are meeting current crises democratically. Others, defining democracy differently or perhaps discarding the concept altogether, prefer a selection of the curriculum by those who by virtue of training and experience are better qualified to assess the long-range significance of social change. Still others think too much confidence is placed in the authority of man and in his tendency to confine himself to the natural order in seeking to accommodate himself to the varying strains and stresses of his continuing world crisis. They think

he puts too much trust in secular education to extricate the next generation from its inherited difficulties. To remedy this situation they favor an increasing emphasis on religious education. Others, however, take no comfort in a supernatural orientation of education and hold that man must stand alone and on his own feet to solve his problems.

As one can see from this brief sampling, "existing practice is perplexing" today no less than it was twenty-five hundred years ago. But what to do in the face of this perplexity? That is the urgent question. Perhaps the approach to an answer is not unlike attaching relative weight to a collection of fractions of odd sizes; one must find a common denominator. If so, then too when confronted with conflicting educational practices, one must seek some common denominator, some "principle" as Aristotle said, which will enable us to resolve the conflict or at least achieve some balance of mind. This search for principle is, in a nutshell, the mainspring for the study of philosophy.

Common Sense

Perhaps the philosophical quest for principle will be simpler to understand if we start with a common-sense approach to the sort of educational problems just mentioned. Ask the average layman or teacher untrained in educational philosophy what action to take in meeting any of these problems and he will, in all probability, have a ready answer for you. Where did he get the resources for such an answer? From common sense, we say, from the common allowance of wits which everyone has to understand practical affairs. But it is more than that; it is also a capacity of wit armed with a mass of accumulated convictions which he shares with his fellows and which social convention endorses. Thus common-sense decisions on educational matters are the individual expression of a kind of underlying public opinion. Or, stated differently, common sense is the theoretical group premise or bias by which everyone undergirds his decisions and conducts his practical affairs. And, like as not, his practice will be surprisingly sound. In fact, it is redundant to speak of sound common sense.

It is often remarked that every teacher has a philosophy of education whether he is aware of it or not. This is probably true if what is meant is that every teacher has a common-sense outlook on education. Doubtless common sense as a homespun philosophy of education is often adequate to make immediate resolutions of conflicting demands on the teacher's attention, but it easily breaks down if the severe strain is placed on it of formulating long-range educational policies. Properly speaking, the philosophical outlook results from much more rigorous thinking—from giving thinking much greater scope and also from making it much more logical.

Although this is the case, it would be a mistake to conclude that the difference between philosophy and common sense is so abrupt or sharp as to amount to a difference in kind. The difference is rather one of degree. Yet even here we must exercise caution in the use of our terminology. While on occasion we may be justified in using the term philosophy to cover a common-sense viewpoint, we should beware of using it in the case of every sort of educational viewpoint from mere fancy¹ to severe logical reasoning.

Yet, however ready or in vogue common-sense decisions on education may be, they have their shortcomings. When we stop to do the uncommon-sense thing of asking common sense for its credentials, we perceive at once how unsatisfactory is their authenticity. A critical examination of the past of common sense alone quickly reveals its fickleness. It has vacillated from time to time and place to place. While yesterday it may have been common sense to make a dull child wear a dunce cap, today this practice would not make sense to the community at all. And while it may have been common sense in ancient Greece to practice educational eugenics by exposing deformed infants to death, in modern America this custom would almost constitute nonsense to current standards of common sense. Consequently as good a point of departure as common sense may be for the solution of educational controversies, it can hardly be a satisfactory court of final appeal.

Obviously the earnest professional student of education must go beyond the common sense of the lay community if he is to form educational policies which are to have any scope and stability. (The way for him to do this is to subject common sense to careful refinement, that is, to bring in further data so that his judgment can reach conclusions which will be valid for more people in more times and more places. There are two principal methods of achieving this further refinement of common sense, the one scientific and the other philosophic.) The way in which the scientist improves on common sense is well known. He selects for experimentation an educational problem which can be narrowly and precisely defined. That is, he selects a problem in which the number of factors or variables involved is very limited and in which these factors or variables can be easily isolated from the context in which they occur. The reason for this careful selection of factors is to enable the scientist to gain rigid control over their variation. If he is experimenting with homogeneous grouping of pupils according to ability, for instance, he must be sure that such factors as the teacher, the sex of the student, the community, the size of the class, and the like do not vary sufficiently to upset the homogeneity of the groups he is studying.

¹ The *reductio ad absurdum* here is the teacher who said she overcame her professional anxieties philosophically, that is, she did not think about them.

Just let one such factor elude control and the educational scientist cannot tell whether such results as better scores on tests are due to the homogeneity of his groups or to some extraneous factor which has escaped his control. To make the dependability of his conclusions a further refinement on common sense the scientist usually repeats his experiment and encourages others to conduct the same experiment. Then, if the results are uniform, he can claim that his conclusions are not only reliable but objective, both prime characteristics of dependability. It is by the employment of these refinements that science enjoys the wide popular confidence it does today.

The Philosophic Point of View

The philosophic method of extending and refining common sense moves in a quite different direction from the scientific one. It aims not at a solution of just a limited number of the factors and variables which inhere in an educational problem and which can be rigidly controlled experimentally, but at one which includes every factor or variable which is either directly or remotely relevant to the problem. Thus, in studying the feasibility of homogeneous grouping, the philosophic interest concerns more than just the limited data to which the scientist must confine himself. Beyond improved test scores, for example, the philosopher is also interested in the personal attitudes of superiority or inferiority that children learn when homogeneously grouped, in the out-of-school as well as the in-school effect of these groupings, and in the impact of these groups on the democratic outlook.¹ Or take another instance from the field of moral education. Admittedly we all want to teach traits of character such as courage, loyalty, perseverance, obedience, and the like. Taken singly, however, these are each traits which a band of gangsters might also cultivate among its members. Consequently we cannot confidently assert that any of these traits is a worthy aim of moral education until we refer them to some over-all purpose of education, for instance, what kind of society we live in or want to live in.

A thorough philosophical study of a problem such as this may become very complex. Thus the data which educational philosophy draws into its synthesis often is derived from a wide variety of sources. As often as not it may start with the humble data of common sense and that stolid first cousin of common sense, tradition. The facts of common sense and tradition, however, will not be exact enough for the thoroughgoing conclusions at which philosophy aims. Consequently philosophy will gather into its bag those more critical editions of common sense and tradition, science

¹ For example, see the philosophical critique of scientific results in homogeneous grouping in A. V. Keliher, *A Critical Study of Homogeneous Grouping*, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1931.

and history. Among the sciences educational philosophy will pay high regard to the life sciences of biology and psychology but no less high regard to the social sciences of sociology, politics, and economics as they bear on the problem at hand. But philosophy will want a synthesis which is not only consistent with the best current data but also with the best experience drawn from the past. Hence educational history as well as science is a notable source for philosophical synthesis. Last but not least the data of religion and morals should become an ingredient of the comprehensive outlook of educational philosophy. Indeed religion itself is closely akin to the philosophical enterprise in that it too is interested in exploring the most inclusive ramifications of educational problems, even in exploring those boundaries of the problem which border on the most sublime speculation.

The totality of circumstances considered relevant for philosophical study should not be considered a mere quantitative affair such as an encyclopedia might total up. Merely to multiply the circumstances which the educator should take into account is as likely to confuse as to enlighten the educational practitioner. In addition, therefore, to trying to be sensitive to the widest possible range of factors or circumstances affecting an educational problem, the philosophical method is characterized by an endeavor to integrate or synthesize this data according to some over-all order of unity or consistency.¹

One or Many Philosophies of Education

While it is generally agreed that wholeness or unity of outlook is the legitimate objective of educational philosophy, the manifold details with which it deals may or may not necessarily reduce to a single principle of interpretation. Some philosophies actually succeed in achieving a unitary or monistic point of view or synthesis, as, for instance, the totalitarianism of fascist education. But other philosophies, paradoxically, find unity in diversity. Those reducing to two principles are called dualistic. This type is illustrated in religious philosophies of education such as Catholicism or Scholasticism where educational practice is determined by two distinct orders of thought, the natural and the supernatural. All other philosophies which are neither monistic or dualistic go under the title of pluralism. Such is the educational philosophy of democracy which protects and promotes the cultivation of diverse personalities and cultures as a matter of central principle.²

¹ Cf. *infra*, p. 231.

² In choosing a philosophy of education one will do well to bear in mind G. S. Counts, "Criteria for Judging a Philosophy of Education," *School and Society*, 30: 103-107, July, 1929; and S. A. Courtis, "Significant Criteria for the Appraisal of the Validity of Contemporary Educational Philosophy," *Educational Method*, 9: 66-72, November, 1929.

Whether unity be in principle one or many, the question next arises whether this unity serves current educational experience and is, consequently, always forming and reforming to meet the shifting demands of education or whether this unity outruns the experience of the moment to take lodgement in ultimate and final reality.¹ Some think the demand for unity takes its point of origin in ordinary educational experience, in some circumstance which has arisen to interrupt the continuity of the educational process. Perhaps different pressure groups such as the parent-teacher association, the chamber of commerce, or the American Legion are making conflicting demands on the program of the school. Perhaps the faculty is in doubt whether to introduce some new theory or technique or cling to traditional procedures. In such a situation philosophy considers its function to clarify the various factors of experience involved, to reduce conflicts, where found, by finding some larger common denominator of their differences. Thus, in the end, it restores the continuity of the educative process by continuing the former process of education together with a readaptation of it which will keep it vital and growing. The decision on whether philosophy thus succeeds in lifting educational practice to some broader, more unified level of meaning will be grounded, finally, in the test of further experience.²

Others, while they too deal with experience, have no fundamental confidence in it. Distrusting it, on the contrary, they seek to guide educational practice by looking beyond experience, by trying to ground educational philosophy in a superior kind of knowledge, a knowledge of ultimate reality. To them the philosophical quest for wholeness is not just a reduction of conflicting educational tendencies to some temporal harmony but a quest for wholeness or unity that is eternal. Since the whole is naturally interrelated and since education is but a fragment of this interrelated whole, a major justification for the philosophical study of education is the clue it offers in regard to the nature of the perfected whole of reality. The way to gain insight into such complete and perfected knowledge is through a priori intuition or through a rational faculty which has the unique ability to grasp directly absolute non-empirical truth.

This rift between basically empirical and non-empirical educational philosophies poses problems, the seriousness of which will become increasingly clear in detail as the exposition of this book proceeds. Suffice it here to point out that, if the claims of educational philosophy to being grounded in ultimate reality are justified, then there can be only *one* true philosophy

¹ Cf. DEWEY, J., in National Society for the Study of Education, Thirty-seventh Yearbook, Part II, *The Scientific Movement in Education*, Chap. 38, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1938.

² For a treatment of this sort of unity, see E. V. Sayers, *Education and the Unity of Experience*, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1929.

of education. There cannot be a number of equally true competing philosophies each with its own peculiar set of assumptions and definitions. Perhaps no great difficulty will arise from this situation so long as proponents of *true* philosophies of education are modest enough to confess that they are not sure that theirs is *the* true philosophy of education. More difficulty will arise where such modesty gives way to absolute assurance. In that case two teachers, motivated by different but absolutely right educational philosophies, will find it extraordinarily difficult to cooperate in a joint school program. Neither will be able to persuade or convince the other because any concession toward community of opinion by either must be a betrayal of his absolute conviction that he alone is right. The two might as well be talking two different languages.¹

What to do in such an impasse?² The teachers might return to the sphere of action without the benefit of philosophy and try to arrive at a purely practical compromise. This will be difficult to effect without the aid of theory, but it is neither impossible nor untried.³ The principal deception in such a practical program for the school, if by good fortune it is reached, is that people may regard differences of philosophy as superfluous. Such an easy solution could be and frequently is very misleading, for should differences of opinion persist over the plan of action, the teachers would have no common principle by which to arbitrate their differences.

Some think a philosophical impasse quite unnecessary. If such an impasse arises out of the diverse social backgrounds of economic occupation, political conviction, or religious belief, such differences can be solved by referring them to their common denominator, man. Man being intelligent and the world intelligible there is no insuperable obstacle to reasonable agreement. But men vary by temperament, say others, and this is the ultimate reason why they choose contradictory educational philosophies. Temperamental differences are not ultimate or essential, reply those who think that philosophical differences can be resolved by appealing to the nature of man. According to them all men have essentially the same rational nature in spite of accidental differences of temperament. Common nature, therefore, still provides a common denominator for quieting the quarrels of philosophers.

Unfortunately the nature of human nature is itself one of the most con-

¹ MCGUCKEN, W. J., in National Society for the Study of Education, Forty-first Yearbook, *Philosophies of Education*, p. 287, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1942.

² For an extended discussion of this question, see *infra*, Chap. XV.

³ See O'CONNELL, L. J., *Are Catholic Schools Progressive?* B. Herder Book Company, St. Louis, 1946; and John Dewey Society, Seventh Yearbook, *The Public School and Spiritual Values*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1944.

troversial problems giving rise to our philosophical impasse.¹ It is not likely, therefore, that we will break the impasse by introducing or depending on another one. Consequently, if an appeal to the rational nature of man fails to break the impasse those with absolute philosophies of education are tempted to accuse their opponents with being merely contentious or even morally perverse.² Hence their final recourse, at least historically, to draw those of a contrary mind to the right point of view is to appeal to external authority, such as church or state. Backed by such powerful institutions they are under the further temptation of being justly intolerant of rival educational philosophies.³

Critique of Assumptions and Concepts

In delving into any educational problem we find that there are some aspects of it which by their very nature force the investigator to make the comprehensive approach of the philosopher rather than the limited approach of the scientist. One of these aspects is the critical examination of basic assumptions on which the solution of a problem may depend. Assumptions which can be tested by an appeal to experience are more in the nature of hypotheses and probably should be called hypotheses. The kind of assumption we have in mind here, however, is that on which the solution of a problem rests but which itself cannot be demonstrated by an appeal to experience.⁴

Educational measurement is a case in point. The scientific measurement of, say, intelligence or achievement depends ultimately on whether the data of intelligence or achievement can be treated arithmetically, that is, whether it can be added or subtracted. In order to add or subtract such psychological data, it must be capable of being stated in cardinal numbers, that is, in equal units. Now it is customary to state the scores of intelligence and achievement tests in cardinal numbers, but how do we know that the items on the test are actually of equal difficulty? As a matter of fact we do not know, nor with the greatest of care can we make them exactly equal. In other words we have to assume that our units are equal. This assumption, though unsupported, is, nevertheless, very useful in supporting practical results in educational measurement.⁵

¹ For a fuller development of the nature of human nature, see Chap. III.

² ADLER, M. J., "Tradition and Communication," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, pp. 110-111, 1937.

³ Cf. RYAN, J. A., and F. S. BOLAND, *Catholic Principles of Politics*, p. 318, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1947.

⁴ Cf. BODE, B., "Where Does One Go for Fundamental Assumptions in Education?" *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 14: 361-370, September, 1928.

⁵ For a fuller treatment of the philosophy of measurement, see *infra*, pp. 240-244.

Since there is an unproved core at the heart of every genuine assumption, obviously someone must stand guard against too great dilution of sound educational argument by a lavish or unwarranted use of assumptions. This is the more important since assumptions are often so innocently unobtrusive that their significance is quite overlooked. At any rate this task of challenging assumptions and letting only those pass which can stand rigid scrutiny is one which the philosopher has long claimed for himself. He has, however, no monopoly on the post. Scientists, too, are often as scrupulously critical about the assumptions in common use as are philosophers. Naturally the more philosophically trained the scientist is, the more fruitful is his criticism likely to be.¹

If philosophers are critical of assumptions, they are no less critical about the precise definition and use of basic terms and concepts. To this end, like any advanced discipline, they have developed a very technical vocabulary.² This not only enables them to take important short cuts—letting a single word or phrase stand for a whole paragraph of exposition—but it also enables them to be very exact in their thought. It compensates them in part for the lack of fine instruments of precision such as the scientist employs in his laboratory. Refinement of terminology, however, can become a vice as witness the times past when philosophers have suffered the scorn of the layman for making “hair-splitting” distinctions. Today the careful analysis of word meanings enjoys the dignified title of semantics and is one of the more important approaches to the philosophical solution of educational problems.³

Facts and Value

Another aspect of resolving educational problems which pushes the educator beyond a common-sense or even scientific solution of his difficulty arises when values are present in the situation at hand. Here it is often said that science can determine facts but not values, that values are for philosophy to determine. This statement is not quite accurate. It needs qualification. Values are sometimes facts in a situation. Communities, for instance, do as a matter of fact have certain values or aims which they

¹ Cf. HULL, C. L., “The Conflicting Psychologies of Learning—A Way Out,” *Psychological Review*, 42: 491-516, November, 1935; KATTSOFF, L. O., “Philosophy, Psychology, and Postulational Technique,” *Psychological Review*, 46: 62-74, January, 1939. See also SCATES, D. E., “Types of Assumption in Educational Research,” *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 26: 350-366, May, 1935.

² Note the treatment of terminology by H. C. Morrison in *Basic Principles of Education*, pp. 27-29, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1934; also by M. V. O’Shea, in “Should We Endeavor to Secure Uniformity in Educational Terminology?” *School and Society*, 19: 134-136, February, 1924.

³ BYRNE, L., “Resolving the Conflict of Educational Parties,” *Educational Forum*, 5: 191-207, January, 1941.

seek to realize in their school systems. There are scientific techniques which can determine fairly accurately what these aims or values are at any given time or place. But while the scientist is qualified to determine what values are in fact held, he must be scrupulously careful not to allow his own scheme of values to bias his judgment in ascertaining any fact. If he did that, another scientist confronting the same situation with a different scheme of values might find a different set of facts, thereby greatly interfering with scientific objectivity.

Although science may properly aid in determining what the aims or values of a community *are*, it is obviously quite another question to determine whether existing aims or values are good ones, the ones the schools *ought* to have. To answer this question we must go beyond science to philosophy. Starting with the description of what values actually obtain in an educational situation, philosophy goes on to a critique of them in terms of a norm of value. The critique or evaluation of values is a very complicated affair. The variables are many and so intricately interwoven with the social and cultural context that they cannot be easily, if at all, isolated for study but must be treated comprehensively in the light of the total situation. Indeed, apart from some comprehensive or philosophical theory it will be next to impossible to decide whether the schools should perpetuate the *status quo* in educational aims or whether they should amend it.¹ If the philosopher's personal set of values enters into his final judgment there will be no complaint, as there would be if the scientist permitted his bias to affect his conclusions, for the philosopher himself is bound to be part of any total situation.²

Speculation

The more we reach out beyond science to understand the educational problem in its more complete ramifications, the more we tend to outrun the facts at hand and the more our conclusions tend to become purely speculative in character. The belief of some educational philosophers that theirs is the one true philosophy of education because its unified view corresponds to the unity of ultimate reality clearly outruns empirical evidence and therefore is supported chiefly on speculative grounds. Speculation, then, is still another reason for making a philosophical attack on educational problems.³ There is difference of opinion, however, on how fruitful specu-

¹ For a philosophical critique of the scientific determination of educational aims and objectives, see B. H. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories*, Chaps. 4-6, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927. See also M. A. May, in National Society of College Teachers of Education, Twentieth Yearbook, *The Relative Value of Science and Philosophy in Appraisal*, Chap. 8.

² For further illustration, see *infra*, pp. 338-339.

³ SCHILPP, P. A. (ed.), *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, pp. 626-628, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1941.

lation is in educational matters. Some think that speculative inquiry leads nowhere at all, that conclusions not based on practical experience are so inconclusive that they bring the whole philosophical enterprise into positive disrepute. Others sanction speculation because on occasion it has pointed to conclusions with which science has later on had to catch up. Thus the theory of evolution started out in the early nineteenth century in philosophical speculation on the dynamics of history. Since the evolutionary theory has been so tremendously fruitful in interpreting data of the social sciences—and especially education—the friends of speculation find it easy to write off the abortive results of speculation as a consequence of any process subject to human error.

The speculative function of educational philosophy is obviously closely akin to its function of determining what values education *ought* to pursue. Taken together both these aspects of educational philosophy would seem to indicate that philosophy has a prospective reference, that it anticipates and directs practice. While there are many who agree that philosophy should state the ideal at which teachers and superintendents should aim, there are others who take a less ambitious view of the task of educational philosophy. They think that philosophy follows rather than leads educational practice.¹ They view educational philosophy as a rationalization of usages already familiar in practice. From their point of view educational practices arise in random informal fashion. On the face of it these practices do not appear to be parts of a large-scale coordinated plan. By the artful use of logic and a little imagination the philosopher manages to supply the intellectual coordinating structure. He states with as much consistency as he can what seems to be the common theory underlying these diverse practices. But in so doing philosophy is retrospective rather than prospective in character. It is more conservative than progressive.

The place of John Dewey's *Democracy and Education*² in the literature of American education may be a case in point. Most readers of this justly famous book view it as the single best statement of the democratic ideal in education. And there can be little doubt that subsequent to its publication it had a profound effect on education not only in America but in the world at large. Yet, valid as it is to regard the book as setting a goal to be achieved, this could easily be a superficial view of it. It bears noting at this point that *Democracy and Education* appeared at the end and not at the beginning of America's first century and a quarter of experience with

¹ KANDEL, I. L., *Comparative Education*, p. 24, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1933.

² DEWEY, J., *Democracy and Education*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916.

democratic institutions. Coming at this time, it makes explicit for education what was implicit in the social, economic, and political developments of the country up to this time. On this account it is doubtful indeed whether the book could have been written one hundred twenty-five years earlier. In a deep sense, therefore, the book is a rationalization of past national experience as well as an inspiring ideal for the future.

Theory and Practice

As can readily be seen, the further our quest for fundamental or comprehensive principle extends beyond common sense, the more theoretical our conclusions become. In fact there are not a few educators who think that philosophical conclusions are too theoretical. The growing dependence on theory—the further one analyzes the more inclusive significance of a given educational problem—strikes them as a distinct liability. Interesting as an excursion into theory may be, it too easily causes these men to slip their moorings to the practical realities of the educational situation. Losing sight of the connection between theory and practice, they rail against theory as remote, vague, and idealistic.

In lodging this complaint against philosophy, educators are all too likely to forget that it may still be practice that is at fault. Generally we have plenty of practice, but practice is often confused and contradictory, a circumstance already seen to have been almost the continual state of affairs since the time of Aristotle. What we need is not more practical remedies but, as Aristotle pointed out, some theory to guide practice. It is on this account that the defenders of philosophy have stated that theory is in the end the most practical of expedients.

The conflict between theory and practice should really be capable of some solution. Perhaps we can start by recognizing that the critics of both theory and practice are each really criticizing straw men. One is criticizing ineffective theory and the other thoughtless practice. It is not likely that any one will object to burning up both these straw men. But what sort of men should be installed in their places? What is the proper relation of theory and practice, of educational philosophy and the conduct of the schools?

It is the view of some that it is the function of theory to describe and explain facts and the function of practice to decide what to do about them.¹ Theory thus deals with facts and practice with values. According to this distinction the scientific study of education is necessarily, even exclusively, theoretical because it attempts to describe and explain the educative pro-

¹ ADLER, M. J., in National Society for the Study of Education, Forty-first Year-book, Part I, *Philosophies of Education*, pp. 224-227, 234, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1942.

cess. Educational psychology is a good illustration; it attempts to state the theory of how we learn, that is, to describe and explain learning so carefully that it will hold in every case of learning. The philosophical approach to education, however, may be either theoretical or practical, or both. It is obviously practical since practice raises problems of value, and problems of value are, as seen earlier, a special province of philosophy. But philosophy is also theoretical in so far as it defines and explains the nature of the good in general. Whether or not to group children homogeneously, to return to that problem, poses a practical problem for philosophy to decide. What criterion of the good to use in making this practical judgment, however, is a theoretical problem for philosophy.

To carry this analysis a step further, it appears that the theoretical approach to education is more general than the practical one. A practical judgment raises the question what to do in the particular case of this child or that school. A theoretical judgment, on the other hand, if carefully made, should hold for every case, the case of all children or all schools. In the case of homogeneous grouping, again, science should be able to state theoretically what to expect every time children are homogeneously grouped. Correspondingly, philosophy should be able to state whether it is feasible to introduce homogeneous grouping into any single school.

But here we run into a significant limitation of philosophy according to the interpretation under consideration. While it is admittedly a practical problem for philosophy to decide what is feasible to do, it is not proper for philosophy to decide what to do in any particular case. The situation in any particular school is compounded of so many accidental and contingent factors arising out of local circumstance that any judgment on it would be mere opinion and not true knowledge of what to do. Since in addition to its other characteristics philosophy deals with knowledge rather than mere opinion,¹ philosophy must limit itself to general principles of practice.

Consequently clashes of opinion on what to do in a particular case can be resolved only experimentally. Experimental verification, contrary to expectation, plays a subordinate role in the practical aspect of educational philosophy. It seems to be a minor court for the resolutions of small claims rather than a court of last resort for the settlement of fundamental principles. Philosophy in both its theoretical and practical aspects seems relatively unaffected by it. Yet, one should not be mistaken into thinking that this is ineffective theory all over again. To its proponents an educational philosophy whose banner is not pushed about by experiments, often fads, of school practice is an admirably effective theory because of its very stability.

¹ For a fuller development of this point, see *infra*, pp. 77-88.

Others, looking for the proper relation between theory and practice in educational philosophy, make experimental method the very heart of the relation. Starting with something specific that is baffling or obstructing the conduct of school, they employ theory to enlarge the range of circumstances to which attention should be paid in searching for a solution. By escaping from the immediate into a more comprehensive range of circumstances they claim that the educator gains the opportunity to explore theoretically a great variety of possibilities. From these he chooses the one most likely to restore the interrupted continuity of the educative process and bring it into harmony again with the larger ongoing life situation. In putting his theory to practice he watches very carefully to see whether the consequences of so doing corroborate the theory. If they do, the theory is verified; if not, then the theory will have to be rejected or modified. In either event theory and practice go hand in hand. The educator resorts to philosophy to hold a lamp to the feet of practice, and the philosopher, far from neglecting or disregarding practice, esteems it as a check on the efficacy of his philosophy. Indeed the pragmatic philosopher holds that differences in educational philosophy which do not make a difference in practice are either nonexistent or trivial and therefore inconsequential.

Pedagogy

The relation of theory and practice is of particular interest to pedagogy, to the art of education. The art of education lies in actual instructing or teaching of live boys and girls. It should be obvious at once that the art of education, or pedagogy, differs from the science of education. The latter is concerned with universal principles which are applicable to all learners. The art of education may be and usually is based on such principles, but often there is some slack between principle and practice. It is through the art of the teacher that this slack is taken up, that an adjustment is made between general principle and the peculiarities of the individual learner.

There is a similar relation between pedagogy and the philosophy of education. Thus it is on philosophy that the art of education must wait for a design of action. Conversely, educational philosophy, whose solutions can be achieved only in action, will have urgent need for the art of education. Philosophy cannot bring its theories into existence merely by thinking them. This the art of education can do and in doing so can make education a laboratory where philosophical distinctions can be empirically tested. A philosophy of education that constantly appeals its validity to practice is in that degree necessarily dependent on the art of education. In fact only a philosophy truncated from practice can be clearly distinguished from education as an art.

Philosophy and Science

But how does philosophy differ from science if philosophical theory bears a strong experimental relation to educational practice?¹ The main difference lies, not so much in the experimental test of theory but, as already indicated, in the scope of the theory. Science prefers an educational problem in which it need propose a theory to cover no more variables than can be rigidly controlled. Philosophy, on the other hand, makes no such limitation. It is willing to handle educational problems in which it must propose a theory for uncontrolled as well as controlled variables. While scientific and philosophic theory cover different ranges of fact, there is no reason why both should not test their theories by an appeal to practice. Yet, though both science and philosophy may test their theories by the same method, they will differ widely in the extent to which their results can command assent from other workers in the field. By limiting its variables science is able to win wide and almost universal support for its conclusions. Refusing to limit variables philosophy has become almost notorious for its disagreements.²

¹ This question has provoked much discussion in educational literature. See T. Brameld, "The Relation of Philosophy and Science from the Perspective of Education," *Educational Trends*, 9: 5-10, July-August, 1941; Dewey, in National Society for the Study of Education, *loc. cit.*; R. Finney, "Philosophy versus Science Again," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 16: 161-173, March, 1930; F. N. Freeman, "Scientific and Philosophic Method in Education," *Science*, 73: 54-59, January, 1931; H. G. Hullfish, "The Relation of Philosophy and Science in Education," *Journal of Educational Research*, 20: 159-165, October, 1929; E. B. Jordan, "Respective Roles of Science and Philosophy in Education," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, pp. 38-49, 1947; T. L. Kelley, "A Defense of Science in Education," *Harvard Teachers Record*, 1: 123-130, November, 1931; T. L. Kelley, "The Philosophic vs. the Scientific Approach to the Novel Problem," *Science*, 71: 295-302, March, 1930; W. H. Kilpatrick, "A Defense of Philosophy in Education," *Harvard Teachers Record*, 1: 117-122, November, 1931; W. H. Kilpatrick, "The Relation of Philosophy to Scientific Research," *Journal of Educational Research*, 24: 97-114, September, 1931.

² A number of other ways have been proposed for distinguishing the roles of philosophy and science, but none of them deserves much merit. For instance, some say that science makes an analytic attack on the educational problem while philosophy is synthetic. Similarly others say that science is inductive while philosophy is deductive. Both these statements are half truths. As a matter of fact philosophy is often analytic and inductive, just as science is frequently synthetic and deductive. The prize for indefensible distinctions, however, goes to G. A. Mirick in his *Progressive Education*, pp. 12-16, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1923. He charges philosophy with championing viewpoints that are final and absolute as over against science whose positions are tentative and relative. Again he baldly asserts that philosophy is idealistic while science is pragmatic, that philosophy is static and conservative while science is liberal and progressive. Finally he comes to the as-

Can one conclude, therefore, that scientific theory and practice is more dependable than philosophic theory and practice? No, the fact rather seems to be that science and philosophy each has its unique advantages and limitations. In reaching the prized advantage of reliability and objectivity science sacrifices the breadth of scope of its conclusions. In achieving the no less prized advantage of a comprehensive solution philosophy gives up any hope of general agreement on its conclusions. Apparently the practical educator cannot expect solutions that are at once reliable, objective, *and* comprehensive. Educational philosophy and educational science, therefore, are to be considered complementary disciplines. Perhaps better, they are but different aspects of a single discipline, the discipline of inquiry. The educational practitioner will need them both.

There are some, however, who do not draw this balanced conclusion from the various incidental comparisons of educational science and philosophy made so far. Instead of assigning each a unique function of its own to perform, they insist on arranging science and philosophy in a hierarchical order. In this group some regard science as the premier discipline while others put philosophy at the top. Those who subordinate philosophy to science do so because of the exalted importance they attach to experimentalism. The test of experiment or practice, they hold, is the final arbiter of all doubts and perplexities in education. It is science, furthermore, that has made the most brilliant and permanent conquests by this method. To be sure philosophy, particularly pragmatic philosophy, has employed this same method but confessedly without the same commanding results. Philosophy is all right but only as a temporary expedient till science has had time to mature a more thorough and enduring solution. In fact, as these scientific solutions accumulate there will be progressively less and less need for philosophy.

The atrophy and ultimate obsequies of educational philosophy seem to its friends rather premature. When science purports to exclude the need for philosophy in the solution of educational problems, it is, they declare, paradoxically asserting a philosophy. Unwittingly it is making a statement as to the totality of circumstances which affect the educational process. On the one hand it is assuming that the variables or factors which compose the educational situation are of such a character as to lend themselves to the technique of isolation and description. On the other hand it is assuming that the number of variable factors in the educational universe is limited. If these assumptions were warranted, perhaps science could

tounding conclusion that scientific thinking is more difficult than philosophic! The note in Mirick's eye seems to be that he condemns philosophy in general because he disapproves an individual philosophy in particular.

ultimately look forward to overcoming all educational difficulties one by one. But there seems to be a growing conviction, even among scientists, that the world is more than a sum of finite parts; that on the contrary the world seems to possess an infinitely variegated structure. Hence each scientific solution of an educational difficulty seems to beget as many and often more problems than it solves. Indeed, new solutions frequently unsettle old ones and thus add to, rather than diminish, the problems awaiting solution. If this is the case, the need for educational philosophy will last as long as the need for science.

Those who subordinate science to philosophy do so because they think that both theoretically and practically philosophy is superior to science in explaining the educational process. As science gives a more refined explanation than practice, so philosophy, they declare, gives a more adequate explanation than does science. The study of the sciences of biology and psychology, for example, is superior to the practical study of education, but in turn the study of such philosophic branches as ontology or metaphysics is superior to biology and psychology. The basic reason why these studies can be arranged in this hierarchy is because science is interested in the proximate or efficient causes of practice, while philosophy is concerned with its ultimate or final causes. But in addition it should be noted that in every case the superior study is of greater general interest and more worth studying as an end in itself. The inferior study, on the other hand, is in each case of more practical value and only worth study on that account. Not only that but the inferior study in each case presupposes the principles of the next higher range of studies. Thus a study of education presupposes a knowledge of the psychological principles of learning or the biological principles of the interaction of heredity and environment. But the study of psychology and biology in turn take for granted an understanding of such basic concepts as life, adaptation, regeneration, and the like. For an adequate understanding of these terms one must turn to ontology or general metaphysics, the absolute top in the hierarchy of studies, for it is the one discipline which does not presuppose any other inasmuch as it studies pure being as such.¹ The way in which philosophy thus tops the sciences has earned it the title among its devotees of queen of the sciences.

The Content of Educational Philosophy

The difficulty we find in delineating the proper spheres of philosophy and science in education is not one of ancient origin. Originally all advanced study was philosophical. Philosophy was, as its etymology from the

¹ See two statements of M. J. Adler, "God and the Professors," in *Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion*, p. 129, published by the Conference, 1941; and "The Crisis in Contemporary Education," *The Social Frontier*, 5: 142-143, February, 1939.

Greek *φίλος σοφία* suggests, love of wisdom or learning. Moreover it was love of learning in general; it subsumed under one heading what today we call science as well as what we now call philosophy. It is for this reason that philosophy is often referred to as the mother as well as the queen of the sciences. This philosophical lineage of science was still quite clear as late as the nineteenth century when the various divisions of science were still spoken of as branches of philosophy. At that time the growing sciences of physics and chemistry went under the title of "natural philosophy"; psychology had the title of "mental philosophy"; and the budding social sciences of politics, economics, and sociology were subheadings under "moral philosophy."

Of course, it is common knowledge that one by one the various sciences have come of age and have left the maternal household to engage independently in building the temple of learning. This exodus includes practically all the fact-finding disciplines. As a result no one today expects philosophy to contribute to the finding or determination of facts.¹ Instead philosophy now generally takes its exact facts from history and the sciences. It is the assumptions underlying these facts, their value connotations, and the speculative theories that they support with which philosophy does its characteristic work.

Specialization of labor in philosophy has not only given birth to the sciences, but it has also borne another subdivision, educational philosophy. What shall we take to be the proper relation of general philosophy to philosophy of education? On this point there are several opinions. Most obvious is that which holds a philosophy of life basic and primary to a philosophy of education. The former establishes fundamental principles; the latter carries out their implications in a special field. Quite the opposite is the view that strictly speaking there is no philosophy of education at all. To think of philosophy as a prefix to education is to put the cart before the horse. Philosophy is the flower, not the root, of education.² Other opinion takes the position that educational philosophy can stand

¹ Cf. SYMONDS, P., "A Course in the Technique of Educational Research," *Teachers College Record*, 29: 29-30, October, 1937. Although the author is probably right that there is no philosophical method of research (meaning fact-finding) it is quite possible that the philosophical method of handling data produces no less important research results though they are of a different kind. See MONROE, W. S., *Encyclopedia of Educational Research*, rev. ed., s.v. "Philosophy of Education," The Macmillan Company, New York, 1950; also CLUGSTON, A. H., and R. A. DAVIS, "Suggested Criteria for the Philosophical Method of Research in Education," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 16: 575-580, November, 1930; and CHILDS, J. L., "Philosophy and Educational Research," *Teachers College Advanced School Digest*, 4: 6-8, May-June, 1938.

² WOODBRIDGE, R. J. E., "Philosophy and Education," *Teachers College Record*, 31: 134, November, 1929.

independently on its own feet. It will, to be sure, benefit from contact with general philosophy, but this contact is neither necessary nor essential.¹ Finally there is the view which virtually merges philosophy and philosophy of education by defining philosophy as the theory of education in its most general phases.²

Whichever of these views is most appealing, it still remains to consider just what disciplines are still left under the philosophic roof with which to attack educational problems after the exodus of the sciences. There are three which principally concern education. They are ethics, or the theory of values; epistemology, or the theory of knowledge; and metaphysics, or the general theory of being or reality. In examining the aims of education, the motivation of learning, or the measurement of its results we are inescapably dealing with ethical problems, problems of value. Ethical considerations also come up unavoidably in examining the social or political setting of the educative process, to say nothing of its religious and moral dimensions. Values are also an important consideration in selecting which studies shall be included in the curriculum. But the curriculum also raises very important questions of epistemology. The curriculum being the student's avenue of approach to knowledge, it behooves us to understand the nature of knowledge. The nature of knowledge will not only have an influence on the way in which the curriculum is organized and taught, but it will also undergird the conception of truth and the freedom with which it is taught. Ultimately, difficulties in the problems of knowledge and value, epistemology and ethics, will rest back on our notions of what kind of world we live in anyhow, that is, the study of metaphysics. Here we will have to consider the nature of human nature as well as the world in which it abides, also, whether the whole story may be had from an examination of nature or whether there is a supernatural realm affecting education as well. Such problems as these, then, constitute the content of educational philosophy and the remaining pages of this book.

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¹ ADAMS, SIR JOHN, "The Teacher as Philosopher," *School and Society*, 36: 418, October, 1932.

² DEWEY, *Democracy and Education*, p. 386.

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CHAPTER II

GENERIC TRAITS OF EXISTENCE

The Need for Metaphysics

Since the day of Aristotle, as we have seen, and probably from a time much earlier, there has been perennial disagreement on the question how education should be managed. If we try to resolve this disagreement we will find that it stems from various sources. One of the principal sources has been disagreement over the real nature of the world for which education supposedly prepares our youth. Virtually all shades of educational philosophy are unanimous in their agreement that education should prepare youth to meet the problems of life in this tough old world. But this unanimity is shattered into fragments on the rocky question of just precisely what kind of world confronts the learner.

Progressive educators, for instance, are wont to think of the world as continually undergoing change. Therefore they do not feel called upon to accept any educational aims as fixed or final. They define education as the constant reconstruction of experience and hold that educational growth is subordinate to nothing save more growth. Growth, they hope, will be creative and progressive by their cultivation of individual differences among their pupils. Uncertain, however, about the outcome of the future they lay heavy stress on the problem-solving method of teaching and learning. Consequently they confine their attention to education for the here and now of the world of nature and eschew preparation for a supernatural hereafter.

Critics and opponents of progressive education, on the other hand, find themselves confronted with quite a different sort of world. Recognizing the trait of change in the world they also discern that there is much in the world that does not change. Attaching greater significance to the enduring and changeless they do not hesitate to accept some educational aims as perennially fixed. Consequently education, though inescapably involving the alteration of existing habits, has some definite pattern which it is seeking to realize. Individual differences, too, while important, will give way to a cultivation of what is universal in man's nature. Sure of their aims and of what is universal in nature, the opponents of progressive education feel much more free to teach authoritatively and even dogmatically. Much of their confidence in doing so arises from the fact that they do not confine

their educational attentions to the ephemeral world of nature but have a constant educational eye on the supernatural world of eternity.

It is a pity that educational philosophers, starting with a common educational objective, should end with almost diametrically opposite conclusions. At first glance it would seem as if the appeal to reality should be a means of adjudicating or reconciling contradictory educational practices rather than a cause of stirring them up. Reality is what is so, any common-sense person would say. Being so, it cannot be otherwise. Opinions about reality may differ, but reality itself cannot be self-contradictory. Therefore, if we could only pierce through the fog of opinion about reality to reality itself we would have a criterion for resolving many if not all educational controversies.

The perennial attempt to align educational practice with the generic traits of reality, technically speaking, is a problem of metaphysics or, perhaps better, ontology, the theory of being. There are some who think it a waste of time to attempt to undergird education with a precise metaphysics or ontology.¹ To try to penetrate through to the nature of true being, of reality as it actually is, is entirely too speculative. Indeed some think the enterprise so highly speculative that the distinctions between various educational ontologies are largely verbal and not practical at all. One of these ontologies, for example, proceeds on the premise that the real world is independent of all human experience of it. Such a view entails definite consequences for education, as we shall see,² but how do we know whether the premise from which they flow is warranted? Nearly anyone can verbally distinguish the external world from his private internal experience of it; yet whether this verbal distinction is matched by a distinction in fact is placed beyond experimental verification by the initial premise. To press such a tenuous distinction very far cannot help but invite a demurrer from educators who are impatient with metaphysics and ontology.

Another view more hospitable to metaphysics concedes that metaphysics has a role to act in the determination of educational policy but nonetheless plays down the importance of the role. It is led to do so because from a given metaphysic it does not feel logically compelled to derive any particular philosophy of education. On the contrary it holds that a number of different educational philosophies may be erected on the base of the same metaphysic.³ Take the Christian metaphysics as a good example; it has

¹ FREEMAN, F. N., "Scientific and Philosophic Methods in Education," *Science*, 73: 55, January, 1931.

² *Infra*, pp. 72, 75-76.

³ REISNER, E. H., in National Society for the Study of Education, Forty-first Yearbook, Part I, *Educational Philosophies*, pp. 31-37, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1942.

supported a number of different educational philosophies from the Thomistic Aristotelianism of Catholicism to the Froebelian idealism and Herbartian realism of Protestantism. So, they say, pay attention to metaphysics in education if you will, but do not expect it to be of much consequence in making fine distinctions.

The teacher could get into considerable trouble by following the advice of taking his metaphysics lightly, say critics of this view. To take metaphysics into account without attaching much importance to it encourages a dangerous eclecticism. Of course there is nothing wrong with being eclectic about one's philosophy so long as one does not incorporate into it incompatible items from diverse systems of thought. Yet this is exactly what frequently happens. The best instance is the case of teachers who profess allegiance to progressive education with its philosophy of underwriting no aims of education as final or beyond revision and who at the same time subscribe to a theory of the cosmos in which certain ends or patterns are fixed and unalterable.¹ They see no deep inconsistency in making temporal revisions of their approach to eternal ends. What else can the wisest finite man do with ends that are infinite? If this is intellectually satisfying reasoning, one can easily have a progressive philosophy of education within a nonprogressive metaphysic or ontology.

There are many others, however, who feel that questions about the true nature of reality can neither be brushed aside as purely verbal nor be rounded up indiscriminately in the camp of almost any educational theory. To deny metaphysics or ontology, they assert, implies a metaphysic or ontology. Their assertion is not difficult to illustrate. As already indicated, many who take a traditional Christian view of the world hold that education should prepare for the life hereafter as well as for the life here and now. There are not a few progressive educators, on the other hand, who think educators will do well to confine their professional efforts to the phenomena of this world. In rejecting the idea that the world has a supernatural dimension, which the architects of educational policy must take into account, these progressive educators think they are rejecting the need for metaphysics and ontology as well. What in effect they are doing is to assert that the world of education has only one dimension, that of nature. Yet what is this assertion but a statement of metaphysics, the metaphysic of naturalism?² In other words, it seems to take a metaphysic or ontology to reject a metaphysic or ontology. If this be the case, it will certainly be

¹ THOMAS, L. G., "What Metaphysics for Modern Education?" *Educational Forum*, 6: 127-131, January, 1942.

² Cf. CHILDS, J. L., *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism*, pp. 43-46, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1931; and HORNE, H. H., *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, pp. 471-472, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1935.

in the interests of clarity and frankness that metaphysical and ontological considerations be made explicit rather than be allowed implicitly and unwittingly to control educational policy.

Appearance and Reality

In proceeding on the conviction that the educator should be sensitive to metaphysical or ontological considerations, the first and perhaps our most important problem is whether the world which the young set out to learn is as it appears or whether there is a reality behind these appearances which should preferably absorb their attention. Common sense tells the child that he is surrounded by the four walls of the school, that the school-house is situated on a street near his home, that he lives in a community of adults and other children. But ask him, or even his teacher for that matter, to prove the existence of those four walls, of the paved streets outside, of his neighbors coming and going about their affairs, and it is an odds-on-chance that he will have a difficult time doing so. No doubt he will appeal at once to his physical senses. Told that he is just relying on private impressions he may appeal to the common sense of the community. Reminded that their common sense can rise no higher than each individual's private impressions, he may be nonplussed or perhaps finally project his frustration on you by thinking your head must be addled to persist in asking questions the answers to which are so obvious. Every appearance indicates that there is an objective world out there, but can he be sure?

As a matter of fact he cannot be sure. Indeed, not even the most learned are sure enough to be in substantial agreement on this perennial metaphysical question. Unable to prove the existence of an external world independent of a human observer, scientists generally make its existence one of their major assumptions. Not a few educational philosophers follow suit and just take the reality of appearances for granted.¹ Other educational philosophers, overcome by their inability to get satisfactory proof of the existence of anything *extra mentem*, the *Ding an sich* which Kant made famous, prefer to regard their feelings or ideas, to which the world gives rise, as the only sure reality. Their argument is that anything more real than thoughts and feelings would itself be a conception of thought or feeling.²

There is a broader issue here than just whether things exist independently

¹ BREED, F. S., in National Society for the Study of Education, Forty-first Year-book, *Philosophies of Education*, pp. 93, 105, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1942. DEWEY, J., also seems to take the same view in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, p. 521, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1938. For a further instance of this theory see *infra*, pp. 72, 75-76.

² HORNE, in National Society for the Study of Education, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

of their apparent relation to a human learner. This broader issue is the nature of relations in general. Are relations between things external or internal? Does the nature of a thing change when its relations to other things change, or does it retain its characteristic properties despite any alteration in its relations? If a change in its relations does not affect the thing itself, then a thing is independent of its relations and relations can be said to be external to the thing concerned. If, on the other hand, a change in a thing's relations also alters the thing itself, then relations may be said to be internal; they are part of the very constitution of the thing itself.

The externality or internality of relations leads to two quite different views of the world. The externality of relations leads to an atomistic view of reality. The irreducible components of reality are atoms in physical phenomena and individuals in social phenomena. It is noteworthy that the Greek root of the word "atom" and the Latin root of the word "individual" have the same meaning—uncuttable, undividable, indivisible. In other words, while atoms and individuals assume a variety of configurations, they are always the same old atoms and individuals. Being the irreducible core of all relations, relations must be external. Furthermore, since atoms and individuals are many and diverse, many think reality to be pluralistic and the universe really a multiverse. Internality of relations leads to a more organic view of the nature of reality. Since the nature of any one thing is contingent on its relation to everything else, there may be an overall interrelatedness or ultimate unity of all things. If so, it follows that reality is monistic and the world truly a universe instead of a multiverse.¹

All these considerations come to an educational focus in such questions as how the teacher is to conceive the relation of the learner to the world, the child to the curriculum. If relations are external and therefore the world exists independently of a human knower, then the teacher may well take the view that there are physical facts and social customs which constitute the brute realities of life to be included in the curriculum and learned with the relish of interest if possible but without it if necessary. Learning in such a case will be largely a matter of discovery of antecedent truth. The accuracy of what is learned or discovered will turn on how closely it corresponds to external reality. This will hold as the measure of truth, whether it is the learning of children in the classroom or the learning of the investigator in the laboratory. If, on the other hand, relations are internal, then the nature of the world to be learned will depend somewhat on the relations or reactions of the learner to it. Truth will not be just a matter of accurate correspondence between reality and what is learned but will depend in part on how the learner's reactions or activities turn out.² Starting with

¹ For further instances, see *infra*, pp. 53-54, 84, 93, 124, 242.

² To the extent the externality and internality of relations raise epistemological as well as metaphysical problems, see *infra*, p. 72.

such premises the teacher will probably pay more attention to the pupil's feelings and interests and permit him greater freedom to express his own individual outlook.

But now, whether one approaches reality from the angle of internal or external relations, there is the further question, What are the generic traits of this reality? Can the educational philosopher derive these traits from a study of everyday nature, a nature constantly changing physically and geologically, a nature continually evolving new species and individuals, a nature unique at each succeeding juncture of time and place? It certainly appears as if he could, as if nature made up the whole of reality and as if the stream of time were the principal channel of the educational process. But can we trust appearances? May not our perceptions betray us? If we trust our senses alone, the stick thrust in water appears bent. But if we use our heads a bit, we realize that the stick is not really bent at all. Perhaps, therefore, if we will use our heads some more we will find that the world of nature is but a distorted finite replica of a perfect ideal world, that the dynamic flux of nature is but a defection from a changeless supernatural world, and that time is but a way station on the road to eternity.

But again, what warrant is there for holding that a changeless world is more real than a changing temporal one? What evidence is there that the world given us by our minds is more real than the one given us by our senses? Which is appearance and which is reality? There is probably no single answer to these questions which will satisfy everyone. Whichever traits are real and whichever are only apparent, we must now examine the claims of each to the attention of the educator.

Change and the Changeless

The trait of our world which has stirred up the greatest amount of controversy in educational philosophy is that of change. Change is a familiar term. At the very outset we note that learning is itself an active process of change. For that matter, so too is life—to be alive is to be constantly active and changing. Change is not only a main trait of our world psychologically and biologically, but it is a chief characteristic of our social world as well. The social milieu of the school is constantly undergoing political and economic changes to which the learner must make adaptations.¹

So far probably no one will be so rash as to deny change as a generic trait of reality which besets education fore and aft, early and late. Probably no one will be so rash, either, as to refuse acknowledging that there is often a uniform pattern according to which change takes place. Indeed

¹ Cf. KILPATRICK, W. H., *Education for a Changing Civilization*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927.

without some degree of uniformity of recurrence there could be no prediction, no setting up of norms. Without predictability of what the pupil will do and norms of what he should do the task of education would be well-nigh impossible. So it may be taken for granted that some kind of stability is also a generic trait of reality. The acute philosophical quarrel starts brewing, however, when we try to assess more precisely just what the character of this stability is. Is it predicated on uniformities which themselves are anchored in static traits of reality? Or is it predicated on uniformities which are statistical statements of the probability with which changes will recur based on past performance?

Traditionally man has sought stability in the faith that there are static traits in reality. Confronted with the hazards of change on every hand he has sought security in the changeless. In spite of daily activities and the changes consequent upon them, the basic culture patterns of prehistoric man must have changed almost imperceptibly if at all for centuries at a stretch. Under such circumstances the education of each generation so nearly repeated that of the preceding that it was not difficult to conclude that there was a certain immutability in the aims and content of instruction.

During the period of classical antiquity this traditional outlook received a brilliant rationalization by Aristotle which for many Catholics and Protestants still provides a satisfying philosophy. For the basis of this rationalization Aristotle went to botany and biology. In these life sciences growth is one of the most obvious facts. Growth, of course, implies change. But the changes incident to growth occur according to very well-defined patterns. Thus an acorn falls to the ground, becomes embedded in the earth, germinates under proper conditions of moisture and warmth, puts a shoot above the ground, and grows into a sapling and later into a mature oak, which bears acorns, which fall to the ground, thus completing the cycle of growth and preparing to repeat it. The notable feature about this cycle is that there is change from its beginning to its end but no change in the pattern of the cycle itself. The organism maintains its identity throughout its various stages of growth. Since there is this constancy during change, it is the constant that is viewed as the truly real. Being is more real than becoming and the changeless more real than the changing. Not only that but the real is taken as a measure of the good. The changeless is a sign of perfection, while "change and decay" are associated with each other as in the appealing old hymn *Abide with Me*.

No one seriously questioned Aristotle's subordination of change to the changeless till the nineteenth century when Charles Darwin published his *Origin of Species*. Down to the time of this famous book it was common opinion that each species with its unique unchanging cycle of growth came into being through a supernatural act of creation. By putting forward his

theory of evolution, that species come into existence quite naturally, Darwin shook the thought structure of the world to its very foundations. He observed that offspring are seldom exactly like their parents but rather exhibit individual differences marking them off from their parents as well as from each other. In nature's struggle for existence some of these differences are better adapted for survival than are others. The differences that survive perpetuate their kind. By compounding these differences over many generations new species arise. The startling philosophical inference from this epitome of Darwin's work is the fact that species change. There is not only change within the cycle of growth, but the cycle itself can change. If this is so, then change is no longer to be subordinated to the changeless. Change is now an ultimate trait of reality.¹

At first glance it may appear as if this evolutionary philosophy reduces things to a state of flux and relativity, conditions which are the very denial of what is necessary for some degree of stability in an educational philosophy. As a matter of fact the situation is not quite that ominous. On the point of complete flux it is well to note that not everything changes at the same rate. Some principles of the psychology of learning, for instance, are more firmly established than others which are currently still under investigation. Consequently in a flux where some things alter more slowly than others one can achieve a not inconsiderable measure of stability by viewing the flux from the standpoint of those things having a low probability of changing either soon or often.

On the point of relativity it is well to note that adoption of the evolutionary concept need not necessarily cause one to slip the stability of his philosophical moorings. Change does not become uncontrolled merely because it is relative. What one needs now is to study the order of change which is consequent on a shift in relations. Aristotle took the view that relations were external. He thought that things changed or functioned according to their structure but that this structure was antecedent to and unaffected by relations with other things into which functioning brought it. In the evolutionary concept these relations are internal and therefore play a much more vital role. In this view structure not only functions variously according to its relations but may in fact actually be altered by these relations. Thus changes in conditions of temperature, moisture, or chemistry of the soil may cause an acorn embedded there to become a different kind of species of oak from its parent. Such relativity does not render stability impossible, though it does, of course, render it more complicated.

¹ In defense of this view, see J. Dewey, "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy," *Popular Science Monthly*, 75: 90-98, July, 1909; and, critical of it, see E. B. Jordan, "The Proper Attitude of the Catholic Scientist toward Evolution," *Catholic Educational Review*, 23: 321-335, June 1925.

Brief as the foregoing excursion into metaphysics or ontology has been, it requires little imagination now to appreciate more fully the profound disagreements in educational theory and practice which the twentieth century has witnessed. Obviously the controversy which has hovered over "progressive" education is more than an issue of whether to keep abreast of the latest educational reforms.¹ However much progressive education may have commenced merely as a protest against the formalism of the education inherited from the nineteenth century, it has become in the twentieth century a system of education predicated on a theory of reform or reconstruction. It hardly needs pointing out that this theory rests squarely on the notion of a dynamic world order. Progressives conceive of education as the constant reconstruction of experience because in a continually evolving world experience is always more or less in need of revision. Furthermore, revision is not in terms of some fixed goal. Progress is not successive stages in the advance toward some perfect immutable standard. On the contrary in a dynamic and relativistic world the goal of the educative process will be found not outside, but inside the process itself. The process of growth will be its own end. Thus growth becomes a goal; it is subordinate to nothing save more growth.

There are many thoughtful educators—and laymen too—who are sincerely anxious for the schools to be in the forward ranks of progress but who are frankly alarmed at the theory of progress put forward by the so-called progressive educators. They accept the theory of evolution as good science but not as good philosophy. The fluidity and relativity of this theory they think a threat to the ultimate security of the family, state, and church. From their viewpoint these institutions represent a funded capital of social experience which, though subject to amendment in detail, stand in need of no essential or major revision. The fundamental tenets of this culture root deep in an immutable structure of reality and human nature. Placing abiding faith in such unchanging traits of reality they do not hesitate to affirm that there are absolute and universal principles which should govern education.² Education is progressive merely in the sense that it is striving toward the fulfillment of a cycle of personal development, the ends of which are absolute and immutable.³

The Novel and the Primordial

First cousins to change and the changeless as generic traits of reality conditioning the meaning of educational theory and practice are two

¹ BRUBACHER, J. S., "A Criterion for Judging What Is and What Is Not Progressive Education," *School and Society*, 48: 509-519, October, 1938.

² ADLER, M. J., "Are There Absolute and Universal Principles on Which Education Should Be Founded?" *Educational Trends*, 9: 11-18, July-August, 1941.

³ For further reference to change and the changeless, see *infra*, pp. 55, 59, 189.

further traits, the novel and the primordial. One of the most inescapable impressions we derive from our changing environment is the fact that there is uncertainty as to how the changing current scene will turn out. The future is fraught with contingency.¹ Events seem to be constantly taking a novel turn. But how seriously should the educational philosopher take novelty and contingency as generic traits of reality on which to predicate his educational system? It is an old adage that there is nothing new under the sun. Omar Khayam stated it not very differently when he observed:

Yea, the first morning of creation wrote
What the last day of reckoning shall read.

Although the truth of this poetic insight is not easily apparent on the face of events, yet, if it states the underlying reality, then it will certainly behoove the educator not to be a victim of first impressions about novelty and contingency but rather to rest his educational philosophy on the foundations of the familiar and the primordial.

Logically it would seem as if there could be no genuine novelty or contingency. For anything new to emerge in the environment there must be a cause sufficient to bring it into existence. On any other basis the emergence of novelty is equivalent to the creature being greater than the creator, to making something out of nothing. This is impossible as well as logically absurd. But if the cause must contain everything necessary to bring about its effect, then, since the cause antedates the effect, we may safely conclude that there is nothing new under the sun, that there must have been latent in the first moment of creation everything which has emerged since that time. Even in the case of evolution, according to such a view, nothing can evolve which was not already primordially involved. There is no more possibility of novelty in evolution than of pulling yarn off a ball which was not originally wound on it.

Cogent as this argument appears, it is no stronger than the assumption on which it is based. As a matter of fact the assumption that every event has a sufficient cause, useful as it is, cannot be established beyond reasonable doubt. And even if it could be, the lack of novelty would only be apparent retrospectively. Prospectively an emerging event might still give every evidence of being novel and unpredictable on the basis of the causes known to have been operating. Consequently it is far from an

¹ There has been some tendency to invoke support for this view from physics where Heisenberg has announced a principle of indeterminacy reigns in the subatomic world. The full significance of this random element in the constitution of the universe, however, has not yet been fully established. For an educational reference to it, see F. S. Breed, *Education and the New Realism*, p. 45, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1939. See also *infra*, p. 288.

altogether unreasonable view of the world to conclude that the future is not merely the unfolding of a reality already antecedently complete. On the contrary, it may well be that reality itself is incomplete. Novelty, instead of having occurred just once at the beginning of the world, may be constantly recurring in the evolutionary process. In this case the last instances of novelty are just as truly novel as the first ones. The universe is not a closed but an open one—open at the end marked future. It is William James's world with the "lid off," a world in which the book of Genesis is still being written.

The educational consequences of these two attitudes toward reality—whether or not it has a streak of novelty or contingency running through it—are plain to see. The progressive-education movement has proceeded on the assumption that novelty is genuine. Naturally, therefore, when progressive educators encourage children to be creative in poetry or prose, painting or music, they regard the product as unique and not something the children have created merely because they have found what already existed. They plan just as much, however, for creativity in the class in "problems of democracy" or inventiveness in shopwork as they do for the class in art. Furthermore, when they introduce controversial issues into the curriculum of the social sciences, they regard the issues as controversial because their outcome or solution is genuinely in doubt. Issues are not controversial because benighted pupils or adults quarrel over a truth or a good which is merely awaiting discovery. Progressive educators, moreover, frankly confess to such a real contingency abroad in the universe that they cannot accurately predict the kind of difficulties which their children will meet when they grow up.¹ As a result, instead of merely transmitting to them solutions for past or future problems, they concentrate especially on cultivating in their pupils a problem-solving attitude of mind as the best preparation for meeting future problems.

The educators, who guide their practice by a theory grounded in the primordial, teach with greater assurance and authority. They confront pupils with problems too but are more likely to keep a finger in the back of the book because, relying on the primordial, they are more likely to think they have the right answers. Often this confidence has been predicated on an analogy between education and plant life. The theory that children are to be likened to plants and the school to a garden has principally achieved a prominent place in educational vocabularies through the German-derived "kindergarten." Just as the full-grown plant already blooms in the seed, so too the pupil's mind already has latently concealed within it all the powers it can ever hope to develop. Neither plant nor child has the potentialities

¹ Attacking this view, see I. L. Kandel, *The Cult of Uncertainty*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1943.

for becoming anything which is not already foreshadowed in the germ. Education thus becomes a process of unfolding what was primordially unfolded. It cannot endow a child with capacity that he does not have; it can only develop what he already is. The process of education is, then, indeed well named from the Latin *e-ducere*, to lead forth, to bring out. What was potentially implicit it makes actually explicit.

So stated, this theory of educational development may seem to neglect the influence of environment. It is, however, not so intended. Neglect of the environment can stunt the finest potentialities of both plant and child. Just as the gardener must cultivate, fertilize, and water a plant to get the best results, so too the parent and teacher must be diligent if they would cultivate in the child the right habits of manhood. And the same doubtless applies to the training of teachers. Whether or not teachers are born, not made, there can be no doubt but that the professional study of education will be necessary to bring into full play whatever genius a person has.¹

There is some danger in revering every activity of the child as a manifestation of primordial purpose. To do this would probably put too high a price on his nuisance value. Consequently it is necessary to have some standard by which to judge whether he is unfolding properly. Naturally this must be his state of complete unfoldedness. The culture epoch and recapitulation theories of education, perhaps, offer the best insight into complete unfoldedness. The thought here is that the child becomes adapted to life by passing through all the stages of culture that the race has already passed through. Thus he should learn the culture of the nomadic, pastoral, agrarian, and industrial epochs. By recapitulating these, the child proceeds from being a little savage to becoming a civilized man. Nor is this pattern of development an offhand suggestion, for it is rooted in the very constitution of the universe itself. It is the way history itself has unfolded. And what is history but the unfolding of the mind of God Himself, a dramatization of the ultimate nature of things on the world as a stage.

The Individual and the Universal

A novelly developing world, if such we have, or a world developing according to some primordial design, if that be nearer the truth, calls attention to two other possible traits of reality to which the educational philosopher should undoubtedly be sensitive. These are the traits of individuality and universality. The problem which they present is that of the relation

¹ For a more ample discussion of this theory, see F. E. Bolton, *Principles of Education*, Chaps. 5-6, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1910; J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 65-70, 84-89, 130-138, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916; E. N. Henderson, *Textbook in the Principles of Education*, Chap. 6, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1910.

of the part to the whole or, in Plato's phrase, the problem of "the one and the many."

On the whole it needs little or perhaps no argument to convince us that the school is surrounded by a multivariety of people, things, and events. One might say that such diversity is a self-evident trait of existence. If further proof were required, we would need go no further than to the scientist—to the physicist for a catalogue of the variety of physical phenomena, to the biologist for a list of the various forms of life, to the educational psychologist for an inventory of ways in which children and adults differ in their intellectual capacities and emotional dispositions, or to the sociologist for an inventory of the diversity of conventions under which people live. The accumulation of such differences are what one would expect, no doubt, if change and novelty have been genuinely operating for any length of time in this world.

By themselves these differences are harmless enough. But, taken together—for they cannot be kept separated from each other—these differences, especially the personal and social ones, give rise to problems. Instead of always supplementing or complementing each other they often contradict each other. The individualities of parent and child, teacher and pupil, to say nothing of the individual interests of pressure groups like the chamber of commerce or labor unions, frequently cross purposes on what is best to do educationally. Are such conflicts inescapable because of the variegated nature of reality, or is there some unity or harmony as a generic trait of ultimate reality according to which they can be reconciled?

The classic view here is that there is an ultimate unity to which the diversities of existence are finally subject.¹ Differences there are, to be sure, but these differences are accidental variations within the generic. Children, for instance, differ widely as to sex, height, weight, mental capacity, and the like, and yet are all numerators of the common denominator childhood. Childhood, thus, is a generic or universal concept which sums up a whole variety of particulars. It gives us unity in the midst of diversity. Childhood in turn is part of the larger unity of humanity which in turn has its place in an ascending hierarchy of unity wherein finally all parts are related to all other parts in a final universal whole and all parts are in "preestablished harmony."

Some have believed the concept of the universal to antedate in time the individual or particular and therefore to be more truly a generic trait of reality than the individual or particular. The universal, thus, is a primordial quality of the world. It is not the product of the human mind but discovered by it. To illustrate the significance of this conclusion, the

¹ For a later reference to this point, see *infra*, pp. 230-231.

school as an ideal must antedate any particular school of brick or mortar. So too the normal school as setting the model for teacher training must have its birth in conception before a single step can be taken toward its actualization. Indeed should some terrible cataclysm such as atomic war leave not a single school standing, the universal idea of school would still persist and provide the causative energy to raise up new edifices.

Without passing judgment on these claims for the universal let us make clear what their educational import is. An educational philosophy exalting the importance of the universal calls for an education which stresses what is common to all human nature. Without neglecting individual differences it puts individual differences where they ought to be, in a subordinate position. Instead of teaching children how to adapt themselves to the particular environment in which they live, a too narrow objective, education will teach them to adjust to any clime or epoch.¹ For the same reason what is universally applicable will justify a prescribed rather than an elective curriculum. Hence the curriculum will give large place to the classics of our culture whose universal value has been attested by all men the world over. Finally, educational innovations will probably be suspect as "fads and frills" because, more than likely, they are mere accidental particulars of some already existent universal.

Universals, however appealing, are, in the last analysis, only concepts, while individual particulars are percepts. The concept is so abstract and the percept so concrete, it will occasion little surprise that many have a greater sense of reality when dealing with particular children than when dealing with children in general. Consequently there are many who are inclined to regard individuality rather than universality, conflict rather than harmony, as more truly generic traits of reality. If this gives reality a rather untidy aspect, they do not lament it but count it a gain since the novelty of individuality and the uncertainty of conflict are what make life zestful.²

Moreover, some, following the medieval nominalists, think universals are mere words or names and thus merely pose a problem in semantics. Others, not unmindful of the importance of universals, look upon them as merely a statistical summary of human experience with particulars to date. It neither exhausts the individuality of particular things, people, or events yet to be met, nor does it make it impossible to deal with a single child apart from his relations to childhood in general or his relations to reality as a whole, the sum total of all relations. Instead of being a final statement

¹ HUTCHINS, R. M., *The Higher Learning in America*, p. 66, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1936.

² For further reference to this point, see *infra*, p. 230.

of primordial reality which governs education, universals are rather points of departure for attacking and resolving the confusions and conflicts of tomorrow with its set of unique experiences.

An educational philosophy constructed from this point of view will leave its own distinctive impress on educational practice. In place of making the school a Procrustean bed for the child, it will bend every energy toward individualizing instruction both as to curriculum and to method. The indigenous experience of the child rather than the universality of reason will become the measure of educational practice. The formation of broad policy must be for a particular kind of political economy, in a particular country, and for a particular time in history.¹ Of course the child will try to reconcile the various conflicting demands of his environment in terms of some larger whole of experience. He will try to achieve integration. But integration will be a result of his efforts, not an initial datum.

Time and Eternity

So far in discussing the generic traits of reality the dimension of time has already either openly or covertly forced itself on our attention at a number of points. Our educational philosophies have the impress of time upon them either because it requires time to encompass the change and emergent novelty which they admire or because what they emphasize remains the same in spite of the passage of time. Some educational philosophers, however, are not content with traits of reality which stand uncorroded by the lapse of time but want to escape from the transitoriness of time as well. Unable to think of time as anything but finite, these philosophers try to project their thinking beyond the finite limits of time into the infinite which is timeless and eternal.² To other educational philosophers this projection is an idle speculation without any verification of fact. They, on the contrary, take time rather than the timeless as the basic trait of reality.

Those who consider time as a generic trait of existence realize that time is past and future as well as present. The flow of time not only affects the stream of learning now, but learning has the quality it has now because of the circumstances which conditioned it a moment or hours or even years ago. History, therefore, many think, and the history of education particularly, is an inescapable ontological dimension of the educational process. But if this is true of past time, it is equally true of future time, still others claim. They regard a future utopian view of what education should be like an important condition in determining what it could be like if proper steps are taken now. If the educator is to consider the past and future as

¹ American Historical Association, *Report of the Social Studies Commission, Conclusions and Recommendations*, p. 31, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1934.

² For further treatment of this point, see *infra*, pp. 222-223.

current dimensions of the educative process, it will be necessary to regard the present not just as a razor-edged slice of time that is constantly being replaced but as an accordionlike span which expands and contracts with variable portions of the past and future to suit the occasion.

If a world of eternity is speculative at best and if a world of time is all that we can surely count on, then must education conform to all its temporal vagaries? With the passage of time comes change, and with the occurrence of change come novelties. To be prepared for both the educator must keep his attention riveted on the present, for it is there that change is at work producing novelty. For this reason education, instead of preparing children for the sort of life they will live as adults, must prepare them for their contemporary life as children. Similarly instead of preparing them for an uncertain life hereafter, education must prepare them for life here and now. Education for adulthood or for a life beyond the grave puts too much of a premium on past time, relies too much on the assumption that for all essential purposes the future will be a repetition of the past, of a primordial cycle. It forgets that "time makes ancient good uncouth." If one believes that changes occurring at the present time are progressively turning out genuine novelties, then the more distant the future for which the educator prepares, the more uncertain his plans. Therefore he prepares children for the future best by preparing them for the living present.

There are many who feel very insecure and uncomfortable at this emphasis on "presentism" in education. For themselves they prefer an educational philosophy which steers its course not only by the changeless and the primordial but by the eternal as well. They draw great comfort from the words of the liturgy, "As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be." With such a view it goes without saying that the aims of education may well be unwavering, the method of instruction authoritarian, and the curriculum composed of the "great books" of undying worth which are contemporaneous with any period. While during life those with this inclination cannot escape time, they do, nonetheless, regard education as a process whereby the child "becomes in time what he eternally is."¹ This is a fitting educational corollary to the interpretation of evolution that nothing can evolve which was not previously involved. But life, like time, is finite. Its threescore years and ten are an insufficient span for education to enable the child to achieve a fulfillment of his potentialities. The failure to reach a full perfection of these powers argues speculatively to some that there must be immortality, an eternity of life after death, in which to accomplish what was left undone.²

¹ HORNE, H. H., *Philosophy of Education*, p. 286, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, p. 283.

Natural and Supernatural

Reference to the possibility of an eternal as well as a temporal dimension to reality raises the inquiry whether all the generic traits of existence which an educational philosophy must take into account are to be found in the natural order or whether some derive from a supernatural realm. Until mention of the eternal our exposition has proceeded on the assumption that we were trying to get a better understanding of the natural order when we were inquiring whether the world was characterized better by change or the changeless, by the novel or the primordial, by the individual or the universal. We proceeded as if nature, the world about us, contained within itself all the answers for which we were looking. Now the mention of the eternal casts doubt on this assumption. The natural order is a temporal order. If there is a nontemporal order, it must lie outside or beyond the natural order. If there is a supranatural order, perhaps some of the answers we have been looking for are to be found there. At least a further inquiry must be made in that direction.

Before pressing that inquiry it may be well first to improve our understanding of the natural. When we try to conduct education according to nature, whether the nature of the child or the nature of his physical and social environment, what do we mean? Unfortunately we do not all mean the same thing. Progressive educators, when they claim to make nature their norm, seem to give primary attention to dimensions of time, change, novelty, and individuality. Following these specifications, as already seen, they build an educational program which permits of continual adjustment and readjustment of one's talents and aptitudes in terms of the constantly changing demands of time and place. Carried to an extreme some progressives have such a strong tendency to revere the unique and novelly developing in nature that they advise wide and almost complete freedom for the child. They warn parents and teachers to interfere only at their peril with nature's processes.

There are notable critics of progressive education who think that its conception of naturalism is a false naturalism. According to the critics a true understanding of nature would bring out in bold relief, not what is variant in the physical and social world about us, but that which is invariant and uniform. If this is the case, then the principal dimensions for the house of knowledge are those which are changeless and universal. Certainly this is the norm of nature against which the scientists, closest students of nature, measure their efforts and results. The naturalistic educator will therefore do well to be content with no less an exacting standard. He will find it good pedagogy, to be sure, to pay attention to the individual differences of his pupils or to the prevailing opinions and

conventions of the day in which his students come to school, but he will even more surely not fail to pass from these accidental and transitory matters to those of universal validity. Thus the teacher will be following a naturalistic educational philosophy of sorts if he permits the pupil freedom to express his individuality, but he will fall short of what a truly naturalistic philosophy demands if he fails to show the pupil that the greatest freedom comes, not from the uninhibited expression of mere whim, but from ruling himself by principles of universal validity.

Is there any clue, now, as to which of these views of nature stands closer to nature as she really is? Apparently nature reveals none herself since equally sincere and competent spokesmen for her make such different representations. At this point there are many who think we must look beyond nature to the supernatural for further dimensions and specifications of our educational philosophy.

In arguing that reality is not characterized by emergent novelty the case was made plausible by alluding to the so-called law of cause and effect. It was stated that for anything to occur there must have been a preceding cause capable of bringing it forth. Proceeding on this law, or perhaps better assumption, we saw how many conclude that an educational philosophy should be guided by the old and familiar rather than by the new and unique. Pressing back in time for the causes of later effects an inquiring mind is more likely to search for the even earlier cause which caused the cause which produced the effect with which he started out. In fact he can keep on pressing back for prior causes of later causes till he finds their traces lost in the imperfect or nonexistent records of history and geology. Undaunted by such obstacles he may continue to press his search logically if not practically. He may speculate whether logically there must have been a first cause not caused by any antecedent cause. Was there a beginning of time and a prime order which set the primordial pattern of all that was to follow?

Those who find it impossible to refrain from assuming the relation of cause and effect find no difficulty in answering these questions in the affirmative. They have no hesitation in affirming that nature had a beginning and that the prime mover of nature was a God omniscient and omnipotent, in fact, perfect in respect to every attribute ascribed to Him. Being the author of man as well as of nature God must be a personal God since the creator must be at least the equal of his creatures in order to bring them forth.¹ Prepotent as the supernatural is, however, it should

¹ For a critique of a philosophy of education predicated on this view, see H. E. Langan, *The Philosophy of Personalism and Its Educational Applications*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1935.

not be thought of as superseding nature nor as standing in opposition to it. Rather should the supernatural be regarded as complementing and completing nature.

If a supernatural God is the maker and ruler of nature, then the teacher will do well to let His will be done in the classroom as it is in heaven. The educational philosopher, seeking to formulate the aim of education, should hasten to find out the purpose for which God made man so that he may fashion a program which will enable man to meet his creator's expectations. Of course this will not be easy to do; there will be problems to solve. Yet, if nature seems problematical, it is because the Deity has arranged it so. Likewise, if He has provided perplexities, He has not provided them in such a manner that they completely baffle the expectation of solution. On the contrary He has, in the opinion of many, given indications of the proper solutions through divinely inspired teachers and supernaturally inspired writings. From these indications it will be of decisive importance for the dignity of teaching that teachers regard children, not just as organisms behaving according to nature, but as "images of their Great Original and children of eternity."

It is only fair to add in conclusion that many naturalists find the appeal to the supernatural distasteful and unnecessary. Confining themselves to the natural order they find no reason, not even the law of sufficient reason, the law of cause and effect, for undergirding the natural order with a principle or spirit more real than its own product.¹ The supernatural to them is at best so speculative that they prefer to conserve and improve their time by attending to education in the natural order where experimental methods permit of more reliable and objective conclusions.

Two Major Philosophies of Education

Such, then, are the principal generic traits of existence which the educator will have to bear in mind as he determines his educational philosophy and in the light of it all subsequent policies on aims, methods, and curriculums. Two major types of educational philosophy seem to be emerging. The one stresses a dynamic nature bounded by time and rich in novelty and varied individualities. It does not overlook the need for stability, but the recurrent and universal it treats as items of the social culture which are constantly subject to revision in the light of future events. The other educational philosophy gives full recognition to this dynamic world of nature but thinks that the stable factors in it are not just instruments of the culture but are primordial traits of reality themselves stemming in the last analysis, for many, from a supernatural source. While there are these

¹ CHILDS, J. L., "Whither Progressive Education?" *Progressive Education*, 13: 584, December, 1936.

two major types of educational philosophy, neither teacher nor parent is confronted by an either-or choice between them. There are a number of intermediate positions. However, if one feels confused from time to time in keeping the intermediate positions distinct from each other, it will be an advantage to keep the perspective of these two major viewpoints in mind.

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CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE

Need for a Broad Theory of Human Nature

In an important sense the discussion of the nature of human nature is but a continuation of the discussion of the generic traits of reality in the preceding chapter. The educator and especially the educational philosopher must not only know the nature of the world in which we live and learn, but he must also know the generic traits of the human learner. "What is man that Thou art mindful of him?" cried the ancient Hebrew prophet. This question is as urgent today as it ever has been. The teacher must have an answer to it as well as the prophet.

With the rapid growth of educational psychology to the status of a full-fledged science there has been an increasing tendency for educators to look to this science for any statement about the nature of the human material involved in the educative process. As is well known, educational psychology has a ready account of human nature contained in a carefully taken inventory of man's original capacities together with a theory of their modifiability. Handy as this information is, it is likely to be infected with one very serious shortcoming. It is likely to imply that the description of human nature is a purely scientific affair. The danger of viewing human nature from a purely scientific angle is that the teacher may fail to take account of facts which do not lend themselves to isolation and objective statement. Educational psychology is all the more likely to be guilty of this shortcoming because it has tended to restrict itself to just those aspects of human nature which enable it to state its conclusions with an exactness aping the physical sciences. Commendable as it is for educational psychology to aim at such exactness, it leads to slighting and often eliminating aspects of human nature which many are unwilling to sacrifice on the altar of scientific objectivity.

The behavioristic school of educational psychology is a case in point. In order to get as completely objective results as possible some educational psychologists have confined their descriptions of human nature and its functioning to just what they could see of others' overt behavior. They eschewed evidence from personal introspection into their own conscious states as too subjective to be a reliable source of information. Indeed,

in favoring behaviorism as the exclusive method for studying human nature they have tried diligently to rid themselves of their former mentalistic vocabulary. Thus they have tried to explain human nature without the use of such concepts as consciousness, purpose, and mind to say nothing of such older concepts as soul, faculty, and will. Granted that these are difficult facets of human nature to describe objectively, yet there are many who oppose a view of human nature which does not take them into account at all. The importance of self-conscious purpose, for instance, in guiding and motivating learning is altogether too well attested by them introspectively to be sacrificed to mere scientific objectivity. They would be willing to accept behaviorism as one method of investigating human nature but not as the central theme of a comprehensive philosophy of education.¹

A few further illustrations may fix the point. There are those who think that the aims of education should be the same for all men in all times and all places. They make this claim because they take the position that human nature is the same everywhere and always. There are others who argue that the aims of education should vary from time to time and from place to place. In fact, they claim that aims should differ for each individual because individuals differ not only according to the circumstances of time and place but also according to their inborn traits and capacities. Similarly there are educators who think that the motivation of studies should take its origin in the spontaneous interests of children because human nature and therefore the interests sponsored by it are essentially good. Opposing these educators are those who, happy to have spontaneous interest as an ally, are not averse to motivating studies and particularly moral character, if necessary, against the grain of interest. They do not hesitate to exert external adult pressure on children because in part they hold a less optimistic view of human nature, one often influenced by the doctrine of original sin. Further issues of this sort need not be multiplied now. Suffice it that the resolution of them all waits on an answer to the age-old question, "What is man?" Science may have a specific answer to this question, but clearly the issue raised here demands a broader answer which ultimately must come from philosophy.

The Mind-Body Problem

In helping the educator to formulate an answer to the question, "What is man?" we may as well start with the issue which historically and perhaps currently lies at the core of the whole problem. This is the meta-

¹ CHAPMAN, J. C., and G. S. COUNTS, *Principles of Education*, pp. 93-94, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston 1924. But see also LEARY, D. B., *Living and Learning*, *passim*, Richard R. Smith, New York, 1931.

physical or ontological question, Of what is man made? It has long been the common-sense view of our culture that the nature of man is dualistic, that man is composed of mind and body, spirit and flesh. This division of man into mind and body is but a subdivision of the larger dichotomy of the world into animate and inanimate categories.¹ Matter is what we ordinarily refer to as having extension or occupying space. Furthermore it is inert until pushed about by forces external to it. But there are exceptions to this definition. Man has a body which has extension in space too, but instead of being the inert butt of physical forces impinging on him from without he can initiate activity himself. This ability to initiate action has led to the belief that there is more to reality than just matter. That man's self-activity takes the form of having purposes, making decisions, voluntarily executing them, and feeling responsibility for their consequence has led to the further conviction that there is another generic trait of reality in addition to matter, namely, mind or spirit.²

But for educational purposes, what more particularly is the nature of mind and spirit? Since it is in a different category from matter, we may conclude at once that mind is not matter, that it is immaterial. Being immaterial it can think space even if it does not occupy it. Yet, though immaterial, it is common to refer to mind as an entity. This usage gives focus and a degree of permanence to the ephemeral flow of experiences through consciousness such as our joys and sorrows, our perceptions and memories, our thoughts and feelings. In fact, this entity constitutes the central core of selfhood. The self, however, is not identical with any of the states of consciousness, nor with them all together. It is something more; it is the entity that has or entertains these states.

It is easier to make the common-sense distinction between matter and mind than it is to describe the mutual relation between the two. Ask the average teacher where the mind is located, and it is a better than average chance he will reply that it is located in the cerebrum. How an immaterial entity which does not occupy space can be located in a material one which encloses space is not explained. Indeed, the difficulty of location aside, it is still an unanswered question—at least to the satisfaction of all or even a majority—just how an immaterial entity like mind can operate on or interact with a material entity like the body. Yet, difficult as it is to comprehend how the dualism of mind and body is to be bridged, Catholic educational philosophy is confident that it can be. It holds that the school is neither a morgue nor a limbo of disembodied spirits but rather a place where learning cannot take place without the union of body and mind. St. Thomas Aquinas, as a matter of fact, found

¹ For a later reference to this problem, see *infra*, p. 224.

² Hence the quip: What is mind? It's no matter. What is matter? Never mind.

reason to think that after death the spirit or soul, when alienated from the body, is so incomplete as to be unable to learn new truths.

The educational consequences of adhering to a dualistic theory of the nature of man are not hard to surmise. It leads many to differentiate two kinds of educational psychology, rational for the explanation of mental phenomena and dynamic for the exposition of bodily ones. In either case, however, education is primarily a matter of training the mind, of exercising its faculties. The bodily senses have a part to play, to be sure, but since it is mind or spirit that activates the neuromuscular system of the body, it is the mind on which the educator lavishes his greatest solicitude. For the same reasons education is also primarily a matter of self-activity or self-development on the part of the pupil. Hence learning is anything but mechanistic. Matter may not change position till acted on by some external force, but man can change his position, that is, learn, without waiting for the teacher to act upon him. He can initiate responses without waiting for stimuli.

The educational consequences of a dualistic theory of human nature are not without their contradictions. One is the danger that mind and body, because they are so utterly different in kind, may travel along courses of action which ultimately run at cross purposes. The child, as has been pointed out, inescapably brings his body to school along with his mind. Since the body naturally has its own activities, they are only too likely to become insurgent and intrude upon the child's attention at just the time when his mind ought to be occupied with his lessons. The teacher, consequently, has to spend much of his time restraining physical activities and insisting on order and quiet. Not only is this dualism a source of disciplinary problems, but it also poses the problem of how what the mind learns is to be translated into conduct of the body.

To avoid the theoretical and practical difficulties of a dualistic theory of human nature a number of educational philosophers have turned to some form of monism. Instead of taking the common-sense view that human nature is composed of mind and body, each of which is an entirely different trait of reality, they try to simplify human nature by regarding it as all mind or all body. Thus some realists take the view that mental functions can be reduced to bodily ones, while there are idealists who make matter a function of mind.

The idealists arrive at their monism by pointing out that it is mind that is central in understanding the world. To them nothing gives a greater sense of reality than the activity of mind engaged in trying to comprehend its world. For anything to give a greater sense of reality would be a contradiction in terms because to know anything more real than mind would itself have to be a conception of mind. Perhaps this reasoning does not

exactly prove that the composition of matter is mental, but it does leave no doubt that education lives and moves and has its being in a world circumscribed by mind.

Many people who subscribe to this monistic point of view think of mind as an entity just as in the dualistic pattern and with similar educational results. But many others have come to opposite conclusions. The latter, starting with the notion that everything can be reduced to a concept of mind, come out with the conclusion on further analysis that there is nothing to the mind but a succession of concepts and percepts. When they try to inquire most intimately into what they call themselves, they always seem to stumble on some particular concept or percept which is occupying the forestage of their consciousness. In fact, try as they will, they never seem able to come upon their conscious selves without their being conscious of some particular thing or other—some time or place, some color or form, some hope or purpose. Unable to catch themselves so unoccupied they have finally come to the conclusion that mind, instead of being an entity behind and entertaining ideas, is really a nonentity and therefore best to be described in terms of passing states of consciousness.

This view of mind leads to definitely different educational conclusions. Guided by a theory of mental states the aim of educational psychology is to determine the structure of the mind by analyzing the complex affair of consciousness into its various elements. The whole is explained by its parts. On the side of learning, learning consists in putting parts together. It leans heavily on the psychological theory of associationism. Following this theory the teacher organizes the lesson and presents it to the pupil so as to correlate and achieve the sequence of ideas or passing states of mind which will ensure understanding and retention in memory. This process is strongly reminiscent of Herbart and not a little mechanistic in spirit.

Quite different is the description of human nature which reduces the common-sense dualism of mind and body to the monism of body alone. Behaviorism is the best instance of this where, as already noted, psychologist and educator base their knowledge of human nature strictly on an observation of overt physical behavior. Mental phenomena have no standing except as they have muscular correlates. This theory is not only materialistic but mechanistic as well. Learning is fundamentally a matter of analysis of wholes into parts on the one hand and of association or forming connections between stimulus and response on the other. Connections are formed, habits stamped in, largely by mere repetition. Unlike the case where the mind is an entity and initiator of its responses, in behaviorism the response waits to go into action till it receives the ap-

propriate stimulus. All human activity is reactivity. Purpose is just as mechanical as anything else.¹

Some realists and naturalists, too, think outright materialism and mechanism the only remedy for the confusion and division of opinion which reigns among those who continue to think in mentalistic terms. Human nature will remain an enigma as long as men insist on regarding it in such mentalistic terms as states of mind, consciousness, and the like. To them the only way to clarify the nature of human nature and reduce it to the rule of natural scientific law is to proceed on the theory that man is continuous with physical nature.

The materialism implied in this continuity between man and physical nature is not the old materialism where solid indivisible particles or atoms were supposed to be the essence of matter. On the contrary the materialism of the theory under consideration takes its meaning from modern physics in which Einstein has given us the equation $E = MC^2$ where E stands for energy, M for mass, and C is a constant. In other words matter is just a form of energy; the two are transposable. Gone now is matter as hard lumps or atoms, and in its place is a field theory of forces, matter being merely the place where there is the greatest concentration of forces. Accordingly the materialistically minded educator will hold that human nature is "essentially an electron-proton aggregate which is identical in nature with inorganic substances except for the presence of that unique process called life; and since the latter is seen only in connection with protoplasm, it is believed to be due to 'organizational properties' inherent in organic tissue."²

By studying these forces the modern materialistically minded realist hopes to invoke a strict cause-and-effect determinism and thus pave the way to a scientific control of human nature and behavior which should take a great deal of uncertainty out of teaching. Reduced to strictly mechanical terms education would be translated into the physical impact of sound waves of the teacher's voice on the tympanum of the pupil's ear or the light waves from the printed page on the retina of the pupil's eye. Physiology interposes no difficulty to the transfer of such vibrations from one medium to another without compromising their identity. Just as in the case of the telephone, vibrations can be transformed from atmospheric to electrical media and back again at the end of the line, so sound or light waves may be transposed into neural impulses without loss of charac-

¹ THORNDIKE, E. L., *Human Learning*, p. 122, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1931.

² THORPE, L. P., *Psychological Foundations of Personality*, p. 92, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1938.

ter. This theory of human nature is all the more likely, think its sponsors, when we bear in mind the well-established fact of the electrical character of neural energy. Add to this fact the integrative action of the central nervous system which, like an automatic telephone switchboard, is a device for receiving and organizing reactions to impulsions from without and one has laid the basis for a thoroughly mechanistic theory of cognition and education.¹

Bold as these materialistic and mechanistic theories of human nature are they probably overreach themselves at least at present. Neither physiology nor neurology,² let alone physics or biochemistry, has been able as yet to propound a satisfactory mechanistic explanation of learning. There seems to be an "organizational" aspect of human nature, particularly of mind or the central nervous system, which they fully recognize, and which may in time yield itself to their interpretation, but which as yet remains undigested by them. Attempting to take this factor into account some other educational psychologists and philosophers have made quite a different approach to the nature of human nature. Their approach is twofold. On the one hand they try to describe human nature not so much in terms of what it is as what it does, and on the other hand they attach new significance to human nature as an integral whole. Hitherto human nature as a whole has seemed so complex to investigators that they have approached its understanding by analyzing it into parts and then putting these parts together to get a view of the whole. Believing that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, later theorists have started from the opposite end, the whole, and complex as it is, have kept relations to the whole constantly in mind while studying any of the parts. It is they in large part who have been responsible for urging the education of the "whole" child, that is, educating him both in regard to all the facets of his personality and in regard to these facets viewed in relation to each other as a whole.

As a basis for this approach these theorists too draw on field theory in physics but not so much for an exact explanation of human nature as for an analogy. Thus, in modern field theory the atom is no longer the unit of action. Since mass is transformable into energy, the atom is now continuous with its field of forces. Any change in tension in part of the field will necessitate a redistribution of forces over the whole field. When

¹ BREED, F. S., in National Society for the Study of Education, Forty-first Yearbook, Part I, *Philosophies of Education*, pp. 107, 112, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1942.

² RAGSDALE, C. E., *Modern Psychologies of Education*, p. 393, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1932.

forces are so redistributed, the result will be due to the resultant of all the forces entering therein. So similarly of child nature operating in its field, the school. Instead of assuming that the individual initiates his own responses, as where mind is conceived as an entity, or instead of responding to stimuli, as in the case of behaviorism, we should think of neither stimulus or response as preceding the other but of both operating simultaneously. Thus the learner is already responding before the stimulus makes its impact upon him. In fact it is because of his motor set or attitude that he picks up the stimulus at all, say, the words of the teacher. If he were paying attention to something else, he might not even hear the teacher. If he forms the habit of paying attention to the teacher's directions when the teacher speaks, the resulting habit—the redistribution of energies—will be due or belong to the teacher as well as to the pupil. In other words reorganization or redistribution of energies will be as much a reorganization of the environment as it is of the pupil.¹

Learning, therefore, is as much a reorganization of the environment as it is of the self of the learner. Taking his cue from signs in the environment the learner acts according to what he thinks the signs mean. If the consequences of acting show that the signs mean something else—if the dog that looked like an attractive playmate turns out to snarl and bite—then the child not only changes his own responses, but he changes the signs in his environment, in this case, what the dog means. From this it follows that habits about dogs are not stamped in but formed by constantly reorganizing and perfecting in detail one's responses to them. Mind, to sum up this position, is neither an entity, a nonentity, nor passing states of consciousness but rather "the power to understand things in terms of the use made of them."²

Original Nature

Whatever human nature is, metaphysically speaking, we must now inquire what its various capacities are. It will be well to take inventory of these capacities before they have become overlain with learning so that we can know as nearly as possible with just what educational capital the parent and teacher must begin. We must distinguish as nearly as we can between heredity and environment, nature and nurture. It may appear to be emphasizing the obvious to state at the outset that human nature is, in the main, dynamic, active. What parent or teacher needs to be re-

¹ JORDAN, E., "Education and the Organization of Intelligence," *Journal of General Education*, 4: 4, 8, October, 1949.

² DEWEY, J., *Democracy and Education*, p. 39, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916.

mind of that? Yet, in spite of this apparently obvious fact, there are some who think of the child as a rather passive recipient of the educative process.

The theory that the learner comes to school with a "vacant" sign hung on his mind and that it is the duty of the school to furnish the empty spaces is probably held more frequently by popular than by expert opinion. Nevertheless, some authorities still cling to the view first expounded by John Locke that the child's mind at birth is like a clean slate on which the school, little by little, writes the accumulated heritage of race experience.¹ From a normative point of view, the practices which would follow from such a theory would be unacceptable. To hold that the mind is what it is taught unduly exalts the powers of teaching and demeans the privileges of learning. There is further danger that teaching will become preoccupied with furnishing the mind with patterns of the past, since these can be more readily cut and measured than those of a yet undetermined future. All this is to say nothing of the difficulty of translating knowledge into conduct. If teaching treats mind like an empty container to be filled, the problem arises how to empty it into action. Practice in filling is certainly not the equivalent of practice in pouring out.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find the weight of informed opinion holding to the theory that child nature is fundamentally dynamic. One has but to watch the child in the act of learning to become convinced of this. Take writing, for instance. Legs are employed as well as arms and hands, not to mention facial contortions. Even listening involves muscular coordination. A little further examination must also reveal that learning is not just a matter of perception but of apperception as well. The new is worked over by what is already familiar. The immaturity of the learner, far from being a void which needs to be filled, is a positive capacity or potentiality for growth.

The dynamic, growing, self-activating principle, which animates human nature and causes the human pattern of development to unfold to maturity, has traditionally been known as the soul.² While the soul is a single unitary principle, it possesses a number of faculties. A faculty, as its derivation from the Latin *facultas* implies, is an "ability to do." The soul manifests two main kinds of faculties or abilities, the bodily and the mental. Through its bodily or somatic faculties the soul is able to sense, feel, and desire. Through its mental or rational faculties the soul is able to remember, imagine, reason, and the like. Naturally there is a hierarchy of faculties in human nature such that the bodily or somatic ones are subordinate

¹ Cf. FINNEY, R., *Sociological Philosophy of Education*, p. 64, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1928.

² For a later reference to this concept, see *infra*, pp. 85-86.

to the mental or rational ones. This is as it should be in order to check man's tumultuous appetites and give them profitable direction.

The educational corollary of this traditional conception of original nature is a traditional kind of education. Accordingly the main aim of education is to exercise and develop the faculties, especially the mental or cognitive ones. There is some difference of opinion, however, what sort of curriculum is best suited to this end. The tradition of longest standing here is one extending from Aristotle to the present day. It seeks intellectual excellence as an end in itself by steeping the intellect in a curriculum as wide and rich as the liberal arts can afford.¹ Another tradition of long standing had its heyday in the nineteenth century but is still popular in some quarters. It strives for mental discipline through a formal training of the faculties on a narrow curriculum selected not so much for its rich breadth as for its being a medium of resistance, a whetstone for the mind. The expectation here is that the exercise of a faculty like memory results in an increment of improvement for that faculty which can be transferred at will to any field of mental endeavor.

There has been one important point of attack on the theory that original nature is animated by a soul possessed of various faculties. This is the tendency of some of its supporters to reify the faculties, that is, to conceive of them as actual structures or independent entities of the soul. The theory of transfer of training, as a good case in point, strongly implies that faculties are structures or entities which improve with use. Now since psychological experiment has cast considerable doubt on the theory of transfer, the shadow of doubt has fallen over the theory of faculties as well. If there is little or no transfer, perhaps there is little or no basis for a theory of faculties which supports transfer. Defenders of faculty theory have tried to buttress it by pointing out that the reification of faculties is a spurious and inconsistent extension of their main theory of the soul. They recall to mind, as already pointed out, that the soul is a single unitary principle. Faculties are facets of this principle, not subdivisions of it. Reification of the faculties, thus, appears to be a liability rather than an asset. Rid of this encumbrance the traditional theory of the soul seems able to carry its main point again. But, it is to be noted, the soul remains an entity even though it itself is not composed of entities.

A more modern view of human nature lists its original capacities under quite a different set of categories. These categories it draws chiefly from the biological approach to the study of man raised to such importance by the theory of evolution. Treating man more as an organism continuous

¹ Cf. DEMOS, R., "Philosophical Aspects of the Recent Harvard Report on Education," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 7: 203-208, December, 1946. Also cf. *infra*, pp. 107-108.

with nature than as a soul destined for heaven it records his instincts and impulses rather than his faculties. There has been quite a variety of opinion on how wide a range of activities to include under instincts and impulses. This range runs all the way from two or three basic urges such as hunger, sex, and fear to a dozen or more including such items as pugnacity, gregariousness, rivalry, imitation, curiosity, and play. The capital trait of them all, however, is that of modifiability; without this trait, of course, there would be no learning and no need for a philosophy of education.

Some of these urges can be identified with actual physical structures or organs of the body as, for example, when glandular secretions help condition fear or the cerebral center greatly conditions modifiability of behavior. But in spite of this identity many who support these categories of original nature take care not to reify them. Even basic drives like sex and hunger have more than one channel of motor outlet and may vary in form of expression as the occasion for release varies. Hence terms like sex and hunger, and even terms like intelligence or consciousness, should not be used as nouns, for nouns are names of things and thus seem to designate entities, but rather as adverbs to describe ways in which the organism behaves.¹

The chief difference which the more modern biological inventory of human nature makes in educational practice is that it directs greater attention to the forces which motivate human conduct. With a knowledge of what motives have been operating from the beginning in child nature the adroit teacher can better learn how to harness them to draw varying curriculum loads. Some think these drives so important that they should guide the formulation of educational aims. School, they think, should provide for the release of the energies which are pent up in these native drives. But even if they cannot be given uninhibited expression, they are important for the teacher to bear in mind in trying to resolve pupil maladjustments arising out of conflicting drives or drives which conflict with deep-rooted social conventions.

The Social Basis of Human Nature

The caution against reifying not only faculties but also instincts needs reemphasis when we look at human nature from a social point of view. Some students of human nature have been inclined to regard man as instinctively social. To ascribe man's social behavior to a social instinct, however, is like ascribing the effects of morphine to a dormitive power in the drug. In the end this approach toward understanding human nature

¹ KILPATRICK, W. H., "The Nature of Human Nature," *Religious Education*, 35: 3-12, January-March, 1940.

merely begs the question under inquiry. It leads nowhere except to learned ignorance.

Instead of seeking to understand the social basis of human nature through endowing it with social instincts, perhaps the educator will do better to commence with the empirical fact that man seems everywhere and always to be caught up in an intricate web of social relations. Without them the newborn babe would almost surely perish. But even after the child grows to relative physical independence, he enters, in complex civilizations, a long period of social infancy in which he is dependent on others for tutelage in the folkways or culture of his social group. The greater the division and specialization of labor in this group, the more adults are interdependent on each other. Mutual dependence, then, is a characteristic of human culture so deep-rooted that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. Indeed, it is so ingrained over the centuries that it is easy to see how social habits become, as we say, second nature.

It is of the utmost educational importance whether we regard the social basis of human nature as instinctive or habitual. We often hear men despair, for example, of correcting some of society's worst social ills. War as a means of settling international disputes, they say, cannot be eliminated so long as human nature is what it is. If man is pugnacious by instinct, why of course then he must fight as a child in the school yard and later as an adult on the battlefield. There is little or nothing that education can do. But if, on the other hand, fighting is just a bad habit, presumably we can rearrange social circumstances so that war will be superseded by the institution of international courts. In that event education could do much by way of creating a new outlook on an ancient abuse and by way of attaching to the administration of international justice the individual's present habits of self-restraint in submitting to the administration of domestic justice.

The social view one takes of human nature also turns on one's view of the nature of the social process, the nature of the relations of individuals to each other.¹ Here we must raise again the question whether to conceive of relations as internal or external.² According to the view that relations are external, reality can be analyzed into basic particles or atoms. These units can be moved about into a variety of relations, but each is so fundamentally discrete and indigenous that its character does not depend on its relationship to other units. Extended to society this view treats individuals as the atoms of social relations. Society is a compact in which individuals freely contract to form society. Individuals, therefore, will be

¹ Compare these theories of the social basis of human nature with corresponding theories of the nature of society, *infra*, pp. 123-127.

² *Supra*, pp. 26-27.

able to take on or throw off a variety of social yokes without impairment of their own unique identity or personality.

This approach to the social basis of human nature has led to various kinds of educational practice. It is probably fundamental to the whole laissez-faire position on education.¹ Since the nature of the individual is external to his relations, his only social obligations should be those of his own free choice. Therefore the government should allow him to arrange for the education of his children privately and should not force him to pay taxes for public schools.² Similarly when the child goes to school his curriculum should be elective, freely chosen, and not prescribed. With such a theory, furthermore, it will be no surprise if ultraprogressive or ultra-democratic schools show such reverence for pupil individuality that they give it almost unbridled freedom to express itself.³

If one takes the view that relations are internal, then one commences, not with independent atoms, but with an initial state in which everything is so related to other things that a disturbance of relations would affect an alteration in the nature of the things related. Experimental studies in biology reveal that the kind of organ a cell grows into depends only in part on what kind of a cell it is, for fully as important is the location of that cell. That is, a given cell may grow into the head or foot of an organism depending on its being transplanted near the head or near the foot.

It is the same with individuals as with atoms or cells; relations are all important.⁴ At the very outset what the human embryo becomes may be radically conditioned by prenatal influences on it. Furthermore when individuals grow up they do not voluntarily form society; rather are they found almost unavoidably in society. Their normal environment is in association with each other. It is by shared purposes that they constitute society. In fact society may be said to exist *in* and *by* communication between individuals. By the same token individuals are in large part what they are by virtue of what they share in communication with others. Each is so much a part of the other that we may regard society as a category which actually transforms physical and animal nature into what it is.⁵

If this analysis of the social quality of human nature is sound, we as educators are justified in reversing the age-old notion that human nature is unchanging. It may change very very slowly as in the category of physical structure, but change it does, if Darwin is right. In social category it may change no faster than the social relations or conventions in which

¹ *Infra*, pp. 151-152.

² *Infra*, p. 152.

³ *Infra*, pp. 267-268.

⁴ Cf. WHEELER, R. H., "The Crisis in Educational Objectives," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 20: 19-25, January, 1934.

⁵ DEWEY, J., "The Social As a Category," *The Monist*, 38: 176, April, 1928. Also see *infra*, p. 124.

it is enmeshed. But change in this category could be greatly accelerated by being open-minded to change ourselves. The individual nature of human nature, then, depends on the kind of human nature which is emerging in others. The concepts of *ego* and *alter*, self and other, emerge simultaneously in the educative process. That is, learning to know oneself is not just an affair of private introspection. It is also an affair of seeing how others behave and recognizing and identifying feelings of theirs with feelings of his own. Each is indispensable to the other.

Integration

Any way one approaches human nature it would appear to be possessed of a diversity of traits, whether of faculties, instincts, or habits. Yet, in spite of this diversity of traits, the individual gives every appearance of being an integer. He maintains unity and order among his attributes. Or, should we say, he is a more or less integrated individual. Although his feelings and thoughts change from moment to moment, it always seems to be the same self that is doing the feeling and thinking. Although the child grows older from day to day and although he learns new habits and attitudes at home and at play, the teacher has no difficulty in identifying him on his return to school the next day. Furthermore, one of the earliest things the child learns is to be aware of his own identity—of the difference between I, me, and mine, you and they, yours and theirs. Whence this identity, whence this idea of unity or integration? Is integration an original datum which the child brings to the educational situation, or is it a subsequent acquisition which is gained in the social or educational process?

This paradox of identity in the midst of change raises again one of the most difficult issues in educational philosophy.¹ Some think of unity as an addition to or imposition on human nature which commences at birth as a big buzzing confusion. Unity emerges from this chaos by organizing the sequence of passing states of mind or through building up aggregates of stimulus-response bonds. It is a rather mechanical putting together of parts to make a whole, a gluing together of boards to make trees. According to this view the child achieves integration in school through having subject matter presented to him in well-organized fashion by the teacher. If child personality is in danger of disintegration because of the diverse and conflicting loyalties in the community—the family, the gang, the school, the church—then the therapy is to organize the community so that it presents a more unified aspect to the child. In both instances, integration is an acquisition; it is added on. The child is integrated from without.

Others incline to the view that integration is an original datum, that it is a native tendency of the child to maintain his identity throughout the

¹ *Supra*, pp. 27-30. See also *infra*, pp. 230-231.

flow of his learning experiences. He is always integrating, but never integrated—save in death. They gain their chief support from biology with its conviction that organisms tend to act as wholes. From them, also, comes much of the emphasis on the education of “the whole child.”¹ In this they are careful to point out that they do not mean that the whole armory of a child’s impulses, habits, skills, and attitudes are simultaneously involved in learning. Such a coincidence of forces might rather result in confusion. The emphasis on wholeness here should rather be on integration, wherein each resource for action comes into play at a time and in an amount measured to some dominating design, some thoughtful purpose.

To hold that the child is an organic unity does not go far enough to satisfy others. They agree with the organic theory that the child is something “more” than an agglomeration, something “more” than the sum of his parts. Yet it is still not enough that selfhood is a biological emergent. That far, the “more” is but an empirical fact. The “whole” child is not yet a complete whole. Nor can he be, until there is some vital principle, a spiritual soul which, as mentioned earlier, provides the underlying unity of the faculties, orders them in a hierarchy, and saves the behavior of the self from being a mere stream of states of consciousness, wherein each state virtually becomes the thinker and actor.

In whatever manner the self precedes or emerges from the educational process, there at least seems unanimity of opinion on the point that the selves of pupils, young and old, are in an incomplete state of development. How shall this deficiency be accounted for, and whither shall one look for its repair? According to one view of Christian teaching, perfect selfhood is something which, once possessed, has since been lost and now must be regained. In the original state of justice man’s being is supposed to have been in order. Because of his initial fall from grace, however, the perfect equilibrium of his hierarchy of powers has been lost. Original sin—man’s fallen nature, his disorderly inclinations, his lack of integration—thus naturally orients education to antecedent goals. From the outlook of the experimentalist, education is pointed the opposite way. Integration is something ahead, something yet to be attained for the first time.

Modifiability of Original Nature

The discussion of the social basis of human nature has already required us to take note of an important difference of opinion about the modifiabil-

¹ R. M. Hutchins, in his article “Education and Social Improvement,” *Educational Trends*, 6: 7, June-July, 1938, completely misunderstands the technical meaning of the “whole child.” He erroneously identifies the phrase with making the school responsible for the whole education of the child.

ity of man's original nature. Some think that there are definite limits beyond which human nature cannot be modified by membership in a social order, thus putting limits on the reconstruction of the social order itself. Others regard these limits as much more indefinite, if they exist at all, and are therefore much more optimistic about modifying human nature and remaking the social order as well. There is no disagreement between these two opinions on the fact of man's modifiability, only on how much of it affects nature, how much is due to nurture, and how independent nature and nurture are of each other. In fact adherents of both opinions would likely agree that modifiability is the principal item in any inventory of man's original nature and that no animal is so superbly equipped to learn as is man.

Central in this superb equipment is the human cerebrum. By virtue of it no other animal can match man in flexibility and range of adaptation. Not all men, however, have the same range and flexibility of adaptation. Psychological tests show that men differ widely in intellectual capacity.¹ Intelligence quotients range up to 70 or more points above and below 100, the norm. But what we want to know now is whether man can raise his intelligence quotient by improving his mental capacity. He can increase the content of his learning, no doubt, but can he add to his capacity to learn? The general opinion of psychologists is that he cannot. They do admit that if he is retested a second or a third time his quotient may be higher or lower but never by more than approximately fifteen points either way. And these points would be just an error due to differences in such accidental circumstances as the emotional disposition of the examinee and not at all to mental exertion taken with a view to adding cubits to his mental stature. In other words human nature is modifiable in that it can learn but unmodifiable in that it cannot increase its inherent modifiability. There is a strict line separating nature and nurture.²

This doctrine of the constancy of the IQ has led to a kind of social determinism as a philosophy of education. The doctrine has afforded justification to some for the social-economic hierarchy of classes in our society. They believe that the individuals with higher IQ's due to their superior abilities rise to the top of the social ladder, while those with lower ones due to their more modest capacities settle to the bottom. Consequently the schools should guide the former into the higher intellectual studies and the latter toward vocational curriculums. Moreover, since like tends to beget like, the expectation is quite warranted that the children of families in the upper social-economic brackets will be more likely to profit by opportunities to stay in school longer than will those from the

¹ For major consideration of individual differences, see *supra*, pp. 33-36, 264-266.

² For an application of this view, see *infra*, pp. 264-265.

lower income groups. All of which is to say nothing of using this logic to award superior educational opportunities to a dominant race and discriminate against an inferior one because the advanced culture of the dominant race is evidence of their superior native inventiveness and originality.

The doctrine of social determinism has aroused fierce resistance from those who believe it a dagger pointed at the very heart of democracy.¹ They counterattack by insisting that the constancy of the IQ is predicated on an unproved assumption. This assumption, as we have seen before, holds that mind is an entity external to and independent of its relations. Modifiability or learning, therefore, is purely a function of exercise which does not add to or subtract from the power of original nature but simply develops what is inherently and potentially present. Whatever its amount or extent, it is fixed from the beginning by one's genes.

To these critics there is another assumption just as warranted and more consistent with the pretensions of democracy. According to this assumption mind is not so much unaffected by its relations as it is in large part a product of them. Intelligence, therefore, is a quality of learned behavior. Every relation we enter into with our environment leaves its emotional or rational traces in us, and as a result we act differently when new relations are undertaken. In conserving the traces of former experiences our habits may vary in quality from being automatically routine and rigid to being sensitively resilient and adaptive. Which sort of habit is formed will depend on the social relations obtaining at the time, the kind of society in which education takes place. But the main point is that modifiability, far from being a biological constant, is in fact a social variant. The line between nature and nurture is not so clear cut. If this is the case, then the superiority or inferiority of races and social classes is to be explained on the basis of their historical and cultural environment rather than their biological heredity.² Hence supposed limits to the modifiability of human nature in races and social classes should be a challenge to the educator to try to overcome them, and no limits should be tentatively or finally recognized till there have been unsuccessful attempts to exceed them.

Social determinism is not the only educational doctrine which finds its support in a theory of the constancy of human nature. Also starting with this theory or premise another doctrine proposes that the aims of education

¹ BAGLEY, W. C., "Educational Determinism: or Democracy and the IQ," *School and Society*, 15: 373-384, April, 1922.

² AXTELL, G. E., "Significance of the Inquiry into the Nature and Constancy of the IQ," *Educational Method*, 19: 99-105, November, 1939. See also WAHLQUIST, J. T., "Is the IQ Controversy Philosophical?" *School and Society*, 52: 539-547, November, 1940.

should be the same for all men in all times and all places. This proposition is put forward in part as a denial of the theory of progressive education which holds that, since change is generic,¹ the aims of education must be progressively undergoing reconstruction all the time. One of the main premises of this theory, of course, is Darwinian evolution. If species are continually evolving, including human nature, then naturally the aims of education must take their cue from this fundamental fact. But the answer to such reasoning, according to those attacking it here, is, not a denial of the theory of evolution, but a claim that, if human nature should change radically, then we would have a new species.² When a new species appears other than *Homo sapiens*, it will be time enough to reconstruct the aims of education. In the meantime as long as man is man, as long as he continues to reproduce his present species—and what does species mean if not constancy of characteristics over and above mere accidental individual differences, which themselves have a limit of variability?—the aims of education should be constant, that is, the same for all men everywhere and always.

*Learning*³

The disagreements on the extent to which original nature is constant or modifiable continue on into the interpretation of nurture as contrasted with nature. Everyone agrees that nurture produces some change; but what kind of change is it? Where this change is in the form of learning, what does it mean to learn? This may seem more properly to be a question for the educational psychologist to answer. In fact we will leave it to him to answer the scientific aspects of it. Nevertheless there still are some aspects of nurture as learning to which the educational philosopher may well address himself. There is the philosophical question of how we ought to learn as well as the scientific question in what ways do we actually learn.⁴ Even this latter question of scientific fact will be more fruitfully answered if interpreted in the philosophical light of a general theory of human nature.

We may start by noting a famous educational dilemma posed by the Greeks. Either one knows or one does not know, runs this ancient dilemma. Whichever horn one grasps, he can conclude only that education is futile. If he already knows, then it is futile to search for what he already possesses. If he does not know, the search is still futile for he will neither

¹ *Supra*, pp. 27-30.

² ADLER, M. J., "The Crisis in Contemporary Education," *The Social Frontier*, 5: 142, February, 1939.

³ For religious components of a theory of learning, see *infra*, pp. 285-289.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 11.

know which way to turn in his search nor will he be able to recognize the object of his search if he were accidentally to come upon it. Like so many Greek dilemmas, the alternatives presented are static. They ignore a dynamic third possibility, a mediate position wherein one neither knows nor yet is ignorant but is "getting to know," that is, learning.¹ Learning thus involves a sort of metamorphosis, a transformation of the learner. But how does this metamorphosis of learning take place? How does the learner modify original nature? How does he engraft the new upon the old? The transformation of learning is a commonplace of life, and yet just exactly what happens in the process of transition from ignorance to knowledge is variously stated theoretically.

Some students of this problem find it very difficult to see how human nature can add anything new from outside its original nature. If there is anything new, it must come from within. It must have been resident in original nature from birth. Learning thus becomes an actualization of what was potentially present from conception. The environment of the home or the school may be necessary to tip off the actualization of this potentiality, but the important thing to remember is that any novelty in the learning process stems from child nature, not the environment. Learning thus is an unfolding of what was originally enfolded. It is developmental, a kind of growth.

Other students have been as equally impressed with the fact that the source of novelty in learning is in the environment outside the child. Some of this school of thought hold that human nature is rather colorless, malleable stuff. Hence practically everything it learns takes its origin in the environment. Learning the novel is largely a matter of mechanical impact from the outside world. It is a matter of making an impression on the plastic mind of the child.² Others of this school, granting that human nature is possessed of some determinate quality such as instincts, use these instincts as convenient pegs on which to hang the novel things the child is to learn. Here learning is a matter of associating the novel in the environment with the old and familiar in instinct.³ There is almost a mechanical joining of the two. In different terms, learning is a matter of conditioning. But if conditioning is not kept up by habituation, acquired modes of behavior pull loose and basic impulses reassert themselves again in unconditioned form.

¹ For a further consideration of this dilemma, see *infra*, p. 71.

² For other references to this same point of view, see *infra*, pp. 84-85, 255.

³ For an exposition of this kind of learning in terms of logical syllogisms, see W. T. Harris, *Psychologic Foundations of Education*, Chaps. 9-10, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1898.

Still other students take a more organismic and a more emergent or creative view of learning. Confronted with a novel situation for which the individual has no response in his repertoire—a situation which is cosmically indeterminate, not just indeterminate to the individual—the individual contrives a way out by reorganizing both the environment and his own experience. According to this view the novel situation has upset a total field of forces. Hence learning is not just the simple impact of these disturbed forces on the mind of the learner, the second view above. Neither is it merely a modification of the learner internally, the first view. On the contrary learning is a reorganization of the whole field of forces including both the environment and the learner. Hence the subsequent pattern of behavior is as much a function of the one as of the other. As a result of such a reorganization of forces or relations the individual is a different person. Novel functioning leads to a modification of human nature. Indeed, learning is the actual building of new structure.¹

Freedom of the Will

Granting that human nature is modifiable in some sense or other, we will now want to know whether human nature can freely choose the direction of its own modification or whether that direction is determined by forces beyond its control. Those charged with the responsibility of education can hardly avoid coming to terms with this problem. They must decide whether teaching the child involves enlisting the assent of the child's will to the lesson in hand or whether that lesson can be taught merely by the teacher's clever manipulation of the environment so as to release the mainsprings of human nature in the right order and degree. They must decide whether the child before them is the captain of his destiny and capable of responsibility for his conduct or just the deterministic product of his heredity and environment with its peculiar faults and virtues.

Before discussing the freedom of the will it may be well first to say a word about the nature of the will itself. According to one doctrine, the will is a distinct faculty. It is not only to be distinguished from impulse, desire, and emotion, but it is to be elevated above all these as the sovereign

¹ OGDEN, R. M., "The Gestalt Theory of Learning," *School and Society*, 41: 529, April, 1935; KILPATRICK, W. H., *A Reconstructed Theory of the Educative Process*, p. 4, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1935. These sources document the last view which is that of progressive educators generally. The preceding view is that of behaviorists and associationists, while the first view will be recognized as that of Froebel and other early educators. Cf. MURSELL, J. L., "The Miracle of Learning," *Atlantic Monthly*, 155: 733-741, June, 1935.

faculty. Furthermore, will is not to be confused with intellect. It works closely in conjunction with the intellect but is separate from it. The way in which these two function is that the intellect apprehends the facts of any situation and presents them to the will for choice or decision. Nothing can be willed which is not first known. So conceived, will is a datum. Its training results in no intrinsic increase of the faculty itself. Strengthening the will merely affects its habits of execution as to whether they be deliberate and resolute or vacillating and weak.

An opposing school of thought rejects the view that will is a special faculty. For them it is not a power separate from the energy expressed in children's other activities.¹ It is to be found in every manifestation of motor energy either of original nature or of that nature as it has become overlaid with habit. Choice is made up of the preferences to which original nature and habit incline one. Indeed the individual cannot avoid making choices because it is of the very nature of individuality to be different from other individuals and therefore to prefer its own unique bias toward its environment. Choice may be delayed while the individual elaborates the consequences of alternate courses of conduct and until some preference becomes strong enough to dominate or integrate all conflicting preferences and so command the channels of motor outlet. But in any event the focus of choice is on the outcome of this struggle, not on a faculty or entity of will sitting in judgment on the contending preferences. One wills, therefore, with everything that he has willed in the past. Consequently the training of the will is to be viewed genetically. The pattern of the will evoked at any time cannot be distinguished from the form of the culture which is coincidentally being transmitted.²

But now, whichever way we look at will and choice, we are anxious to know whether there is warrant for believing that we have some voluntary control over what we choose or will to do. Common sense widely attests to the fact that we do. Yet the moment we systematically examine our common-sense notion, doubts begin to arise in our minds. These doubts spring up from paying attention to the relation of cause and effect, or the so-called law of sufficient reason.³ Take anything that a child does in or out of school. How did he come to do it? There must be definite reasons or causes in the past. The reasons or causes for the present situation, then, are to be found in the immediately preceding state of affairs. This, in turn, is the result of the circumstances which preceded it, and so

¹ KILPATRICK, W. H., *Selfhood and Civilization*, pp. 30n, 176, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1941.

² HOCKING, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 258, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1923.

³ THORNDIKE, E. L., "The Contribution of Psychology to Education," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, I: 6, January, 1910.

on indefinitely. If a complete investigation of all these antecedent factors could be made, however remote their relevancy, no uncertainty whatever would be left in accounting for the child's deed under consideration. Far from having been free to select his own course of conduct, then, the pupil's choice will be seen to have been determined for him by the necessity of preceding events. Nor need this view be depressing. Just as the present is the result of the preceding state of affairs, by the same token the present is also the cause of the succeeding state of affairs, the future. Therefore, given a complete chart of the configuration of past events, the teacher will be able unfailingly to predict the future outcome of present educational efforts.

Even conceding the "ifs" in the determinist's case, the libertarian would doubtless still think the sacrifice of freedom too great a price to pay for the picture of educational efficiency offered. Yet again, where is there room for freedom in such an apparently common-sense account? Must not the events of this world seem at least that simple and complete to an omnipotent and omniscient deity? Nevertheless, various theories have been put forward to account for freedom and to secure the pupil and teacher from the ironclad determinism described. Some of these must now be considered.

Among those who hold that reality is already eternally realized and that change and novelty are merely appearance of reality so conceived, perhaps most popular is the theory that there is a transcendental freedom of the will. If every event in the past, present, and future is already accounted for in a changeless eternity, nothing less than a will able to transcend the ordinary chain of cause and effect relationships will be sufficient to assure freedom. According to this theory the individual is himself an originating source of energy, an original cause. Because he is self-active, he is self-directive, self-determining. He is the author of his own deeds, the captain of his destiny. This enables him to modify the stream of causation which is operating upon him. He is free to coincide or interfere with it at will. Freedom is a primary quality of reality. It is God-given.

So stated, it would almost appear as if freedom of the will transcended all conditions, as if it were absolute, even indifferent. While some libertarians actually hold such an extreme position, others are inclined to set some limits to freedom. One count against absolute freedom of the will is that it might encroach on omnipotence itself. If man had such freedom he might, by taking thought, add cubits to his mental stature, thus contradicting both science and scripture. A second count against it is the idea that the will acts without motivation, the so-called liberty of indifference.

Motives very definitely do bear on the will. As has been noted, there cannot be willing without knowing facts or motives for a decision. Hence, there is no freedom from motivation, but rather freedom to pick between the different motivations presented. Yet, though conditioned by motives, the will is not limited to respond to the strongest motive. It is not free, indeed, unless it can also choose the initially weaker motive or cause.¹

Yet even with such conditions, a transcendental freedom of the will presents the educator with knotty problems. If the pupil is free to pick between the stimuli to conduct, is he not also free to accept or reject the instruction of the teacher? How, in other words, can the teacher make his teaching stick? If he is quite frank, the teacher will probably admit that he cannot assure that learning will follow teaching. To be consistent, the libertarian teacher would probably say that in the last analysis the pupil is self-educated. Neither the teacher nor anyone else can educate him; an education is something he must choose for himself. He can no more be constrained to learn than the proverbial horse can be made to drink. So if, in the day of the visitation of the teacher, the pupil willfully refuses the teacher's ministrations, it is unfortunate, but the responsibility is the pupil's.

Another problem may be set by inquiring what this freedom of self-activity is for? A good transcendentalist would probably reply that only in freedom can the pupil achieve self-realization, that is, develop his individuality. In the language of the unfoldment theory of education, he must be free to unfold properly. Freedom consists in voluntarily becoming what one was intended to become. The addition of this condition further circumscribes the concept of freedom. In a sense it almost seems to cut it off. But there is an all-important choice still left for the child. He is free to choose between his destiny and the privation of failing to realize it. Stated in this fashion, great pressure is brought upon the child to exercise his freedom of will as he "ought" to. His freedom of choice lies between duty and fault.

Quite a different theory of freedom occurs to those who are committed in the first instance to viewing novelty, time, and change as basic realities. The alternative to determinism or mechanism here is found in predicating freedom on the indeterminism which such realities entail. Freedom, instead of being an original datum transcending determinism, is something to be wrought out in a contingent, precarious universe. It occurs principally when opposing or conflicting pulls on the individual from his environment are about equally balanced. In this case he becomes the agent for determining which pull will govern the subsequent course of events. Through the medium of his imagination he anticipates and elaborates the

¹ For later reference to this theory, see *infra*, pp. 205, 285, 323.

consequences of each pull of the environment. If he is self-conscious at all he must be aware that he—that is, the dramatic rehearsal in his mind of future events struggling to see which shall be born—is a real determinant of the course of events. This realization not only gives him a sense of agency but also a sense of responsibility.¹ The thrill in this experience lies not in the sense that he can freely declare his independence from the past but in the sense of challenge and adventure which remains even after the past has fully exerted itself to predict and control the precarious future. Hence any stimulating sense of personal autonomy is due to the outcropping of cosmic novelty, to an emergent evolution. Freedom of the will is the human phase of this creative process.² Here one's range of freedom of choice is not just between good and bad, between great happiness or abject misery, but between alternative goods.

Some think unpredictability, and hence freedom, is but a cover for human ignorance of the underlying determinism really at work. To the one with complete knowledge of all the factors, they say nothing is unpredictable or new. But no educator, it is retorted, has or ever is likely to have such omniscience. Were he to, he would no longer be an educator. Such complete understanding is only speculatively possible. There is no evidence that the theory has a basis in fact. The ceaseless flow of time with its accompanying change and novelty ever outmodes and prevents a complete configuration of acting forces. Indeed, it is asserted that the more one tries to get complete control of the educational situation, the more he increases the contingent elements and hence the number of permutations and combinations possible.³

Accordingly, much of the anxiety over too much determinism or mechanism in education is unwarranted. By and large the teacher should welcome every device that the educational psychologist or educational sociologist offers as a means of more certainly controlling the outcomes of instruction. A world in which the precarious and contingent are not just figments of the human mind but genuine traits of the cosmos will always baffle any complete educational determinism. The chief caution the teacher needs to observe is to remember to select aims and to adjust method and curriculum so that his pupils will learn the lifelong thrill of matching his wits against nature in an attempt to anticipate and control her outcomes.

Perhaps the principal focus of all this discussion of whether human

¹ THOMAS, L. G., "What Metaphysics for Modern Education?" *Educational Forum*, 6: 120, January, 1942.

² BAGLEY, W. C., *Education and Emergent Man*, pp. 65-66, 68, Thomas Nelson & Sons, New York, 1934; *Education, Crime, and Social Progress*, pp. 121-122, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1931.

³ DEWEY, J., *The Public and Its Problems*, pp. 198-199, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., New York, 1927.

nature is endowed with freedom of the will centers in the question of responsibility. It is generally held that without some sort of freedom there can be no responsibility. Thus, if a rigid determinism obtains, the child can hardly be held accountable for what he does. Accountability must be predicated upon choice. But even so, there are many who incline to lay the blame for past acts at the door of early training. If this is the case, responsibility is not merely individual but social as well. The teacher, parent, and community are jointly accountable with the child. Others would ground responsibility, not on what has already happened, but in the anticipation of future consequences. The child is responsible, then, only as he can be taught to become responsible, to act in the light of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his acts. Some think that this function has been performed when the child has been educated to know better. Others insist that he does not truly become accountable till he *does* better as well. This does not mean that ignorance is an excuse before the law. Public liability may attach to one's acts in spite of one's ignorance. But moral responsibility must be based on anticipation of consequences, on education.

Fallen and Supernatural Nature

So far we have investigated the nature of human nature without passing any moral judgment on it. Is human nature essentially good or essentially bad? This is an age-old question and as important for the teacher to answer as for the clergyman. If the child is active by nature and if learning, therefore, is a process of self-activity, then, if in addition human nature is essentially good, the teacher must regard the child's native tendencies as essentially good. He will have to make the aims of education a projection of these tendencies and select the curriculum as a means of releasing and promoting them. In his method the teacher will have to pay due respect to the child's freedom for fear of impairing the goodness of nature manifested in the child's originality.

If, on the contrary, the teacher detects shortcomings and perversities in human nature, then his educational procedures will take on a different complexion. He will aim to teach the child to like the good things he ought to like, not merely to follow the aims toward which his propensities incline him. He will select the curriculum from the great treasure trove of the race, not just in terms of the individual's personal proclivities. In his method he will be glad to utilize the child's native drives to accomplish the school's task, but he will not hesitate to run counter to those drives in order to arrive at his chosen objective.

What are the reasons, now, for choosing either of these views of human nature and the educational practices predicated on it? The traditional

Christian line takes a rather dim view of human nature; it holds to the familiar doctrine of original sin.¹ This doctrine has been variously expounded, but since it is the Catholics who give it principal place in their educational philosophy, it is the Catholic view which will receive major consideration here.² According to this view when God created Adam, He endowed him with a human nature to which He added for good measure a supernature as well. When Adam sinned by rebelling against God in the Garden of Eden, God punished him by depriving him of the benefits of this supernature. The effect of Adam's fall from grace was not to wound human nature as is often thought. On the contrary it left human nature with its powers of will and intellect just as they had been originally constituted. In other words, Adam's descendants, the children in school today, are no worse off in regard to their strictly human nature than they would have been had God never vested Adam with a supernature.

The respect in which contemporary man is worse off, however, is in the loss of the supernature which Adam forfeited. Now what were the added gifts of this supernature? They were notably two, the gift of integrity whereby all man's faculties were perfectly subordinated to his reason and will and the gift of immortality whereby man's body was subjected to his soul so that it was freed from falling into corruption and death. It is in respect to the loss of these priceless gifts, then, that human nature is worse off today as a result of original sin than it would have been had Adam freely chosen to obey God's commandment. Any darkening of understanding or weakening of will as a result of original sin, therefore, is a deterioration, not from human nature, but from the state of perfect justice in Eden when Adam possessed the attributes of supernature as well as of human nature.

The educational damage of Adam's sinful act is almost incalculable. His descendants in the modern classroom will certainly not thank him for the immeasurably more difficult task he has made of acquiring an education. Thus if their first ancestor had not sinned, he would have passed on to them his special gift of infused knowledge. Through this they might have had minds equipped with a unique aptitude for higher truths. Furthermore if they now possessed the supernatural gift of integrity—having all their faculties perfectly subordinated to will and intellect—they would not suffer the distractions from their studies provided by unruly appetites, bodies lacking robust health, or the need to spend most of their daylight hours chained to toil to care for their bodily needs at the expense of time that might otherwise be spent on spiritual development.

¹ For other references to this doctrine, see *infra*, pp. 150, 283-284.

² VOLLERT, C., "Original Sin and Education," *Review for Religious*, 5: 217-228, July, 1946.

If one subscribes to a Calvinistic view of human nature, the situation is even worse. According to Calvin human nature was not just deprived of the special gifts of supernature, but it became depraved as a result of the expulsion from Eden. Following Scholasticism human nature though fallen can rise again; it can learn and be redeemed. But following Calvin human nature is so cast down that it cannot lift itself up again without divine aid. It is, furthermore, predestined to iniquity or salvation so that education can affect the final outcome little if at all.

In contrast to the Scholastic and Calvinistic views of human nature is that of Rousseau. According to Rousseau human nature as it came from the hands of its Maker was essentially good. To be sure, it was immature and had weaknesses that needed correcting through education, but even so the material the parent and teacher had to work with was basically good. Consequently Rousseau and his followers have been optimistic about the possibilities of education, not pessimistic like Calvin. As one may infer, Scholastics also are optimistic about the possibilities of education, but Rousseau in the eighteenth century and the more romantic progressive educators of the twentieth century have been even more so. The optimism of the Scholastics labors under the heavy burden of original sin. The optimism of the progressive educators is not so weighted down. They reject the doctrine of original sin, that man once had a superior nature which he is trying to regain through education. On the contrary they take the view that his human nature is the only nature that he has. Taking this basically sound capital free from Adam's debts they naturally enjoy a more buoyant optimism as they boldly build the school of the future.

With the rise of modern studies like sociology and anthropology still another approach to the moral quality of human nature has recommended itself to some educators. This is the view that original nature is neither good nor bad. The moral quality of original tendencies of human nature is not resident in the impulse to act but rather in the manner in which it reaches fulfillment, the consequences it entails in its environment, particularly its social environment. Following this theory the educator cannot take human nature as a blueprint for his instructional plans as some more romantic progressives have done. Instead, human nature will be seen to have both strengths and weaknesses, but just which they are will depend on the environmental context or field of forces.

Two Major Philosophies of Education

On the whole, again, subject to amendment and minor qualification, two basic philosophies of education emerge from a consideration of the nature of human nature. One finds a spiritual entity at the heart of

human nature which in spite of its capacities for learning and entering into various relations with its environment remains relatively constant in the midst of changes going on round about. Between some of these changes human nature is quite free to choose subject, however, to such infirmities as it has inherited from its first progenitor, Adam. The other regards human nature more materialistically as a component in a field of forces which require such continual adjustment and modification that human nature is never more than relatively constant. Attributes like integration, freedom, and moral tone are seen to inhere in the environmental context rather than in the organism itself. The first of these two views will be seen on the whole to be consistent with the major metaphysical view that generic traits of reality are rooted in the changeless and eternal. The second will be seen as a continuation of the metaphysical view that reality is more of a temporal dynamic flux.

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CHAPTER IV

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The Problem of Knowledge

The stock in trade of the teacher, as everyone knows, is knowledge. Like any good salesman, therefore, the teacher should have a thorough understanding of the materials he puts on display in the curriculum. This is especially true if the knowledge offered the child carries the label of truth. But even if it does, the question may arise how will the pupil know whether he can trust the label? Is the warrant of the teacher enough? Or must the pupil test the facts himself? And if he must, what is to be the test of knowledge, what the criterion of truth? For that matter, how does anyone know that he knows? Knowledge is such a familiar everyday occurrence that few sophisticated people ever stop to ask questions like these. Indeed few sophisticated people, such as scientists and educators who are constantly accumulating and dispensing knowledge, stop to propound such fundamental inquiries to themselves.

In directing the educator's attention toward an examination of the credentials of knowledge it may be well to note again the ancient Greek dilemma that either one knows or he does not know. As we saw before,¹ whichever horn of the dilemma we seize, presumably education is futile. It is futile to seek knowledge one already has, and it is futile to seek knowledge he does not have for he would have no means of recognizing it if he accidentally came upon it. Formerly we cited this dilemma in order to pose the difficulty any theory of learning encounters in trying to explain how anything new can enter the mind. The dilemma is apropos again because it poses a problem in the theory of knowledge as well as in the theory of learning, in epistemology as well as in educational psychology. The question presented by the dilemma is not only how does new knowledge enter the mind, but, assuming that it does, how do we know that it is the knowledge we are seeking? While these may seem to be independent questions, in reality they are inescapably tied together; the educator cannot give an answer to the one without giving an answer to the other too. Hence the problem of the teacher is not merely how do children learn or acquire knowledge, but how ought they to learn or acquire it so they can be assured it is genuine and not counterfeit?

¹ *Supra*, pp. 59-60.

This problem comes up in a number of practical connections. One of the principal ones may perhaps suffice for a sample. In planning a lesson some teachers treat knowledge as if it were already known before the lesson starts. For them it has already been found out, collected, systematized, and tucked away in textbooks, cyclopedias, dictionaries, and other academic paraphernalia. The curriculum thus has a tailor-made, ready-to-wear aspect so that all the teacher has to do is to make an appropriate selection of it in advance from the wardrobe of knowledge and to assign it for the student to acquire and don as his own. Other teachers plan their lessons in terms of pupil problems, the answers to which they may suspect but do not specifically know in advance. Consequently they feel unable to give precise formulation to the curriculum in advance of the emergence of the problem. Rather does the curriculum unfold as they make selections from the storehouse of culture which give promise of advancing the problem to a solution. Instead of being ready-to-wear the curriculum is custom-made out of selections from the social culture chosen for their promise in advancing this particular problem to a solution. But even so they will deign to label any selections knowledge only in the form finally adapted for use and only then to the extent warranted by its outcome in use.

Truth

How, now, shall the teacher decide whether to regard knowledge, the curriculum, as a ready-to-wear or as a custom-made garment? Much will depend on the criterion he selects for judging when knowledge is true and when false.¹ According to common sense this should be a comparatively easy task. It should be just a matter of comparing any bit of information, fact, or opinion with reality. If it squares with reality, then it is true. This is the "correspondence" theory of truth. It obviously proceeds on the metaphysical or ontological theory that there is an objective world independent of a human knower.² The pupil has learned the truth when his ideas or impressions correspond to this external reality. Hence correspondence is a matter of external rather than internal relations.³ On this basis truth is objective. It is preexistent to the search for it. Therefore the person engaged in educational research literally "finds" the truth; he discovers it in the sense of removing or cutting through the cover of ignorance or misunderstanding which obscured its location during the period of search. Hence truth is not temporal; rather

¹ For further references, see *infra*, pp. 204-205, 242.

² *Supra*, p. 25.

³ *Supra*, pp. 26-27.

is it eternal, immutable.¹ Any variability or ambiguity about it is apparent only, the result of human error in comprehending it.

This is almost undoubtedly the conception of truth with which the child comes to school. Thus a major part of his moral upbringing at home has been always to tell the truth. What does this moral injunction mean but that the child should make his statements of events correspond to fact. He must learn the difference between telling a story which grows out of his imagination and a story which unimpeachably corresponds to events as they happened.

There are some educational philosophers who think that truth is not just occasionally infected with human errors but always suffers from being refracted through the prism of the human mind. Furthermore, they inquire, how can we be sure that our ideas or impressions really correspond to actuality? Successive contacts with the same object often lead to widely different reactions. Moreover, our ideas or impressions of reality frequently do not correspond to those of others. How shall we tell, then, who is closer to the truth, whose reaction is closer to reality? Whichever way we judge, we must realize that any judgment is but still another idea. Obviously to those who interpose these embarrassing questions the criterion of truth must be something more than correspondence to reality. Their own answer is that truth as exact correspondence to naked reality lies forever beyond human grasp. Hence the best we can do is to seek truth as the consistency between our ideas or impressions about reality. This is the "consistency" theory of truth.

Consistency rather than correspondence is the usual test of most of those engaged in educational research or educational measurement. It undergirds their quest for "objectivity" and "reliability." To them experimental or test results are reliable if successive impressions of a single investigator tend to be consistent with each other and objective if they are consistent with the impressions of other investigators operating under the same experimental conditions. Scientific knowledge of education, therefore, is true in so far as it achieves this sort of consistency among observations.

Perhaps it needs pointing out here that the consistency theory of truth need not radically supplant the correspondence theory. The two views may not be so opposed as supplementary to each other. The correspondence theory is a statement of the meaning of truth, while the coherence theory is a statement of the test of truth. Both posit an external objective reality and probably also an eternal immutable order of truth. They differ only on how close they can bring reality and truth within the reach of human comprehension. Thus the consistency theory despairs of de-

¹ For a further reference, see *infra*, pp. 254-255.

fining the objectivity of our knowledge of external reality except in human terms, while the correspondence theory expects to leap over human barriers and come face to face with objective naked reality.

On second thought as well as at first glance it is difficult to see any way to break the impasse between the advocates of the correspondence and consistency theories of truth, respectively, the realists and the idealists. In place of meeting this deadlock head on another group of educational philosophers, the pragmatists—also known as instrumentalists or experimentalists—endeavor to bypass it. Instead of trying to gain truth by attacking reality frontally, as in the case of the correspondence theory, or from the flank, as in the case of the consistency theory, they propose to test the truth of ideas (opinions, facts, theories, or what have you) by inquiring what would be the practical consequences of acting on them? Ideas by themselves are neither true nor false. They only become true or false when employed to clear up some confusion or ambiguity which has occurred to obstruct educational practice. If they clear it up and restore the continuity of instruction, then they are true; if not, then they are false. As the pragmatist says, truth is what "works."¹ Truth, thus, does not exist; it happens. Truth is literally verification, truth-making. It is never perfect, immutable, eternal but always in the making.

The pragmatic test of truth as workability will perhaps be most familiar to educators in the project or problem method of teaching. The project is ordinarily a problem arising in a real-life situation. After thorough analysis of the problem and mobilization of data to solve it, there may appear to be one or more possible solutions. Which is the true one? The one that appears most logically consistent in view of all the data? Probably but not certainly. Pupil and teacher will not know for sure until they have tried it out to see if it works. During its trial unforeseen factors may turn up which prevent the proposed solution from working satisfactorily and which suggest that some other solution might work out better.

In essaying truth in the crucible of a problem or project we must be very careful about the ingredients which enter in and the conclusions which are drawn forth. The pupil and teacher, for instance, generally have a purpose which motivates their efforts to find a solution for their project. For this reason some pragmatic progressive educators have slipped into thinking that a solution works if it helps to realize this purpose. If so, then the search for truth is in danger of being conditioned by the interests or values motivating the educational program.² If truth is subject to

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 15, where differences in theory which do not make a difference in practice are ruled out as trivial or negligible.

² Cf. COUNTS, G. S., *School and Society in Chicago*, p. 344, Harcourt, Brace and

expediency, how can we escape the cynical attitude of Pilate when he asked, "What is truth?"

Critics of pragmatism have been quick to pounce on this confusion of truth with value. The progressive educators under criticism, however, can appeal for support to no less an advocate of pragmatism than William James. James took the view that any good which flows from acting on an idea or belief proves the truth of that idea "in so far forth." The logic of this position, however, has never been easy to defend. It seems that James was trying to argue that since true ideas are good, therefore any idea if it leads to good consequences is true. Clearly this is a *non sequitur*. Thus a teacher may tell a timid child he is doing well on a test in order to instill confidence in him to put forth his very best effort and yet know all the time that the child is doing poorly. The motivating ruse may work, but it is not therefore true.

Other pragmatists, like John Dewey, have been careful to avoid this confusion of truth and value. He treats an idea or proposed solution of a problem or project as a hypothesis. In acting on the hypothesis Dewey looks to see whether the consequences of action corroborate the original hypothesis, whether the outcome is what the hypothesis led him to anticipate. Corroboration, even where the problem concerns values, is just a question of fact. That a theory or hypothesis works when it is corroborated by its consequences suggests that possibly Dewey's theory of truth is, in a sense, a further development of the consistency theory. For him consistency is not just the relation which holds between ideas but also the relation which holds between ideas and their consequences. Yet, although there is this similarity, Dewey would still be a thoroughgoing pragmatist in holding that truth is no already completed logical pattern of consistency but rather something which is constantly on the make.

At this point it will be well to meet an important criticism which has been leveled at Dewey's pragmatism. If not subject to the kind of criticism leveled at James and his brand of pragmatism, Dewey has not escaped criticism from other directions. The claim is that since Dewey thinks of truth as verification, truth-making, he thinks of the pupil as "making" the world.¹ This is clearly a misconception. Dewey holds to the existence

Company, Inc., New York, "Toward truth in any abstract sense, social groups have no inclination; rather do they seek effective instruments for the winning of battles. If truth, however it may be defined, serves them, well and good; but if it does not, so much the worse for truth." Note how political philosophies like those of the Nazis and Communists have claimed that truth is not academic but conditioned by the interests of the state. See also *infra*, p. 248.

¹ BREED, F. S., in National Society for the Study of Education, Forty-first Yearbook, Part I, *Philosophies of Education*, pp. 108, 117, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1942.

of an externally real world just as do those who espouse the correspondence and consistency theories.¹ He differs on this point principally in how the child gets to know the world. Instead of trying to learn to know objects directly in and of themselves, the correspondence theory, or indirectly through impressions of them, the consistency theory, Dewey holds that the child learns about them incidentally in the course of using them to achieve solutions to his problems. In using them, of course, he may alter the existing state of affairs, but he does not make it, certainly not in any solipsistic fashion.

Another criticism of the pragmatist's position implies that he has got the cart before the horse. The question arises at the outset, why does any educational theory "work"? Is it an arbitrary, accidental happening? Or is there some inherent quality or interconnection of the factors at work which makes them "work"? If the latter, then educational theories are not true because they "work" but, conversely, they "work" because they are true.²

The difference between pragmatism and its critics at this point is one of metaphysics or ontology. Is school carried on in a world in which ultimate reality is already complete, in which change is insignificant, in which there is no genuine novelty, and in which time is but a vestibule to eternity?³ If so, then the conditions of truth are already preexistent so that naturally any hypothesis would work because it is already true. But if the opposite metaphysic holds, if genuine novelties are still emerging, then some conditions of truth are yet to be determined by the way man's decisions work out and the pragmatist has the horse and the cart in the right order. Nevertheless this idea that truth may change is very uncongenial to many. If truth is not a fixed star in the educational firmament, they cannot steer a steady course of study. Others do not feel uncomfortable at all in such a world. They prefer to stake everything on their experimental method of ascertaining the truth rather than on any completed statement of it at any given time.

Reliance on method is very important, anyone would admit, but do the

¹ DEWEY, J., *Logic*, p. 521, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York 1938; SCHILPP, P. A. (ed.), *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, p. 113, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1939.

² HORNE, H. H., *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, pp. 500-503, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1935. In his *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., p. 303, The Macmillan Company, New York, Horne qualifies this statement by saying "... or will work when conditions are better." This seems like a vital concession to those who contend that truth is temporal and contingent on circumstances. See also *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, pp. 420-421, where the author states that truth does not have to wait to become true.

³ *Supra*, Chap. 2.

educational pragmatists suffer from a "methodomania"? Some educational philosophers certainly think so. Employing systematic methodical doubt the pragmatist is constantly in the pursuit of truth, but he never catches up with it. His critics for the most part do not catch up with it either, but they think it is theoretically possible if they were only smart enough. The pragmatists do not even grant themselves this theoretical chance. The conclusions they reach are never final, only more or less doubtful. This persistent undercurrent of doubt leads many to charge that pragmatism is ultimately based on skepticism. This charge may be admitted, but only in part. Doubt is cultivated but not as an end in itself as by the ancient skeptics. Skeptical doubting paralyzes action. The educational pragmatist, as already stated, employs doubt to clarify action, to clear up ambiguity. Yet even with this qualification the critics are only half convinced his methodomania is cured.

Ways of Knowing

Just as there are different theories of truth, just so there are also different ways of getting to know the truth. Indeed each conception of truth treated above has its own peculiar theory of how truth is acquired and how learning, therefore, is conditioned. We may start with the correspondence theory whose adherents think that truth results from the direct apprehension of naked reality. To some of them this apprehension is a very simple affair. In fact it is so simple that they are almost disinclined to propose a theory of how it occurs. They naïvely trust their experience. Reality is what their senses tell them it is. For the urban school child who makes a field trip to the farm the making of butter is just what it appears to be. He needs no recondite epistemological theory to explain it. It is just a fact, something he knows.

Other adherents of the correspondence theory of truth do not place such naïve confidence in their senses as a way of knowing reality. The variability of sense information is too notorious for that. They depend more on theory. To them knowing is a direct participation by the learner in the nature of the object under study. Any such object generally has a number of facets by which it may be apprehended. Some of them are accidental and some are indispensable to its essential nature. The watch by which the child gets to school on time may be a pocket watch or a wrist watch, which may have Arabic or Roman numerals, may or may not have a second hand, and so forth, but if it is a watch it certainly does have some mechanism which measures the passage of time. Knowing the watch consists of sloughing off its accidental qualities and seizing upon its essential form, its "watchness." It is the essential form of the human mind that it can select out and lay hold of the essential form in the objects pre-

sented to it. When the form of the mind operates on the form of the object, it knows the object. Knowing is dianoetic; it participates in the very being of that object.¹ It is for this reason that the advocates of this theory are convinced that they know reality and that they know it directly and in its protean nakedness.

To be more specific on the way in which this sort of knowing occurs it is necessary to distinguish five steps. The first is a report from the senses of the apprehension of some object, say, the pupil's watch just mentioned. Second, memory holds the image or phantasm of the watch in mind together with other similar images or phantasms so that, third, the active intellect can distinguish between the accidental and the essential qualities of the watch. The essence of the watch, fourth, is presented to the cognitive intellect which, fifth, conceptualizes this essence in terms of what is common to all watches.² But of course the learner should not stop with this morphology of knowledge. From a knowledge of things he should go on to an understanding of the relation of one known thing to another. The true scholar, thus, is the one who seeks to know the totality of all things defined and organized in their proper hierarchical relationship to each other.

It is well to note here that the learner is not empty-handed as he starts the process of learning or acquiring knowledge. He comes to his task already possessed of certain potentialities for knowledge beyond sense data. His mind is already equipped with such primary ideas or first principles as "being," "contradiction," and "cause and effect." Such principles as these are not learned through experience; neither do they require demonstration. Rather are they self-evident. Although they do not antedate all experience, they are applied on the occasion of the first experience and are indispensable to all subsequent experience.³

Yet, in spite of this superb equipment, the faculties of human nature lack the perfect coordination which might enable them unerringly to strike straight to the heart of knowledge in every attempt at learning. This defect of man's nature can be compensated by extraordinary aids to the learning process. In the first place, it is an old article of Catholic faith that one must have faith in order to understand. The weaknesses of human nature's equipment for learning, however, can be further strength-

¹ As J. Maritain is quoted, "In the act of knowledge, the thing and the thought are not only united, they are strictly one." See the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings of the Western Division, *The Philosophy of Christian Education*, p. 51, 1941. See also G. Esser, "The Meaning of Intelligence and Its Value for Education," *Catholic Educational Review*, 33: 257-270, May, 1935.

² SANDERS, W. J., "Thomism, Instrumentalism, and Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, 10: 103-105, January, 1940.

³ MARIQUE, P. J., *Philosophy of Christian Education*, pp. 209-210, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1939.

ened by divine grace and revelation. This does not argue the neglect of man's animal nature, but merely its need for help beyond its own powers. Yet no single one of the three—faith, grace, or revelation—is sufficient by itself to help intellect to the deeper vision of truth; it is necessary that all three be employed. Moreover, not even conceiving intelligence as a possession held in common by the race will make up for the shortcomings of individual intelligence. There will still be need for divine authority. Only later, as learning expands, is it expected that authoritarianism as a crutch can be discarded. By that time, it is hoped, the intellect will be so strengthened that it will be able to record the truth from a distillate of intrinsic evidence alone.

A principal criticism of this way of knowing is that it is limited to the discovery of truth. There seems to be little room for invention, for creative learning. As a form of discovery learning is always moving toward a limit fixed in advance, that is, the apprehension of the form or species resident in objects perceived by the senses. When the teacher presents the curriculum in the shape of problems, the pupil's only thrill is the discovery of what is already known by the teacher or textbook. Even invention, whether by the great man or the pupil, is taught as the discovery of what was antecedently true or possible.¹

To return now to the second theory of truth, the consistency theory, we find a very similar and yet quite dissimilar conception of how knowledge is acquired. Here too knowledge takes its point of departure from the senses. Sense impressions in this theory, however, are not the first step toward an unobstructed view of objective external reality. Advocates of the consistency theory, as already seen, doubt that anyone can ever come into naked contact with reality as it actually is. Like Immanuel Kant, they have no hope of getting to know any object in itself, *das Ding an sich*. Hence they view their sense impressions as merely copies of reality, copies at that which take much of their character from the a priori nature of the human mind. Indeed mind tends to make knowledge in terms of its own categories of time, place, causation, and the like. Consequently this so-called "copy" theory of acquiring knowledge is as much a building forth from within as it is a taking in from without. In operating on its sense data the mind checks them for internal consistency. The more consistent they are, the more nearly they approximate the universal law and order which is characteristic of the rationality of the world wherein all knowledge subsists as an interrelated whole.

Perhaps here is the place to refer to another way of knowing, one which claims to penetrate to the very core of reality and yet one which at the same time is the highly private internal product of the knower or learner.

¹ DEWEY, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

This is learning one's world through an intuitive or mystical experience.¹ Here knowledge seems to come in sudden flashes or sharp insights. Often it is as difficult to state precisely what these intuitions are as to state systematically and objectively how they come about. They are inscrutable, ineffable, *sui generis*. Perhaps knowledge of this sort is merely an expression of the uniqueness of a person's individuality.² Yet, whether it is or not, obviously the weakness of mystical or intuitive learning is its ineffable character. Incommunicable knowledge—granting there is such—can be taught only with the greatest difficulty if it can be taught at all. The teacher can indicate things to do which *may* lead the pupil to have a particular intuition. But, since intuition is ineffable, there is no checking to see whether he has had it. There is more than a little risk, therefore, that intuition and mysticism as ways of knowing will be educationally sterile.³

The pragmatic way of knowing leads to different results. This is to be expected since the pragmatic conception of truth aims not so much to come at the reality of the external world as to try to solve the problems it presents. Consequently it does not start, as do the preceding theories, with sensations or intuitions of the world. Rather does it start with a child or organism interacting with his environment. For some reason unforeseen contingencies arise which interrupt the continuity of this interaction. The interruption poses a problem requiring inquiry which can be terminated only by knowledge leading to the restoration of continuity.

It is important to note at the outset that not all interaction with the environment terminates in knowledge. Much of the child's interaction with his environment will be just a being or a having, a doing or an undergoing.⁴ Such direct immediate acquaintance with his environment, as in the case of color, sound, or rhythm in his study of fine art, is just *sui generis*.⁵ As sensation or intuition it is ineffable. Of such experiences it is futile to try to say anything to himself and impossible to say anything to anyone else. They fall short of knowledge, however, not because they enshroud themselves in a veil impenetrable to the human mind, but because by themselves they do not call for judgment, criticism, or interpretation. Jeopardize such experiences by interrupting their smooth flowing

¹ DRESSER, H. W., *Education and the Philosophical Ideal*, pp. 21-22, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1900. See also HORNE, H. H., "The Application of Ontologies to Education," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 2: 557, November, 1916; and BRINTON, H. H., *Quaker Education in Theory and Practice*, p. 63, Pendle Hill, Wallingford, Pennsylvania, 1940. For further reference, see *infra*, p. 281.

² See also *infra*, p. 264.

³ COE, G. A., *What Is Christian Education?* pp. 276-281, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1930.

⁴ See also *infra*, pp. 227, 251.

⁵ See also *infra*, p. 95.

continuity, and then one will have to decide what conditions will restore it. If invoking these conditions actually does restore it, then that much we know. But the knowledge we know is not immediate but mediate. It is mediated through intelligence which adjudged its instrumental usefulness.

In the pragmatic way of knowing it is convenient though not inescapably necessary to distinguish five steps between the occurrence of a problem inviting inquiry and the termination of inquiry in knowledge. The first step, of course, is sensing a problem, that is, becoming more aware that one's hitherto smooth interaction with the environment is suffering some sort of impairment. The next step is to locate and delimit just precisely what the difficulty is. That done, the third operation is to hunt around for data which may be useful in solving the problem, restoring smooth interaction with the environment again. The fourth stage is the logical elaboration of this data to see what their consequences would likely be if acted upon. The final follow-up on this dramatic rehearsal in imagination of alternate possibilities is the selection of one for overt action to see whether it actually does restore one's smooth interaction with his environment. If it does, then inquiry is terminated and knowledge results.¹

There is an obvious contrast between these five steps in the method of knowing and the five of those whose method is to know true being. It may help to make this contrast more vivid by noting how each invokes the old pedagogical maxim of arranging instruction so that it proceeds from the concrete to the abstract. In the one case the concrete is some object in the environment. In the other the concrete is some instance where the pupil is dropping out of adjustment with his environment. In the one case proceeding to the abstract is an intellectual process wherein the object under study is conceptualized and classified in terms of its essential nature. In the other the process of abstraction is the intellectual clarification of the problem, the hunting up of data, and above all the elaboration in imagination of the probable consequences of proposed lines of action together with the subsequent checking of actual consequences against the original anticipation.

Finally a word should be said about authority as a path of knowledge. There are many occasions when the pupil has neither the time nor the inclination to make a personal investigation of the truth, however conceived, about some proposition important in his life. On such occasions he not infrequently accepts the word of authority, that is, the word of some book like an encyclopedia, a textbook, or the Bible or the word of some expert such as the parent, teacher, or doctor. But how far is the pupil warranted in taking this way to knowledge?

¹ For further development of this point, see *infra*, p. 101.

Some find warrant for depending on authority in the prestige of the source from which it emanates. No better example of such a source is the Catholic Church. Particularly as a teacher of faith and morals it enjoys tremendous prestige. Much of this prestige is owing to the fact that its authority has a centuries-old tradition. But principally it is owing to the fact that the fount of its authority is vouchsafed by divine revelation. Of all ways of knowing, divine revelation—if such there be—provides the most impeccable approach to truth. It is beyond the tests of correspondence, consistency, and workability for it is the very standard of criticism itself. It is unassailable; it is, indeed, infallible.¹

On the whole the modern temper has been averse to educational authoritarianism. It has preferred to submit everything to rational determination. Yet, while many turn their backs on authoritarianism, there is a version of it which should not be overlooked. Suspicious of authority with unquestioned credentials, many modern educators teach their children to accept the kind of authority which is questioned and to accept it just because it can be questioned. That is, the child learns to accept conclusions he does not otherwise understand simply because they have been tempered by a method of questioning or knowing which he accepts, although in this particular instance he has neither the training nor the background to apply the method himself personally.² Without the acceptance of this kind of authority the individual would have to learn everything slowly and painfully through personal experience. He could never take short cuts around other people's mistakes nor get a better view of the future by standing on the shoulders of experience of his forebears.

The Role of Intelligence

The different notions of truth and the different ways of knowing already suggest that there are different views with regard to the normative role which intelligence should play in education. The traditional humanistic view holds that, since the world is intelligible and can be known directly, the role of intelligence is to know. To know most fully and thoroughly is, indeed, to achieve intellectual excellence. In these terms it is easy to understand why knowledge was long thought to be the proper aim of education. Not only was knowledge thought to be power, but it was thought to be worth while on its own account. Therefore the best employment the student can give his intellect is to acquire knowledge, that is, to master the knowledge already in conceptualized form, to formulate

¹ See also *infra*, pp. 159, 284.

² Cf. HARDIE, C. D., *Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory*, pp. 22-23, Cambridge University Press, London, 1942.

new concepts of the essential nature of true being of things in areas yet untouched, and to bring the whole to a new high level of organization and systematization. To pursue knowledge in this fashion without thought of further sequel is to achieve the cultivation of intellect par excellence.¹

The educational norm, that the role of the intellect is to know, is also held by those who have no expectation of knowing their world directly. Although they have no hope that mind can penetrate the true nature of being, nevertheless they hold that the main business of education is to enable the mind to know as fully as its natural limitations will permit. So, as their way of knowing results in a "copy" of reality, just so intelligence in their conception is cast as a "spectator" of reality. Mind is a sort of intricate photostatic or picture-taking device. Knowledge recorded in the mind will, of course, reflect the mind's own finite limitations just as any picture suffers the defects of the lens and film which record it. Furthermore, mind does not mirror the world impartially like a film. Earlier views of the mind bias and help to organize subsequent ones. But in spite of these limitations the main aim of education is to perfect mental development. This mental development takes the direction of working incessantly toward that perfection or consistency of knowledge represented in concepts of universal law and order. Again to pursue the perfection of knowledge without sequel on its own account sets the highest aim of intellectual education.

The pragmatic educator conceives the normative role of intelligence quite differently. Concerned with solving practical problems rather than penetrating the true nature of reality or obtaining as near perfect facsimiles of it as possible, he conceives of intelligence in the role of an instrument in formulating and testing hypothetical solutions to his difficulties. Following Darwin he regards mind as a relatively late-comer in the evolutionary process rather than as a force primordially present throughout all history as do the preceding two theories. Instead of regarding mind as designed from all eternity to be preoccupied in beholding knowledge in all its disciplines, the pragmatist thinks of intelligence as appearing to facilitate the superior organic adaptation of man to his physical and social environment. Consequently the pragmatist in the school is not given to cultivating intellectual excellence on its own account but rather to refining it as the instrument of human adaptation to a precarious world. Adaptation leads but to continuous readaptation. No intellectual task of the school could be more absorbing than the continual solving of problems.²

Whether to consider the cultivation of intellectual excellence as an end in itself in education or to regard it as a means of adaptation tells some-

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 107-108.

² For another reference to this point, see *infra*, p. 32.

thing further about the relations of intelligence to the world. Where the role of intelligence is principally to behold and know reality, the relations of intelligence to the world are largely external.¹ That is, knowing the world does nothing to the world. It does not disturb its existing relations in any essential way either among themselves or involving the intellect doing the knowing. This conclusion definitely holds for the correspondence theory of truth and probably for the consistency one as well, for though in the latter case knowledge is largely subjective, it still does not alter reality, *das Ding an Sich*. The situation is otherwise, however, where intellect is regarded as an agent of adaptation. Here the relations of intelligence to its world are at least to an extent internal. Given a situation in the present whose outcome is uncertain and precarious, it becomes the function of intelligence to anticipate the future. Where there are alternate routes to completing in the future what is going on in the present, intelligence will have to choose which one is to be the future. In performing this role, intellect does not merely discover a foreordained, eternally completed set of relations in the world, but on the contrary it is instrumental in directing or readapting them. In other words, intelligence makes a difference in the course of events; it is truly creative.

It may occasion some surprise that pragmatic educators are sometimes called "anti-intellectuals" by their critics. This may seem all the more surprising since Dewey, their chief leader, made one of his chief educational contributions in the form of his widely read book *How We Think*.² Having made thinking such a principal part of his educational philosophy, how can he possibly be accused of being anti-intellectual? It is because the pragmatic point of view about the role of intelligence in education is so contrary to tradition. The theory that the world is intelligible and can be known by the mind in a one-to-one correspondence is entrenched behind centuries of belief and conviction. For Dewey to say now that the proper role of thinking is to solve problems rather than to plumb the depths of reality naturally seems to his critics to demean intelligence, to be, therefore, anti-intellectual. It demotes intelligence from the exalted role of an educational end to the menial role of a mere means. It reduces thinking from man's nearest approach to divine reason to a mode of natural adaptation just a little above the brute.

Obviously it will make no little difference which view of intelligence the teacher employs in planning the instructional program. In the one case he is likely to assign work as if the child's mind was a storehouse of information about the world, some gleaned from books, some from laboratories,

¹ *Supra*, pp. 26-27.

² DEWEY, J., *How We Think*, D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1910, rev. ed., 1933.

and some from field trips or life outside the school. At examination time the teacher makes demand for the delivery of goods stored, hoping against hope that they will be returned in at least as good condition as when first deposited by lecture or demonstration. In the other case he will challenge the pupil's mind with problems for which he must exercise ingenuity in digging up data and inventing hypothetical solutions. If as a result of overcoming the obstacles in the problem some knowledge clings to the pupil's mind, it will be an incidental result rather than the main objective of education.

The Activity Theory of Learning

It is very easy to make the mistake of thinking that knowing or learning is just a matter of intellection, just a matter of using one's head. This mistake is doubly unfortunate if it begets the further mistake of thinking that learning is something principally done while the pupil is seated at his desk in a state of relative physical inactivity. Indeed the conclusion that learning is a relatively inactive affair is not infrequently reinforced by the theory that mind is passive, that it is some sort of tablet on which impressions are registered by the teacher or environment.¹ In any event this position has offered stubborn resistance to progressive education with its theory that acquiring knowledge is an active rather than passive affair.

Those who have advocated the view that getting to know is an essentially active affair have by no means been unanimous in their supporting reasons. Of longest standing is the ontological view that the principle of life which animates man is fundamentally active.² Therefore when the psyche or soul, which embodies this principle of life, engages in learning, it must be an active process. This was essentially the view of St. Thomas Aquinas. He made this very clear in the analogy he drew between the offices of the doctor and the teacher. Getting well, he pointed out, is something which the patient has to do for himself. By prescribing a regimen of medicine or exercise the doctor can only aid the potentialities of the natural processes of the body to heal themselves. Similarly with education and getting to know. The child must do it himself; the teacher cannot do it for him. The teacher can teach him but, to put it ungrammatically, he cannot "learn" him. Education, accordingly, is not so much an imparting of knowledge as it is a soliciting or prompting of the child to exert his native potentialities for knowing or learning.

Many who rally to the support of "activity" schools, "activity" curriculums, learning by "doing," and the like, are attracted to this educational device because it suggests, in particular, physical activities. When

¹ *Supra*, p. 60. See also *infra*, p. 255.

² *Supra*, p. 50.

they employ this idea, they have in mind the activities of the gymnasium, the shop, and field excursions, to say nothing of freedom to move about the regular classroom. Activities of this sort they regard as a belated recognition of the child's biological nature. Generations of adults on end have tried to curb the restless and boundless energies of children with only indifferent success. What is more sensible, therefore, than to go along with nature rather than against it, to build education upon the enlistment of activity rather than its suppression!

Pursuing this theory its advocates hold that children must move about if they are to have an adequate chance to learn. They must actually go to the farm or the factory, for instance, if their knowledge of these places is to rise above secondhand impressions. Pictures and books are good as far as they go, but at best they are only symbols. They merely denote, point to, kinds of richer experience which may be had. They do not convey the actual hum of machines or the smell of new-made hay. Such firsthand knowledge can be had only through an activity program.¹

Moreover it is no accident, as someone has said, that "ken" and "can" are allied words. Hence it will no longer suffice to say, for example, that we know the Ten Commandments though we have failed to act on them. Knowing does not have an exclusive locus inside the head. Learning occurs not just from the neck up; it involves habituation of the muscles from the neck down as well. Not only that but knowledge of the participator must be seen to entail genuinely different results from that of the mere spectator. We cannot learn to play a sport or a musical instrument by merely watching someone else or by reading the directions. We must step forth and produce real strokes of the tennis racket or the violin bow ourselves if we are to learn these accomplishments.

To pragmatists progressive education's emphasis on activity suggests still another justification. With them, it will be remembered, activity is an all-important step in the method of knowing. Confronted with a problem and alternate solutions which might turn out in various ways, the pragmatic pupil or teacher will not know which is the best way till he acts on one or more of them. He must translate his hypotheses into a series of activities, activities in fact which result in physical changes in the environment, and note their consequences before he can conclude what he knows or has learned.² Hence learning is akin to verification; it is essentially experimental. The process is the same whether carried on in the classroom or the laboratory. The paramount reason for the activity program, then, is not ontological nor biological, but epistemological.

¹ For another reference to this point, see *infra*, p. 258.

² DEWEY, J., *Democracy and Education*, pp. 181, 321-322, 393, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916. Another reference to the same point is *infra*, pp. 255-256.

Considerable exception is taken to the pragmatist's theory of activity learning. The chief resistance centers in certain kinds of learning in which, so his opponents allege, no activity of the learner could possibly alter the relations of the subject matter under study. Take the case of astronomy as an instance. Certainly no activities engaged in by the learner are going to alter astronomical relations. Again take the case of history. Surely no study activities of the pupil or even the graduate student of historical research can change the course of past history. He may amplify or amend the historical record but not the historical fact. In slightly different vein look at moral education. Need one engage in vice in order to learn to eschew it? Merely to ask the question is to discredit it. Finally, may it not be possible that some people will delight in the acquisition of impractical knowledge, knowledge which solves no problems? Thus should there not be a place in school for viewing great art, hearing edifying music, and witnessing inspiring drama?

These are pointed questions. They do not, however, want for a rejoinder.¹ The pragmatic educator does not contend that all relations are internal, only that some are. Yet, even if learning cannot alter history and astronomy, it nevertheless is still true that one cannot learn history or astronomy without undertaking definite physical activities such as examining documents or peering through telescopes. Again, the pragmatic educator would probably grant that not all knowledge involves practical activities, for obviously there is much knowledge that is pursued for purely aesthetic and scientific ends. But one fact needs pointing out even in this case that scientific and aesthetic knowledge have usually been distilled by intelligence from what originally were practical activities. And even in the scientific and aesthetic pursuit of knowledge for its own sake learning must ultimately involve activity if it is to be verified.²

*Knowledge as Subject Matter*³

So far our treatment of the theory of knowledge has been preoccupied with the conquest of new knowledge rather than with knowledge already conquered and subjugated, that is, reduced to subject matter. A word is now in order with regard to knowledge as subject matter in the curriculum. Such conflicts as obtain here are largely the lengthened shadows from those already considered in the acquisition of knowledge. We may well start with the question whether to treat subject matter in the curriculum as knowledge which already antedates the learning experience of the child or

¹ Cf. MONTAGUE, W. P., *Ways of Knowing*, pp. 134-135 n., The Macmillan Company, New York, 1925.

² For an application of the foregoing activity theories, see *infra*, p. 227.

³ For a treatment of this topic in the curriculum, see *infra*, pp. 223-228.

whether to regard it as just information or data which become transformed into knowledge as it successfully meets the demands of the problem being studied by the child with his teacher.

The most commonly accepted view of subject matter in the curriculum is that it already has the status of knowledge. Subject matter is the funded capital of social experience which has met the test of life. It is the truth. At least it is the truth tempered and hammered on the anvil of experience to as near perfect shape as human effort can bring it. The great repository of known truths is the library. There arranged shelf after shelf, tome upon tome, is the systematized knowledge of the race. What better can the teacher do than go to this storehouse of knowledge before school opens and carefully choose select portions of its contents to be included in the curriculum of the school! And what better can the pupil do after reaching school than to appropriate unto himself his daily assignment of knowledge of the great truths of the past!

In spite of the great tradition which this sort of curriculum represents, there are cautions which the educator should bear in mind. If the curriculum is handled in this fashion, there is risk of worshipping knowledge for its own sake. The caution is not that knowledge is not worthy as an aesthetic end but that knowledge as an aesthetic having and contemplating may be exaggerated. This obstructs or severs intelligence from action and volition, knowledge from the everyday concerns of life. Moreover, the content of the curriculum too easily becomes largely verbal, to say nothing of being stated largely in other men's words. Vicarious experience gets to be substituted for that which is firsthand, and children become victims of a regime of memorizing mere facts and words. In sum, man is taken captive by his own cultural spoils.

A more recent view regards subject matter in the curriculum more in the nature of data or information. The fact that this subject matter is the verified knowledge resulting from previous problematic inquiry is no guarantee to them that it should be learned in exactly the form in which it emerged from that inquiry. In a changing precarious world they hold that it is premature to assume that the next problem for inquiry will so closely resemble the former one that knowledge gleaned from it can be carried over to the new without verification. Consequently they prefer to regard knowledge from previous inquiries merely as the data for solving subsequent ones. In this view of the matter the curriculum cannot be selected in advance of the opening of school. To be sure a course of study can be drawn up of possible and even probable things to learn during the year. But what goes into the ongoing curriculum from day to day will be determined largely by what problems come up. There will be subject

matter in this curriculum, but it will not be learned exactly in the form in which it emerged from previous inquiry. Rather will it be learned as it is adapted to the unique problem at hand. Only as the modification is successful will the materials of the curriculum be transformed from the status of subject matter, data, information, into that of knowledge.

This view of the curriculum also deserves a caution. It is the caution, already mentioned in another connection, of considering no subject matter unless it is related to some practical situation. Some children have aesthetic and scientific interests in subject matter quite apart from employing it to solve their personal problems. They enjoy exploring the grove of knowledge on its own account. Another limitation of too exclusive preoccupation with the practical situation is that if the school sticks too closely to what chance presents this way it may omit or overlook some important areas included in the course of study. The school must not become so absorbed in the informal character of the curriculum that it forgets the function of the more formal course of study. The latter, planned in advance, affords perspective from which the teacher can judge whether the child is getting sufficient scope and sequence in his curriculum which is made somewhat extempore.

Beyond the question whether subject matter in the curriculum is to be regarded immediately or only subsequently as knowledge is the question whether subject matter can be organized into degrees of knowledge whenever it is appropriate to consider it knowledge. Those who think of knowledge as a penetration into the very nature of being refer to several grades of knowledge. These grades they measure by the degree of abstraction they achieve, that is, the degree of being to which they penetrate. The first degree is a knowledge of physical nature, animate and inanimate. Here the pupil studies physical objects or physical organisms, analyzed and conceptualized according to the form or species of each. This level includes all physical sciences such as physics, chemistry, biology, and geology. The next degree of knowledge is that of mathematics. Physical objects and organisms all exist in some quantity or number. Yet, while things must have number, number itself can be abstracted from things and can be given a logical development of its own. Indeed the validity of the logic of mathematics depends on its own self-consistency rather than on any empirical verification. The final degree of knowledge is metaphysics. Here the pupil deals with pure being. Here he reaches a level of abstraction of his knowledge which is quite free from any material specification as is so preeminently the case in the first degree and to a limited extent in the second. Of course the well-balanced curriculum will include all three degrees of knowledge, but even so there will be no doubt as to the hierarchi-

cal order of their importance.¹ Metaphysics is clearly the queen of all disciplines in the curriculum.

Three Major Philosophies of Education

In considering the generic traits of reality and the nature of human nature there appeared to be two major theories or philosophies of education by which to guide educational practice. In reviewing the theory of knowledge, however, there appear to be three major points of view. Differences in educational philosophy here seem to stem basically from different attitudes toward reality, or better, from different attitudes toward the knowability of reality. The classic view regards reality as knowable and intelligence as capable of knowing it. Truth is the precise correspondence of the knowable with the known. Once known, knowledge can be introduced into the curriculum directly. A later view holds that all one knows of reality are his sensory and mental reactions to it. Reality itself is forever beyond direct knowing. Truth, therefore, is found in the consistency of our constructs of reality. In knowing the world each beginner builds his own, seeking for as much consistency as he can find between his own ideas and those of others. A last view turns aside from the ancient stalemate of whether we know reality or only our ideas of reality. Instead this philosophy of education defines knowledge in terms of successful adaptation to environment. Truth is what "works" and learning is verifying. Knowledge is the outcome of this process, but it appears in the curriculum principally as data for future inquiry.

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¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 99-100.

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CHAPTER V

EDUCATIONAL VALUES

The Scope of Educational Values

Few problems stand so persistently at the educator's elbow as do those involving questions of value. Directly or indirectly questions of value are involved in nearly every decision which the educator makes. Education is directly concerned with values at a number of points. Most obvious, of course, are points such as instructional aims, motivation, and marks or grades. To state one's aims of education is at once to state his educational values. It is through such a statement that we get at the purposes of a teacher or school system. These or other aims, when accepted by the pupil, constitute the values which motivate him at his study of the curriculum. If the student is interested in his work, it is a sign that he values it. The value which the teacher attaches to his achievement is usually represented by a mark or a grade. But the evaluation of schoolwork goes on in many other ways than that of formal marking.

In fact, indirectly evaluation is going on nearly all the time of the educator's day. Thus the educator is constantly in the position of having to choose between this and that educational policy, between this and that educational practice. He should decide in the first instance on a consistent set of policies, a philosophy of education, if you will, in the light of which to decide details of practice. Here he will have a choice between at least half a dozen points of view, ranging from the policies of progressive education to those of more traditional forms of education. He must decide, more practically, whether to adopt the project method, whether to institute an elective or prescribed curriculum, what use to make of scientific tests and measurements, and how to accommodate the interests of liberal and vocational education to each other. All of which is to say nothing of a host of lesser details like choosing among various possible textbooks, determining the form of report cards, and deciding what to do in the case of minor infractions of school discipline.

Most of these judgments the educator makes in terms of the best practice he knows and the experience he has had with it. That is, he settles his values empirically. Too few educators, however, have any underlying theory of values which they can consult to give them some degree of consistency in handling their succession of varied duties. Or perhaps they

have a theory but it is only vaguely formed and they are not consciously aware of it. They are probably no more consciously aware of the theory of knowledge on which they operate than they are of their value theory. Yet, important as it is to have a conscious theory of the truth, it is even more frequent that the importance of a conscious theory of the good arises.

Are Values Subjective or Objective?

Do educational values exist independently of the valuer, or do they find their origin in a valuing organism? This is one of the first questions to answer in forming a conscious theory of educational values. The question will be recognized at once as another form of our old problem of whether to regard relations as internal or external.¹ As might be expected, some educators take the view that educational values are internal and subjective. Thus textbooks, school supplies, and other academic paraphernalia have value because of the relation they bear to pupils and teachers who value them. With these educators value is biological or psychological in nature and origin. The environment is neither of worth nor worthless unless an organism is involved. Upset the organism's equilibrium, and instinct, emotion, and intellect will at once combine to express a preference. Value is then realized in the native demand for the restoration of balance. In ascribing value to his environment, man is merely projecting these feelings into the objects to which he pays attention. But by themselves these objects have no value until connected with some human interest.

Other educators are inclined to regard educational values as external and objective. To them value is not just a private inner experience. Rather it is an external quality in the things and circumstances which surround teachers and learners. One way of stating it further is that everything has some form or purpose. For instance, the skilled artisan takes wood and steel and fashions them into schoolroom seats and desks. That is, he gives form to these raw materials. This form lends purpose or value to the product. Value, thus, is incorporated into the object; it is objectively part of it.

Adherents of this view do not doubt that personal desire is an important element of educational value. What they do deny is that it is the complete account. They are unable to find the whole meaning of value in the relation of teacher or pupil to his environment. Value, in short, is independent of desire. It antedates and arouses desire. They are ready to defend the thesis that, unless value inheres in the form of the universe as a whole, it can scarcely be said to abide in a fragment thereof such as man. Consequently, there must be more to educational value than the mere wishful behavior of persons engaged in the instructional process.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 26-27.

Lest this difference of opinion on the subjectivity or objectivity of values seems a hair-splitting distinction, it may be well to point out the significant differences to which it leads in school practice. The problem of whether Latin, or any subject for that matter, should be included in the curriculum against the wishes of those studying it will illustrate the importance of the distinction. If the curriculum maker follows the subjective theory of value, it will be difficult for him to insist on the continued inclusion of Latin in the face of the fact that children are not *interested* in it or that parents do not see the *need* of it. But if, on the contrary, the curriculum maker follows the objective theory of value and holds that Latin has values regardless of whether pupils or parents recognize them, he will feel justified in requiring Latin in spite of the disinclination of pupils and parents.

Both theories of educational values, plausible as they may be, are not without their difficulties. On the one hand, to insist that children keep at Latin, the piano, or anything else on the theory that it is good for them even if they do not recognize it places a great strain on motivation, if it does not almost contradict it. If it does not deny motivation, it at least results in a severe dislocation of it. Instead of locating motive in the relation of the pupil to the curriculum, it locates it in his relation to the adults supervising his instruction. Instead of pleasing himself, he seeks to please others. If he has to put forth uncongenial efforts in this direction, the result will still be justified to him as having great value, the value of discipline, of learning to do things one does not like to do.

On the other hand to insist that children study only when and what they like seems to make all values relative. If all values are relative to individual taste, what is to become of social stability? What will happen to moral education if there is no settled way of teaching what is right and what is wrong? According to this view there is no common rule of good and evil, no standard of value that is simply and absolutely so. On the contrary, this view seems to assert with a vengeance the old saying that "There is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so."

Ominous as the charge against the subjectivity and relativity of educational values sounds, one fact must not be overlooked that the charge does not bother some educators at all. Quite the opposite, they welcome the prospect of teaching where values are constantly subject to examination relative to each school and each child. For them, indeed, only those values which retain the sap of flexibility have sufficient vitality to survive in a constantly evolving world.¹ They take seriously the poet's dictum that "New occasions teach new duties; time makes ancient good uncouth."

It is worth noting in passing that the subjectivist has his own way of dealing with social values so that children will not be reared to disregard

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp 28.-29.

them. He holds that the child will and must inevitably learn that he lives with adults who are as interested in asserting and maintaining their values as he is in his. If he expects adults to concede him the opportunity of realizing his values, so too he must behave so they can realize theirs. For the child to conform to adult social values without personally accepting or endorsing them may seem, perhaps, to differ little if at all from the situation where values are regarded as objective. But if they are objective here too, it is a different kind of objectivity. It is a situation in which values are objective, not in the metaphysical sense of being independent of human valuers, but in the social sense of being the values of other people.

Kinds of Value

As we come to closer grips with the problem of educational value it will be well to distinguish several kinds of value. At the outset there are two major categories which develop from two meanings which attach to the infinitive "to value." A moment's reflection will reveal that this infinitive means both to value and to evaluate. The same difference appears in to prize and to appraise, to esteem and to estimate. The difference also comes out in the distinction between what is desired and what is desirable.¹ It is a commonplace that not everything that a child desires is in fact desirable. Desires are simple expressions of biological urges or bodily appetites. They only become elevated to the level of the desirable when, after taking other things into account, they have been judged desirable.² Educational values, therefore, cover both likings and intelligent likings. Like knowledge, they are both immediate and mediate.³

Educational values as simple or immediate likings, prizings, or desirings are consummatory values. As such they are ineffable, *sui generis*. They satisfy a unique craving or want which cannot be satisfied by any other thing. If a child has a bent for the fine arts, then work in painting, modeling, music, or dancing is the only thing which will adequately give realization to his values. There is no use prescribing chemistry, history, or trigonometry for they will not carry the same sense of consummation, self-fulfillment. Similarly if one has a bent for chemicals or antiquity, then there is no use trying to substitute work in the fine arts. Only chemistry or history will satisfy these unique inclinations. At the initial level of desire, then, every school activity has its own invaluable value. The student should learn to appreciate each of these activities in some measure on its own account, just for the simple fulfillment of the desire it satisfies.

¹ For an application of this distinction, see *infra*, pp. 231-232.

² Cf. BODE, B. H., "The Concept of Needs in Education," *Progressive Education*, 15: 7-9, January, 1938.

³ *Supra*, pp. 80-81.

Yet, valuable as it is to squeeze each school activity to as complete fulfillment of desire as it is possible, it is even more valuable to be intelligent in the choice of the desires which one seeks to fulfill. Not all desires are of equal worth. Moreover there frequently is not time enough to realize every worthy desire. Hence we must choose between desires; we must use our heads as well as our hearts to get the most value out of school and out of life. Our values must undergo evaluation and appraisal. In the process of mediating or intelligently selecting values we should note two further kinds of educational values, instrumental and intrinsic.¹

Instrumental values are values that are judged good because they are good *for* something. Their value depends on their consequences when used to achieve some other value. In drawing up a course of study for a student to pursue, for example, What subjects or values should be included? Much will depend on what career the student has set for himself. If he has decided to become an engineer, then studies like mathematics and science will have first call on his adviser's attention. Because they are the indispensable means or tools for the student's future career their value is clearly instrumental. They are good *for* such a career. But they might not be good at all for some other career such as that of a lawyer or actor. Instrumental values, thus, are clearly subjective in character and relative to people and situations.

Intrinsic values are values which are judged good, not for something else, but *in* and *of* themselves. Their value is not contingent on other values outside and beyond themselves but is inherent, self-contained. The inherent value of anything can be easily determined by inquiring what its peculiar function or excellence is. Take the desks at which the pupil works in school as an illustration. Their unique function is to provide the pupil with a place at which to pursue his studies, a place to write and sketch or to spread out his books and study materials. No other piece of classroom furniture has this particular value; only the desk has it. This value inherent in the desk is objective rather than subjective. It is external to such human valuers as pupils and teachers, and it is not relative to these or other uses to which they plan to put it.²

In fact, the desk's inherent value was literally built right into it. The artisan who made the desk might have given the same wood and metals a different form such as a cabinet. But instead he made them into a desk. Therefore this object of school furniture must always be primarily evaluated in terms of its approximation to the ideal or perfect prototype of a desk. If the educator is an idealist, this ideal is more than just an idea to be experimentally embodied and verified in the craftsman's shop; it is part of

¹ For application to motivation and the curriculum, see *infra*, pp. 228-229.

² For later employment of this idea, see *infra*, pp. 115, 133-134.

the eternal mold of the universe.¹ Unless the draftsman and the artisan get some conception of this ideal, they can neither form a pattern of what is to be made nor can they evaluate their work after having finished it.

Can anything have both instrumental and intrinsic value at the same time? Instrumentalists, because they regard all values as subjective and relative, feel that they would be contradicting themselves were they to hold that values could be intrinsic and objective as well. But those who subscribe to intrinsic value are quite willing to admit that anything, such as a school desk, might have instrumental as well as intrinsic value. Thus, the teacher might strike an informal pose by sitting on his desk as he explains some problem. Although not designed to be a seat, a desk can be used for one. It can have that instrumental subjective value assigned to it by use. But whatever its use, it still retains its original objective intrinsic value.

Aesthetic Values

A still further kind of value perhaps needs separate statement. As already noted, every educational value has its own unique invaluable value. That is, there is a sense in which it can be enjoyed on its own account just as an enjoyable experience. Indeed unless we learn to appreciate each subject in the curriculum for whatever value it may possess *sui generis*, then, when it comes time to invoke it, we may all too likely overlook the very quality in it which we have not appreciated and of which we are most in need. There is a possibility, furthermore, of an intensified appreciation of educational values for what they uniquely are. To intensify appreciation, to strain and alert every sensitivity to a full appreciation of a value is to treat it as an aesthetic value.²

There is a tendency in education to limit aesthetic values to a restricted range of subject matter in the school, notably the fine arts of music, dancing, painting, modeling, and perhaps literature, especially poetry. Yet there are a number of educators who think this much too narrow a range.³ They think that pupils can have intensified appreciation of geography and shopwork just as well as of music and drawing, that pupils can enjoy beauty in mathematics as well as in poetry. They would regard all the arts as offering fulfillment to children's aesthetic yearnings, the useful arts along with the fine ones. When children actually perceive the possibility of intensified values in the arts, it is nothing short of extraordinary what tasks

¹ *Supra*, pp. 34-35.

² For an incorporation of this idea in the nature of interest, see *infra*, p. 233.

³ DEWEY, J., *Democracy and Education*, pp. 278, 281, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916; DEWEY, J., "Appreciation and Cultivation," *Harvard Teachers Record*, 1: 73, April, 1931; and DIX, L., *Work, Play and Art in Education*, New York, 1942. See also *infra*, p. 233.

they will lay on themselves in order to achieve the enhanced values of perfected performance. In this sense the aesthetic emphasis on schoolwork is not a luxury but an emphatic expression and final embodiment of what makes education important and valuable.¹

To cultivate a more intense appreciation of the subject matters or arts included in the school curriculum is no easy matter. The teacher cannot simply assign values and tell children to appreciate them, much less to appreciate them deeply. There seems to be general agreement that the approach to this problem has both emotional and intellectual components. If there is difference of opinion, it is on the amount of each of these ingredients.² Some seem to think that the appreciative or creative mood is dominated by an inward orientation; it is propelled by an inner desire to objectify one's emotional mood. Of course there must be intellectual guidance, but yet that can be effective only when surcharged with emotion. Others, recognizing the importance of emotion in enhanced appreciation, nevertheless put more stress on the intellectual, problem-solving aspect of aesthetic creation and aesthetic appreciation. Perhaps the balance of these forces is different for different individuals.

In any event the educator will do well not to confuse aesthetic values with other kinds of value in the curriculum. Studies are capable of aesthetic enjoyment quite apart from the support or criticism they afford of existing institutions. The fine, industrial, or liberal arts can be intensively prized by pupils quite apart from whether they pull their own weight in the economic boat, whether they make the pupil a more patriotic American, or whether they coincide with Christian morals. Yet while aesthetic values are capable of standing independently on their own feet, nevertheless they should not stand apart from the activities of daily life. On the contrary they should lend a quality of enrichment to every decision that the pupil has to make.³

Hierarchy of Value

After recognizing the existence of different kinds of value and the need for judging among them, it is but logical to inquire whether there is any

¹ WHITEHEAD, A. N., *The Aims of Education*, pp. 62-63, Williams & Norgate, Ltd., London, 1929; BODE, B., *Progressive Education at the Crossroads*, p. 121, Newson and Company, New York, 1938.

² RUGG, H. O., *Culture and Education in America*, pp. 364-370, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., New York, 1931. See also HORNE, H. H., *Philosophy of Education*, pp. 221, 307-310, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927; and RABY, J. M., *A Critical Study of the New Education*, pp. 53-54, 100, Catholic Education Press, Washington, D.C., 1932.

³ BENNE, K. D., "Art Education as the Development of Human Resources," *Art Education Today*, pp. 1-8, 1948.

hierarchy of values which the educator can use as a yardstick or norm to evaluate educational practices and policies. On this point educational philosophers differ. Those holding that educational values are objective and intrinsic are most likely to be the ones to think it possible to erect a hierarchy of value. Lowest in their scale are the values arising from simple unmediated desire or animal appetite. Such are the child's spontaneous joy in play, in color, or in rhythm. While all such consummatory values are good, some are better than others. This suggests a second or higher level of values, those rationally judged valuable. By general consent values thoughtfully chosen in the light of their consequences, values thoughtfully conceived in harmony with cosmic design, take precedence over unreflected desires.

Even educational values thoughtfully chosen are capable of organization into a further order of preference. To make this arrangement we may begin by ranking intrinsic values above instrumental ones. Instrumental values, because they are subject to individual purpose and circumstance, have much greater variability than do intrinsic ones which remain settled by the form or purpose originally impressed on or embodied in the thing valued. From this we may conclude more generally that the values which are more durable are on the whole superior to those with less lasting qualities. Temporal values must give way to eternal ones. Similarly those values which are more inclusive or more many-sided take priority over those which are exclusive and less variegated. Much the same can be said for values marked by greater productivity, greater creativity. Some try to organize thoughtfully chosen values in a hierarchy based on the frequency of their occurrence in daily life. To an extent this is possible, but there are some educational values, like knowing how to swim, which the child may not need often but when he does in a rare emergency the value has a cruciality which outweighs its frequency of occurrence.

As intrinsic values stand higher in the hierarchy of educational values than do instrumental ones, so too among intrinsic values those stand highest in the hierarchy which are least materialistic. It has already been noted that intrinsic values seem to be incorporated into the very form which matter takes. On this account the more nearly matter actualizes the perfection of form of which it is potentially capable, the more valuable it is. To use our former illustration of school furniture, the more nearly the raw materials of wood and steel actually take the ideal form of seats and desks under the hand of the skilled artisan, the better seats and desks we have. Or, to state it theoretically again, the more matter passes from potentiality to actuality of form, the more being it possesses. Hence, as some educational philosophers say, the good is convertible with being.

Furthermore, the more the artisan or educator is concerned with form

and the less with matter, the greater is the increase in intrinsic value. To contemplate the proper form and design of schoolroom furniture, therefore, is an intrinsically superior activity to fabricating raw materials according to that design. Consequently liberal studies like mathematics and languages are more valuable than are vocational studies like shopwork and agriculture. The latter, to be sure, involve some form along with considerable attention to matter, but the former deal with form almost exclusively. It follows, incidentally, that the highest studies will be those which deal with pure form. Form most abstracted from matter is usually found in the intellectual disciplines. At least we have Aristotle's word for it that the highest form of happiness is to be found in sheer intellectual contemplation; indeed such activity is most like the divine occupation of God himself. If studies have the intrinsic hierarchy of worth indicated, then we can further lay it down that the order of studies in the curriculum is prescriptive and not elective. The order of worth being inherent in the nature of things, it is not subject to the preference of the individual student.

These conclusions are reinforced by noting that a similar hierarchy obtains in the nature of man and rules his various faculties. These faculties, as we have seen, are principally of two sorts, the somatic and the rational.¹ Man's somatic faculties pertain to his body and are physical and material in nature. At this bodily level man has much the same faculties as other animals in that he takes nourishment, gets angry, moves about, and succumbs to sleep. But over and above this common heritage man possesses one faculty not shared with any other animal, the faculty of reason. True, other animals can learn to adapt themselves to unusual situations; yet, in spite of this ability, there still remains a vast gap between rational man and the most adaptable animal. Man's rational faculty is further unique in that, though somehow connected with his physical cerebrum, it partakes of the immaterial nature of the soul. This makes reason akin to form and enables reason to sort out and apprehend the form of things. Therefore the rational faculty ranks above the somatic faculties. Being both immaterial and preoccupied with form, it is intrinsically superior to them. Consequently physical education, valuable as it is, must yield precedence to intellectual education in such disciplines as logic, rhetoric, and mathematics. Thus it turns out that the studies which involve the most form and the least matter happen at the same time to coincide with the very ones which most deal with man's higher rational nature.²

The instrumentalist cannot help but look askance at so elaborate an attempt to set up a hierarchy of educational values. To the instrumentalist,

¹ *Supra*, pp. 50-51.

² For further reference to intrinsic or final values, see *supra*, pp. 89-90, and *infra*, p. 221.

it will be remembered, values are good *for* something. Which of two values, therefore, outranks the other will depend on which one is the better instrument for achieving some given educational objective or policy. A hierarchy, thus, cannot be established in advance or once for all. The order of value will rather depend on each particular educational situation, each particular person, at some particular time, at some particular place. Such a relativity of standard is maddening to the critics of instrumentalism but utterly necessary for the instrumentalist if standards are to grow experimentally in the light of a dynamic universe.

For example, which of several textbooks put out by competing publishers should a teacher recommend for adoption? If the policy of the board of education is to emphasize economy, then perhaps the book with the sturdiest binding or the one with the lowest sale price will be chosen. If cost is not a factor and the policy of the board is to look for educational advantages, then the book with print most suited to the age of the pupil, the clearest exposition, and the most attractive illustrations will be selected as the best means of instrumenting the board's policy.

It goes without saying, of course, that deciding which of several books is the best instrument for giving effect to educational policy is in the first instance a matter for intellectual deliberation. But the instrumental comparison of values does not end there. Comparison is not finally validated until choice has been put to the test. Valuation is as much a matter of inquiry as knowledge is. Just as the pragmatist verifies knowledge by acting on his hypothesis and checking the consequences back against it,¹ so too his cousin, the instrumentalist, ultimately chooses values on the basis of how they work out in practice. In other words, *does* one textbook wear longer than another; do children *actually* find one book easier to read and to comprehend than another? That is, do these instrumental values accomplish the consummation of values anticipated? If so, then choice can be substantially grounded.

A more difficult case for the instrumental comparison of values arises where the teacher must choose, not just between values which are means or instruments for achieving educational policy, but between several educational policies as values. Again we may say that that educational policy is best which affords the best means of carrying out some broader or more general educational policy or value. For instance, should the board of education just mentioned adopt a policy of economy or a policy of educational expediency? Much will depend, no doubt, on whether the need for determining policy comes up during a period of economic depression or a period of economic prosperity. But even if it is the former, should the board practice economy at the expense of effective texts for children or at the expense

¹ *Supra*, p. 81.

of building repairs? Which is more valuable, children or buildings? Yet granted that people are more important than things, a contract for building repairs might relieve the ranks of the unemployed. How, from that angle, shall we balance the interests of growing minds against the interests of the adult unemployed? And even if relief from unemployment has first claim on our values, is it better to seek a solution of our economic woes by educating the next generation more effectively or by salvaging the economic wrecks of the preceding generation?

This analysis basic to choosing educational policy can obviously be carried much further. The difficulty lurking in this analysis is that it might be carried indefinitely further. Each level of policy analysis seems to depend for determination on some other value, which depends on still some other value, which depends on some more remote value, which depends on some still more remote value, and so on ad infinitum. At each level of analysis choice depends on the acceptance of some common denominator of value from the next level into which the values of the lower level are divisible. But one never arrives at a final level or denominator of value which is accepted on its own cognizance as finally backing all preceding values and not on its instrumentality in achieving further values. Refusing recourse to some fixed value a priori, the instrumentalist educator seems confronted with the dilemma either of never acting, because his mental elaboration of what instrumental values are good for leads on and on into an infinite regress, or of acting before he has thought his values through to a final conclusion.

If the educator is a good instrumentalist, he knows he cannot expect complete and final intellectual assurance in advance for values which can only be validated in the future by noting the consequences of acting on them. Therefore he has no great difficulty in resolving the above dilemma. Being a good pragmatist or experimentalist he mentally anticipates as carefully as possible which value is most likely to be the best means of attaining some end and then acts on it. But the question persists, How does he arrive at the preference of a value on which to act? He does so by treating some end, not as a potential means to another end, but as an end in itself. That is, he anchors his preference on this end value, not as a final or objective value, as the advocate of an intrinsic hierarchy of values might do, but as an ineffable or consummatory value. The advantage of doing this is that consummatory values are, somewhat paradoxically, good without being good for anything. They are, it will be remembered, unique, *sui generis*. Being what they uniquely are, they are not only irreplaceable but incomparable. There is no appeal from them. They can serve at once as a dependable criterion to select what appears to be the greater instrumental value upon which to act and by which to judge the consequences of action.

Thus this invocation of consummatory values puts an effective, if not final, stop to any tendency to string out a series of instrumental values into an infinite regress.

It but remains to deal with those who jump from the uniqueness of consummatory educational values to the conclusion that consummatory values are all of equal worth. In evaluating courses for college admission, for instance, they claim that every subject is of equal value with every other one if pursued for an equal length of time under equally competent instruction. Now there is no doubt that each school subject has its own unique consummatory value which it alone satisfies. If a student is interested in the past, then history is the one and only study which will satisfy that interest. Neither physics nor mathematics nor any other nonhistorical study can do it. Similarly if one desires to study the atom, physics and mathematics and not history are the uniquely valuable subject matters. One cannot transpose history and physics nor mathematics and history. But these subjects are not therefore equal. They are rather incommensurable. If they are incommensurable, then they are neither equal with each other nor greater or less than each other.

Obligation and Motivation

Before going further with a theory of educational values it will be well to distinguish two further aspects of the process of valuation. When we make statements about educational values, we must be clear about the use of our language. If the teacher announces to his class, "We all like to write neat compositions, don't we?" what precisely does he mean? Two meanings appear possible from such a statement.¹ The teacher may be simply stating a fact. Or, knowing full well that the contrary is the fact, he may be taking this form of exhorting his students to make it the fact. Obviously the impact of the two meanings of the same words is quite different. The class may be quick to perceive just what this impact is. So too in a theory of educational values we must be alert to make the same distinction. We must distinguish what in fact *is* held valuable from what *ought* to be held valuable. While we know pretty well how to settle disagreements about facts of value—for they do not differ greatly from other kinds of facts—we find it much more difficult to settle disputes about what ought to be the fact or norm of value.²

What gives educational values a sense of oughtness, a quality of

¹ HARDIE, C. D., *Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory*, p. 123, Cambridge University Press, London, 1942.

² National Society of College Teachers of Education, *Twenty-eighth Yearbook, The Discipline of Practical Judgment in a Democratic Society*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942.

compelling our assent to them? Those who subscribe to an intrinsic theory of values have perhaps the simplest and most impelling answer to this question. With them the norm is set by determining the unique function or excellence of the thing under evaluation. To return to man, granted that his unique nature is rational, then we must organize his educational values in the order of their rationality. We have no choice in the matter. Rationality is man's peculiar essence, form, or excellence by fiat of his Maker. In obedience to or at least out of respect to his Maker, therefore, we ought—that is, we owe an obligation—to recognize this value. This obligation is all the more binding if one holds, as many do, that human nature is essentially unchanging.¹ Thus the oughtness of educational values stems not only from the way things objectively are, the way the external world is constituted, but also from the fact that this frame or scheme of things is eternal in the heavens.²

The instrumentalist or pragmatist in educational values lacks the all-compelling norms of the adherent of intrinsic values. His values in the first place are relative to some particular situation in hand. Being relative and possibly subjective they exercise commanding allegiance over him only in so far as he accepts them to act upon. Even then he may reject them if they do not prove their worth experimentally. The obligation of educational values, therefore, is grounded experimentally rather than metaphysically in the nature of man. Instead of deriving oughtness from the nature of man as he eternally is, the instrumentalist squeezes oughtness from the nature of man as he develops or evolves in terms of a career in time or history and in the culture of which he is an inseparable part. Rather than being the norm of value, intelligence or rationality is the means by which he discriminates values; it is an efficient rather than a final cause in determining values.³ The depth of one's feeling of obligation, therefore, rests on the strength of the grip which the intellectually foreseen end or value has on moving him to act for its realization.

It is one thing intellectually to recognize an obligation to act on the values which he accepts. It may be quite another to mobilize the physical energies necessary to actualize these values.⁴ Some educational philosophers have thought that intellectual recognition of educational values is sufficient to motivate the child to learn his lessons. If he has difficulty in rising to

¹ *Supra*, pp. 56-59.

² *Supra*, pp. 36-37.

³ Cf. Hook, S. "The Ends of Education," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 18: 173-184, November, 1944; and THOMAS, L. G., "The Meaning of Progress in Progressive Education," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 32: 395-396, October, 1946.

⁴ For another reference to this problem, see *infra*, pp. 236-238.

the demand of his homework or his piano practice, when his friends are out playing, then he must lift himself up to it by loyalty to sheer abstract duty. Similarly, if he finds it an effort to live the ideal of good manners and morals taught him at home and in church, he must nonetheless attach himself disinterestedly to principle, for any appeal to personal desire could not escape being selfishly expedient.

Other educational philosophers take the view that motivation must originate and be sustained by the physical, biological drives of the human organism. It is unfulfilled desire or coiled up native energies seeking release, they claim, which galvanize values and make them come alive. What carries the student over a period of flagging enthusiasm, therefore, is not loyalty to abstract duty but intensity of commitment to the larger, more remote, the more inclusive ends he is pursuing. So, it is the enjoyment of eating off clean plates that gets the drudgery of dishwashing done. So too with the dishwashing in any vocation. It is the game on Saturday that makes the routine drill of daily football practice palatable or the ambition to become an engineer that motivates the dreary stretches of solving mathematical riddles in college.

The Determination of Educational Aims

So far we have been discussing educational values in general. We must now inquire into what specific values to set up as the aims of education. Presumably our discussion of a hierarchy of educational values should afford an immediate clue to the selection of aims. But before carrying on from that point, it will be well to look at the claims of other methods of determining educational aims. There are some educators, for instance, who have tried to derive the aims of education from a historical analysis of social institutions. Others have derived them from a scientific analysis of current life. With an eye on the current scene they have made descriptive analyses, on the one hand, of children's activities and, on the other hand, of adult activities. Individuals in this group have recorded minutely the errors and mistakes of children which the school should aim to correct, while others have made job analyses of various adult occupations for which the school should prepare. Somewhat different are those who have tried to predicate educational aims on a psychological study of the original nature of man.

There is a common fault which vitiates all these approaches to the selection of educational aims. They are all preoccupied with the *status quo*. They describe very well what values are in fact held by contemporary society, but they do not tell whether contemporary social values should be perpetuated or whether they should be amended or even supplanted. Science and history are fact-finding disciplines. They can tell what is de-

sired, but they cannot tell what is desirable, that is, what ought to be desired. To let history and science arbitrate what is desirable too would be to enthrall the future to the present and the past.

Impressed with this reasoning a number of earnest students of education have returned to the older method of taking their aims from their formulation by individual leaders in the field. Unfortunately, however, personal opinions vary, even conflict, on what the aims of education ought to be, the very thing the scientific study of education sought to avoid. To remedy this infirmity some educational sociologists have resorted to taking a consensus of expert opinion among professional educators. But again, the trouble with consensus is that, on the one hand, it covers up real differences of opinion among experts and, on the other, it risks putting too much confidence into thinking that there is strength in mere numbers, especially where the numbers of experts are often not too aware of their own philosophical presuppositions.

Consequently after this excursion into the scientific determination of educational aims we find that we have been on a detour which brings us back to the conclusion that it is only through philosophy that we can satisfactorily determine the ends of education. If philosophers differ on educational aims, as of course they unmistakably do, we shall have to face the fact. As already intimated, therefore, we will do well to commence a discussion of educational aims by returning to those educational philosophers who confidently claim to be able to arrange educational values in a definite hierarchy, for the top values they disclose will naturally be the ones which we shall want to have for our educational aims. On the whole they divide their educational aims into two categories, general and specific, or ultimate and proximate.¹

The Ultimate Aims of Education

We begin with the ultimate aims of education since they are the more important. They hold this position because they will control the selection of the more specific or proximate ends of education. Various values have been put forth as constituting the ultimate aims of education. If one takes a religious view of the world, then the ultimate aim of education will most likely take its coloration from the ultimate end of human life. Consulting the penny catechism we find that man was created to know, reverence, and serve God, thereby to earn eternal life with Him. If so, then the chief purpose of the school is to teach the child how to act so as not to disappoint this expectation. Fortunately for the child he has the lives of Jesus and the

¹ Cf. SANDERS, W. J., "Thomism, Instrumentalism and Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, 10: 98-101, January, 1940. For a further discussion of educational aims, see *infra*, pp. 219-223.

saints to imitate as the concrete embodiment of this aim.¹ He will be particularly well advised to be mindful of Jesus' injunction, "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."² Since nothing can be more perfect than divine perfection itself, the ultimate quest for perfection is literally the last and final end of education.

Closely akin to a religious statement of the final end of education, though not necessarily allied to it, is the view that the ultimate aim of education is self-realization.³ Here we should examine human nature, see what its potentialities are, and then set up an educational program which aims to actualize or realize those potentialities. Or, as some have expressed it, education should aim to perfect the individual in all his powers. This perfectionism may resemble the supernatural religious ideal just mentioned, but it may also be simply a fulfillment of the pupil's natural potentialities. In either event the ultimate aims of education lean heavily on an intrinsic theory of educational value, especially as it is revealed in the nature of man.

Self-realization, however, is not without its ambiguities. Does self-realization mean, for instance, the maximal development of all one's potentialities? If so, this is probably a physical impossibility. There is not time enough, neither in formal nor informal education, for each individual to become a poet and a plowman, a philosopher and a financier, a sinner and a saint, to say nothing of many other kinds of selves. Furthermore there are some human potentialities like fear and anger which, useful as they may have been in the struggle for existence in the past, we might hope could be left to atrophy if ever law and order can come to regulate that struggle in the future. Stated somewhat differently, self-realization must not be confused with self-expression as the ultimate aim of education. To express the self he now is, the child might well disclose a very weak, bigoted, hateful self. The ultimate aim of self-realization is to realize, not so much the self one is as the self he ought to become. But this is just the issue—What kind of self should he become? What is the ultimate aim of education? Obviously self-realization without some further qualification is too ambiguous an aim.

Seizing upon rationality as man's peculiar excellence some educational philosophers have tried to give self-realization a more definite character by declaring that the chief and ultimate end of education is the cultivation of the intellect. Indeed, we have the authority of Aristotle for the assertion that of all human activities the intellectual is most akin to the activity of Deity. If Aristotle was right—and St. Thomas Aquinas tended to agree

¹ SHIELDS, T. E., "The Ultimate Aim of Christian Education," *Catholic Education Review*, 12: 308, November, 1916.

² Matthew, 5:48.

³ For further mention, see *infra*, p. 284.

with him—then the pursuit of intellectual excellence and its by-product knowledge for its own sake can lay just claim to being the ultimate aim of education. Even some who follow Darwin rather than Aristotle and who confine their educational philosophies to naturalism to the exclusion of supernaturalism come out with this same exaltation of intelligence as the principal aim of education.¹ In a dynamic culture the main business of society is to cultivate intelligence if ever it is to meet on even terms the uncertainties of a constantly changing social order. All of which is to say nothing of still others who think of formal discipline of the mind as the ultimate aim of education. In this case intellectual excellence does not so much consist in the pursuit of knowledge on its own account or in making adjustments to a contingent world, as in sharpening faculties so that the power developed in exercising them on one kind of subject matter will be easily transferable to any other.

Another way to qualify self-realization in more definite terms is to give it a social setting. Man lives not to himself alone. On the contrary he lives among his fellows; in fact he would hardly be man without the benefit of the social structure. Hence self-realization is a matter of balanced participation in the institutions of society. It is a participation, as some add, not just in social institutions as they are but as they are becoming and as they ought to become. The ultimate aim of education, therefore, takes its form from whatever the social stereotype may be. Naturally this stereotype will vary depending on whether society is organized along democratic, fascistic, or communistic lines.

A notably different approach to ultimate educational aims is one which holds that, rooted in concrete situations as educational aims must be, they still should not be thought of as determined by such external social conditions as may happen to obtain in politics, business, or religion at any time. Rather is the converse true; those engaged in education should look upon the educational process as an autonomous way of setting up the aims of education. This is because education is itself an independent process for determining what values deserve to be pursued as ends. Consequently to take one's educational aims ready made from some source outside education is to play false to the very nature of education. External social conditions supply materials by which to judge the effect of the educational process, but they do not supply the educational norm.²

The foregoing is a necessary preface to saying that, if educators are to view the educative process as autonomous, then education is subordinate

¹ KILPATRICK, W. H. (ed.), *The Educational Frontier*, p. 108, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1933. Cf. *supra*, pp. 51, 83, and *infra*, pp. 256-258.

² DEWEY, J., *The Sources of a Science of Education*, pp. 73-75, Liveright Publishing Corp., New York, 1929.

to nothing save more education. Or, as Dewey has stated it, "The educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end."¹ What does this mean? That knowledge is its own end? Not exactly. Perhaps the statement can best be understood in terms of Dewey's famous syllogism that education is all one with life, that life is growth, and therefore that education is growth. The ultimate aim of education, then, is to grow, not just, physically, of course, but in greater insight into and control over one's environment. The growth that is thought of here must not be just the kind which grows toward perfection and upon reaching it necessarily stops. Rather is it the sort which leads to continued growing, to using current insights and controls to widen and deepen further insight and control.² It eschews growth which is made significant by any perfection it is approximating and holds that growth, to be a significant end of education, must be worth while on its own account.

To name growth as the ultimate aim of education seems confusing and vague to a number of educators. For one thing it seems to confuse a consequence of education with its aim. All learning inescapably involves an increment of growth of some sort. But should not an aim specify which sort? For another thing, continual growth as the ultimate aim of education seems to confuse growth with progress. Certainly stepping up the tempo of growth is neither a guarantee nor a dependable index of progress. There is continued growth in cancer, but manifestly that is not the kind of growth we want. The pupil can grow in lazy and careless habits of study as well as in industrious and painstaking ones. For a last thing there is apprehension that some educational activities will be content with mere commotion as an outcome of being guided by the concept of growth.³ In sum, the chief indictment of growth as the ultimate aim of education is that it appears to fail to specify what is a desirable or right direction for growth to take.⁴ It appears to have the alleged fatal weakness of instrumentalism, the lack of finality or decisiveness.

Adherents of the ultimate aim of education as growth have a rebuttal for these doubts and apparent confusions. Agreeing that change and progress

¹ DEWEY, *Democracy and Education*, p. 59. See also *infra*, p. 141.

² Cf. WHITEHEAD, A. N., *The Aims of Education*, pp. 61-62, Williams & Norgate, Ltd., London, 1929.

³ COUNTS, G. S., *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* pp. 6-7, The John Day Company, New York, 1932; MECKLIN, J. M., "Some Limitations of the Social Emphasis in Education," *School and Society*, 9: 584-591, May, 1919.

⁴ Cf. BODE, B. H., "Education as Growth: Some Confusions," *Progressive Education*, 14: 151-157, March, 1937; O'HARA, J. H., *Limitations of the Educational Philosophy of John Dewey*, p. 75, Washington, D.C., 1929; and GEYER, D. L., "The Wavering Aim of Education in Dewey's Educational Philosophy," *Education*, 37: 484-491, April, 1917.

are not to be confounded with each other, they still hold that the subtle and strategic significance of change and growth lies in further possibilities of change and growth. This does not mean a deference to the mere drift of the cosmic weather nor an almost superstitious reverence for the child's inner growth. Furthermore, they insist that one must be patient and take a long-range view of growth. From this perspective, it will be seen that baleful and obnoxious activities, though they may seem to flourish for a time, eventually sow the seeds of their own decay. Good and righteous habits, on the other hand, tend to lead to indefinite expansion. They increase and lead out into a variety of other activities, as well as grow in stature themselves. Cancerous growth undoubtedly leads on with increasing vigor—but to death. Some instructional methods also lead to growth, but only in school; after graduation the interests cultivated there, as in literature and public affairs, cease. The kind of teaching on which a high value can be placed is that which results in a permanent disposition to continue one's education, one's growth, as long as one lives.¹

The Proximate Aims of Education

In spite of their prime importance, the ultimate aims of education mark out the teacher's task in only the most general outlines. To be effective in the classroom ultimate aims must be broken down into more immediate, specific, or proximate objectives for the pupil and teacher to pursue. Since Herbert Spencer listed the specific ends of an education for "complete living" in his famous essay on *What Knowledge Is Most Worth?* there have been a number of attempts to improve upon him. Perhaps the most widely accepted design for complete living has been the *Cardinal Principles of Education* put forth by a commission of the National Education Association.² These principles were summarized under seven headings: (1) Health; (2) Command of the Fundamental Processes, notably the three R's; (3) Worthy Home Membership; (4) Vocation; (5) Civic Functions; (6) Worthy Use of Leisure Time; and (7) Ethical Character. The most notable omission from this list is religion. It may be that its authors mistakenly thought this to be included in the item of ethical character, or it may be that the list was being recommended as a program for public schools from which religious

¹ DEWEY, J., *Experience and Education*, pp. 28-29, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1938.

² National Education Association, Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education, *The Cardinal Principles of Education*, U. S. Bureau of Education Bulletin, 35: 11-15, 1918. For somewhat different statements, see National Education Association, Educational Policies Commission, *The Purposes of Education in American Democracy*, 1938; Progressive Education Association, *A Children's Charter*; and American Federation of Teachers, Committee on Educational Reconstruction, *Goals of American Education*, Chap. 2.

instruction is ordinarily barred. In either event, with its inclusion, this enumeration of educational values should be fairly complete and satisfactory.

Even with this breakdown the aims of education are still quite general in outline. Just what is worthy home membership, some teacher may ask, or just what is worthy use of leisure time? What are the specific classroom activities which the teacher should initiate to realize these unquestionable values? Obviously the Cardinal Principles are intermediate rather than proximate educational aims. For proximate aims the teacher will want to know literally what to do *next*. Of course expanded to this length and detail the proximate aims of education virtually merge with the curriculum itself. At this level the aims of education are not one, nor seven, but legion in number.¹

Some exception has been taken to the foregoing discussion of the aims of education. The basis for this exception is the contention that an abstract idea like education cannot have any aims, that only people like pupils, teachers, and parents can have them. The point of this fine distinction is that aims arise out of concrete situations in which people are involved. Aims, therefore, must be tailor-made for the occasion; we cannot publish a list of them in advance. We do not know our aims till a situation arises and we project aims as means of guiding our observation and final selection of a plan for handling it. A list like the *Cardinal Principles of Education* is useful in such a case, not as aims, but as suggestions to educators for what to be on the look out and of how to keep an over-all balance of all the values which may be involved.² By necessary consequence of taking this position the aims of education are constantly being refashioned. Hence there are no educational aims which are unalterably or eternally fixed.

Two Major Philosophies of Education

In review we can see that in value theory, as in other phases of educational philosophy, there are two dominant trends of thinking. On the one hand are those who regard values subjectively. Things are valuable as they are personally felt to be valuable. Where the educator must think his values through because there are competing values, he chooses on the basis of which one serves best to instrument the purpose in hand. This purpose also determines the order of worth among values. But since purposes shift with changing situations, the instrumentalist finds it impos-

¹ For one of the most detailed published statements of aims, see F. Bobbitt, *Curriculum Construction in Los Angeles*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1922.

² DEWEY, *Democracy and Education*, p. 285.

sible to proclaim in advance a hierarchy of educational values which will hold for all occasions. His educational aims are as personal as his values. Although he seems to hold to an ultimate aim of education like education itself, he interprets that aim in such a way as to indicate that aims are never fixed but always experimental. The proximate aims of education, therefore, constantly emerge from the growing edge of life. They cannot be proclaimed in advance any more than a hierarchy of educational values.

On the other hand are those who regard their educational values more objectively. To them values are intrinsic; they derive from their designer or maker rather than from their user. Educators of this persuasion do not deny instrumental values, but they do insist that instrumental values should be subordinate to intrinsic ones because intrinsic values are primary in time and therefore more likely to be stable and enduring. Herein lies the basis for a hierarchy of educational values which carries over into the field of educational aims as well. Central in their hierarchy is the intrinsic nature of man. Hence the ultimate aim of education is self-realization, the fulfillment of man's intrinsic potentialities—for many, in addition, the realization of eternal life. All proximate aims of education take their direction from this ultimate aim which itself stands imperishable, eternal.

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CHAPTER VI

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

A Special Ethic for Education?

In our discussion of educational values in the preceding chapter the strategy of the educative process has been pretty well sketched. There are, nevertheless, further educational values as yet unmentioned which are involved in the personal tactics of the teacher in giving effect to the grand strategy of education. The teacher must negotiate many personal relationships with his pupils, his colleagues, his superiors, and with the lay public of board members and parents which might be motivated by and result in a variety of different values. Which is the better or best way for the teacher to conduct himself presents some real difficulties. For the appropriate theory of conduct in these situations we must consult a first cousin of value theory, ethics.

To be more concrete about the kinds of personal relations which involve ethical considerations, we might sample a number of situations. However, to point to but one very striking illustration, let us take the teachers' strike. Is it ethical for the teacher to withhold his services from the pupil? Ostensibly the teacher withholds instruction in order to bring pressure to bear on the community to ensure the sort of working conditions which make it possible for the teacher to lead his pupils to the achievement of the values incorporated into the ultimate and proximate aims of education.¹ But in spite of that high purpose an inevitable ambiguity arises. When he strikes, is the teacher really acting in the interest of his pupil or rather in his own personal interest? Obviously the interests of pupil and teacher overlap and interpenetrate so that it is not easy to discriminate the exact motivation. How is the teacher to disentangle and sort out these interests to ensure a judgment about them that is just and fair? This is clearly an ethical problem.

Undoubtedly there are general ethical principles which could be invoked to guide the teacher's conduct in such a case. But the question arises whether such general principles are enough or whether the practice of education presents special circumstances which require some added qualification of general ethical principles. Does the relation of pupil and teacher

¹ *Supra*, pp. 107-111.

present unique problems not ordinarily found or recognized in the relation of people generally to one and other? Such a unique relationship is recognized in the relation of the doctor and his patient, of the lawyer and his client, and of the clergyman and his parishioner. Do the same or similar circumstances obtain in the case of education which warrant our going beyond a general to a professional ethic?

The Major Principle of a Professional Ethic

If the professional person were to consult only the maxims of general ethics he would have at once a very good rule by which to guide his relations with laymen seeking his services. That rule is embodied in the famous imperative of Immanuel Kant. "So act as to treat humanity," he enjoined, "whether in thine own person or that of another, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only."¹ By treating the individual as an end we may assume that Kant considered the individual to have intrinsic value.² His injunction, therefore, is always to take this value into account in dealing with individuals. In other words the imperative is always to act with the other fellow's best interests at heart. So long as we bear this directive in mind it will be unobjectionable that on occasion we use others to our own advantage, that is, make them means to the realization of our own ends and interests.

The Kantian imperative is addressed to everyone, both child and adult, both layman and professional person. But the responsibility for acting upon it, it is submitted, rests more heavily on the professional person than on the layman. Hence the need for a *professional ethic*. The principal circumstance which demands greater sensitivity of the professional person to the Kantian imperative is the great differential in knowledge which exists between himself and the layman he is serving. The professional person knows so vastly more than the layman that the latter is almost completely at a disadvantage in determining whether the professional service he is receiving is to his best interest or not. Consequently the professional person must take extra precaution to assure his public that he is not confusing his own personal interests with theirs. The only way he can unmistakably do this is to put their interests unequivocally ahead of his.

One of the principal ways in which the professional person assures the public of his high ethical sensitivity resides in the kind of motivation to which he owns in carrying out his professional activities. If he is thoroughly imbued with his high ethical obligation he must necessarily dispense his expert information and skill primarily for the service he renders to others. Financial remuneration, though also necessary and important,

¹ KANT, I., *Metaphysics of Morals*, Part I, Book II, Chap. 1, Sec. 25.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 96-97, also *infra*, pp. 132-204.

must be subordinated to social service. Indeed it has long been stated that the essential difference between a trade and a profession is that the former is carried on primarily for financial gain while the latter always counts financial remuneration of secondary significance.

How does teaching stack up to these general ethical requirements? In the first place does the teacher possess a body of highly expert knowledge which is so beyond the layman's ken that a special ethical obligation devolves on the teacher to be quite single-minded in looking after the educational welfare of his public? There is no doubt that this situation obtains vis-à-vis the pupil. Vis-à-vis the parent, however, some qualifications may be necessary. The parent may frequently know as much subject matter as the teacher, if not more. Whether in addition the teacher commands a body of technical information and skill in the science, philosophy, and art of teaching which quite exceeds that of the parent will no doubt vary with the mother's vocation before she was married and with the teacher's length of training and years of experience. As long as the training of teachers was accomplished in a two-year period in normal school, teaching could make little claim to being a "learned" profession. As that period, however, has lengthened into four years at a teachers college, a fifth year for a master's degree, and particularly two further years for a doctor's degree, teaching has made great strides toward the dignity of a "learned" profession with all the ethical obligations that has been seen to entail.

In the second place does the teacher teach primarily for his salary or primarily for the social service he performs? When a student buys a textbook he gives a *quid pro quo*; he gives money and receives a book in return. The affair is a purely trade transaction. Each party expects to gain from it. Is that the situation when the teacher teaches? Does he expect a *quid pro quo*? Does he teach for his pay check? Or does he teach primarily for the joy of seeing children grow and develop? No doubt there are both kinds of teacher. Obviously, the teacher who teaches principally as a means of livelihood, who only stays at school long enough to fulfill the minimum duties which will entitle him to his salary, is carrying on a trade and not a profession. But it is no less obvious that, if the public wishes professionally minded teachers who place the interests of their pupils ahead of their own pecuniary interests, they must not take advantage of such high-minded teachers by expecting them to teach for starvation wages. The public too has ethical responsibilities.

Applications of Professional Ethics

There are two directions in which to note the application of our major professional ethic. One is in the direction of the relations of teacher and

pupil and the other is in the direction of the teacher and his colleagues. No attempt will be made to cover all cases in either direction but merely to point to a few principal ones.

In the course of his contact with the child, to launch out in the first direction, the teacher is bound to pick up considerable information about the child and perhaps even his home. Following the ethical principle of always acting in the best interests of the child, the teacher will regard it an ethical obligation to treat this information as strictly confidential. If he does not do so, he is likely to find the main avenue of approach to indispensable pedagogical information cut off, for no one likes to learn that his private affairs have been discussed before a curious and gossipy public of children or adults. On the other hand, if the teacher's ingenuity leads him to the discovery of some new pedagogical technique, the teacher will find it unethical to keep such information a closed secret and even more unethical if he discloses the secret only for a price. On the contrary he must publicize his discovery so that children everywhere may benefit from instruction informed and improved by his fresh insight. There must be no ambiguity in the mind of the teacher or the public on the precedence of the child's growth and development over the teacher's fame and fortune.

If the teacher's fortune is secondary here, it is no less so in the case where he is asked to give a pupil special tutoring. It is distinctly unethical to accept pay for this extra service because otherwise ambiguity arises as to whether the teacher has not neglected this pupil so that his parents, who may be well-to-do, would ask him to undertake this service and thus he might add to his usually meager compensation. Even where the child has fallen behind through illness it is still a delicately ethical question whether the teacher should accept pay for tutoring because he might confuse his own with his pupil's interests on the number of lessons necessary. The ethical rule which holds for tutoring one's own pupils holds, furthermore, for accepting any kind of gratuity which is offered the teacher for fulfilling his usual line of duty. If he does not reject this gratuity, as when offered by a publisher to influence the teacher's selection of a textbook, it will never be clear, even if he picks a good text, whether he might not have picked a better one if he had refused the favor.

To turn now in the direction of the ethical relations of the teacher with his fellows, it is important to note at the outset that, though these relations only indirectly affect the child, ultimately they are governed by the same ethical imperative of keeping one's eye single to the best interests of the child. As already seen, to keep his best interests to the fore requires considerable sacrifice of personal fame and fortune on the part of the teacher. It will be difficult for any one teacher to continue to make this sacrifice if

he observes colleagues who do not seem to restrict themselves similarly. Therefore, in order to reinforce every teacher in his high ethical resolve toward the pupil, each must owe a duty to the other not to act in any way which will make it difficult or embarrassing to maintain a high level of professional ethics.

A number of stratagems illustrate the point. For example, a teacher must not apply for a particular position till a vacancy occurs in that position. Furthermore, an applicant must not underbid for a vacancy and offer to teach for less than what the salary schedule calls. Practices of this sort undermine the props which make it possible for the professional teacher to refuse emoluments like gratuities from publishers or fees from private tutoring. Of course it almost goes without saying that it is not only unethical but positively illegal for a teacher unilaterally to break an existing contract even though it is to accept another position offering better opportunities for professional advancement. And again, to emphasize the advancement of the pupil's rather than the teacher's interests, the teacher should neither apply for nor accept a position from a superintendent or board of education where he, the teacher, is a blood relation of one of these public officials.

Teachers must also be very careful about adversely reflecting on their profession by disparaging their colleagues. If the profession is to stand high in the regard of the public, it must have a professional solidarity born of mutual respect and loyalty. It will be a long step toward this mutual respect if the profession will discipline itself by keeping high at all times the standards of admission into its fellowship. On the other hand in writing testimonials for fellow teachers the teacher or administrator should be at least as honest as he is ordinarily kind. After all, as he writes his testimonial, it is the benefit of the children to come under the influence of this teacher, even more than the prospects of the candidate himself, that the writer should have in mind.

Again, if a teacher has been helped by one of his colleagues to achieve some success and public notice, it is only proper to acknowledge the help. Especially is such acknowledgement owing from the author of a professional publication when he has received help in arriving at his conclusions. This is almost true no matter what the circumstances of the help. Thus it will not matter that his wife helped him or that he paid for the assistance he received. Neither will it matter that the technical assistance he received was or was not of a sort he could have done himself, had he wished to take the time. Neither will it matter, again, if he picked up help incidental to shoptalk with his colleagues or at a professional conference specially called to consider his problem. In every case it is the better part ethics, to say nothing of good manners, to give credit where credit is due.

The Enforcement of Professional Ethics

Obviously a breach of professional ethics not only rings up a moral lapse for an individual teacher, but it casts a shadow on and weakens the whole corporate body of the profession. In most breaches of professional ethics, however, there is no infraction of any statute law. Hence there are no remedies enforceable at law. This is just as well for there are nuances of ethical relations which perhaps the grosser and more cumbersome machinery of the law could never judge anyhow. Professional organizations have long taken the view that the organization itself is the only effective agency for disciplining its members. Hence, it is the ethical duty of every member to report instances of unprofessional or unethical conduct to the committee in charge to be dealt with as the rules of the organization provide.

The most difficult cases of enforcement arise where the profession disciplines, not its own membership for infractions of its code of ethics, but the community for tolerating conditions inimical to the maintenance of high professional standards. The reference here is chiefly to the case of the teachers' strike. Strikes have principally occurred over salaries. At first glance it would appear conclusive from the principles already laid down that a teachers' strike is definitely unethical. To strike for higher pay appears not only to put the teachers' personal interests ahead of those of their pupils but at the same time to do the pupils positive harm by withholding instruction from them. This harm is the more threatening since by reason of their advanced training and state certification teachers have a virtual monopoly over their art.

To this indictment defenders of the strike reply that, although the immediate incidence of the strike is to advance the teachers' private interests, the long-run effect is to benefit the child. By insisting on salaries which enable teachers to afford the personal sacrifices of high ethical standards, teachers are really putting the interests of their pupils first. This is well said, if true, but even at best an inherent ambiguity remains in the situation which lies open to misinterpretation even by the well-intentioned.

Teachers would not be caught in this embarrassing situation if they really enjoyed all the prerogatives of a professional person. If they were members of a full-blown profession, they would have the prerogatives of setting their own hours of employment, owning their own professional equipment, and above all, regulating their own rate of compensation. Because of these circumstances the conventional professional person has within his own control the financial conditions necessary to maintaining professional standards. Public-school teachers, on the contrary, do not. The public through its board of education regulates their hours and pay. If negotiations to raise subprofessional conditions of employment fail,

teachers can protest only by striking or quitting the profession. If the strike of public employees is outlawed, then the only protest left teachers is to seek employment in some other line. This, of course, is an intolerable conclusion for both teachers and the community to reach. Teachers are thwarted in their calling, and the community loses talented teachers. To avoid such an admittedly intolerable situation many think the strike, while still unethical and an evil, is at least the lesser evil.

Less apologetic are those who forthrightly claim that teachers should recognize themselves, not as professional persons, but as members of the laboring classes.¹ Hence they should organize themselves along economic rather than professional lines; they should organize as a union rather than as a profession. If they were to do so, then they would be less hampered by the sort of ethical misgivings considered so far. Indeed, there are substantial reasons for making this reappraisal of themselves. As already indicated, teachers do not regulate their fees; they are paid a salary or wage as in the case of other laboring groups. Today, furthermore, when nearly every calling is becoming increasingly complicated by science and technology, the line between trades and professions is growing very thin. It grows even thinner, excessively thin in fact, when any occupational group finds itself exploited by another social group, whether private employers or government authorities. Hence teachers' ethics may be due for amendment. After all, professional codes of ethics are no more than the expression of the best ethical practice of the times. When times change, codes must change with them. But if historical precedent were needed for the strike, it can easily be found in the right of *cessatio* at the medieval university. There the profession of scholars did not hesitate to cease holding classes if the townfolk did not provide satisfactory conditions for carrying them on.

Two Philosophies of Education

On the whole there has been a large measure of agreement on the philosophy of professional ethics for teachers. The suitability of the Kantian ethical imperative always to treat individuals as ends is widely recognized and applied. The only serious disagreement is one of very recent origin and centers in a problem of social philosophy. The issue whether teachers should organize as a trade or a profession with consequently different views of the ethics of the strike stems, not from different philosophies of metaphysics or values, but from different political and economic bases for a philosophy of education. It is to these that we now turn.

¹ Cf. LINVILLE, H. R., "The American Federation of Teachers," *School and Society*, 40: 616-621, November, 1934; and PULLIAS, E. V., "Teaching—A Profession or a Trade," *Educational Forum*, 4: 263-270, March, 1940.

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CHAPTER VII

POLITICS AND EDUCATION

Social Implications of Education

It is common to speak of a person as being self-educated. While no doubt it is possible for a person to learn through his own unaided efforts and while it is a credit to his resourcefulness when he does, yet the total amount that anyone can learn exclusively on his own is extremely limited. Except for association with its mother the newborn child would not only learn little but more than likely would physically perish. Even the so-called self-taught adult would make snail's progress indeed if he did not have at hand the tools and books representing the funded capital of learning of others both of his own generation and of those of ages past. In view of this situation it is probably not extravagant to claim that education is primarily a social process and that the social process constitutes one of the main dimensions of any philosophy of education.

The significance of this social dimension of educational philosophy varies according to the conception one has of how individuals are or should be related to each other. Different arrangements of social relations lead to different educational practices. Some societies, notably those in democratic states, recognize the unique differences among individuals and try to give expression to them. Other societies, notably those in totalitarian states, tend to curb individuality by regimenting it to a common pattern. Turning from the macrocosm of the state to the microcosm of the classroom one will not have to visit many schools to find the educational corollaries of these different social philosophies. In some, instruction is highly individualized. Children initiate their own learning activities. No course of action is undertaken unless the child accepts its objectives as his own. In others teachers are virtual autocrats. They not only rule with iron discipline, but they dictate the order of the day. What is true of relations between pupil and teacher is often true of those between teacher and administrator as well. While in some school systems teachers are invited to share in the responsibility of forming school policies, in others little is expected from the teacher but to carry out policies and orders of his principal or superintendent.

Obviously practices such as these reflect political inclinations. They reflect different conceptions of the way in which power should be distributed

and controlled. Clearly those who hold power not only determine educational policy but in the long run favor themselves with the most education of the best quality. For convenience we will note the educational consequences of vesting political power in the one, the few, and the many. This threefold division of political power represents a division of political theories which is as old as Aristotle and as modern as today.

Schoolmen almost universally have deplored the entrance of politics into school affairs. They generally deem the interests of politicians as too narrow or too likely to be at variance with the broader, innocent interests of children. Politics so conceived is the management of public relations so as to gain advantages for oneself or for one's party. The danger of such manipulations is that they are brought about through influence of "pull" and that their results too frequently work injustice because they are planned for such immediate and shallow ends. In some quarters, this studied attempt to keep the schools unsullied by politics is viewed as grave misfortune. In the communistic ideology—and probably in the fascistic one as well—it is unthinkable that the schools should lie outside the political sphere. Since the school trains the future citizen, education is far too strategic an instrument to fall into the hands of any save the state. Politics so conceived is not a term of opprobrium; it is more synonymous with statesmanship. It is that phase of ethics which treats of the duties of states. In this sense probably even bourgeois societies will agree that education can hardly be divorced from politics. In any event, it is the theory of politics conceived in its highest terms with which the philosophy of education has now to deal.¹

The Nature of Society

Before considering the educational implications of the various ways of distributing political power, it may be well to insert a short preface on the nature of society itself.² According to one view, individuals antedated society. In the presocial state they were free and independent. It was naturally a free and voluntary act, therefore, when subsequently they formed society. In forming society, of course, they necessarily encumbered themselves with limitations to their former freedom and independence. Yet since society resulted from a voluntary compact, individuals surrendered no more freedom than nominated in the bond of social union. Moreover, since society is contractual, its terms can be amended or even

¹ WARREN, W. P., "Philosophy, Politics, and Education," *International Journal of Ethics*, 47: 342-344, April, 1937; BRAMELD, T., "The Philosophy of Education As the Philosophy of Politics," *School and Society*, 68: 329-334, November, 1948.

² Compare the following theories of society with corresponding theories of the social aspect of human nature, *supra*, pp. 52-55.

abrogated at the will of its members. From this guarded, almost mistrustful, attitude toward society, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that somehow there is a fundamental opposition between individual and social interests.

Needless to say, such an understanding of society is rather atomistic. It regards the nature of individuals as independent of and therefore external to their mutual relations.¹ This atomistic view has expressed itself in a variety of educational practices. One of the first was the elective curriculum in which the individual student was left free to choose which portions of the social heritage should form his curriculum. Later on in the Dalton plan, instead of simultaneously teaching a whole class of children in the conventional fashion, the teacher made a separate "contract" with each child for the accomplishment of a certain segment of the course of study. While the use of the term "contract" was probably purely coincidental, the spirit of the Dalton plan was quite individualistic as each child could take his own time to complete his contract and in whatever order he saw fit. A quite different illustration is the current system of academic bookkeeping which keeps track of students' achievements in terms of units, hours, and credits which seem to be as discrete and interchangeable as the atoms in certain conceptions of the physical universe.

2) A somewhat different view of society makes communication rather than contract central in the nature of society. The bond that ties society together is seen to lie in communication among individuals, in a meeting of their minds, in mutually shared purposes. No communication, no community. According to this view society is predicated on a meeting of minds—a basic requirement in any social contract—yet without making any commitment to the initial state of the individual or how society was first formed. The effectiveness of society, thus, depends on the extent to which communication results in a real meeting of minds. To share purposes in common, individuals must have the same understanding of them, the same emotional disposition toward them. There must be a quality of like-mindedness among them. It should be added that not only does society take its character from communication, but individuals become the kinds of persons they do from what they share in communication.² Society, therefore, is man-made and, far from being antagonistic to the individual, is quite his natural environment.

Society, furthermore, not only exists in communication, but it continues to exist, it perpetuates itself, by communication. The process by which it transmits its common store of purposes and meanings is the educational process. The social process and the educational process, consequently,

¹ *Supra*, pp. 26-27.

² *Supra*, pp. 54-55.

are closely akin if not one and the same. Education is effectively consummated just to the extent that there is a real meeting of the minds of the teacher and pupil, adult and child. Here is the principal reason why many teachers invite their pupils to share in planning the work of their class, why some superintendents invite their teachers to participate in determining educational policies of their school system.¹ Both teachers and superintendents are aware that unless they see eye to eye with their respective constituencies there will be no genuine community of interest between them. They will not form a society and will, consequently, fail educationally.

Another view of the nature of society purports to see grave difficulties in the way of independent individuals' coming together to form society. How can there be genuine meeting of minds in simple communication, let alone in formal contract, backers of this view inquire? If individuality be 3) unique, how can the pupil possibly enter into the experience of the teacher or the race? Or how can the teacher understand the difficulties which the child is experiencing? Because one's own experience is peculiar to himself, he seems precluded from ever knowing what his fellow's experience uniquely means to him. People's highly prized individuality would seem to keep them locked up in separate worlds and prevent the very existence of society, the school, or the class.

The idealist thinks he has a way of overcoming this impasse. In any given class there are at work not only the minds of the teacher and the individual pupils but, as he says, there is also a social mind.² The social mind is the corporate mind of the pupils and teacher organized around some principle of knowledge on which all minds are thinking as one. For an individual to learn the meaning of his lesson is equivalent to being a member of a class. There is a close relation here between class as a social grouping in school and class as a logical category or classification. So, defining what the individual has learned involves subsuming the species under the genus, the individual under the universal. The social tie which thus binds teacher and pupil together into a class is an ideal or spiritual factor. While the pupil and teacher are distinct from each other, yet neither achieves his full meaning except in opposition to the other. Thus a child can only be a pupil in relation to a teacher and an adult a teacher only in relation to a pupil. This thesis and antithesis of the pupil-teacher relation is finally mediated—and so the Hegelian triad is completed—in a synthesis of a higher third, the spiritual, which in its highest manifestation is the source of mankind and binds mankind together.

¹ This resulted in part from an early criticism of J. Dewey, "Democracy in Education," *Elementary School Teacher*, 4: 139-204, December, 1903.

² FLESHMAN, A. C., *The Educational Process*, p. 90, J. P. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1908.

(4) Yet another view of society regards it in the nature of an organism. Just as a biological organism is a whole consisting of many parts each performing its unique function in integration with the rest, so society too is a whole consisting of many individual persons or social strata each making his unique contribution toward an integrated totality. In general this has been the theory of totalitarian states. According to this view society is a corporate entity in addition to the individual entities which compose it. As any whole is greater than its parts, so the social organism takes precedence over the individual organisms which compose it. While this does not deny the freedom or independence of the individual, it insists that the individual only realizes freedom through merging his identity with the organic whole.¹ In totalitarian practice any nonconforming individual who by his nonconformity contradicts the theory must be either regimented or liquidated.

Since there can be but one social whole, the state is that whole. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the totalitarian state the education of the individual is subordinated to that of the state. He is educated as a citizen rather than as a man. This is as it should be for the state has ends of its own—cultural, religious, linguistic, economic, territorial—which, if in conflict with those of the individual, must be deemed superior because more farseeing and less selfish. The state itself thus becomes an end in the educational process. The individual becomes a means to its realization. His personality is made to emerge out of its narrow isolation into this larger social consciousness, which in the totalitarian ideology thus inspires and gives meaning to his life. The group culture which thus forms the core of the curriculum is in turn the expression of the will of the totalitarian state.

2) A final theory of the nature of society rejects its formation either through mere human efforts at communication and contract or through such figments as a social mind and a social organism. According to this last view individual and society are coeval, for society originates in human nature itself. The individual is regarded as endowed with a social nature; he is social by instinct. Conceived in a social situation necessitated on account of bisexual reproduction the individual is born with such undeveloped potentialities that he would die if it were not further instinctive for the parents to prolong their temporary association into the more enduring society of the family. While the society of the family is necessary to offset the deficiencies of the child's early immaturity, it meets this requirement with only varying degrees of success because of the unavoidable limitations of the parents. If the child is to actualize the full potentialities with which

¹ Cf. GEYER, D. L., "Three Types of Education for Freedom," *School and Society*, 66: 406-407, November, 1947. See also *infra*, pp. 268-269.

he is born, he needs a larger society than the family to help him do so. To achieve this end, it is necessary, it is instinctive, that man form the larger society of the state.

To reason that society is rooted in nature carries a twofold advantage. On the one side this reasoning reveals society as definitely subordinated to the individual. It is the means to his self-realization. The educational converse is never true that society is the end and the individual a means to the realization of that end. On the other side, if we add that God is the author of nature, this reasoning leads to the conclusion that society is not only a generic trait of nature in general and of human nature in particular, but it is also divinely ordained. The advantage that some see in this conclusion is that the kind of education to which an individual is entitled by right stems from God and cannot be abrogated by society as it could be if society were formed in any of the other foregoing ways.

Autocracy

To return now to the effect which political power has on educational philosophy, there have been various types of rule by the one. Whether the ruler has been a king, tyrant, despot, or dictator, however, will make little difference, for the educational consequences of all will be much the same. Where one rules, the final decision on public policy rests with him. Obviously, such a ruler must have the best education that his times afford in order to make wise choices. While it would be a happy coincidence for all the ruler's subjects to have an equally fine education, it is clearly not a necessity, as in the case of the ruler himself. Since it is not indispensable, it is an easy step to point out that neither is it desirable. Where there is differentiation of social function, it may well be claimed that there should be specialization in educational preparation. Thus, the ruler should have one kind of training, but the ruled another. The former should learn to choose and to lead, while the latter should learn not to question, but to follow.¹ The teachers under an absolute ruler will propagandize and indoctrinate the decisions made higher up. As in the army, the schools of an autocracy will more than likely emphasize drill and obedience at the expense of initiative and criticism.

The merits and demerits of such an educational philosophy are the same as those of the political theory after which it is patterned. There is undoubtedly an efficiency and expedition that is deserving of praise. The respect paid to the expert is indeed admirable. On the other hand, educational outcomes for the people as a whole are heavily staked on the superior education of just one person. This might fail at several points.

¹ For an instance see a quotation from Kaiser Wilhelm II, in F. Clarke, *Essays in the Politics of Education*, p. 34, Oxford University Press, New York, 1923.

If the ruler be a hereditary one, of course his education for leadership can commence very early. But there is no guarantee then that he has the native hereditary qualities which will improve or deserve the opportunities of his environment. If the ruler rises to power relatively late in life, as in the case of dictators, it is too late to educate him formally for his task. And this is to say nothing of the waste of the undeveloped talent of the mass of the population.

Aristocracy and Oligarchy

It is rare that rule by the one is found in pure and simple form. Generally, the sovereign power is shared with a selected group of others. Sometimes this minority group may rule without elevating one of their number above the rest. In either event, this distribution of power results in rule by the few. These few may be variously recruited. Among the Greeks, they were the *oi áριστοι*, the best people; hence, our word aristocrats. Later on, the best people became a hereditary nobility. Aristocracy became plutocracy. Dictatorships which aim to preserve capitalism tend in this direction. But dictatorships of the proletariat generally result in rule by the few, where the few are a minority political party. Obviously, the way in which the few are constituted will have definite educational implications.

When the few have been a nobility, education has notoriously been an upper-class affair. The nobility and the wealthy bourgeoisie have virtually had a monopoly of education beyond the rudiments. European education, even as late as the twentieth century, still exhibits this influence in its two-class system of schools, one set for the masses, and another for the classes. The reasons are clear. Governmental policy is determined by a ruling class. Naturally they must have an education predicated on their responsibilities. The education of the rest of the people beyond what is absolutely necessary can be relatively neglected.

The fascistic philosophy of education has some points in common with this view. Here, education is chiefly for a dominant elite. The leadership principle of feudal times is central. Sovereignty rests with a group of leaders who do not derive their power from the populace or its elected representatives, but from their ability to rule by rising above their own immediate private interests. It is no chance affair that those of exceptional endowment become the elite of power and influence in the affairs of life. This is but the inexorable logic of events. Furthermore, like produces like. Consequently, it is no mere accident that the great majority of gifted children are born in the families of the privileged classes. Education, therefore, does not make or unmake the dominant elite. It merely accentuates their excellence and in so doing increases their social

distance from the masses. It equips them to wield the power which is their lot. In this there should be nothing depressing. On the contrary, there is a sort of Platonic justice about it. Each person will be educated to the full extent of his potentialities, but none for a role beyond what his native endowment warrants. If some are discontented, it will be a simple exercise of educational technique to condition them to be content with what they have and to perform their role in the social whole.

Members of this select minority validate their choice of values by their power to enforce them. It is bluntly admitted that this is the only way to terminate the protracted arguments to which the more democratic methods of discussion and persuasion lead. Those in the adult generation who cannot see it this way must be repressed. In the younger generation, education can take the place of repression. But, even with them, what is taught is fixed in advance by the leaders. There is no free discussion of the educational ideal. Universities are no longer autonomous seats of learning where an argument can be pursued in Socratic fashion whithersoever it may lead. A science so pure and objective as not to reflect national bias has no place in the curriculum. Educational freedom in such a state does not mean self-realization, or emancipation of the individual, but rather the sublimation of the individual in the interests of the state. Liberty is not a right but a concession of the state, contingent on what it deems its own interests. Consequently, the virtues in which the individual is schooled are those of discipline, duty, and self-sacrifice.

The communistic philosophy of education appears to court many of the same objectives that fascism does. Yet there are some notable differences. One may perhaps take a very serious exception, at the very start, to communism as an instance of the rule by the few. Since most communists agitate for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and since the proletariat far outnumbers any other class in society, this classification of communism may seem somewhat incongruous. On the other hand, whatever the manifold paper theories of communism call for, the fact is that in Russia, communism's most conspicuous exponent, sovereign power has been narrowly held by a minority political party whose head is a personal dictator. The educational corollaries of this paradoxical situation require some further elucidation.

On the point of educational method, the dictatorship of the proletariat seems to have most in common with the fascistic type of dictatorship. Communism just as frankly warps the school to its peculiar ideology as does fascism. The rising generation is instilled with the proletarian point of view through just as authoritarian indoctrination. Academic freedom or self-determination for other minorities can be tolerated only within the confines of communist doctrine.

Not everywhere, of course, is the proletariat powerful enough to dictate educational policy so unquestioningly. In countries where communism is a hope rather than a fact, methodology must be modified during the inevitable period of transition. For the evangelical teacher, persuasion is the first line of attack.¹ He will openly persuade his pupils toward his viewpoint if the community does not interfere but will not hesitate to exercise his influence subtly if necessary. But, even so, the Marxist will have much less confidence than liberal educators as to what can be achieved through a democratic educational process. When balked by the counter-opposition to communism, he will readily abandon education altogether as a means of social reform and rely on force and violence just as the fascist does. If disobedience to law seems highly inconsistent for the teacher in the capitalist system, it may be looked upon as highly moral when viewed from the Marxist frame of reference.²

In the matter of the creation of educational opportunities, the two types of dictatorship commence to diverge considerably. Rule by a minority political party is said to be only a temporary phase of communism. The benevolent despotism of fascism apparently is to last indefinitely. When communism has been made entirely secure, sovereignty is expected to be put on the widest possible base. Consequently, while opportunities for the best education may be narrowly limited at first, later it is hoped they will be extended to all. Far from cutting the educational pattern to meet the needs of a dominant elite, communism aims ultimately at a classless society where the limits of schooling will be set by ability alone. This recognition of the proletariat as the center of gravity in the communistic philosophy of education is also emphasized in the curriculum, where the cultural problems of peasants and industrial workers are the absorbing interest. This is true even of the transition stage of rule by personal dictator and party leaders.

At this point, the philosophy of education consequent to rule by the few almost merges with that attendant upon rule by the many. Before taking up this next point, however, it will be well to glance at some objections to the philosophy of the education of the few. Several shafts of criticism have been loosed at supposedly vulnerable points in this theory. One of the chief snares said to lurk in this point of view is the assumption that only the few are capable of intellectual training. Certainly one must beware the insidious ease with which the holding of such a hypothesis can color one's estimate of the data it seeks to interpret.

¹ BRAMELD, T. B., "Karl Marx and the American Teacher," *The Social Frontier*, 2: 54, November, 1935.

² *Ibid.*

No less misleading, so it is claimed, is the plausible way in which the ruling class justifies its superior education. The stock argument has it that higher education of the few is to be justified in the superior service which they thereby render to the masses and to society as a whole. If they have educational privileges not shared by the majority, they are a compensation or reward for the meritorious social function they perform. But one must be on the lookout for hypocrisy here.¹ While educational privileges might originate in this fashion, after the lapse of time, one will more than likely find them predicated on hereditary superiority. Superior educational advantages so readily increase one's social distance from his fellows that he all too quickly rationalizes his outstanding opportunity as due to innate endowment. For the argument to be really plausible, proof should be required that the underprivileged classes could not do so well if given equal educational opportunities. The privileged class has usually asserted the futility of any social maneuver to find this out, because they claim the masses, on the whole, have given practically no evidence of abilities worth cultivating. Here, it is alleged, they are caught in a logical fallacy. First they oppress the masses by denying them an enriched opportunity to develop their innate capacities, and then they turn about and accuse them of lacking the very things they have been refused a chance to reveal.

But, even granting that the maximal education of the few is but commensurate with their peculiar function as rulers, there is still objection to such a philosophy of education. The further difficulty with this argument is that it is so dangerously easy, even with the best of intent, to mistake the selfish interests of one's class for the welfare of the whole. In practice, it must be admitted that only too frequently individuals use the educational gifts conferred on them by society for their own self-aggrandizement and correspondingly often fail to recognize the social obligation which such privilege creates. Indeed, in some instances, the privilege is even looked upon as a means of avoiding some of the more onerous social burdens. As a matter of fact, it ought to be axiomatic that it is a good thing for any man that his fellows obtain a superior education. But so long as any of the better educated are propelled by narrowly selfish motives to use their education to exploit their neighbors, one can hardly give blanket approval to such a dictum.

Democracy as Respect for Dignity of the Individual

An instance has already been noted where the educational pattern is cut after the interests of the many, although the many do not, at least as

¹ NIEBUHR, R., *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, pp. 117-118, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1932.

yet, participate broadly in the exercise of sovereign power. It is now in order to inspect a philosophy where not only are the many the center of educational gravity, but where the government, too, is of the many, by the many, and for the many.¹ This variance in political base does make a significant difference in educational theory. While the schools of benevolent despotism may be primarily devoted to the cultural concerns of the workers, they may still fall short of the development of personality found in a democracy, simply because they do not reach the moral autonomy which is possible with a universal franchise.

Democracy makes the many of such paramount political and educational importance because it believes in the essential dignity of all individuals.² It enjoins that every individual be treated always as an end.³ This injunction holds no matter to which sex a person belongs, no matter what his color or race, no matter whether he is high born or low, and no matter what are the economic circumstances of his parents. Whatever these accidental circumstances, a man is to be educated as man because of his common nature, because "a man is a man for a' that." Since every individual counts, whatever is unique and distinctive about him must be brought out. Not to realize his peculiar potentialities would not only pauperize him but would in so far pauperize the society of which he is a member.

The personal virtues which democracy's schools inculcate can easily be imagined. Since the measure of a man is what he is and what he can do, the individual is under the duty of making the most he possibly can out of himself. Teachers will encourage qualities of initiative, enterprise, self-reliance, and perseverance in their pupils. On the economic side, there will be emphasis on hard work, the dignity of labor, and scorn of idleness and a leisure class.⁴ On the political side provisions for education will be conditioned by a deep devotion to our common patrimony of civil rights and by a no less deep regard for civic responsibilities. To fulfill these specifications nothing less than universal education will suffice, the education of each and all to the limit of human capacities or at least to a point of diminishing returns of instructional effort expended on them.

¹ See also *infra*, p. 231.

² KILPATRICK, W. H.: "Democracy and Respect for Personality," *Progressive Education*, 16: 83-90, February, 1939; REISNER, E. H., "The Quality of School Experience Appropriate to a Democracy," *Teachers College Record*, 40: 698-700, May, 1939; GATES, G. G., "A Philosophy of Education and Our Democratic Faith," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 28: 180-182, March, 1942.

³ *Supra*, p. 115.

⁴ KANDEL, I., "The Philosophy Underlying the System of Education in the United States," p. 518, International Institute, Educational Yearbook, 1929.

What is the warrant for the democratic faith in the dignity of the individual?¹ Some support their faith with largely secular arguments.² Democratic regard for human dignity, they claim, pays off in a richer quality of living for all concerned. This is not simply the conclusion of unsupported theory; it is attested by the hard facts of human experience. Furthermore, these facts are not of just recent origin; they have been accumulating through long centuries of history. From pre-Christian times right down to the present there has been an age-long struggle to guarantee the respect for personality—long accorded to the one and the few—to the many as well. The struggle has waxed and waned in different periods of history, but over the centuries democracy has slowly been emerging the victor over autocracy and aristocracy. People aware of their stake in the struggle and the price at which it has been bought evidence a staunch and abiding confidence in their democratic faith.

Others feel anxious about the security of their democratic faith in the dignity of the individual unless it is anchored in something more than the precedents of history and the habits of men. To them the proud claim that the dignity of man is guaranteed by "inalienable" rights to life, liberty, and happiness is hollow indeed unless it is rooted in religious rather than purely secular principles. Operating on Judeo-Christian convictions they find the dignity of the individual assured through the universal fatherhood of God. To acknowledge the fatherhood of God implies that all men are brothers. If all men are brothers, then they must all be objects of infinite worth in the sight of their divine Parent. Having a capacity for infinite love God is not likely to play favorites with his children. In any event, whatever their worth it is intrinsic in their nature.³ Democracy and Christianity are not just congenial; they are congenital.

Obviously these two approaches to authenticating the dignity of man lead to different consequences. In the one case "consent of the governed" is the ultimate authority in determining educational policy. This implies that authority is immanent in man and requires us to place tremendous confidence in our fellows that they will neither impair nor rescind man's fundamental rights, especially his right to an education which will enable him to realize the fullness of his nature. In a world that could produce the Nazi philosophy of education this seems an optimistic if not unwarranted expectation. In the other case it is not society that is sovereign but God.

¹ BRUBACHER, J. S., "Democracy, Education, and the Judeo-Christian Tradition," *Religious Education*, 38: 353, November-December, 1943.

² KILPATRICK, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84; BREED, F. S., National Society for the Study of Education, Forty-first Yearbook, Part I, *Philosophies of Education*, p. 136, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1942.

³ *Supra*, pp. 96-97. See also *infra*, p. 149.

And it is He who gives ultimate validity to educational policy. If the right to command man came from God instead of man, society might disregard man's fundamental rights but it could never alienate them from him. On the contrary, as is often stated, these most precious rights are "inalienable" because God-given.

Democracy as Equalitarianism

Granted now that we have established democratic rule by the many, together with its educational corollary of universal education for all, on the rock of human dignity, does it follow that the education of each individual should be equal to that of every other? Many supporters of democracy take the affirmative side of this question. And well they may for does not the American Declaration of Independence state that "all men are born free and equal"? Yet, conceding that it does, just what precisely does this declaration of "equality" mean? Does it mean anything more than that all men are of infinite worth, that the claims of each individual are entitled to impartial consideration with regard to the claims of every other individual?

There are a few who take a quite literal interpretation of the word "equality." They believe that it refers to the fact that children are born with an equality of psychological endowment. Any appearances to the contrary are but evidence to them of the fact that some children have been so fortunate as to enjoy superior educational advantages because of the privileged circumstances of their parents. Whatever inequalities creep in later, it is clear that man's political status takes its character from an equality presumed to obtain at birth. Certainly no man's ballot when cast at the polls counts for more than his neighbor's. At any rate, if literal equality be granted, it follows that educational offerings should be equivalent and identical for all.

There are many who regard a literal equalitarianism as too naïve an interpretation of the democratic philosophy of education. For them it no longer fits the facts. It is sentimental rather than scientific. Educational psychology has too clearly proved the definite existence of marked individual differences to leave literal equalitarianism with a leg to stand on. Individuals are not only born different as to capacities and attitudes but unequal with respect to the same capacities and attitudes. The educator is now no more justified in assuming that children have equal mental gifts than that they are all the same height and weight at birth. Furthermore, no amount of education will eliminate these differences. Education cannot endow a school generation; it can only develop the endowment given it by nature. Indeed, the more education that is provided, the more pronounced will the effect of innate differences of children likely become.

Consequently it must be clearly recognized that democratic equality cannot mean an identity of education for all.¹

Easily yielding the naïve position of a literal equality of talent, other friends of democracy concentrate on endeavoring to equalize the external or material circumstances of obtaining an education. They fully recognize the differences between human individuals but think it ill-advised to increase the disparity between the extremes of talent in society. If the disparity becomes too great, there is danger that the extremes will not understand each other and consequently fall out of communication with each other. A failure of communication, of course, would threaten the very existence of society. Hence, many think, a democratic society or state must be built on an education which emphasizes the likenesses of men rather than their differences. Accordingly they would lay down the same minimum educational requirements for all. At the same time, however, they generally recognize that economic resources for commanding minimum educational opportunities are no more evenly distributed than are psychological talents. Not only are talented children accidentally born into families with low economic competence, but whole families by chance live in areas of the country where the natural resources are scant or little developed resulting in a low standard of living. Hence for them a democratic society must try to equalize educational opportunity by taxing everyone according to his ability to pay but disbursing public funds according to educational need.

There is little or no objection to the way in which equalitarian theories and procedures tend to level up the school population. Exception is rather taken to the fact that they also have a tendency to level it down. Public effort seems to exhaust itself once it puts a floor under educational opportunities. If it does not exhaust itself, at least it all too often contents itself with meeting minimum requirements. This attitude neglects the ceiling which those of superior ability might reach. While they generally exceed the average in spite of the failure of society to enrich their opportunities proportionately, there is no telling what they might do if democracy were not so tied to the idea of equalitarianism.

Democracy as Freedom

The American Declaration of Independence asserts, it will be remembered, that men are born free as well as equal. Many of the adherents of democracy think that the emphasis in a democratic philosophy of education should be on freedom rather than equality—or at least equity rather than equality.² Instead of flying in the face of the stubborn fact of individual

¹ LASKI, H., *A Grammar of Politics*, p. 114, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1925.

² For the educational significance of the difference between equity and equality,

differences by continually trying to find some basis for equalizing them, these adherents believe it sounder educational philosophy to predicate democracy on a frank recognition of the differences of men. Because it is of the very nature of man's individuality to be different from his fellows, he wants to be free. He wants to assert his individuality, his unique nature, with a minimum of let and hindrance from his fellows.¹ If men were born with equal talents, they would not feel this yearning for freedom for the wants of all would be much if not altogether alike. But the scientific fact is that they are born different, and it is this fact which lends significance to the declaration that they are born free.

It is not difficult to argue that justice and equity demand that the individual be free to develop the unique differences of his individuality. We can argue to this conclusion on several grounds. We may refer to Plato's norm of the good society as stated in his famous essay on justice, the *Republic*. There he lays it down that the just society is one wherein each individual is trained to do that thing for which his talents peculiarly suit him in such a way as to benefit the whole social group. As regards the social group we can further argue that it is certainly no benefit to repress a student's individuality. Unless we allow him the freedom to capitalize on his individuality it will be impossible to have a progressive democratic society. There simply must be a measure of freedom to depart from the norm of social custom if that norm is to be improved and advanced. As regards the individual we can reenforce his case by calling up again the Kantian imperative to treat the individual always as an end. If we obey this injunction, that is, if we always bear the individual's best interests in mind, we certainly must take his unique potentialities into account by creating the conditions which will enable him to exploit his abilities.

Conversely one might go so far as to assert that it is positively unethical, undemocratic, to prevent a child who is strong in mind or body from accomplishing what nature has endowed him with power to do. So, it is just as much a crime against both the individual and society to keep an extraordinarily capable child down to the level of mediocrity as it is to prevent a weak child from developing his powers to their fullest extent in competition or cooperation with his fellows.

When we use the word "freedom" it is usually followed by the preposition "from." On the whole this is the sort of freedom with which we have identified democratic education so far. We have emphasized the importance of establishing the independence of the individual from environmental circumstances which would restrict or interfere with his individ-

see B. F. Pittenger, "Some Relations of Education and Democracy," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 8: 424-428, October, 1922.

¹ Cf. KANDEL, I. L., "Liberalism and Education," *Educational Forum*, 1: 261-270, March, 1937; KILPATRICK, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-90.

uality. But "freedom" is also often followed by the preposition "to" or "for."¹ Mere severance from encroachments of the social environment would give democratic education a rather narrow and principally negative quality. There are many who like to think of democratic freedom in more affirmative terms. They want freedom "from" restriction, to be sure, but they also want to be free "to" take action in the belief that freedom to take action is a factor in the outcome of events.² In order to be free to take positive action the more thoroughly educated they are in that field of action, the more effective their action will be because taken in the light of all the pertinent facts. Hence no one should think of democratic freedom in a whimsical or capricious sense. On the contrary, only the well-disciplined should be entitled to enjoy democratic freedom.³

There are a number of points in educational practice at which democracy emerges in the form of an emphasis on freedom. Perhaps first to leap to mind would be academic freedom.⁴ Academic freedom is an excellent illustration of a freedom which involves both the prepositions "from" and "to." The teacher must be free "from" influences which prevent his stating the truth as he sees it, but he must also be thoroughly competent in his field "to" investigate the truth. The basis for such competence generally rests in part on a sound liberal education. In liberal education we have another emergence of freedom. Liberal education, as the etymological derivation of liberal from the Latin *liber* implies, is the education of the free man, the man who enjoys political freedom.⁵ Obviously in a democracy in which all men are politically free, all should have a liberal education. As a last instance, since all men in a democracy are free, education must be free, that is, there must be no economic barriers to its acquisition.⁶ It is this freedom which is incorporated in the idea of a "public" school, a school open and free to all.

In modern democracies numbers are so enormous that entrusting political powers to the many would all but defeat itself if it were not for the selection of leaders or experts to guide and execute the common will. Since modern democracies are representative rather than simple or direct democracies some think it the proper function of the schools on the one hand to select

¹ MCCONAUGHY, J. L., "Education in a Democracy," *School and Society*, 46: 391, September, 1937.

² GEYER, *op. cit.*, pp. 407-409; cf. also *supra*, pp. 62-66.

³ Cf. STANLEY, W., B. O. SMITH, and K. D. BENNE, "Progressive Essentialism in Education," *Frontiers of Democracy*, 9: 209-210, April, 1943; KANDEL, I. L., "The New School," *Teachers College Record*, 33: 505-514, March, 1932.

⁴ MCCONAUGHY, *op. cit.*, pp. 387-389.

⁵ Cf. ADLER, M. J., "Liberalism and Liberal Education," *Educational Record*, 20: 422-436, July, 1939.

⁶ For further illustrations of what democracy means in practice, see C. F. S. Virtue, "Are Our Schools Really Democratic?" *School and Society*, 51: 425-428, April, 1940.

and educate the capable for leadership and on the other to train the balance of the population for intelligent followership. While this is undoubtedly a gain in freedom for the individualities of the few educated to lead, it is not, as some fear, an infringement on the freedom of the individualities of those educated to follow. It is really a gain in freedom for all. The obvious advantage in the education of a democratic elite is the greater freedom they make possible for the masses through making available for them insights they have not the wit to see. Indeed, such an educational practice falls neatly within Plato's ethic of justice in that each group in society is being educated in line with its talents and in such a fashion as to benefit the whole group.

The contribution of an educated leadership to the advantage of the social whole is generally well-recognized. Less well understood, however, is the need for well-educated followership. The two are complementary aspects of a democratic education for freedom. The mere fact that leaders are provided is far from a guarantee that the rest of the people will follow. They must know enough to see that their advantage lies that way. On the other hand, leaders cannot expect the populace to follow their initiative blindly. The danger here would be that the leaders might soon lull themselves into the easy self-assurance of infallibility. After all, leaders and led are one society. In a democracy where there is rule by the many, the many must have the final word on what direction social activity shall take. The leaders must, therefore, convince them what is best to do. Their only hope for this lies in well-educated followers, people who can discriminate between the charlatan and the genuine leader. It has even been said that the best educated people are the most led.

Education for the dual role of leadership and followership appears to run a perilously close parallel to the sort of education found fitting where political power is held by the few. In fact no small number are afraid that a democratic elite will abuse their freedom, that they will selfishly exploit it to develop their own individualities through education but not in such a way as to benefit the whole. There seem to be several safeguards to prevent the paradox of democratic schools fostering an aristocracy of talent from endangering an ultimate democratic outcome. The chief thing which seems to save democratic freedom is the democratic recruitment of future leaders. Thus democracy's aristocracy will not be artificially chosen on the basis of socially inherited privileges, but will rather be selected according to the excellence of native endowment. Moreover, it is hoped that a further safeguard on the side of democracy will be found in the debt of gratitude which the natural elite will feel toward the masses from whose flesh and blood they sprang and by whom their superior education was made possible. But perhaps the chief safeguard rests in avoiding the all too common

mistake of drawing the lines between leaders and led too strictly and too rigidly. Those who have a competence to lead in politics may well be those to follow in scientific research, and those who should be captains of industry may well follow in aesthetic concerns. The democratic administration of the grading or grouping of pupils, therefore, indicates that groupings should be kept flexible, that they should be reviewed whenever the educational purpose of the group shifts.¹ Only so can the freedom of the individual be kept alive and flexible.

While this appears to be a sound theory of democratic freedom, we must not forget that historically the distinction between the education of leaders and the education of followers, the education of the upper and lower classes, was not predicated on democratic principles of justice and equity. Rather it was predicated on birth and economic privilege. Only after a prolonged struggle for power were the many, the lower classes, able to wrest a fair measure of educational freedom for their own individual interests. In this struggle, too, only rarely did the upper classes voluntarily make concessions to the distribution of politico-economic power and consequently to educational opportunity on ethical principles of justice. Interestingly enough the upper classes have been quicker to yield to lower class pressure for greater educational freedom than for political and especially economic freedom. This is because education merely denotes privilege, while suffrage denotes both privilege and power. They have further preserved their tactical superiority in social affairs by magnanimously providing the masses with an education calculated to inculcate submissiveness. But the advantage promises to be only temporary. Education, if not power, is at least potential power. It equips the disinherited with the means of an ever more efficient protection of their own interests.²

Some people doubt whether even the rise of the common man is sufficient insurance against possible excesses of an education based on free or liberal principles. They claim that when democracy's schools have liberated individuality they have succeeded in breeding a race of vigorous, self-confident men, but unhappily a race unworthy of the trust of wealth and power because they have been found wanting in self-criticism and unselfish politico-economic action.³ In a limited economy where the means are insufficient for all to achieve the full stature of their potentialities, individuals engage in a competitive struggle for economic and educational opportunities. With no greater loyalty than self, individuals frequently exploit the development of those less able to help themselves. Some even assail

¹ *Infra*, pp. 265-266.

² LASKI, *op. cit.*, pp. 114, 147.

³ HOCKING, W. E., "The Future of Liberalism," *Journal of Philosophy*, 32: 234, April, 1935.

democratic rule by the majority as the attempt of pressure groups to gain control of the government for the time being to ensure their own cultural and educational interests. Furthermore, since government is subject to the whims of passing majorities, they attack it for being unsure of its own educational ends, for offering no steady object of allegiance.¹

These are serious indictments of democratic freedom. They show a one-sided emphasis on justice, an emphasis that is only partly just. Apparently modern educators have not yet fully learned and applied Plato's concept of justice, educating the individual according to his talents, yes, *but in such a way as to benefit the whole*. However, learning to have regard for others as for oneself is an old problem of the human race. No doubt it will long continue to remain a standing challenge to democratic education.

Even when democracy is functioning at its virtuous best, it seems to suffer from inherent infirmities. These infirmities are most likely to disclose themselves when democracy clashes with autocracies or oligarchies. Then the very freedom for the individual, respected by democracy's school, may become a liability rather than an asset. Thus, taught to listen to a variety of opinion, democracy must take time out to educate itself on the merits of the clash and what to do about it. Meanwhile an autocracy or oligarchy, unhampered by parliamentary or educational safeguards, may strike at once and thereby gain an overwhelming initial advantage, not unlikely the advantage of driving a wedge into the ranks of democracy while it is divided into parties to discuss the pros and cons of the clash. Another danger arises from the agent of autocracy or oligarchy who bores from within democracy under the guise of a critic. Behind this pose he may tear down democracy's structure and, if challenged for his destructive work, take refuge in the academic freedom or civil liberty which democracy accords its citizens to be sure that its shortcomings come to public attention.²

Democracy as Sharing

A less individualistic conception of democracy and one with a greater social emphasis is that which takes its origin in the nature of society as communication, as mutually shared purposes.³ Advocates of this conception of democracy not only fasten on sharing as the nature of society but erect sharing into a norm of the good society. To them the good

¹ Cf. LEIGHTON, J. A., *The Field of Philosophy*, pp. 399-400, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1930.

² BRUBACHER, J. S., "Democratic Education—The Vices of Its Virtues," *Educational Trends*, 9: 10-16, May-June, 1941. See also *infra*, pp. 214-215.

³ *Supra*, pp. 124-125.

society, the one to which they attach the name democracy, has two dimensions. It is the one which on the one hand shares the largest number and variety of purposes between its own members and which on the other shares similarly with other groups.¹ And, as some one has added, it continually endeavors to widen the area of shared concerns, to grow in sharing.² Just as the measure of growth is more growth,³ so the measure of democracy is more democracy, more sharing. Put in still another way, the only cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy.

The yardstick for estimating the democracy of an educational enterprise in the classroom, school, or school system is the degree to which the area of shared concerns is being widened between the teacher and his pupils, between one classroom and another, between the school and the family, the school and the church, and a host of other social agencies.⁴ There is an obvious advantage to a way of life which keeps open the channels of communication in this manner. Crises occurring anywhere in the social system can quickly become the concern of all. If all have been educated to self-reliance and inventiveness, a formidable energy can be mobilized to solve common problems. The experience or insight of each is thus made freely available to give added meaning to the experience or insight of every other so that the cumulative effect is bound to be very formidable.

The chief danger to a democracy predicated on sharing arises when the avenues of public communication such as the radio, press, and the schools become shut off or clogged by linguistic differences, or racial and religious antipathies. When traffic in ideas slows down to a standstill, people become caught in jams which they neither can understand nor from which can they extricate themselves. Keeping channels of communication open and free, however, will not alone guarantee the solution of problems confronting a democracy. There may be the freest exchange of opinion wherein the parties to the exchange still disagree. In such cases the democratic way to break the deadlock is to let the majority have its way, not that the majority is necessarily right, but rather that majority rule is the only way to get action. Of course there are some issues of fundamental principle—political, religious, and economic—on which it is better to have no action than to submit them to majority rule. The danger of a vote on

¹ DEWEY, J., *Democracy and Education*, p. 96, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916. For an unusual critique of Dewey's social philosophy, see HUELS, J. H., "Totalitarian Trends in American Education," *Catholic Educational Review*, 45: 135, 139, March, 1947. For further reference to this theory, see *infra*, pp. 162-163.

² BODE, B. H., *Progressive Education at the Crossroads*, pp. 104-113, Newson and Company, New York, 1938.

³ *Supra*, p. 109.

⁴ See for instance *infra*, pp. 262-263.

such issues is that the minority might not abide by it. Rather than offend its conscience by submitting to the majority, it might abandon educational procedures easing the tension and resist with physical force.¹

To learn to free communication and to submit to majority rule wherever possible is, perhaps, one of the greatest arguments for the universal public school. By getting children of various races, national backgrounds, religious faiths, political convictions, and economic circumstances together in the same school where they can rub cultural elbows we have one of the best assurances for keeping open the highways of social intercommunication. But let a group establish a private or independent school on whatever grounds—to teach a particular point of view, political, economic, or religious; to exclude children whose social backgrounds are unacceptable; or what have you—and a difficult barrier is erected to the interpenetration of diverse ideas. No doubt within the private school there is a wide sharing of interests, particularly of those which brought the school into existence. But the real threat to democracy is the impediment which the independent school constitutes to sharing with other groups. The very fact that it withdraws its clientele from the public school shows it has something to share which is not shared in the public school or that there is something the public school shares they do not want to share. In either event the very existence of independent schools invites misunderstanding if not even misgiving.

Yet in defense of the private school we may pertinently inquire whether it is not part of the birthright of freedom for minority groups, dissatisfied with the shortcomings of the public school, to set up independent schools of their own to form the kind of curriculum from the social heritage which they peculiarly want for their children. The answer theoretically and historically is definitely in the affirmative. At this point we are likely to find ourselves in something of a paradox. In the same name of democracy we are doubting and upholding the advisability of private schools. Hence we see that democracy as sharing and democracy as freedom are somewhat incompatible with each other.

The philosophic difference between these two kinds of schools in a democracy is not likely to produce a crisis in practice so long as the advocates of the public school do not insist that the public school is the sole institution for sharing culture with the young or so long as the advocates of the private or independent school do not share doctrines so widely at variance with those taught in the public school as to imperil democracy itself or whatever the majority at any given time thinks democracy is. In other words democracy can put up with mildly contradictory educational practices, but there are definite limits to which such tolerance can go.

¹ BRAMELD, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

This conflict in the meaning of democracy raises the question whether democracy is a definite philosophy of education, whether it has any fixed, absolute principles, or whether it is only a more or less definite philosophy of education whose fundamental principles are constantly undergoing amendment in the light of experience.¹ Of course those who regard the essence of democracy as respect for the dignity of man, and found that respect on man's common fatherhood in God, are strongly inclined to think of the democratic philosophy of education in absolutistic terms.² There are some, too, who regard freedom and equality as fixed or absolute principles of such an educational philosophy. So strongly do absolutists cling to their views that they would not think of submitting them to vote by the majority. Those, however, who make the concept of sharing the norm of the democratic process in education are inclined to think of democracy in more relativistic terms. Thus democracy is constantly becoming whatever its members make it in the light of mutual criticism and reconstruction of their shared experiences.³ Because of this emphasis on experience it will not be surprising if some go so far as to claim that experimentalism is the educational philosophy which is peculiarly appropriate to democracy.⁴ Yet, strangely enough—perhaps paradoxically—some of these people think the experimental method is so basic to the whole conception of democratic sharing that to give it up or even to restrict it would meet the utmost resistance from them. Indeed this resistance is so stubborn that one might well say even their conception of the democratic philosophy of education has absolutistic implications.⁵

Several Major Philosophies of Education

In general, social philosophies of education divide themselves into two categories, those stressing the individual and those stressing the group. Cutting across these categories, however, are three others based on the manner of distributing political power. Here we have philosophies of education appropriate to autocracy, oligarchy, and democracy. Yet even democracy, we find, is not a simple concept but a very complex one. Instead of meaning just one thing it appears to mean at least four different

¹ Hook, S., "Synthesis or Eclecticism," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 7: 217-218, December, 1946.

² Cf. Hocking, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, pp. 11-13, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1923.

³ BRUBACHER, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁴ CHILDS, J. L., *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism*, pp. 30, 93, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1931.

⁵ BRUBACHER, J. S., "The Absolutism of Progressive and Democratic Education," *School and Society*, 53: 1-9, January, 1941; SANDERS, W. J., "Educators and the Democratic Principle," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 27: 692-697, December, 1941.

things to educational philosophers—respect for the dignity of man, equalitarianism, freedom, and sharing. Each one of these ingredients seems to represent a value which every friend of democracy would like to preserve.

The only difficulty with appropriating all four is that some of them are not altogether compatible with others. Thus freedom and equality are not altogether compatible bedfellows in a single educational philosophy since the former gives reign to individual differences while the latter tends to level them off.¹ Neither is freedom altogether compatible with democratic sharing as seen in the case of the comparison of public and private schools. Finally the freedom, equality, and the dignity of man as absolutes conflict with the apparently more relativistic experimental conception of democracy as sharing. In spite of these incompatibilities democratic education generally manages to incorporate each of these ingredients into practice. Such a situation could be very explosive, yet perhaps the genius of the democratic philosophy of education is that it is so paradoxical, that it can mean contradictory things to different educators and yet not result in a crisis which disrupts society completely.

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¹ Cf. LOWELL, A. L., "Democracy, Equality, and Education," *Harvard Teachers Record*, 1: 94-98, November, 1931.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE STATE AND EDUCATION

Spheres of Public and Private Action

The way in which various political forms of society condition the philosophy of education has been described at some length, with hardly any intimation whether the schools were to be supported and controlled by the government or by private effort. The distinction has not been insisted upon so far, because to make it is to uncover a whole new area of perplexities with which the philosophy of education must deal. While this area is undoubtedly directly related to the preceding ones, in a sense it is independent from them. Whether education is a suitable enterprise for governmental support and regulation may be a moot point, regardless of a society's political pattern. While democracies, for instance, have usually been enthusiastic patrons of public education, there is nothing in the democratic principle which makes it mandatory for the public to maintain a system of schools. Historically, some democracies have been conspicuous for their governmental neglect of education. And equally, while societies governed by an aristocracy or plutocracy might be expected, through private schools, to monopolize education for their own children as the future rulers, there are many instances where such societies have provided extended educational opportunities for the masses at public expense. From these instances, then, it should be clear that the relation of the government to education presents a discrete problem for the philosophy of education.

The foregoing illustrations not only delimit the present topic from preceding ones, but they also serve to introduce one to the sort of conflicting educational practices one finds in this region. Only a few of these need to be indicated here, to define further the problem of this area. The fundamental difference of opinion and practice here concerns what parts of education shall be allocated to the sphere of government and what parts to the liberty of the private citizen. Formerly, all education fell in the latter sphere. Latterly, more and more of it has come under the government. In some places, the government merely provides the school building and teacher. In others, it goes further and offers free textbooks and supplies. In still others, it furnishes such services as medical care, transportation to and from school, and noonday lunches. Probably no one today would like to see the government abandon any of these services.

Nevertheless there are many parents who still prefer to keep close control over the quality and amount of these services by sending their children to private schools of their own selection.

The practical consequences of maintaining both public and private schools seldom presents serious conflicts till a case arises where both public and private agencies reach out for the same thing. Thus when the state has included religion in the public school curriculum, the church has regarded it as an invasion of a subject-matter field peculiarly falling within the precincts of the church and its Sunday or parochial schools. Similarly when the church has sought a portion of public funds raised by taxation for the support of its schools, the state has generally objected. Most critical, of course, have been cases where the state has tried to establish a monopoly over education by abolishing private schools altogether. This clash of secular and religious interests in the sphere of education has been all the more severe where the secular state has been strongly nationalistic as well. But to the forces of nationalism in education there is secular opposition as well. Here the competition is not only whether the church or state shall control educational policies but whether central or local secular authorities shall dominate.

The reason why the clash on the locus of educational control is of such import is that if one favors the state as the proper educational agency one puts tremendous potential power in the hands of those who control the state. Men form many societies such as the family, church, and school, but in forming the state they do something unique—they organize the physical force of the community. In fact, the state is the only society which can lawfully employ physical coercion to achieve its ends. It can, for instance, compel children to attend school, while private agencies have no such power. Even more important it can levy a school tax and, if it is not paid, proceed against the property of the delinquent taxpayer. Obviously, to put the state back of the schools is to back their educational program with unmatched power and resources. A fortiori to put the national state back of the schools is to weight central authority heavily as over against local authority. It is small wonder, therefore, if we must be at considerable pains to examine the philosophic principles on which the control of such power should rest.

Pluralism and Totalitarianism

A matter of first importance here is to decide more precisely just what are the limits of the state. As already stated, men associate themselves together for a great many different purposes such as business, recreation, politics, and worship. But the critical question arises whether political society or the state is but one among many societies with limited objectives to which the individual belongs or whether the state is an over-

arching society which includes and dominates all the rest. Those who hold that the state is but one among many competing forms of society hold to a pluralistic theory of society and the state. On the other hand those who regard the state as the all-inclusive social category hold to a monistic or totalitarian theory. The pluralistic theory of society and the state has found its chief advocates among democracies, while the monistic or totalitarian theory has been chiefly espoused by autocracies or oligarchies like communism and fascism.

The totalitarian theory proves attractive to its adherents because basically they hold to an organismic theory of society.¹ Just as the biologic organism must be studied as an integrated whole, so they think the social body must be approached as a whole or a totality. Of all the societies which men form, the state is the most inclusive in its membership. Some churches aim to be catholic, that is, all inclusive, in their membership, but they fail of their objective because membership in them is ultimately on a voluntary basis and some people do not choose to join. In the case of the state, on the contrary, the child is born into it. He cannot escape being a citizen. He may be an individual in addition to being a citizen, but it is only as he overcomes the necessary limitations of individuality through participation in the social whole, the state, that he really reaches the full stature of a man. The state represents the universal, and it is only as the individual draws inspiration from the universal that he amounts to anything worth while. Hence the totalitarian is inclined to regard society and the state as coterminous and citizenship as exhausting or absorbing the status of the individual.

With the state lifted to this pinnacle of importance it will come as no surprise that all schools must be under governmental control. Private schools can have no autonomous standing. In such a system Rousseau's idea of educating the man rather than the citizen would be quite repugnant. On the contrary the totalitarian would probably follow Hegel in believing that the child had no chance of becoming a full-fledged man except through education for citizenship. Similarly, the only way the child can make his will effective is to learn to will what the state wants him to will. Hence the child is educated not only exclusively by the state but ultimately exclusively for the state as well. Thus the state comes to assume ethical as well as political sovereignty in the education of its wards.

The pluralistic theory of society and the state appeals to its proponents because of the large measure of freedom it preserves for them. History has taught them to be very cautious about the aggrandizement of governmental power. The inherent danger of a state coterminous with society

¹ *Supra*, p. 126. See also *infra*, p. 190.

or even approaching such congruity is that it will bestride the life of individuals like a colossus. To protect themselves from the shadow of such governmental tyranny they have persistently tried to reduce the pretensions of the state. One of the best ways of doing this, they have learned by experience, is by specifically delimiting the powers of government through a written constitution. By basing government on limited rather than absolute powers the pluralist leaves many social enterprises to be undertaken by other forms of human association besides the state, such as the church and family. This not only provides relief from the uniformity of state regimentation, but it also affords a welcome competition among a variety of different ways of doing things.¹

With the dimensions of the state scaled down materially where the conception of pluralism obtains, the social climate proves congenial to both public and private schools. The state may provide schools but so also may the family, church, industry, and other voluntary agencies.² Therefore the state must guard itself against claiming a monopoly in the education of children. If it exercises this restraint public and private schools existing side by side become a mutual example and stimulus to each other's improvement. In this way, too, the pupil will be assured of being educated as an individual and not exclusively as a citizen. He will be educated as an end and not just as a mouthpiece or instrument of the state.³ This is not to imply that there is any necessary antithesis between the education of the good individual and the education of the good citizen, but it is a reminder that there are two different kinds of value here to which a democracy, at least, must be constantly sensitive. Furthermore, separating ethical sovereignty from the state and lodging it in the individual or the church will assure the state of a more honest estimate of its own vices and virtues when studied in the schools.

Anarchism

If the principle of pluralism be granted, it becomes a matter of expediency which parts of the educational program should be assumed by government and which parts should be allocated to private effort. The two expedients

¹ For further reference to pluralism, see *infra*, pp. 190-191.

² Pluralism seems to be the educational philosophy of the United States Supreme Court in the oft-cited Oregon case of *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510. In that case the court held (p. 535), "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 132-133.

found most frequently in practice are *laissez faire* and socialism. In the former case the government holds aloof from education, leaving it to private agencies like the family and the church to provide it. In the latter instance the state steps in to organize and maintain schools of its own. But there is also a third expedient, anarchism, which though less significant, must not be overlooked. Under anarchism education would be carried on, neither by the state nor merely at its sufferance, but with no state at all.

Only a theoretic statement can be made about education under anarchy, for practical instances of anarchism are all but nonexistent. In an anarchistic society, as already stated, there would be no political or civil state. Such social organisms as might obtain would be quite voluntary. In view of the shortcomings of human nature¹ many confidently believe that the absence of civil government with power to enforce law and order would lead to wild confusion, even chaos. Indeed, in the popular mind anarchy passes as a synonym for chaos and disorder. Whether or not anarchy would actually lead to such a social condition need not be a matter of moment here. The fact is that theoretically anarchists believe it possible to organize a society where each individual is able to hold his unruly animal nature in leash without constraint from the state. The least that can be said for such a theory is that it is a brave and lofty aspiration. If it is at all capable of realization it would certainly involve long and intensive schooling in the art of self-control. Since social control would be dependent on education rather than the coercion of government, it is probably true that in the utopia of anarchy there would be more need and regard for education than there would be in either the expedients of *laissez faire* or socialism.

It but remains to inquire how schooling would be provided in a society where people held to anarchistic principles. With no frame of public government on which to depend, providing educational opportunities would be a purely voluntary matter. The right of a child to education and the duty of his parent to provide it would exist only in contract, that is, in voluntary agreement.² Of course the infant would be too young to make such arrangements and would therefore be at the mercy of his parents for an education until he grew older. Nevertheless, the anarchist is reluctant to coerce the parent in his educational duties toward his offspring, for he fully counts on parental instinct to fulfill its function at this point. Moreover the anarchist is no more ready to compel the child to go to school³

¹ *Supra*, pp. 66-68.

² TUCKER, B. R., "Some Socialist and Anarchist Views of Education," *Educational Review*, 15: 6-10, January, 1898.

³ KELLY, G. B., "Some Socialist and Anarchist Views of Education," *Educational Review*, 15: 13-16, January, 1898.

than he is to compel the parent to provide him schooling. Even if the parent fails to fulfill his natural duty, the anarchist is more likely to blame this result on the inequitable distribution of wealth under capitalism than he is on parental defection of duty. Granted a suitable standard of living which would afford enough leisure for education, the anarchist is confident that those who are fond of teaching could not be kept from volunteering to teach their fellows and that, consequently, voluntary associations for educational purposes would spring up everywhere.¹

The Laissez-faire State

Only a negligible number of people think there is any possibility of dispensing with the state in the foreseeable future. Yet, while nearly every one recognizes that the state is indispensable, there are many who would severely restrict the state to a few basic functions such as providing police and courts of law to protect the life and property of its citizens. With regard to other social enterprises they would have the state adopt a hands-off or laissez-faire policy. Under such a regime the schools would in effect fare little different from what they would under anarchism. If there is a government but the government does not concern itself with education, there might almost as well be no government at all so far as the schools are concerned. Hence children would have to depend for their education on the family, church, and other voluntary philanthropic agencies as under anarchism.

As a matter of fact few states are completely and undeviatingly *laissez faire* about education. While *laissez faire* is a general or basic policy they are constantly making exceptions. Paupers and the children of paupers are a case in point. If parents or other private agencies do not voluntarily feel a responsibility here, then the state almost perforce must step in. But the question arises, What is the argument for having it step in just as little as it possibly can? Fundamentally the argument grows out of a general demand for freedom. Originally *laissez faire* was a protest against excessive government interference in private business and commerce. The feeling was that if the government would keep its hands off, not only would individuals be more prosperous, but the state itself would be better off. The best way to provide for the general welfare was for each individual to be free to look after his own. Self-interest is the law of nature. Government should tamper with it only where individual or group interests conflict and there only to be a referee and maintain a just balance among private interests.²

¹ JOAD, C. E. M., *Introduction to Modern Political Theory*, p. 106, Oxford University Press, New York, 1924.

² See also pp. 267-268.

The rule applicable to business was supposed to be no less applicable to education. The child must be free to pursue his own self-interest in getting an education.¹ Only in the case of the infringement of this interest through conflict with others was the state justified in interposing on behalf of the child. Such a possible infringement, however, could arise only where some previously existing power of the child to get an education had been cut off or impaired. Now such a situation does not exist even where the parent fails to educate his child. In such a case the parent merely fails to enhance his child's development; he does not positively diminish or retard it. The child is no less free to exercise his native liberty after his parents neglect than he was before it. If the result of this rugged reasoning seems to risk leaving the child to his own ineffective devices to obtain an adequate education, we must comfort ourselves, as does the anarchist, that no doubt some adult will find it to his self-interest to exercise his freedom in offering to care for the child's education.

Just how assured this comfort is seems rather doubtful to critics of the laissez-faire state. As a matter of history, private initiative and private philanthropy have been laggard in their provision of schools both in quantity and quality. Even with public subsidy private philanthropy has been unable to expand educational facilities rapidly and extensively enough. Worse yet, the educational result is that some individuals have become more absorbed in their liberties than in their duties, in private economic gain than in civic responsibility. Under the banner of rugged individualism the strong have enjoyed the individualism and the weak have suffered the ruggedness. Not a few of those who have benefited from such a social policy have become so enamored of their success as to hold a vested interest in the doctrine of *laissez faire*. In fact they are so fanatically *laissez faire*, that they carry the doctrine to a *reductio ad absurdum*, that is, they are no longer *laissez faire* about *laissez faire* itself. Strangely enough, *laissez faire*, originating as a doctrine of freedom, becomes a bulwark of the *status quo*. Thus, according to their creed they should let the teacher alone and not interfere with his freedom to deal with controversial issues in the curriculum, but as a matter of fact they are often among the first to beseech the state to make the teacher take a loyalty oath to prevent his rocking the ship of state.

The Positive or Welfare State

Those who are impressed with the shortcomings of the doctrine of *laissez faire* generally think that the state should take a more positive attitude toward education. Much as they may admire a state that is a just and

¹ *Infra*, p. 306.

neutral umpire between the clashing interests of its citizens, nevertheless they think that the state must take positive as well as negative action to maintain a proper balance of social welfare for its citizens. As they see it, freedom is to be obtained, not merely through independence from the restraints of state regulation, but also through active social planning. This is no paradox to the socialist, the advocate of positive state action, for he would hold that social regulations which do not free more human energies than they restrain are ethically unsound. The state, hence, must have ends of its own.¹ Instead of being uncertain about its own ends, as an excessive emphasis on its neutrality would indicate, the state has a stake in the welfare of its citizens just as much as the individual citizens do themselves.

It is one thing to favor the positive or welfare state, but it is quite another to state the precise nature of the state's interest in education. Perhaps the best way to look upon the state's interest in education is as a long-term investment.² This interest obviously runs far beyond the span of any single generation. The state must take affirmative steps to conserve its human resources just as it does its natural ones. Only so can it hope to perpetuate the vital virtues and skills which make it what it is. Such a crucial enterprise the state can hardly let hang on the liberty of the private citizen or on the uncertain benevolence of private philanthropies. The state must step forward from the outset and ensure not only an adequate amount of education but also education of an adequately high standard. Certainly we can trust no agency less universal than the state to accomplish such prophetic and unselfish ends.³

Now just how far may the state exert its power to achieve these ends? Certainly it must have the right to erect and maintain public schools. Moreover these schools must be of all grades, from the nursery school to the university, with curriculums ranging from the simplest elements of liberal education to the most profound and recondite elements of professional specialization. If the state has an interest in establishing schools, it has a corresponding right to compel attendance at school and to regulate child labor so that attendance will be possible. To ensure that children get to school it may provide transportation at public expense, and to ensure the tools of instruction when they get there the state may provide children with free textbooks and supplies. Furthermore, to guarantee vigorous bodies as well as vigorous minds the state must have the right to give

¹ Cf. RUSSELL, B., "Socialism and Education," *Harper's Magazine*, 151: 416, September, 1925.

² BRIGGS, T. H., *The Great Investment*, p. 8, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1930.

³ WILSON, W., *The State*, p. 638, D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1889.

medical and dental examinations together with free meals if it wishes.¹ There are those who think that the state should further reach forth and preside over childbirth, regulate the housing of children, advise them in courtship, and instruct them in parentage.²

All this, it almost goes without saying, the state is entitled to provide at public expense. This means that the state can tax the childless to educate the children of those blest with families, the Jew to educate the Gentile, the Protestant to educate the Catholic, and the rich to educate the poor. But this does not mean that the state control of schools extends only to state-supported schools. The positive state may regulate private schools as well as public ones as where, for instance, it may require all children to be instructed in American history.³

This scope and sweep of the positive or welfare state's interest in education frightens a few as socialistic, even communistic. And they do not think that they are just indulging in name calling when they so describe the public-school system. They honestly believe that the public school is paternalistic, that it so encroaches on the proper sphere of the family as to destroy the parents' sense of responsibility for their children. Furthermore, it works a real injustice on responsible and industrious parents to tax them for the education of the children of the shiftless and indolent as well as for the education of their own. Indeed, some critics claim the public school has a bad influence on the children as well as the parents. Making no personal financial sacrifice for their education, children fail to appreciate the benefits conferred upon them.⁴

The Family

In a pluralistic society where the state, whether *laissez faire* or positive, is only one among several educational agencies, it will be well to examine the claims of these other agencies to sponsor the education of children and to see how these claims relate to those of the state. Of course all three principal educational agencies—the family, state, and church—are anxious to have the child grow into the very best possible kind of person. On some traits of what is the best possible kind of manhood and womanhood these three institutions are quite agreed. They reinforce each other in their educational endeavors to make children courteous, industrious, gen-

¹ BRUBACHER, J. S., "The Public School: An Example of the New Social Order," *School and Society*, 44: 761-768, December, 1936.

² CHANCELLOR, W. E., *Motives, Ideals, and Values in Education*, p. 254, Houghton-Mifflin Company, Boston, 1907.

³ HOWISON, G. H., "The Real Ground for the State Control of Schools," *Educational Review* 5: 433, May, 1893.

⁴ MUNROE, J. P., "Certain Dangerous Tendencies in Modern Education," *Educational Review*, 3: 145-155, February, 1892.

erous, and the like. On some traits each institution specializes so that it supplements the others. The family develops affection; the state gives military training; and the church teaches religion. But in still other areas all three institutions try to do the same thing but in such different ways as to lead to some confusion. All concern themselves with making the child a good citizen and with trying to make him a moral individual.¹ As we might expect, there will be difference of opinion, particularly between the church and the state, on how to achieve these ends.

Naturally, each institution, confident of the worth of its own point of view, will wish to incline youth in its direction. The family, however, has the initial chance to win the child's loyalty. For one thing, the family begets the child and from time immemorial has been charged with its earliest training. That this is a sound vested interest has been recognized by both church and state. Whether it is necessary or even desirable to go so far as to say that the parent "owns" the child is perhaps a matter of some doubt.² Among other reasons which account for the priority of the family as an educational institution is the fact that it is unrivaled as society's basic affectional institution. Educational authorities at best are motivated by public spirit, a poor substitute for parental affection. It is doubtful whether even the teachers of the schools of the church, actuated by the deepest brotherly love, could do better. The security afforded by this family sentiment is simply invaluable.

But even when the strongest case has been built for reposing certain educational responsibilities in the discretion of the parent, it is generally recognized that the family has its limitations, that it does not contain within itself all the means for its own development. Worthy as the diversity of families is as a bulwark against the uniformity which state education too frequently imposes on children, nevertheless the diversity often amounts to abysmal deficiencies on the part of parents as educators. Capacity for parenthood is not by any means highly correlated with capacity for educating. Furthermore, fundamental sociological conditions are profoundly affecting the efficiency of the home as an educational agency. The passing of home industry, the frequent employment of both parents, the invention of the automobile, and the development of commercial amusement—to mention but a few of the changes—have greatly under-

¹ RYAN, J. H., "Limitations of Public Education," *Religious Education*, 22: 582-585, June, 1927; SHIELDS, T. C., "Relation between Catholic and Public Schools," *Catholic Educational Review*, 12: 135-146, September, 1916.

² KILPATRICK, W. H., "Thinking in Childhood and Youth," *Religious Education*, 23: 132, February, 1928; RUSSELL, B., *Education and the Modern World*, pp. 69-70, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1932; BUKHARIN, N., and E. PREOBRAZHENSKY, *The A B C of Communism*, pp. 233-234, Workers' Party of America, Lyceum Literature Department, New York, 1921.

mined the reverence and implicit obedience of the family discipline of not so long ago. In spite of these drawbacks most families persist in educating the child through his tenderest years.

It is the rare family indeed, however, which would think itself competent to undertake the more formal instruction of later years. This the family generally delegates to some other agency, usually a public or private school. By their patronage families have encouraged roughly three types of private school. Some parents, concerned over the heterogeneity of the public school population, wish to have their children attend a school where the pupils will come from a more homogeneous background of manners, morals, health, and language habits. These often turn out to be socially select schools. They generally offer superior opportunities for an education of the conventional type. Other parents are discontented with the public school curriculum and prefer a school where a different content is offered. Most notable here is the Catholic parochial-school system, which grew up as a consequence of the exclusion of religion from the public school offerings. Finally are to be noted private schools of a frankly experimental character. Not infrequently a few parents are dissatisfied with conventional educational stereotypes and are willing to undertake educational risks which the public or other more conservative private schools are unwilling to do.

The obvious advantage of these private schools is the diversity of viewpoint they permit, to say nothing of the safeguard they are against tyrannies of the state. If society had always to depend on the level of popular enlightenment for its educational advances, the rate of progress would be distressingly slow. Historically, many of the most notable improvements in education have resulted from the establishment of schools with purposes different from those of the state. This virtue of private schools is at the very same time the origin of their vice. The danger is that they will stratify society along the very lines of their differences. Where this occurs, there is bound to be envy and misunderstanding. Some envisage a public school in which there will be both variety and socialization. Doubtless it is a noble ideal. Pending its achievement, however, the passing of education from the field of private enterprise should not be forced by legislation but should be the natural outcome of the improvement of the public school.

So far in our consideration of the family we have been looking at education from the perspective of the parents. After recognizing their right to direct the education of their child, the question arises: What about the child himself, has he any rights? Suppose, for instance, that his parents are very haphazard in exercising the right to direct their child's education. Does the child have any right to remedy or redress? Yes,

he does, but it is a rather weak one if he chances to live in a *laissez-faire* state. At common law, for example, he has the right to demand only that his parents give him an education which will enable him to live in comfort in the condition of his parents. If his parents are ignorant and poor, his prospects for educating himself beyond their miserable condition are not very promising. But suppose now that his parents grossly neglect his education or suppose that they are utterly corrupt morally, What is to happen then? Obviously it is very difficult to remain strictly *laissez faire* in the face of such impending disaster, and even *laissez-faire* states have been known to take positive action here.

The embarrassment suffered by the *laissez-faire* state when confronted by such an extreme case is not shared by the positive state. In such extenuating circumstances the positive state will not hesitate to step between parent and child by suspending the parent's supervision of his child's education and by making the child a ward of the state.¹ On the whole the nontotalitarian positive state should be a trustworthy protector of the rights of childhood. By reason of establishing and maintaining schools and by reason of compelling attendance thereat the positive state must define what a school is, that is, lay down its minimum requirements. This minimum generally enhances the educational rights of the child and makes them much sturdier than in a *laissez-faire* state, for the positive state is not content to educate a child to the mere level of his parents but claims the child has a right to a maximum of self-realization.² Moreover the positive state does not think that such a right of the child is incompatible with the right of the parents to educate him at home, if they wish, so long, of course, as the state reserves to itself the right to decide whether any particular home is an adequate school as measured against the state's minimum standards. Any public schools which the state sets up in addition, therefore, are to supplement the home, not to supplant it. They are not schools to which parents *must* send their child, but only places where they *may* send him to discharge the responsibility to educate him which every parent bears in a pluralistic society.

Church and State

The church no less than the state regards itself as a natural complement to the family when the latter reaches the limit of its educational resources in teaching the child. If the child had to depend exclusively on his parents, or for that matter, on his parents and the state as his teachers, his education would inevitably suffer their limitations. Just as the father

¹ LISCHKA, C. M., "Limitations of the Legislative Power to Compel Education," *Catholic Educational Review*, 27: 22-23, January, 1929.

² *Supra*, pp. 107-108.

and mother, except in rare cases, are limited in their educational outlook by birth and training, so too the state, in spite of its larger and more diversified membership, is limited in educational outlook by its exclusively secular interests. If the child is to develop religious interests, therefore, if he is to develop interests in faith and morals, the church insists that it has no less right than the state to complement the education of the child begun in the first instance by the family.

No doubt in a pluralistic society the right of the church to be a teacher must be respected. The state, if it is to avoid totalitarianism, must not assume a monopoly over education but must permit church schools to exist side by side with its own.¹ So much is generally agreed. But the question arises, should the state go further and actively encourage the church to maintain schools of its own by subsidizing them with public taxes? Catholics think that it should, while non-Catholics are divided on the issue. In either case most Catholics and a goodly number of non-Catholics deplore the secular view of life to which the exclusion of religion from the public school curriculum seems to lead.² Recognizing that religion is not excluded on antireligious grounds they nonetheless think the void left by the departure of religion from the public school curriculum tacitly encourages the disregard of religion as an important part of the child's education.

Patently there is an uneasy condition of equilibrium existing here between church and state. In forming an attitude toward it probably the first step should be to understand the philosophical issue out of which it arises.³ Catholics found the right of the church in educational matters in the supernatural order. The divine mission of the Catholic church to teach is derived by succession through Jesus' disciples, to whom he said, "All power is given to me in heaven and earth. Going therefore teach ye all nations . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you."⁴ Although, in the Catholic mind, this grant of power gives the church preeminence among all other educational institutions, it is not claimed to give the church exclusive jurisdiction over education. It is conceded that the family and the state have rights in education, too, but their rights are of the natural order. As the supernatural is higher than the natural, so it follows that the right of the church in educational matters is unqualifiedly superior to the title of the family and the state.

¹ *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510.

² CONFREY, B., *Secularism in American Education*, Catholic University Press, Washington, D.C., 1931.

³ KILPATRICK, W. H., "Religion in Education: The Issues," *Progressive Education*, 26: 98-102, February, 1949.

⁴ Matthew 28:18-20 (Douay version of the Bible).

Hence, any abridgement of the prerogatives of the church in education is palpably and deplorably unjust. And be it noted that the church is not less absolutely right on this point because the state may ignore her claim or even, through superior force, infringe upon her sacred precincts.¹

Normally this claim of the Catholic church to preeminence as an educational agency extends only to the church's proper end and object, instruction in faith and morals. In this field the divine origin of the church enables her to teach with immunity from error. Significantly enough, however, the church does not stop here in her claims. She also claims an independent right to decide with regard to *every other* form of human learning and instruction what will help or harm Christian education. This added claim is logical enough. If these other areas of instruction bear directly or indirectly on faith and morals, the church cannot carry out its primary function adequately unless it extends its educational jurisdiction over these incidental areas as well. Again, the church does not stop here but goes on to make the extremely broad claim that there is no form of instruction at all which in the last analysis is unconnected with man's last end or ultimate destiny and which therefore can be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of divine law of which the Catholic church is the infallible judge.²

This is an exceedingly strong statement. Stated more moderately but with no sacrifice of principle it amounts to saying that the secular and religious curriculums are often very closely related. Where they are, the church will be concerned with secular instruction. But such a concern will be incidental and secondary, not an object proper of the church. For the state, on the other hand, this type of instruction is of primary importance. The church should teach in the secular realm only as an act of charity where the arts and sciences are insufficiently taught, or as an act of necessity where they are improperly taught. To teach that science and religion are contradictory to each other would be an instance where the church would feel it incumbent of necessity to teach science to correct what it would regard as a false impression. But to make this branch of education a main object and direct mission of the church is to make the church assume responsibility for the condition of the profane arts and sciences among Christian nations, an unnecessary responsibility.

However stated, we have here a claim to control over the education of the child on the part of the Catholic church which not only rivals that of the state but actually overshadows it. It is no less overshadowing because the claim is the independent claim of Catholics just for Catholics. If the

¹ PIUS XI, "Christian Education of Youth," *Catholic Educational Review*, 28: 138-147, March, 1930.

² *Ibid*, pp. 133-134. See also *infra*, p. 284.

Catholic church really is infallible in its interpretation of the religious and secular curriculum, it affects non-Catholics as well as Catholics. By intrenching itself behind metaphysical absolutes the church seems to have taken up an unassailable position,¹ which not only overshadows the state but which non-Catholic citizens of the state fear threatens their own religious absolutes. Thinking that it takes a metaphysic to deny a metaphysic, they counter absolute with absolute. In this clash of metaphysical systems it would clearly be folly to allow any one of them to capture the state with its tremendous power of physical coercion. To allow the followers of one metaphysic to coerce the followers of another would lead to insurrection and the bloodiest and most senseless of all wars, religious war. Consequently in a pluralistic society the only way to ease the uneasy equilibrium between church and state in educational matters is to insist on the principle of the divorce of church and state.²

The separation of church and state, however, is easier to achieve in principle than it is in practice. Take the case of free textbooks and supplies or the case of free transportation to school. Is it proper for the state to pay for these services for children attending private or parochial schools? If the answer is no, then it would seem to follow logically that children attending a private school should have no claim to the services of a policeman stationed at a dangerous intersection on their way to school. This, of course, is ridiculous. On the other hand if the answer is yes, then it seems difficult to determine where to stop in providing educational services at public expense. If the state provides transportation for private school pupils, then why not buildings and ultimately the payment of teachers' salaries. In the program of released time for religious instruction in public schools the state has put school buildings with their staffs on school time and at public expense at the service of various church groups.³ But this goes too far in the direction of identifying the educational spheres of church and state,⁴ just as the transportation case seems to go too far in divorcing these spheres.⁵ The private school child must not become the stepchild of the state, and yet neither must his plight be made the excuse for the state's becoming involved in the interminable strife of irreconcilable metaphysical absolutes. In other words the principle of philosophy of

¹ *Supra*, Chap. II.

² HARRIS, W. T., "The Separation of the Church from the Tax Supported School," *Educational Review*, 26: 222-235, October, 1903; COE, G. A., "Shall the State Teach Religion?" *School and Society*, 51: 129-133, February, 1940.

³ Cf. WEIGLE, L. A., "Public Education and Religion," *Religious Education*, 35: 67-75, April-June, 1940.

⁴ *People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203.

⁵ *Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1.

the separation of church and state must not be pressed with too rigorous logic in either direction.

Nationalism and Internationalism

The issue between an all-pervasive state control of education and liberty for the family, church, and other private agencies to supply educational opportunities has a final counterpart within the system of state educational administration itself. Ordinarily, the geographical limits of the state are too great to permit of a single administrative agency for education. Consequently, the state is divided into smaller areas for the purpose of local educational administration. In some instances, these local agencies are still further subdivided for more efficient management. The question now arises whether the central administration should dominate educational policy, or whether a large measure of freedom should be left to the local authorities. Doubtless, much hinges on one's theory of the state. In the totalitarian state, centralization of educational administration with unitary control of educational policy seems a foregone conclusion. The spirit of the pluralistic state, with its toleration of private voluntary educational agencies, would seem to dictate the decentralization of educational administration in order to secure a large measure of initiative and experimentation from local educational authorities.¹ Decentralization also renders more difficult the introduction of any single propaganda into the schools and is thereby one effective way of guaranteeing academic freedom. Moreover, it seems logical to expect that political theory has some influence here. On the whole, one would surmise that rule by the one or few would be associated with centralization, while rule by the many, with decentralization. In spite of this normal expectation, there are instances, especially in democracies, of highly centralized educational administration.

The issues under consideration here are particularly acute where national states are involved. The virus of nationalism gives a complexion to the role of the state in education which otherwise is quite lacking. Nationalism binds a people together in a sense of corporate life. It is not necessarily based on race, language, religion, political sovereignty, or geographical enclosure. Various combinations of these factors will make up the sense of nationalism, depending on the circumstances at hand. Running through all, however, is a sense of common interest, common destiny, common defeat, or common glory. When this corporate self-regard attaches itself to the state's interest in education, there are a number of possibilities which must be canvassed.

¹ MACKENZIE, J. S., *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, pp. 107-108, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1921.

It should at once be obvious that here is an added factor making in the direction of centralization of educational administration. No doubt there are definite educational benefits to be derived from such a centrifugal force. For one thing, loyalty to the broader cultural outlook of the nation makes possible a better type of manhood and womanhood than is often afforded where sectionalism bounds the school horizon. For another thing, through its personnel and greater financial resources the national educational administrative organization can become the instrument for making this higher type of personality possible. But social cooperation on a national scale to achieve this superior individual requires homogeneity of language and ideals on the part of every person. If this is an outgrowth from the life of the people and not something forced on them by the government, it can be a great force for good.¹ Here, nationalism and democracy work toward common educational ends.

On the debit side several matters are to be noted. Nationalism is not always ready to be a humble means to the development of individuality as the end. All too frequently it becomes an educational end in itself, and the individual is turned into the means. Indeed, the individual may be completely engulfed and all but disappear in the nation.² Instead of developing free personality, it cultivates an enforced obedience and docility. Unfortunately, too, nationalism is easily turned into the channels of taking pride in the superiority of one's own nation and extending its influence in imperialistic fashion. Here it becomes the ready tool of the worst competitive features of capitalism. When nationalism becomes harnessed to such narrow and exclusive aims, broadly patriotic education gives way to jingoism and chauvinism.

At this point, nationalism finds itself in opposition to democratic educational objectives. Democracy demands the sharing of culture not only within the group, but between groups.³ To be democratic, therefore, nationalistic education should be internationalistic as well. But is the national state capable of such international cooperation? Could it sponsor a type of education for its citizens which would teach them to transcend mere national loyalties? Or is it necessary to establish some sort of world organization with its own educational counterpart to dispose the minds and hearts of men toward world-wide cooperation?⁴ Again much will depend on what philosophical view we take toward such a world organization. Should it be cosmopolitan or international, a world state or coopera-

¹ DEWEY, J., "Toward a National System of Education," *Social Frontier*, 1: 9-10, June, 1935.

² GENTILE, G., *The Reform of Education*, p. 17, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., New York, 1922.

³ *Supra*, pp. 140-141.

⁴ Cf. COE, G. A., "The United Nations' Philosophy of Education," *School and Society*, 70: 177-180, September, 1949.

tion among national states? There are sincere advocates of both positions. Those who favor the formation of a super-world state seem to trust the old notion that sovereignty is indivisible and therefore to be effective on a world plane must be lodged in some single political entity. Others who favor an international organization do so because they think of sovereignty as localized in a plurality of political entities which are capable of delegating limited sovereignty to some world organization for specific purposes.¹ It is this theory of internationalism which at present inspires UNESCO, but whether it is adequate to combat and restrain the beast of war remains to be seen.

Several Major Philosophies of Education

The philosophy of the state as it affects education presents a number of alternatives which may be variously paired. In the first place one has the choice between a totalitarian and a pluralistic philosophy of education. If one chooses totalitarianism, there are no further choices. On the other hand if he elects pluralism, then he must decide whether the state is to adopt a *laissez-faire* or a positive attitude toward education. If he chooses *laissez faire*, then there are no further options. But if he sides with the positive state, he must decide what its relation is to the other educational agencies, principally the family and the church. If he holds to a divinely ordained church he will subordinate the educational role of the state to that of the church. If, on the contrary, he recognizes the possibility of a variety of metaphysical commitments, he will probably hold to the divorce of church and state in educational affairs.

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¹ STANLEY, W., B. O. SMITH, and K. D. BENNE, "Progressive Essentialism in Education," *Frontiers of Democracy*, 9: 211, April, 1943; RUSSELL, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

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CHAPTER IX

THE ECONOMIC ORDER AND EDUCATION

Economic Factors Conditioning Education

Of the assumptions which underlie a philosophy of education perhaps the ones which escape with the least notice and criticism are the economic. Not infrequently teachers and laymen are altogether unaware of the way economic bias conditions school practice. If they have a philosophical frame of reference, they will likely have constructed it with such dimensions as politics and religion in mind but not economics. They will subscribe, for instance, to the idea of equalizing educational opportunity for children but remain quite obtuse to equalizing the economic conditions of men to the extent necessary to achieve their educational ideal. Some who see this connection fail to see that the remedy is more than a matter of financial engineering, that it is also a moral problem of what kind of coordinated educational system and economic order we want. It well behooves us, therefore, to bring to the spotlight of attention just what economic presuppositions are operating underneath various educational practices. We must call attention to the fact that various ways of earning a living, greater or less success in earning it, inequalities in the division of the national income, and different ways of motivating economic life all have a profound effect on educational values.

To illustrate our problem with more than the instance of inequalities in the distribution of wealth, it is surprising how different democracy in education can be when scaled to an agrarian society and when designed for an industrial one. A nation of small scattered landholders will have an independence and resourcefulness which is bound to be reflected in their schools. But a nation with its population predominantly congested in cities and employed in factories has a mutual interdependence which eventually is certain to find a different educational expression. Furthermore, an agrarian society with free land to challenge initiative, perseverance, and resourcefulness may well develop a rugged individualism in its pupils. But a highly compact industrial society offers little or no chance to start from scratch. There organization and cooperation, rather than individualism, become school objectives. Finally, to mix these ideologies in the same educational prescription, as for instance to infuse education with the optimism of free economic opportunity after the frontier which gave

it birth has disappeared, will surely brew educational confusion and social injustice.

Whether one works behind a plow, beside a machine, or at a desk, it is necessary to notice differences in educational practice which arise out of the way in which work is motivated. Ask the parents of children of almost any generation in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries the purpose of going to school, and it is better than an even chance that they will answer "to get ahead." Home work and the work of making a living are stoked by the same urge, personal profit. Just as one competes in business for profits, so too in many schools there is competition for marks. But older and newer schools differ widely on the employment of competition as the motivation for improving the range and quality of learning. The prominent place awarded to examinations and marks in the older type of school finds its counterpart in a highly competitive capitalistic economic system. The newer schools, which insist that no one shall fail, that a curriculum must be found in which the humblest can succeed, are only truly realistic in an economic system based on collectivistic effort.

Subsistence and Prosperity Economies

At the very outset, it is interesting to note the direct relation which exists and always has existed between education and the production of wealth. It is nowhere better illustrated than in the etymological derivation of the word "school." The Old English spelling was "schole," which was borrowed with the change of but one letter from the Latin *schola*. The Romans in turn were indebted to the Greek *σχολή*. The primary meaning of this Greek word is "leisure"; only secondarily has it been associated with formal education. It came to this derived meaning because leisure time was an indispensable prerequisite to schooling. In those days most people operated on a bare subsistence economy; that is, they consumed practically everything which they produced. Not only that, but with unremitting toil they barely produced enough to ensure a wavering balance between income and outgo. Fortunately, not everyone was so precariously situated. There were a few who had the advantage of a surplus of production over consumption. From time to time these people could relax their bent position over the economic grindstone without endangering the equilibrium of subsistence because they had this reserve to fall back upon. In other words, they could afford to interrupt their work with moments of leisure. It is to the undying credit of the Greeks that, instead of idling away their hard-purchased leisure time, they spent it in self-improvement, in education. So customary did this practice become that in the course of time the very word for leisure came to be adopted as the word for school. And schooling ever since has flourished chiefly in economies of abundance where the standard of living is high.

Perhaps tracing the ancestry of the word school incidentally reveals the reason why school has so often been thought of as academic, as an institution set apart from the workaday concerns of men. But, even in culture patterns where the school incorporates the dominant modes of economic production into its curriculum, there is still need for recognizing a prolonged period of social infancy during which the child will have economic leisure. The immediate consequences of earning a living can be learned on the job. To learn the more remote ones, however, the child must have more time and freedom than steady employment yields. So it has come to be accepted in a complex civilization that education requires a period when the child will live off the labor of others and be released from the responsibilities of self-support.

The relation of the school to the standard of living must now be reversed to see how the standard of living is reciprocally conditioned by the school. Suppose one starts with the rather simple formula that the standard of living is a function of the ratio between the total amount of wealth of various kinds and the total number of people who are to be supported by that wealth. Most obviously the school improves the standard of living either by increasing the total stock of wealth or by decreasing the birth rate. Of course, under the former head, it could hardly increase the amount of land or raw materials. But it can go a long way in developing the technical skills which will increase their yield and productivity. It is also admirably suited to promoting such personal qualities as thrift, industry, and efficiency, so important in the exploiting of natural resources. Yet this assistance will be at least partially nullified unless education at the same time encourages wise and discriminating consumption. In spite of full production and wise consumption the standard of living may still fall, and the quality of schooling with it, if the growth of population outdistances the discovery and development of natural resources. To thwart this, much might be done by the school in disseminating information about birth control, if public opinion were of one mind in this matter. Prevented from influencing the birth rate directly, nevertheless the school in all probability does affect it indirectly. It not only widens the range of human economic wants, but it also rearranges their order of urgency. As education teaches people to want better housing, wider travel, finer art, but above all ampler education of higher quality, the size of families shrinks in order to stretch the family income to cover these items.

Here, then, is a happy formula—the higher the standard of living, the greater the improvement in educational offerings, and the better the education, the even higher standard of living. It seems like a panacea. But looks are often deceiving. Perhaps periods of economic prosperity and educational advance have frequently, even generally, been coincident. But none of them has lasted indefinitely. Why is this? There are at

least three answers. First, there seems to be a human limit at which "wealth accumulates and men decay." Perhaps this is because, when education is highly developed, it fosters mental activity far above what is required for bare subsistence.¹ Such activity requires great effort, an effort which humans, being what they are, are put under great stress to sustain. Consequently, when they lapse and employ their excess wealth in physical ease instead of increased educational endeavor, it is regrettable but not altogether surprising.

In the second place, it seems that the production of wealth is not limitless. For one thing, it appears to check itself. Especially in industrial societies does it seem subject to the infirmity of economic cycles. Surplus wealth is reinvested in further machinery for production, but shortly the market's capacity to consume is exhausted, leading to a period of readjustment. Production is slowed down till consumption can catch up again. Producers are thrown out of work, and the standard of living falls. Public and private financial retrenchment follows in the wake, with a resultant falling standard of living and curtailment of the educational program.

To break out of this cycle some educators urge a new social ethic.² Since science and machines seem to guarantee society against the age-old fear of insufficient production—and that with fewer workers—new educational aims seem in order. The previous emphasis on production should now be subordinated to one of consumption; expenditure should displace saving in importance. The vocational aim in education to produce workers should be tempered to the new economic age. Since there will be need for fewer workers, and they will work fewer hours, much more schooltime should be devoted toward turning out consumers, especially consumers in the arts of leisure. The free pursuit of the good, the beautiful, and the true should be encouraged as never before. If these ends are sound, children should be kept out of early employment and in school longer.

This position has had to meet sharp criticism.³ The contention is that the price of more education is the production of more wealth. To maintain a larger group of young people in leisure, there must be either more work for somebody or a lower standard of living for all. People cannot get something for nothing. To obviate this difficulty it is suggested that economic surpluses be more wisely invested. Instead of directly expanding production, it is recommended that business expand indirectly by re-

¹ LOWELL, A. L., *At War with Academic Traditions in America*, p. 51, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1934.

² HILL, C. M. (ed.), *Educational Progress and School Administration*, pp. 326-327, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1936.

³ LIPPMANN, W., "Today and Tomorrow," *New York Herald Tribune*, Apr. 16, 1936.

investing some of its surplus immediately in raising the level of salaries and wages. One of the consequences of such a redistribution would be the demand of the family for more and better schooling. This, in turn, would extend the horizon of wants and in the end lead to an expansion of consumer demand which would have to be met with increased production.

A third limit to education's riding on the wings of a constantly expanding economy is even more serious. It is to be found in the relatively fixed amount of natural resources. By the careful application of science, raw materials may be forced to make a more efficient yield, but the possibility of their increase in amount seems out of the question. People differ on how to interpret these facts for education.¹ Traditionally, the American system of education has expanded as if there were no bottom to the nation's purse. Three centuries of an open frontier have left an almost indelibly optimistic mark upon the mind of the American educator. Even the disappearance of free land has not discouraged him. He has confidence that the school will so develop the arts and sciences through the inventive genius of its pupils that resultant increased production will more than compensate for the end of the western frontier. But there is also a more sober educational estimate of the economic facts.² There is foreboding that not only are geographic frontiers gone, but perhaps industrial ones as well. Should this prove the case, education like industry will have to beware of overproduction. In a mature economy with population near the saturation point, both economic and educational opportunities may have to be restricted.

Types of Economy

The values propounded by an educational philosophy vary not only with the amount of surplus wealth and leisure which an economy can scrape together but also with the type of economy by which that surplus is achieved. That is, it makes a further difference to educational values whether the basic way in which people make a living is agricultural or industrial. On the whole educational values are lower and less widespread in an agrarian society than they are in an industrial one. This is not difficult to understand. Agriculture involves hard physical labor and long hours of work. As a result there is relatively little time to take off to attend school. Furthermore, agrarian surpluses are always uncertain in amount on account of the weather and even at their peak do not provide

¹ RENNER, G. T., "Education and the Conservation of Resources," *Social Frontier*, 5: 203-206, April, 1939.

² DE HAAS, J. A., "Economic Nationalism and Education," *Harvard Teachers Record*, 4: 69, April, 1934; FINNEY, R., *Sociological Philosophy of Education*, p. 380, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1928.

for the maintenance of large segments of the population in leisure so that they can attend school for extended periods of time. For long, too, agriculture was an art carried on by empirical rule of thumb and consequently had little need of book learning. More recently, of course, agriculture has become a science as well as an art which, together with its mechanization, has called for considerably more schooling than formerly. But even at best predominantly agricultural societies are not renowned for the intensity with which they cultivate the arts and sciences in general.

An economy which in addition to a base in agriculture also has a base in commerce generally has a higher regard for education and also makes greater demands on it. The principal form of wealth in a commercial economy is stock in trade. Because this stock is convertible into currency, it is easier for the merchant than the farmer to buy such services as formal teaching represents. Not only that but the merchant has greater need for formal schooling, for his business has an overhead in the form of records, bookkeeping, and commercial law which requires book knowledge. Add to this the fact that in the marketplace he comes to exchange ideas as well as goods with those from foreign parts, and you have a final reason why a commercial economy makes a greater and more varied demand on education.

It is industrial rather than agricultural society which most enhances the regard for education. In the first place, modern industry is extremely technical. Its intricate machinery and its complicated processes are the result of the tremendous expansion of science. Consequently, if one is just to understand, let alone have the skill to manage, modern industry he must be well trained in science. To gain command of science at its present level of industrial development, one must go long years to school. There is just no other way. In the second place industrial economy has advanced the cause of education by enormously increasing society's economic surplus. Machines today both in the factory and on the farm are capable of turning out economic surpluses which, according to the standards of yesterday, are nothing short of fantastic. Indeed these machines, these mechanical slaves, are able now to provide enough economic leisure to afford universal education for many who in an earlier period would have been bound to the unremitting toil of human slavery.

Even within a given economy, but particularly within an industrial economy, there are further distinctions in making a living which profoundly affect educational values. The principal distinction is that between earning one's living chiefly with his hands or chiefly with his head. Of course, the head directs the hand, but clearly in some jobs the directive function of the head is more important than the executive function of the hand, and vice versa in other jobs. Not always but on the whole, the

more one's job emphasizes mental functions, the more one's education will be an apprenticeship in the use of symbols and abstractions, and the more one's job emphasizes manual handling of concrete materials, the more his education will be an apprenticeship in the development of manual or motor skills. Such specialization in economic function is not only inevitable but on the whole very desirable if the high standard of living of modern industrial society is to be maintained. But with specialization comes differentiation in social rewards. We live in a society which historically has inherited a system of values which attaches greater worth and prestige to occupations involving the directive work of the mind than it does to those involving executive work with the hands, to cultural rather than to vocational education.¹ Yet we also live in a day when the rising importance of the laboring classes is sharply challenging this hierarchy of value both in economics and in education.

The sharpness of this issue was not so great while industrial culture was still in the manu-facture stage. Then both on the farm and in the crafts all forms of work and learning to work were closely articulated with family life. Consequently it was an easy and natural thing for children to learn by observing and participating in economic production. Personal knowledge and ingenuity could be developed because tools were under the general command of the worker. And not least was the fact that the enterprise was usually of such a size that the setting of one's labor in the total undertaking of production, distribution, and consumption could easily be held in mind as the worker labored.

But when industrial culture passed into the machino-facture stage, the economic enterprise became so large that the directive and planning functions became separated from the productive ones. The former became the badge of a class known as management and the latter the badge of a class known as labor. Specialization in economic function led to specialization in education. As the machines of industry became more complex, labor came to specialize in the parts of the machine they tended. Indeed workers often became mere appendages of machines which others owned. From an education under manu-facture which included an overview of the whole economic process, labor became reduced under machino-facture to an education limited to the specialized skill of tending one small part of the machine. This seems a pity since the over-all intellectual possibilities of machine civilization, based as they are on science, so far exceed the educational opportunities based on crafts and prescientific agriculture.

Perhaps the only way to mitigate or rectify the imbalance of economic

¹ DEWEY, J., "Culture and Professionalism in Education," *School and Society*, 18: 421-424, October, 1923.

forces from an educational point of view is to teach the child the educational significance of work not only on the job but in the school. The wheels of industry driven by modern power plants rotate too swiftly for the factory to be the kind of school which the more leisurely family was when it housed handicrafts. But if the schools are to bear the burden, the added question arises of the relation of the school to industry. Should the existing industrial conditions be reproduced in the school as preparation for jobs? Or should industry be utilized to make the schoolroom more meaningful? The likely consequences of both philosophies seem clear. If the school be made an adjunct of industry, guidance will turn into job placement. Training will be pointed to specific trades. Routine duties will be emphasized by drill exercises. Docility will be a school virtue. At the secondary level, different school plants with separate supervisory staffs will be approved for trade and general education.

On the other hand, if industry is to subserve the school and the development of personality, the opposite practices may be expected. General high schools will house all curriculums under a single roof. There will be no separate schools for those destined to vocational and professional pursuits. Training will be broad rather than narrow. Through history, politics, and economics, future workers will be made alert to the fact that present economic struggles are but the latest phase of the age-old battle for human liberties. Manual and motor skills will naturally be developed, but not of the automatic type. Personal initiative will be encouraged rather than abject docility.¹

Finally, there is a third view of the relation of school and industry which partakes of the nature of both those just described but is not adequately covered by either of them. It is that of the polytechnized schools of communism. There, socially significant work is not a mere device upon which the school can call. Nor is the school a narrow utilitarian adjunct of industry. Rather is the social significance of the school found in the fact that the pupil feels himself a worker in a laboring society. The cultural problems of production, distribution, and consumption become the central ideological axis of the school. About this axis are concentrated and integrated the scientific, artistic, and social aspects of labor.

Socioeconomic Class Structure

It is one thing to note the differences in educational philosophy which grow out of the production of wealth. The more serious clash of philosophies, however, runs on from this point. The surplus wealth necessary for leisure and schooling is very unevenly distributed throughout the mass

¹ DEWEY, J., "Learning to Earn," *School and Society*, 5: 331-335, March, 1917.

of the population. While no strict lines can be drawn to divide the populace, it is common to recognize three different strata—the wealthy, the poor, and the middle classes. The differences in the standards of living at these levels eventuate in corresponding divergencies of cultural outlook. Not infrequently these differences run at cross-purposes in the demands they make on education.

How the various class interests set up mutually incompatible tensions in the educational program can be illustrated at several points. Doubtless, it may be taken for granted as ethically appropriate that every child should achieve the optimum development of his individuality. Perhaps this ideal could be reasonably reached if there were an unlimited economic surplus that could be spent on education. The contrary being actually the case, there has been more or less of a mad scramble for each to get as much of the goods of education as he could. In a capitalist society, the economically powerful have generally been most successful in encompassing self-realization for their children. In a proletarian society, the converse has obtained. In both cases, the oppressed class has had to content itself with a half or an even less portion. In neither instance has the dominant class been noted for the tenderness with which it has regarded the educational interests of other classes, especially where any concession might impair or threaten its own aspirations.¹

The chief educational goods, control and possession of which is the object of class strife, are the length of time one's children shall stay in school and the kind of curriculum they shall study there. Some argue for a larger portion of these goods on the ground that the distribution of intelligence among children generally coincides with the social privilege of their parents. Others stoutly rebut this justification for intrenching the dominant economic class of the moment. While children usually inherit the social privileges or handicaps of their parents, they really seem too young and innocent to have done anything to deserve such social baggage. For just this reason society provides schooling which is free to all. Yet, much as this works for equality of opportunity, it really goes only half far enough. The children of the economically favored can make a prolonged stay in school, while all too frequently the children of the underprivileged must be withdrawn at the earliest possible moment in order to go to work.

Indeed, a child will be fortunate if his prospects for staying in school, rather than his native endowment, are not made the main basis for selecting his educational program. Those who can expect a long social and economic infancy usually elect a liberal or cultural education which has tradi-

¹ DAVIDSON, P. E., "The Socialists on the Equality of Educational Opportunity," *School and Society*, 13: 405, April, 1921.

tionally fitted for the governing and directive offices of life. The rest, since they must leave early, are often shunted off into trade education and a position of social subordination. Hard as these circumstances seem to be, they do not lack at least a qualified defense in underlying theory.¹ This theory holds schools should cultivate a privileged leisure class because of the scholarship which its leisure makes possible, the protection its propriety affords ethics and morals, and the wealth with which it can patronize the fine arts. This does not imply that those who labor continuously learn nothing at all. But it does mean that they learn what is immediately useful. The special distinction of the leisure class is that it can afford to study that which is more remotely significant. A great civilization does not live from hand to mouth, from moment to moment, but often centuries beyond its economic working period. Obviously, in such a defense of a leisured class, leisure is not to be confused with idleness. Leisure is to be put to use, notably as the Greeks did, by devotion to education.

But the recurrent danger of such an educational theory is that, in perusing a curriculum dealing with the more remotely significant bearings of daily occupations, a leisure class may lose all contact with their immediate meanings. It may become so aloof in its ivory tower that it is not aware of pressure for fundamental changes in basic conditions. And so, undisturbed, it continues to pursue meanings which, though they once had their origin in a socially significant situation, no longer do. From this point on, the culture of this class runs the grave risk of becoming merely ornamental. This may even be socially very wasteful as where once useful studies are continued as a badge of social class. To dissipate one's time on useless studies marks a person for extravagance. At the same time, however, it permits the subtle inference that he must belong to an upper social class for only such a class could afford such conspicuous waste. This is why some subjects in the curriculum derive their prestige from the social class that studies them rather than from the uses to which they are put.

Even at its best, the culture of a leisured class involves a vulnerable dualism. Its antithesis is the culture of the working class. Whether the latter be slave or free, peasant or factory hand, its training has almost from time immemorial been held at a discount in comparison with that of the upper class. Although the necessity of work is universally recognized, nevertheless it is generally thought of as a disagreeable experience; witness "toil" and "drudgery" as synonyms of work. Even religion, condemning man to work in the sweat of his brow has lent its sanction to some of the

¹ CHANCELLOR, W. E., *Motives, Ideals, and Values in Education*, pp. 11-13, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1907; MACKENZIE, J. S., *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, pp. 105-107, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1921.

disesteem in which work is regarded. Yet, however much the education of a leisure class may have been the admiration and envy of agrarian and commercial societies, its position of preferment is energetically challenged by the proletarian culture of industrial society. Of course, this challenge has been pressed most vigorously under communism. But even under capitalism the culture of the common man has risen to a new prominence. The moral sentiment of democratic capitalism has come to demand that men and women assume responsibility for making a social return for their support. As a result there has developed an increased esteem for labor.¹ No work now is thought shameful except that which is slipshod.

Yet, in spite of the fact that the slowly growing political and economic emancipation of the masses has destroyed the notion that leisure and erudition are the monopoly of a small class, a strong tendency still persists to discount the vital connection between head and hand, between processes and materials. Curriculums built upon the workaday culture of the common man incline to be narrowly confined to the routine and practical. Perhaps this is inescapable, in view of the fact that the results which industrial workers achieve are done for a wage and are the results of working for their employers' ends and not their own. If this degradation of the workers' culture is accepted as the unavoidable consequence of mechanical invention, then educational salvation must be found in shorter hours of work and a compensating leisure life.

But there is another way out of the sense of futility and cynicism engendered by modern industrial life. We might demand that industry make an accommodation which would regain for work its educational and cultural significance.² If work is an important part of education, then industry should be planned so that children can find happy self-expression in it, even at the expense of slowing it down and rendering it less technically efficient. That monotonous noneducative work can be wholly eliminated is perhaps too much to expect. Yet even the simplest operations can be made more meaningful in the degree that they are related to the complexity of the whole process. If the proletariat comes to assume a wider and more penetrating concern in the ends which control economic and political society, there is bound to be room for an education which takes in the more remote bearings of their work. When that occurs, perhaps liberal and vocational education will no longer be divorced, but united in efficient harmony.

No separate attention has been paid so far to the cultural objectives

¹ DAY, J. F., "Education and Labor's Reward," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 4: 434-442, March, 1931, and 4: 625-633, June, 1931.

² HARTSHORNE, H., *Character in Human Relations*, p. 288, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1932. For a further reference, see *infra*, pp. 238-240.

which the middle class is struggling to realize. On the whole, this group feels itself superior to the poorer classes. It further prides itself on its liberality and humaneness.¹ But though it usually is genuinely distressed at the sight of misery and suffering, it is disinclined to make any great sacrifice of its own material comforts to ameliorate the acerbities of the economic order. In severe crises it is most likely to be found on the side of the "haves," rather than the "have nots." Generally the number of children in its families is low, its standard of living correspondingly high. Far from being a class maintained in leisure, this group has a standard of living high enough to appreciate the advantage of superior educational opportunities for its children, yet low enough to need help to realize its educational ambitions. The wealthy have been able to gain their educational ends through private schools. The purse of all but a few of the middle class has been unequal to such a strain. Hence they call upon the state to provide through public schools what they themselves could not through private means. Thus they have long continued the great bulwark of the public school system.

Maybe just because the public school was largely exploited in middle-class interest, it has not enjoyed the full confidence of the proletarian group. Thus, one would prefer to think of the administration behind the public school as being impartial and without the bias of economic class, but the contrary seems more nearly to represent the truth of the matter. Not only is it true that the state is generally controlled by dominant economic interests of the moment, but careful study has revealed that boards of education, instead of being drawn from all three economic strata, have their membership heavily weighted in favor of the middle and upper classes.² These two classes themselves do not regard their class as a barrier to disinterested public service but rather count the superior education they have enjoyed as enabling them to rise above class and formulate educational policies in terms of the common weal. Whether there are any board members who could be so disinterested is certainly a moot point.

Teachers and Economic Class Orientation

The question is now in order as to the class point of view from which the teacher should make up his educational philosophy. Granted that social-class structure is bound to condition educational values, Should the teacher's educational philosophy have a class orientation? On the whole,

¹ COUNTS, G. S., *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* pp. 7-9, The John Day Company, New York, 1932.

² COUNTS, G. S., *The Social Composition of Boards of Education*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1927; and BECK, H. P., *Men Who Control Our Universities*, Kings Crown Press, New York, 1947.

the tendency of teachers has been to identify themselves with the two upper classes. This affiliation is probably very natural, since the teaching personnel is most usually recruited from the middle class. Equally influential is the fact that they prefer to think of themselves as one of the learned professions, and the learned professions are notoriously identified with the middle and upper classes.

Persistent influences have been at work, however, to convince teachers that their true interests really lie with the laboring proletariat.¹ Teaching, it is argued, fails of status among the professions because teachers have no control over their remuneration, hours, and conditions of work, as do other professions. Furthermore, because they do not own their own tools and equipment, it is contended they are wage earners pure and simple and should be organized as a skilled trade.² Instead of organizing academically, they should organize along economic lines. Just as it is a false dualism in epistemology to separate knowing and doing, so it is also a false dualism to organize teachers as intellectual workers apart from those who work with their hands.³ Only by joining with the workers, furthermore, can teachers maneuver themselves into a position where they will be effective in future social reconstruction, especially if that reconstruction takes a radical turn. Teachers have so long been wont to think of themselves as professional people that a labor orientation on their part would doubtless require quite an intellectual and emotional readjustment.

That class division and dualism in epistemology have anything in common seems to some philosophers a far cry. But in addition, they argue, since the schools, at least the public ones of a democracy, belong to all the people, the teachers should not play favorites with any economic class. Teachers may unconsciously or uncritically betray a bourgeois orientation, but when they consciously take thought as to their class sympathy they should strive beyond the ordinary to escape any and all class preference. How else can the school maintain its public character? As for thinking themselves an intellectual proletariat oppressed by supervisors and administrators who, to continue the analogy, constitute a sort of pedagogical capitalistic class, teachers could do nothing which would more quickly disrupt the close cooperation necessary between these two groups for successful learning experiences by children.⁴ Certainly such an interrup-

¹ DEWEY, J., "The Teacher and the Public," *The American Teacher*, 19: 3-4, March-April, 1935; and BRAMELD, T., "The Teacher and Organized Labor," *Educational Forum*, 4: 253-261, March, 1940.

² RAUP, R. B., *Education and Organized Interests in America*, pp. 222-223, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1936.

³ DEWEY, J., "United We Stand," *The Social Frontier*, 1: 11-12, April, 1935.

⁴ ETTINGER, W. L., "Democratized School Administration," *School and Society*, 12: 265-272, October, 1920.

tion of free communication between the two groups would be educationally disastrous.

To soft-pedal class barriers is, in large measure, to press for the cause of democracy in education again. Democracy has frequently been said to stand for the abolition of class distinctions. The Marxian class struggle aims at a classless society in which every one receives education according to his abilities. On the surface, it would appear as if the two educational philosophies of communism and democracy were not so far apart after all. The apparent common ground between them is, however, quicksand. The Marxian society would be classless because only one class, the proletarian, would survive the class struggle.¹ The dictatorship of a single class, however, indicates a certain rigidity of principle. It implies that the evidence on social conflict is all in and that it all points one way. The educational corollary of such a position is to teach by inculcation. Ultimately, such a method could have little in common with democracy where it is recognized that no dominant class, whether it be a priesthood, a military clique, a political party, the bourgeoisie, or the proletariat, is without its own peculiar limitations when it comes to shaping educational policy. Hence the educational corollary of democracy is to socialize intelligence so that no group could, on account of superior knowledge, exploit another.²

Equalization of Opportunity

To universalize intelligence to this extent necessitates raising the standard of living of the great masses of the people so that they will be better able to afford the leisure which such improved education would demand. Making this point seems to indicate that the discussion has been describing a wide arc and is now about to circle back to the point of departure. The class struggle entered the philosophy of education as a means of protesting for a more equitable distribution of wealth so that educational opportunities might be more justly apportioned. Does democracy give effective promise of doing this? The critics of democracy are very skeptical indeed. America has had democracy in education, they say, not because of any inherent justice in the principle of democracy, but because of bountiful resources on the frontier. Hence, some say, equalitarian democracy can succeed only in an agrarian society. Perhaps the reason for this position is that in an agricultural community inequalities of wealth are not so conspicuous as in an industrial one. But, in any event, it would be a great

¹ Cf. FINNEY, R., *Sociological Philosophy of Education*, p. 375, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1928, where the middle class is to be the only class.

² DEWEY, J., and J. H. TUFTS, *Ethics*, rev. ed., p. 408, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1932.

mistake not to recognize the vastly greater extremes of wealth and property in a dominantly industrial as compared with a dominantly agrarian society. Unless something is done to reduce these extremes there can be precious little political or educational democracy.

The democratization of economic opportunity for educational purposes need not necessarily mean the equal division of wealth throughout the community. Yet certainly something more must be done than to give scholarships to promising children in the economically underprivileged masses. Such a procedure may provide an open-class society wherein one may rise from the humblest to the highest ranks of life, but in the end it sterilizes the proletariat of its natural leaders and leaves the masses as subject to exploitation as before. Such practice results in plutocracy rather than democracy.

An untried suggestion for equalizing economic opportunity might be drawn from education itself. So far, in the exposition, economics has been discussed as a conditioning factor in educational philosophy. Perhaps, at this point, education has something to offer economics. Democratic educational philosophy and practice has long insisted that there must be a minimum educational offering for all children. This minimum is generally determined by the quality of citizenship which the state considers indispensable to its existence.¹ Many children will go beyond it, but none should fall below it. Copying this suggestion, the state might similarly declare a minimum standard of living for all its people.² Just as a minimum educational program designates a school term of a prescribed length, a teacher of a given grade of training, a curriculum of specified content, and other requirements, so legislative fiat might define minimum standards of food, shelter, and clothing. Out of this might grow an economic standard of leisure which would afford a genuine socialization of intelligence through the schools for all levels of the population.

Capitalism

The more equitable distribution of economic means as a guaranty of a more democratic education is easier for the propertyless to demand than it is for the propertied to concede. Hence any scheme for equalizing educational opportunity by injecting greater equity into the division of economic goods runs head on into capitalism and the institution of private property. Therefore as part of one's philosophy of education one must make up his mind whether the owner of private property is entitled to do as he wishes with his capital and his income therefrom or whether all

¹ LASKI, H., *A Grammar of Politics*, p. 114, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1925.

² DEWEY and TUFTS, *op. cit.*, p. 457.

property is vested with a public interest which the state can regulate for the benefit of all.

An epitomized description of the system of private ownership and the quest for profit might run as follows. Ownership is a reward for one's labor. Unless a man can be secure in the possession of the fruits of his toil, he will question whether work is worth the endeavor. Furthermore, man wants to be free, in competition with his fellows, to accumulate as much wealth as he can or wants. If one man works for another, the latter as employer is entitled to pay the former as employee a wage and to keep the balance for himself as profit. Indeed, without the prospect of profit, it is said, business cannot go on. Lastly, having acquired wealth, the owner reserves the right to dispose of it as he wills. Even in death his testamentary will reaches on into the future to control the uses to which his accumulated wealth shall be put.

The educational counterpart of the free competition to gain profits is to be found in the appeal to pupil interest, pupil initiative, pupil self-reliance, and freedom for pupil self-expression. More concretely, the pre-eminent purpose for going to school seems to be that of making money, improving one's economic class status, "getting on." Not only is education to get on, but it is to get ahead as well. Competition in commerce is matched in school with competition for marks, honors, prizes.¹ Children learn to glory not in their strength but in the fact that they are stronger. The less capable often develop a debilitating sense of inferiority. Indeed, it is a school crime for a child to be detected in the act of helping a faltering fellow. When people insist that education be practical, it is the narrow sense of making a material living that is connoted. The wider meaning of practical, the way in which education may enlarge the horizon of action, is obscured from view. The individual success motive reigns so supreme that education for personal advancement is thought to coincide with ensuring the common weal.

Not only that but the system has been thought to be in the interest of children.² Some have cited Darwin's theory of evolution in support of competitive practices in business and in school. But it is more likely that Darwin is indebted to the competitive economic doctrine of his day for his theory of the struggle for survival. Again, the worth of self-interest in trade can best be appreciated as a relief from the excessive regimentation of economic life under feudalism and later mercantilism. Correspondingly,

¹ DEWEY, J., *School and Society*, pp. 29-30, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1900; HOWERTH, I. W., *The Theory of Education*, pp. 393-394, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1926; and, DEMIASHKEVICH, M., *Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, p. 319, American Book Company, New York, 1935.

² CURTI, M., "The Social Ideas of American Educators," *Progressive Education*, 11: 28-29, January-February, 1934.

in education it proved a boon to develop the individual's powers of self-reliance and self-expression.¹ Finally, in a frontier society, the appeal to individualistic energy rendered a genuine social service in furnishing the enterprise to subjugate the empire of natural resources to be found there. The contrast it provided between the ambitious and the lazy, the thrifty and the ne'er-do-well, even afforded a commendable moral significance. It is no great wonder, therefore, that in a capitalistic society personal traits like industry and thrift have become cardinal objectives of religious as well as secular education.

Collectivism

As long as there was free land on the frontier no one took occasion to question the competitive system critically. Indeed, its infirmities were obscured by a sort of natural equality of opportunity it presented. Misgivings began to arise, however, when such a view continued to condition the aims of education in the more compact society engendered by industrial capitalism. In a more settled, congested society, men may fail to achieve an economic subsistence through no fault of their own and in spite of being educated to be industrious and thrifty. Under such conditions, to continue to motivate the school from the competitive point of view may result in the excessive stimulation of the strong and the corresponding oppression of the weak. If so, it is high time to put this philosophy of education in its proper perspective.² That the past century and a half has been a period when school could perhaps be revered as an instrument to make wealth in order to gain private profit must not obscure the eras when broader social motives were dominant—when economic success was even irrelevant to the main purpose of life and education.

In fact, some see signs anticipating a return to circumstances which will incline the school toward social service rather than individual success. Since industrial capitalism leads in the direction of concentration and combination, a planned or collectivistic economy becomes increasingly necessary.³ Under such a dispensation child interest will be secondary to social necessity as a gauge for the school program. Children's duties will be emphasized, as well as their rights. It will be of first importance to teach children how to organize and cooperate in the struggle against poverty and political knavery, rather than to sharpen their powers and prospects

¹ HADLEY, A. T., "Educational Methods and Principles of the Nineteenth Century," *Educational Review*, 28: 332-334, November, 1904.

² TUGWELL, R., and L. H. KEYSERLING, *Redirecting Education*, Vol. I, pp. 100-101, Columbia University Press, New York, 1934-35; COUNTS, G. S., *The American Road to Culture*, pp. 68-69, The John Day Company, New York, 1930; CLARK, H. F., "Economic Forces and Education," *Teachers College Record*, 32: 326-327, January, 1931.

³ DEHAAS, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-72.

for individual success. Children will learn to find as much zest in pulling their weight in one big boat, as in paddling their individual canoes. Indeed, children must learn that in a modern highly specialized and interdependent society more freedom is to be gained by planning for it through collective action than by laissez-faire individual action where each looks after his own interests independently, even in disregard of others.

But, even under these advanced circumstances, there are some who are unwilling to see competition completely disappear from the educative process. They prefer the motivation of cooperation as more economical and more moral but, nevertheless, they do not shut their eyes to the dangers of regimentation. In a reconstructed view of things, their design would be to socialize the competitive incentive. Thus, they would have competition between groups, as between two or more schools or classes in a school, to see which could first complete its portion of a large, planned cooperative enterprise. In such a rivalry, no individual would be outstripped and thrown into the social discard because his group would feel obliged to come to his assistance. Care would have to be taken here only that the aid rendered him would be truly educational and not impoverish his scholastic abilities further.

The Profit Motive

One of the peculiar features of the private-profit system whose incidence on education must not be overlooked is the fact that economic production is for profit primarily and for use only secondarily. Goods are produced for use, but only if a profit can be anticipated. Generally, too, only those goods are produced which will yield the greatest profit. One of the points at which this characteristic of business is most pregnant with meaning for education is that of extraschool educational agencies, such as the cinema, the radio, and the press.¹ Although the main purposes of these great instruments of public opinion is to provide commercial services, their incidental educational consequences are admittedly profound. The critical point, for present purposes, is to note that those who control the educational consequences are governed, not by educational ends, but by the necessity of producing profit. Whether this assures the development of the best type of human personality in both the younger and the older generations is at least open to question.

Sometimes this confusion of commercial and educational interest infiltrates into the school itself. The pursuit of academic freedom, for instance, may bring out points which, when taken seriously as a basis for

¹ KILPATRICK, W. H., "Educational Ideals and the Profit Motive," *Social Frontier*, 1: 9-13, November, 1934; and JORDAN, E., "Education and the Organization of Intelligence," *Journal of Higher Education*, 4: 10, October, 1949.

student and popular action, threaten the flow of some entrepreneur's stream of profits. If he thinks of entering a protest, the entrepreneur must decide which is more valuable in the long run, his personal gain or the next generation's education. His usual confusion in distinguishing between selfish and social interests leads many to fear that the profits system is one of the greatest enemies of the free employment of intelligence. Another effect of the profits system is the quality of work it encourages children to do. Since the profits system looks first to the sale and only secondarily to the quality, so too, it is alleged, children are thereby encouraged to do only a grade of work which will "get by."¹ Perhaps this is as much the fault of pragmatism's influence in education as it is the profit system's. Although it was probably only figuratively that pragmatism was early described as raising the question of the "cash value" of an action, nevertheless the pragmatic quality of profits has not escaped popular attention. In either event, the stimulating ideal of fine workmanship as an end in itself is in real danger of being lost. As a last instance, there is the hazard that profits will be put ahead of public education. In order to raise the standard of living so that educational opportunities may be more equitable and widespread, school taxes will have to absorb a larger share of profits. What proportion of private profits to plow back into the business, into self-indulgence, or into a higher standard of living for the rest of the people is a problem which will tax the social vision of any owning class.

This problem is the more critical for the public school because in a capitalistic society it must draw its revenues from sources privately owned. Private schools, endowed universities, foundations for the promotion of research are a consistent offshoot of a society built on an economy of private property. What claim, however, has the public school on property vested with private rights? Very often the owning class supports taxes for the public schools because they themselves are assured of a return on their investment. This return consists in the more productive workers that educated employees make. Furthermore, it is estimated that people educated to a humble stake in the economic order will be less likely to commit crimes of violence against property so that, in the end, the support of public education lowers the population that has to be supported in prisons and poorhouses. Private property thus is assumed to be the stabilizing keel of a civilized system of education.² Conversely, it can be argued that much of the value of private property is due to the stability which culture gives

¹ BAGLEY, W. C., *Education and Emergent Man*, pp. 171-172, Thomas Nelson & Sons, New York, 1934.

² BLAIR, F. G., "Education in Relation to Material Values," *School and Society*, 31: 422-423, March, 1930.

to the social order. If that be the case, then not all of property's value is due to managerial capacity, but a large portion is a sort of unearned social increment. Of this the owner is not owner, but trustee. When the public taxes, then, it but appropriates that which is its own. It may very well levy a school tax, therefore, on the principle that individuals should give according to their ability and receive according to their need.

Two Major Philosophies of Education

On the basic premise that educational advance depends on surplus production with consequent leisure to devote to schooling there is no serious difference of opinion. Beyond this point, however, educators are confronted with a moral choice between predicating their educational practices on either one of two major economic outlooks. On the one hand is an economic system which consigns to the relatively few the major portion of surplus wealth and leisure time. Intrenched behind the system of private property this group likes to be left alone in the enjoyment of its property and feels little but a charitable responsibility for the economically less successful classes. In fact, they feel considerable social distance between themselves and these classes because the largely manual work the latter do is menial and degrading. On the other hand is an economic system which insists that no work is degrading, that all work is inherently dignified. Confident of the inherent worth of the working classes, this outlook insists on claiming a larger and more just portion of the surplus wealth and leisure of the economic system.

The different educational consequences of these two economic systems are considerable. In the first instance educators will continue to give the edge of prestige to cultural rather than vocational education, to admit only the economically capable to the privileges of cultural or liberal education, and to resist attempts of the government to provide universal education for all, especially at the college level. In the second instance educators will be inclined to draw less and less distinction between cultural and vocational studies, to make both types as widely available as possible, and to employ public taxes freely to achieve this end.

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CHAPTER X

THE SCHOOL AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

Progress and the Status Quo

The social order at any time comprises a vast variety of interacting forces. In the action and reaction of these forces, stresses and strains occur which in the long run tend to offset each other and thus result in a sort of balanced state of affairs. This condition is often referred to as the *status quo*. Such an equilibrium, however, is usually uneasy and seldom static. The pressures of old forces wax and wane, or new ones intervene so that both the locus and direction of social tension are always shifting to a greater or less extent. If this dynamic quality were not present, social progress would be impossible.

On the whole most people have their lives pretty well adjusted to the *status quo*. Of course, they expect progressive improvement, but usually inside the *status quo* as a frame of reference. More than likely they will resist any major disturbance requiring a redistribution of social energies of so general a nature as to require a new frame of reference. Such extensive adaptation is quite too inconvenient or even precarious for them. What they fear, of course, is that the advantages which they presently derive from the *status quo* will be jeopardized. Outwardly they do obeisance to the idea of progress, but inwardly they view it with suspicion and trepidation.

The individuality of some people, however, is so marked that it cannot be made congruent with things as they are. It cannot abide the *status quo*. Their individualities are so marked they cannot be made congruent with the *status quo*. Such people are likely to become aggressively restless. Sometimes they are disgruntled with the *status quo* because the existing balance of forces is weighted against their own interests. In other cases, they produce novel ideas or inventions which require thoroughgoing readjustment of the tension of social forces. But, although they press their views in the name of progress, they are more than likely to antagonize their neighbors who either are satisfied with the *status quo* or disagree as to what direction progress should take.

Sometimes schools or individual teachers in a school are the incubators of social unrest. Till the recent past this has only infrequently been the

case because the traditional school has been preoccupied with the cultural spoils of antiquity. As a result the school indirectly, if inadvertently, was a supporting pillar of the *status quo*. Since the First World War, however, the curriculum has increasingly and intentionally drawn its inspiration from the grinding forces of contemporary social life. The school no sooner added this new source for curriculum materials than it was instantly recognized as a powerful potential force for disturbing as well as preserving the *status quo*. Both progressives and conservatives perceived this, and both immediately tried to capture the school as an agent of their point of view. The struggle to make the school an ally of contemporary social forces has led to much discussion of the proper role of the school in the social order and of the proper method of teaching controversial issues in the schoolroom.

Some have thought that the school should hold aloof from the cauldron of social controversy, or at least be neutral toward it. Others have thought that the school should plunge right into it. But those who have taken the latter view have divided on whether the school should be an agent for consolidating the *status quo* or whether it should be an instrument for social progress. Those who take the first view think the teacher should adopt methods which will indoctrinate loyalty to the *status quo*. Those who hold to the second view think the teacher should be free to adopt a more critical attitude in his teaching. If the teacher is to be free to deviate from the *status quo*, he is almost sure to make enemies. Some think that the teacher should enjoy the protection of academic freedom in saying unpopular things, others that he should have no more protection than the average citizen when he exercises his civil liberty in advocating an unpopular cause.

Conservative Function of the School

By far the oldest theory of the mutual relations of the school and the social order, and the one most widely honored in practice, is that the school should conserve the existing social culture. This culture was won only at a great cost of time and suffering. Confronted with the enigmas of life, mankind has only laboriously and at great sacrifice accumulated a stock of solutions. It would, obviously, be a great pity if any of these were to be lost through chance failure to teach them to the oncoming generation. Moreover, except as culture patterns are conserved through the school, there is no way to shorten the period of trial and error which is incident and precedent to social progress. Especially is it important for the school to perform this conservative function if other social institutions neglect to do so. Formerly, each institution like the family, church, and state tended to perpetuate its own mores. Latterly, however, these

mores have become too complex for informal transmission and these institutions have become too busy to attend to their educational duties adequately. Hence the evolution of the school as a residual institution to catch up and preserve social patterns otherwise in danger of being lost through neglect.

Such a description of the conservative function of the school should lead one to be very wary in inferring that, therefore, the role of the school is reactionary. It may have been so in times past. But "conservative" and "reactionary" are not synonymous terms, though they sometimes are treated as such. To treat them as synonymous is to confuse the form with its content, the vehicle with its load. Proceeding on the conservative theory, it is entirely possible for the school to preserve social systems of the left as well as those of the right, radical ones as well as reactionary ones. Indeed, with this qualification, it is perhaps not too much to assert that nearly all educational philosophers agree that, to some extent at least, the school must be conservative in function.

Even after conceding that conservation is indispensable, it must at once become evident that in an advanced civilization the school cannot conserve the whole social heritage through instruction. The total social culture is far too extensive to be crammed into the short span of years that even advanced students spend in school, to say nothing of the short period of compulsory attendance. And even if this were possible, it would probably be undesirable for the curriculum to mirror impartially both the good and the bad in racial experience. The school must exercise a normative function coincident with its conservative one.

This may take several directions. In the first place, the culture of an advanced civilization is not only overwhelming in quantity, but it is also baffling in complexity. One of the things that a school will have to do, therefore, is to simplify what is to be presented to the immature child. Furthermore, not only will it have to simplify it, it may also have to balance it. The time and place into which any child is born suffers under the limitations of its own space-time location. Fortunately, the child need not be wholly at the mercy of his locality, for the school can compensate for this disadvantage through balancing the diet of the curriculum. Especially can the school transcend both time and place through such studies as history and geography. The more diverse the elements to which the school introduces the child, the more will there be need for yet another service from the school, that of coordinating the various pulls which different environments make upon him. Coordination, however, implies some system of values. This leads to the last and perhaps most controversial aspect of the normative function of the school, that of purifying the cultural heritage. It requires but a moment's reflection to

realize the tremendous improvement which could be brought about through sifting out those culture patterns which are unworthy to be perpetuated. The potentialities are great even if the actualization has been somewhat short of expectation.

There are several difficulties with this normative aspect of the conservative function of the school. At the outset, one must beware of simplifying the school environment so that it becomes a pallid attenuation of the real society it represents or of purifying it so that it becomes an impractical idealization of the *status quo*. But next, if there is to be a norm, the question arises, What shall be the norm, what kind of mesh shall the school use to screen the social culture? It is one thing to say that the school has a telic function, but it is quite another to gain general agreement on any particular direction. Perhaps most general acceptance would go to a screen representative of the values of the *status quo*. Then whether the *status quo* is democratic or fascistic, capitalistic or communistic, there will be relatively little ambiguity on the norm of conservation.

Progressive Function of the School

Conservatives offer little or no objection to the normative function of the school so long as it seeks to approximate a more purified form of the ideal of the *status quo*. The major difficulty arises when the school adopts a norm or frame of reference other than the *status quo*. In spite of the difficulty there are liberals and progressives who think that the school is not just a residual institution to catch up and maintain things as they are but a vehicle by which to forge ahead as well. To them it is as absurd to think that education can preserve civilization from decaying as it is to think that the science of medicine can keep one from dying. Rather must education be the source of new ideas, of a social program that is constantly undergoing reconstruction. In other words they think that the normative function of the school may also involve originating major changes, changes possibly in the norm or frame of reference itself.

In this phase, the normative function of the school is creative rather than conservative. It introduces, therefore, the second outstanding theory on the relation of the school to the social order, namely, that it is the duty of the school to take some initiative and responsibility for social progress. Within the supporters of this theory there are two very distinct subdivisions of opinion. One is content to have the school an independent critic of the *status quo*, with any social progress an indirect or incidental outcome of critical instruction. The other would be much more direct, purposeful, and aggressive. It would have the school form a definite conception of the better social order and then work with might and main to bring it into being.

First to regard the school as a pioneer of social progress were the organizers of the "progressive education" movement. Taking a dynamic, changing universe as their frame of reference¹ they attempted to gear education to it. Since nothing can be accepted as final in a world ruled by flux, they taught children not so much what to think as how to solve problems which this flux presented. Children learned to regard conclusions from their problem solving as tentative and subject to amendment in the light of future events. In the struggle to meet a contingent future "progressive educators" laid great store by individual differences among pupils in the hope that out of this rich variety of talent successful adaptation to the precarious quality of a dynamic universe would more likely occur.

By introducing such ideas into the schools, progressive education could hardly avoid creating a ferment in the social order. Yet, although progressive educators kept sharp watch for signs indicating the probable future direction of social progress, they did not identify themselves with any particular political and economic program or party. On the contrary they tried to actualize the long-standing utopian theory that in a mature society education and politics should be one and the same thing, that is, the study of how to manage public affairs intelligently.² Instead of aligning the school with any single reform group, they took the view that the school should be a place where all sorts of social programs would be studied no matter how varied or contradictory they might be. They tried to institutionalize the continuous reconstruction of social theory and practice.³

To have a governmental agency such as the school stand off and criticize the actions of the state will require a great amount of self-imposed restraint on the part of the sovereign. Under a monistic theory of the state⁴ it would probably be too much to expect. With a pluralistic state,⁵ however, it is quite possible, even desirable. Indeed, one can make a

¹ *Supra*, pp. 27-30. See also KILPATRICK, W. H., *Education for a Changing Civilization*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1926.

² DEWEY, J., "Education as Politics," *The New Republic*, 32: 140-141, October, 1922.

³ KANDEL, I. L., "Education for Social Change," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 1: 23-35, October, 1935; REISNER, E. H., "Can the Schools Change the Social Order?" *Teachers College Record*, 36: 388-396, February, 1935; ADAMS, J. T., "Can Teachers Bring about the New Social Order?" *Progressive Education*, 10: 310-314, October, 1933; DEWEY, J., "Education and Social Change," *Social Frontier*, 3: 235-238, May, 1937; KILPATRICK, W. H., "Public Education as a Source for Public Improvement," *School and Society*, 41: 521-527, April, 1935; COE, G. A., "Education as Social Engineering," *Social Frontier*, 1: 25-27, January, 1935.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 149.

⁵ *Supra*, pp. 148-149.

strong case that education should not suffer its objectives to be externally imposed, but that it should be autonomous, free to erect its own ends.¹ Every profession enjoys considerable autonomy in determining its own character. Therefore the public school, although maintained by the state, should not be its supine servant. On the contrary it should have some freedom in determining its own function in and its own relation to the social order.

There are some who would go so far as to set up the school as an independent branch of government.² Ordinarily we think of government as divided into legislative, judicial, and executive branches with education as a department in the executive branch. But perhaps education should be a fourth branch of government. The various reasons which might be adduced for such a policy can be summed up in the statement that political interests are ephemeral, while the cultural interests of the school far outrun annual or even quadrennial elections. The cycle for maturing a new school generation with its set of ideas is much longer. Moreover, the transition from one political regime to the other would be much less of a shock to the schools if the administration of the latter had a long-term independent status.

On first examination, it may seem as if the independence which this critical theory of the responsibility of the school for social progress demands for the school may result in a remoteness of the school from the social order. But not so. The formulation of educational ends should grow out of whatever is incomplete in the everyday lives of those who are learning. Indeed, they undoubtedly will if, as usual, participation in the vital activities of a social group leaves a sense of the unfinished. Under such circumstances, any vital education will inescapably have a share in building the social order of the moment. Proceeding on such premises, education as well as politics is a process of discovering what values are of most worth. The school is one of the community's resources for social experimentation and, as such, should not be neglected. What the supporters of this critical theory seek is not an alienation of the school from life, but protection in a freedom to study life independently. If freedom were the settled policy of the schools no matter what faction commanded a political majority, the educational policy of the schools would not suffer convulsions when political power would periodically change hands.

If the state cannot be objective about criticism directed at itself from the public school, there is the possibility that it will be willing to take

¹ DEWEY, J., *Sources of a Science of Education*, pp. 73-75, Liveright Publishing Corp., New York, 1929.

² National Education Association, Department of Superintendence, Twelfth Yearbook, pp. 65-66.

criticism from the private school. The public school, committed in the great majority of cases to the theory of conservation, acts as the flywheel of the social order. The private school, however, addicted to deviations from any official stereotype, might act as the source of experimental ideas. This might be a good idea except that the chief progress which has resulted from private schools has been in educational techniques rather than radical schemes of social progress. Naturally, private schools, generally drawing the sinews of their strength from the vested economic interests of privileged social classes, are not likely to bite or even seriously threaten to bite the hand that feeds them.

In the course of a short while, however, many educational frontiersmen became disappointed in the outlook for social progress under progressive education. To assure progress, they claimed, society and the school must have a definite plan.¹ It is just this that progressive education lacks. Through stressing individualism, progressive education waits for progress to occur by chance variation. But these educational frontiersmen had no patience to wait for progress to occur in such casual haphazard fashion. Furthermore, progressive education seems overawed by the precariousness of the future. On the one hand, this leads to its being too cautious. It seems unwilling to make any but *ad hoc* disposition of each problem as it comes into view from behind the heavy veil of the future. On the other hand, the contingencies of circumstance have led progressive education to the cultivation of the agile adaptable mind to a point where it appears incapable of attachment to any abiding plan or purpose. In place of such a policy of intellectual drift and *laissez faire*, they would recognize or substitute a deep loyalty to some fundamental social plan. If insistence on such a plan seems to smack of imposition and an infringement of freedom, they would not cringe from the indictment but frankly affirm that imposition is inescapable and the only assured road to vital achievement.

If the foregoing be the case, the only question which remains concerns the authorship of the plan. In the past, the school has at different times taken its direction from clergy, soldiers, statesmen, and businessmen. Not a few educational frontiersmen think it is high time that the teachers themselves should exercise leadership. Through the curriculum and methods of instruction the power lies in their hands to achieve major social reconstruction. The only way for teachers to influence the course of human events is boldly and unblushingly to take advantage of this strategic position in which they find themselves. If their competence to do this is challenged, it needs but be pointed out that no other class is in such complete possession of the wisdom of the ages, nor under such heavy duty

¹ COUNTS, G. S., *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?* The John Day Company, New York, 1932.

to use it in the interests of all the people. But this is just a matter of degree. To act on such an audacious theory of the relation of the school to the social order undoubtedly courts danger. It is to the credit of those subscribing to it that they appreciate its possible consequences. If they would be in the vanguard of social progress, they realize teachers must accept responsibility for their actions, surrender their security in large measure, and suffer any consequent risk to reputation and fortune.

Courageous and challenging though such a point of view may be, many objections have been entered against it. Some have pointed out that it is preposterous to think that so enormously vast a task as the building of a new social order could be undertaken wholly or even mainly by any single social institution such as the school. As a matter of fact, the world is far too complex for such an undertaking. Moreover, there are other institutions as powerful as the school which are equally interested in the amelioration of human ills. Certainly it would be fantastic to think that the school could inaugurate a new social order in opposition to, or without the assistance of, business, the family, or the church.

A closely allied objection raises the question whether the rank and file of teachers is well enough trained to assume the responsibilities of leadership which the creative theory of the school's relation to the social order would demand. Many sincere friends of education have grave doubts.¹ The conduct of public affairs is an art as well as an academic discipline. One can become skillful in this art only by actual participation in those affairs. Many teachers are well-trained academically, but distressingly few of them have had experience in practical affairs as a background for better teaching, let alone for making them competent in the formation and execution of public policy. Indeed, in the Catholic parochial school, where teachers are largely drawn from teaching orders, it is regarded an advantage that the teacher is withdrawn from the turmoil of life.² But, even conceding this questioned proficiency, the further objection may still be advanced whether teachers could agree amongst themselves as to the line along which social reconstruction is to occur. As a matter of fact, there seems no more reason to expect unanimity among them than among any other group of lay or professional people.

Realistic as the educational frontiersmen attempt to be in giving concrete space-time location to the social plan which is to command the loyalty of the school, it is surprising to some how close they hover to an un-

¹ CHAPMAN, J. C., and G. S. COUNTS, *Principles of Education*, p. 624, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1924. The difference in Counts's position here and in his *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* pp. 27-31, is noteworthy.

² SHIELDS, T. E., *Philosophy of Education*, pp. 424-425, Catholic Education Press, Washington, D.C., 1921.

realistic program. Thus, to adopt a frame of reference markedly different from the *status quo* is to make the school discontinuous with its social milieu.¹ So, too, a curriculum pitched in advance of the society contemporaneous to it, may be as unrealistic as one that lags too far behind it. Furthermore, if the public refuses to accept the reform program in the school, serious maladjustment may result for pupils who are prepared for a new social order but who are required to live in an old one. Moreover, there is danger that the educators who would reform the social order too rapidly or too radically will defeat their own ends and that, at the conclusion of their struggle with the community, they will be worse off than at the beginning. When one bears in mind the slow and halting progress that has been made in achieving the limited freedom which the school has come to enjoy in democratic countries, one should be very cautious in provoking a public resentment which would wipe out the gains already made.

But foremost among objections is the oft-repeated argument that in a democratic society it is the adult community first and last which must decide what kind of social order the schools shall nourish. Where the sense of the community is ultimate, it is certainly too much to expect that the community will long support a school which undermines the very foundation of that support. In fact, to teach contrary to its dictates, almost behind its back, so to speak, is positively unethical.² The state has an instinct of self-perpetuation, as the individual has one of self-preservation. Moreover, it can be pointed out that, as a matter of the constitutional framework of government, it is the legislature and not the school that is entrusted with deciding broad matters of social policy like changing the social frame of reference. The school is a department or subdivision in the executive not the legislative branch of government. So, if the reform of the social order is a school matter at all, it seems that the only recourse is to adult education in its widest meaning.

A good argument can be made that the real source of social change is not to be found in the schools at all, but in much more powerful and elemental forces. The really basic factors which compel the alteration of social mores are such things as mechanical invention, military conquest, the strife of economic classes, racial migration, political revolution, and crusading religion. Certainly the school can hardly hope to harness the tides of such basic energies to its leadership. Rather is the school more likely to be carried in and out with them.

¹ PINKEVITCH, A. P., *The New Education in the Soviet Republic*, pp. 153-154, The John Day Company, New York, 1929.

² BRIGGS, T. H., "Should Education Indoctrinate?" *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 22: 571-572, November, 1936.

From these objections to the theory that the school should give direction to social progress, it would be an unfair inference, in most instances, that these same critics did not think the school had any role to play in social progress. On the contrary, they assign a very important part to the school. This part is to complete and consolidate changes in social policy once they have been decided upon—whether by bullets or by ballots.¹ In this view, the school is the servant of social change, not its master. Or, perhaps more accurately yet, one should set aside as futile any discussion of which is cause and which effect, education or social change. The two are mutually interactive, circular, never ending. Each cross-fertilizes the other.

But many adherents of this more moderate position will admit that it would be unfortunate indeed if educational policies and programs were to shift with every variation in the social weather. Certainly the school must be more than a weather vane. Yet it would be their further opinion that, if the school could even slightly modify the great elemental forces of society, it should exercise its influence to reduce the extremes of social oscillation. In times of rapid change, they feel that the function of the school is to stabilize the period of transition, rather than to accelerate the flux of disturbing forces.² It is a time to emphasize the fundamental values which have maintained their position of eminence in the cultural heritage over long stretches of time. This does not mean that they favor rigid static social order, but rather that they would prefer stability to instability, security to insecurity. They would make haste slowly, realizing that it is one of the most puzzling of all social problems how to build new institutions out of old ones and yet keep the old institutions open for business during alterations.

Neutral Function of the School

Seeing that it is no easy task for society to be stable and progressive, free and secure, at one and the same time and seeing that the community may vent its wrath on the school if it dislocates or even threatens to dislocate the *status quo* by its teaching, many educators think it advisable that the school take the high stand of neutrality on controversial social issues. To some of these educators neutrality means a strict aloofness from not only politics but also the marketplace. They claim that the school should not be interested in useful knowledge or the practical clash of philosophic systems. High above these temporal concerns they rather

¹ SNEDDEN, D., "Education and Social Change," *School and Society*, 40: 311-314, September, 1934.

² BAGLEY, W. C., *Education and Emergent Man*, p. 155, Thomas Nelson & Sons, New York, 1934.

think it the austere role of the school to pursue eternal values and to master universal truths. Governed by such laws and principles they regard education as the private possession of the individual, the esoteric art of an initiated intelligentsia.

Other educators who hold to the neutrality of the school concede that the school must be concerned with the affairs of men and only exclude them from the curriculum when they are so controversial that their discussion would divide the community and endanger its whole-hearted support of the school. This is the only consistent position to take, they claim, in a pluralistic culture where the public school belongs to all the people. Still other neutral educators would even admit controversial issues of economy and politics into the curriculum but have the school maintain its neutrality by having the teacher impartially present all sides of these issues, taking strict care not to commit himself or the school to one side or another.

To judge by the criticism it has received, the position of neutrality is not nearly the secure haven into which to retreat that it would appear on first impression. Many scout as idle pretension that any school teacher or administrator can be completely nonpartisan or altogether objective about the fundamental issues which agitate society. Human beings are individuals. Individuality points to differences and limitations in human nature. Differences and limitations inevitably result in unique attitudes and preferences. Thus an individual by his very nature stands for this or that and not "neither" as the etymological derivation of the word neutral would indicate. Since this is the case, neutrality is at best a remote possibility even when consciously sought. To avoid hypocrisy and self-deception, it would seem in the best interests of all concerned for the teacher and the school to be forthright in declaring their philosophic predilections. Needless to add, these are the scruples of a democratic state. In a totalitarian state of either the fascist or communist model neutrality neither is possible nor is it a desideratum.

Yet, even if we concede the possibility of achieving neutrality by the teacher or the school, there are still difficult criticisms to surmount. On the one hand there is the misfortune that, if controversial issues are left out, some of the best places in the curriculum will have to be left blank.¹ On the other hand if the teacher seeks to weigh the pros and cons of some controversial issue impartially, the student may come to suffer a kind of academic paralysis. He may come to think either that the pros and cons are so evenly balanced that it is impossible to come to a decision or that

¹ HOCKING, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 260, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1923.

one argument is about as good as another so that he is disinclined to commit himself to act.

Again there is the grave moral criticism against the neutral school that it paradoxically becomes the unwitting partisan of the *status quo*. For anyone to stand on the side lines and refuse to take sides is a negative or implied approval of things as they are. Thus a failure or refusal to think or act on social alternatives has moral consequences just as definitely as a willing commitment to thought and action.¹ We must be aware that thinking, even behind the four walls of the school, does not occur in a vacuum. If it did occur in a vacuum, totalitarian governments would not be so afraid of academic freedom.

Imagine it be granted now that neutrality on the part of the school, if not impossible, is at least undesirable. If decision and preference are unavoidable, the main concern of the public should be in seeing that action be based on preferences and decisions *fairly* arrived at. This is the case with the courts. No one expects the courts to be neutral, that is, to refuse to decide for the plaintiff or defendant. But he does expect the courts to arrive at their decisions openly and without fear or favor. It is fairness rather than neutrality, therefore, which the public should expect of the schools in dealing with controversial issues in the curriculum.

Some critics of the neutral school would reject even this concept of judicial fairness. To them, the judge whose bias does not creep into the "weight of the evidence" is a fiction.² Or, they ask, How can all sides be fairly represented, when one side is entrenched in the prejudices of the *status quo*? Certainly, there should be no illusions about the difficulty of gaining fairness of instruction on controversial issues. It is, perhaps, only less difficult than being neutral. But, if confidence could be established in a human amount of it, the school might bear some modest responsibility for social progress.³

The School and Revolutionary Change

So far we have proceeded on the assumption that social change and progress would take place in orderly fashion. We have assumed that children and adults could learn to discuss alternative social policies and

¹ DEWEY, J., "Education and Social Change," *Social Frontier*, 3: 236-237, May, 1937; STANLEY, W. O., B. O. SMITH, and K. D. BENNE, "Progressive Essentialism in Education," *Frontiers of Democracy*, 9: 212, April, 1943.

² KALLEN, H. M., "Controversial Social Issues," *Progressive Education*, 10: 188, April, 1933.

³ Cf. CHILDS, J. L., "Should the School Seek Actively to Reconstruct Society?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 182: 1-9, November, 1935.

come to some rational conclusion as to a plan of action. To effect social progress, however, is not always so simple a matter. There are many times when, after the most elaborate study of an issue, the parties thereto cannot agree on what action to take. To break such an impasse it is generally the policy of democracies to take a vote and then let the majority organize the whole group for action. Letting the majority have its way does not mean that the minority agrees with them on principle; it merely means that the minority submits to this way of breaking a deadlock where it is imperative that some action one way or another be taken. Because the minority voluntarily consents to majority rule, social changes can be brought about in orderly peaceable fashion with a minimum show of force.¹ This orderly process of change is one of the chief things children must learn in learning the ways of democracy.

By making only such changes as the minority consents to, change not only occurs in orderly fashion, but it usually comes about very gradually. As it is often remarked, social progress takes place through evolution rather than revolution. Fortunately or unfortunately there are times when it seems to some people that the gradual evolutionary pace of social progress is not fast enough. Supremely confident of the justice of the reform they seek, they feel justified in forcing the pace. They are willing to use the slower processes of education to effect the changes they have in mind, but they will not hesitate to abandon them for more forcible measures if the results are not quick and striking.

Such an occasion may arise where there is some obstruction to the usual orderly process of social change. As an instance, we may take those extraschool educational agencies, the radio and the press. If democracy's confidence in rational methods is to be upheld, these channels of communication must be kept equally available to all classes for educating majority opinion. But suppose now that these channels of communication are largely under the direct or indirect control of men who obstinately refuse access to them to their opponents in social policy. Resentment at such arbitrary use of power may easily stir the opposition to abandon rational or educational procedures in favor of violent ones. Indeed it is perhaps not too much to say that only where power is approximately equally distributed can we be assured that people will willingly or necessarily resort to reason and persuasion as the means of easing social tensions.

The demand for accelerated social change may also arise on more theoretical grounds. Suppose the change demanded is not just a readjustment of the balance of forces within the accepted *status quo* but a fundamental shift from an old to a new frame of reference. There are not a

¹ KALLEN, *op. cit.*, p. 188; BRUBACHER, J. S., "Education and World Order," *Educational Forum*, 8: 195-6, January, 1944.

few laymen and educators who think that such a shift or transition cannot be made gradually. They reject gradualism because it is atomistic; it brings social reconstruction piecemeal, in installments. They very much doubt, furthermore, that qualitative changes like jumping from one frame of reference to another can be brought about quantitatively. Gradualism would mean, for instance, that over a period of time society could move from capitalism to communism. This would imply that, however far apart these two extremes, the difference between them was only one of degree, not of kind. But the opponents of gradualism regard the difference between the frames of reference of capitalism and communism as a difference in kind rather than degree. The change from one to the other can occur only through a drastic reorganization of outlook. It is like jumping a broad stream; we must do it in a single jump and all at once and not in a series of jumps spread over a period of time. Instead of a slowly rising learning curve there must be nothing short of abrupt conversion. Socially there must be a revolution.

Some educators take the Marxian view that this social revolution is to be brought about through the "class struggle." They favor an education which capitalizes on social discontent for revolutionary purposes. They would even sharpen the lines of the class struggle by the formation, inside school and out, of militant organizations of teachers, pupils, and parents. While they would put an initial trust in the modifiability of human nature through logical persuasion, they would have little confidence that old habits of class interest would be readily reached by such means. Consequently, the solution of the struggle will not always proceed along pleasant lines. Power will have to be met with power. Coercion, unfortunately, will be necessary at times.¹ It will be postponed as long as possible, but when it comes, responsibility for it will fall, not on the teachers and working class, but on the shoulders of the upper class who could not gracefully surrender undeserved privileges. If the use of force in disobedience of law seems inconsistent with the office of being a teacher, it can only be said that successful insurrection against the capitalist class is altogether moral from the proletarian frame of reference.²

Some educators are greatly disappointed at this conclusion, for it means that ultimately education has no important role to play in social tensions. It merely conserves whatever social order happens to obtain. In Plato's

¹ NIEBUHR, R., *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. 15, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1932; FISCHER, C. M., "The Place of Religious Education in the Social Revolution," *Religious Education*, 31: 46-52, January, 1936; BRAMELD, T. B., "Karl Marx and the American Teacher," *Social Frontier*, 2: 53-56, November, 1935.

² ESIPOV, B. P., and N. K. GONCHAROV, *I Want to Be Like Stalin*, pp. 141-144, The John Day Company, New York, 1947.

Republic, education was to conserve social justice when by some happy accident a philosopher-king came to rule. But both the philosophies of waiting for chance occurrence to produce the ideal society and of forcing it with violence break down, because they fail to effect social reconstruction through the more gradual processes of education. No revolution can have real enduring success unaccompanied by the wholehearted transformation of the mental and moral habits of people as well as the outward transfer of power from the old to the new order. Otherwise, the new order is sadly compromised at the very outset. By using force to bring in the new order of today, it has already prepared the way for counter-revolution by force tomorrow. If the rebuilding of society is to be spared the setbacks of periodic revolutions which shake it to the very foundation, it must employ education before and during change and not just *ex post facto* to intrench changes brought about by force.¹

Other educators, whose philosophies of education just as clearly recognize the claims of the proletariat in the collision of class interests, fail to see why these terms of the social problem also constitute the method of its solution. They do not think that an ongoing clash of classes must necessarily be solved by open advocacy of class struggle. For those who have little or no faith in education as a means of social reconstruction, the class struggle may be a consistent procedure. But how can those who have adopted education as a career possibly subscribe to such doctrine? To do so is to repudiate and belittle their profession. On the contrary, educators should maintain faith in discussion and persuasion. Instead of intensifying class antagonisms or widening the breach between classes, they should endeavor to keep open the channels of communication between them. To pin their reliance on rational procedures does not necessarily lead to apathy or complacency. Although teachers neither need nor can be neutral in the conflict of social interests, they can and should energetically undertake the reduction of tension in comprehensive social rather than in narrow class interest.

Of course the conciliation of social cleavages is extraordinarily difficult and will take a considerable time to learn. But learning rarely occurs suddenly. All one may learn, even under the pressure of a revolution, is to hate enforced accelerated change. Indeed, how could it be otherwise? If the lamp of reason is not lit, or if the light is blown out, it but remains to struggle to a decision in darkness. When rational processes are put aside, it is only too likely that clubs and machine guns will become the social arbiters. Bullets will replace ballots. What a confession of intellectual and moral bankruptcy! And at what a cost! Yet, confidence that

¹ DEWEY, J., "Education and Social Change," *Social Frontier*, 3: 237, May, 1937.

rational and educational processes can supplant physical force in the long run is a consummate adventure in faith.

Indoctrination

The view one takes of the role of the school in the social order is heavily freighted with significance for the way in which the teacher teaches controversial issues in the classroom. Everything turns on how we define the infinitive "to teach." There are several possibilities.¹ Issues might be presented as if they had but one side to them. This is variously called education by imposition, authority, indoctrination, or propaganda. This method is an admirable instrument in the hands of those who know in advance the kind of social order they want, whether it be the old or a new one.² Another possibility is to present contrary viewpoints as well but assure a favorable outcome for a predetermined point of view. This sort of teaching registers some uneasiness about minority opinion but makes only a feeble gesture in its direction. Its long-term effect is but a slightly more circuitous route to regimenting a preconceived social order. A last option would define the infinitive "to teach" as to cause the pupil to investigate, to deliberate, to ponder. It would have all sides of a problem presented, so that students could independently think themselves through to their own personal conclusions. This would be the method of academic freedom. It fits very nicely, of course, with the theory that the school should be a fearless critic of the *status quo*. Certainly the public would support this role of the school more confidently and enthusiastically if it knew that to teach a very controversial issue like communism does not necessarily mean to advocate it but to weigh its pros and cons for what they are worth.

One-sided and even biased as the method of teaching by indoctrination may be, there are nonetheless substantial arguments in its favor. A frequent claim is that it is inevitable. Merely to be born into a culture settles some patterns of a child's conduct. It settles, for instance, his mother tongue and leaves him no option about the grammatical way in which to express his ideas.³ The same is largely true of his manners and morals. Another claim is that indoctrination is not only inevitable, it is even neces-

¹ It has also been noted that there are several types of controversial issues: those which (1) once were controversial, (2) were controversial elsewhere, (3) are controversial only locally, (4) deal with highly dangerous problems, like religion, (5) are "dangerous but necessary," like economics. W. H. Kilpatrick, "The Teacher's Place in the Social Life of Today," *School and Society*, 46: 133, July, 1937.

² BROWDER, E., "Education—An Ally of the Workers' Struggle," *Social Frontier*, 1: 22-24, January, 1935.

³ JORDAN, E. B., "The Bogey of Indoctrination," *Catholic Educational Review*, 37: 20-29, January, 1939; and JOHNSON, H. G., "A Philosophy of Education for a Complex Civilization," *School and Society*, 71: 34, January, 1950.

sary and desirable. Thus when he goes to school the teacher chooses his text for him or arranges a syllabus of studies for him. It would be showing the child no favor to give him an option in these matters, for he is too inexperienced to have a basis for a valid choice. Similarly there are certain facts in science, history, geography, or mathematics which are so well settled that it would be a waste of valuable schooltime not to indoctrinate the child with them at once so that he can make a short cut to more advanced information in the field. In fact, we might lay down a general rule that it is proper to indoctrinate a child, teach him to accept the facts of the curriculum on authority, whenever experts are agreed on them or the method they have used in validating the facts is the one the child would have used if he had been investigating them.

So far probably most educators would go. The more debatable issue concerns using indoctrination and the method of authority where the child has grown to young adulthood and especially on issues where experts no longer reach common conclusions. Totalitarian states like those of fascism and communism do not stop indoctrinating at these points. Supremely confident in their political or economic doctrines for dialectical reasons sufficient to their leaders, totalitarian states teach a monolithic culture in their schools.¹ Opposing views may be considered but only to be mowed down by the official rebuttal.

Authoritarian churches with absolutistic religions are also prone to methods of indoctrination in their schools. Believing themselves possessed of an infallible truth and often supported in their belief by a divine revelation they go straight to the point in their instruction. True, certain vistas of speculation are closed by this kind of teaching, but this loss is more than compensated, they are certain, by the single-mindedness with which essential truths can be pursued and by the intensified energies released through overpowering loyalty to a changeless and eternal idea.² These churches may on appropriate occasion take up heretical doctrines in their schools, but they always do it with a sufficient antidote of orthodox doctrine so that the ultimate result is a strengthening of the student's faith.³

Not a few democratic educators believe that it is possible and desirable to indoctrinate the democratic method of free inquiry and discussion.⁴ Paradoxical as this may seem it reveals that these educators are virtually as sure of their doctrine of freedom as totalitarian states and absolutistic

¹ See also *infra*, p. 254.

² JORDAN, *op. cit.*

³ PIUS IX, "The Christian Education of Youth," *Catholic Educational Review*, 28: 157, March, 1930.

⁴ BRIGGS, T. H., "Should Education Indoctrinate?" *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 22: 561-593, November, 1936.

churches are of their authoritarian doctrines. If one believes in democracy and freedom, why not propagandize for them? Must the pupil constantly restrain his enthusiasm for these ideals, these educators inquire, by constantly entertaining the hypothesis that perhaps we would be happier without them?¹ Of course, by hypothesis, freedom must always be ready for self-examination, but some of its supporters feel that in a world surrounded by its enemies freedom deserves an all-out defense. Subject to such examination it should be taught with the same assurance scientific findings are.²

In teaching the democratic method of free inquiry some draw a distinction between the brighter and the duller halves of the school population.³ They would teach both halves the slogans of democratic freedom, but they would teach the slogans critically to the brighter half and indoctrinate the duller half. They would teach the one group to think and the other group what to think. In making this distinction, however, they would not make the fatal error of segregating the two groups from each other. Both leaders and led can only be effectively educated for their respective functions when educated in relation to each other.

The critics of indoctrination have attacked it from several sides. Those impressed with the basically changing and unsettled nature of the world look very skeptically at any teaching bottomed on absolutism, whether that absolutism be political, religious, or scientific. Inflexible viewpoints in a flexible world are unrealistic. In a contingent universe, there must be room for the critical weighing of alternative possibilities. This also implies a theory of intelligence as an instrument for reconstructing the social order, in preference to the one which views mind as a mirror of immutable and unquestioned truth.⁴

Some critics think the teaching methods of indoctrination and propa-

¹ REISNER, E. H., "The Quality of School Experience Appropriate to a Democracy," *Teachers College Record*, 40: 700-702, May, 1939.

² CHILDS, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9; and BRAMELD, T., "The Philosophy of Education as Philosophy of Politics," *School and Society*, 68: 333-334, November, 1948. For a discussion of whether the school should make a similar commitment to a labor orientation, see the following: DEWEY, J., "Class Struggle and the Democratic Way," *Social Frontier*, 2: 241-242, May, 1936. See also CHILDS, J. L., "Democracy, Education, and the Class Struggle," *Social Frontier*, 2: 274-278, June, 1936; BODE, B., "Dr. Childs and the Class Struggle," *Social Frontier*, 5: 38-40, November, 1938; CHILDS, J. L., "Education for Democracy," *Social Frontier*, 5: 40-43, November, 1938; "Dr. Bode on Authentic Democracy," *Social Frontier*, 5: 206-211, April, 1939; and SAYERS, E. V., "Social Patterns and Educational Goals," *School and Society*, 68: 2-4, July, 1948.

³ FINNEY, R., *Sociological Philosophy of Education*, Chap. 20, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1928.

⁴ *Supra*, pp. 83-84.

ganda are positively unethical. These methods, they say, treat the child as a means rather than as an end.¹ Instead of using his own intellect independently, the pupil becomes dependent on the thinking of others. Of course, as already noted, these others are often justified in indoctrinating the child by making decisions for him because they are more competent or more experienced. But there is an inescapably grave risk here that the teacher may confuse the importance of his own convictions with how his pupil should learn to think. This possible ambiguity is all the more insidious because the teacher may be utterly sincere in believing that the case at hand is one which imperatively demands that the pupil's judgment be supplanted by his own.

Academic Freedom

For those who flee from an instructional method predicated on indoctrination and propaganda, the logical recourse is to the method of free criticism and inquiry. The method of freedom is predicated on the theory that social progress occurs through individuals who depart from the conventional ways of thinking and acting. Of course not every such departure results in progress; many are abortive or even retrogressive. Nevertheless, the philosophy of this method holds that it is good for the teacher to provide a large measure of freedom in the educational program in order to liberate whatever genius is latent in any child's individuality. The method of freedom, thus, has a social as well as an individual significance. It is not only to let the child develop whatever unique capacities he is endowed with at birth, but perhaps even more significantly it is to make his unique contribution available for his fellows as well.²

Thus far there will probably be little or no disagreement in educational philosophy. But the difficult question next arises just how far shall we go with this freedom. Should freedom have no limits to its exercise, or should it be exercised within a definite frame of reference? To be sure, the teacher must be free to teach the truth so that the pupil will have an opportunity to learn the truth. "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."³ But what is the truth? With the answering of this question, disagreement begins. As already seen,⁴ educational philosophy is divided by different theories of truth. Those who maintain

¹ DEWEY, J., *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 64, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1922. See also *supra*, p. 115.

² BAGLEY, W. C., "Teachers Rights, Academic Freedom, and the Teaching of Controversial Issues," *Teachers College Record*, 40: 99-108, November 1938; GOSLIN, T. W., "Academic Freedom," *School and Society*, 40: 79-83, July, 1934.

³ John 8: 32.

⁴ *Supra*, pp. 72-77.

that there is a truth eternal in the heavens tend to limit freedom to this frame of reference, while those who maintain that truth is contingent on what "works" tend to recognize no limiting frame of reference, not even that of freedom itself.

To ground freedom within the limits of eternal truth Scholastic educational philosophy starts with a recognition of man's free will.¹ Liberty of the will, however, stands in need of direction, for otherwise it would almost certainly be man's ruin. Man directs his will through his reason which judges what law should govern his conduct. To exercise freedom, therefore, does not mean to be exempt from law but rather to act in conformity with it. If to be free were to be exempt from law, then man would be deprived of the benefit of reason. It is of the utmost importance to note next that the law which man's reason declares to his will is not just of his own making. On the contrary, the prescription of human reason can have the force of binding law only if it approximates or is identical with the law of reason of God, the creator and ruler of the world upon whom man's existence is contingent.²

If these premises are sound, it follows that the teacher is not at liberty to teach anything he pleases. On the contrary, he is only at liberty to teach the truth. He must be intolerant of error. The fact that in good faith a teacher may be teaching error in the guise of truth will not justify his act. Error does not have the same right to be propagated as truth. If the skeptic or critic inquires how truth and error can be so sharply distinguished, suffice it to say that for Scholastic educational philosophers the law of God is in the safekeeping of the Catholic church which is vested with a divine infallibility.³ While this infallibility applies peculiarly to the divine order, it has repercussions in the natural order too. Yet this fact need occasion no surprise because there could be no possible contradiction between truth in the two spheres. Hence the academic world should take no alarm but rather comfort and assurance in any restraints which a supernatural frame of reference may place on freedom of inquiry and teaching the curriculum dealing with the natural order.⁴

In spite of this assurance there are many educators who fear for freedom of inquiry if it must operate inside some fixed frame of reference.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 63-64.

² RYAN, S. A., and F. J. BOLAND, *Catholic Principles of Politics*, pp. 169-170, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1947; and RYAN, J. A., "Truth and Freedom," *Journal of Higher Education*, 20:349-352, October, 1949. In criticism of this position, see HOOK, S., "Academic Confusions," *ibid.*, 423-424, November, 1949.

³ PRUS IX, "The Christian Education of Youth," *Catholic Educational Review*, 28: 133-134, March, 1930.

⁴ RYAN and BOLAND, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-177.

They want to be so free in their teaching that they can criticize any frame of reference.¹ Of course, even such a freedom implies a point of view, a frame of reference of its own. But it is a frame of reference different from the Scholastic. Instead of resting ultimately on an immutable supernatural order, it rests immediately on a natural order which is constantly changing and revealing emergent novelties.² In such a world the outcome of current events is shrouded in future contingencies. Hindsight is the best foresight for predicting outcomes, but it is subject to error and can only be verified by living forward into the future. Prediction and verification, it hardly needs statement, require a well-informed and alert intelligence.

To perform this office, intelligence must be free. There must be no beliefs with a preferred status which have to be maintained by averting the searchlight of liberated mind. But individuals, because they are individuals, are bound to differ on this very vital point. In a sense, this contrariety of opinion seems to double the hazards of the future. Not only is the future something of a quandary, but people are perplexed what to do about it. Some try to reduce this risk by limiting the variability of opinion. This is the direction to authoritarian instruction. Freedom, on the contrary, finds strength in augmenting the variety of thought. It feels that the wider the range of policies from which to choose, the greater the assurance of finding a solution to any difficulties which the future may propose, and the greater the prospect for social progress.

Controversies over the infringement of academic freedom frequently develop out of a failure of the parties to the controversy to make clear which of the foregoing theories they are accepting. Take the case of a sectarian college or university. The founders and donors of its endowment no doubt clearly intended the institution to teach, perhaps even indoctrinate, a particular point of view or frame of reference. What now is the status of a professor who takes a view adverse to the founders and donors? This same question can easily arise in a state university if the public of that state is committed to a definite philosophy of politics. Can a state opposed to the policy of *laissez faire*, for instance, have academic freedom in its state university, if one thinks of academic freedom as a sort of *laissez faire* of the mind? The problem may even be there by implication as where the charter of an institution of higher learning is committed to no particular economic doctrine, yet the institution draws its financial sinews from the profits of a capitalist order. If a critical professor is censured or dismissed, the administration will most likely

¹ WRIGHT, Q., "The Citizen's Stake in Academic Freedom," *Journal of Higher Education*, 20: 344-345, October, 1949.

² *Supra*, pp. 27-33.

defend itself with the first theory of academic freedom,¹ while the professor will most likely defend himself with the latter. When the professor contends, as he no doubt will, that it is impossible to have academic freedom in a sectarian or proprietary institution, what he really should say is that he fundamentally disagrees with the administration's philosophy of academic freedom.

The confusion or conflict between these two philosophies of freedom is serious enough when it divides men within academic institutions, but it could be much more serious where it divides society generally into opposing camps. The possibility of this danger is evident in the consequences of the intolerance with which those who think the teacher is only free to teach the truth must treat those who sincerely teach a contrary doctrine as truth. Here we might have the possibility of one champion of freedom aiming to put shackles on the other. Presumably if they were to hold political power, they should suppress the teaching of false doctrine no matter how sincerely its proponents believed it to be the truth. Of course, suppression is a game two can play. If those put under ban came into power, they might suppress their erstwhile suppressors. Unfortunately for them, however, their own principles would not permit them to do it. Regarding no truth as fixed, they must admit the possibility that their opponents are right and therefore should not be suppressed.²

Consequently we have a situation in which the advocates of one theory of truth may suppress the advocates of the other without fear of reprisal by the latter. While this conclusion seems sound enough in theory, it is difficult to believe that in fact the suppressed advocates of truth would not fly in the face of their theory and take reprisal just the same. All told, this prospect of internecine strife in the camp of freedom presents a depressing outlook on a world where the enemies of any freedom at all constantly threaten to overwhelm even modest evidence of it. Confronted with a common enemy probably the two champions of freedom will get along well enough, but if they should definitely gain the upper hand, how they would settle the differences between themselves is a moot point.

Yet, even if academic freedom escapes these contradictions and confusions, there are still other precautionary measures it must face. One of these would limit the teacher's liberty to the field of his specialization. Within this confine, there seems general agreement that he should be quite

¹ SOPER, E. D., "Academic Freedom in a Christian College," *School and Society*, 30: 521-533, October, 1929.

² Cf. RYAN and BOLAND, *op. cit.*, pp. 318-319. Criticizing this view is VAUGHAN, J. N., "On Modern Intolerance," *The Commonweal*, 34: 53-56, May, 1941; and O'NEILL, J. M., *Religion and Education under the Constitution*, p. 39, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1949; and HOOK, S., "Academic Integrity and Academic Freedom," *Commentary*, 8: 337-339, October, 1949.

free to investigate, publish, and teach the truth as he sees it. Indeed, this is the very core of academic freedom. Unless it be granted and protected, the avenue to social progress is seriously obstructed.

But suppose, now, that the teacher elects to speak outside the scope of his specialty. Policy here is not so clear. Some would guard against this by sharply restricting freedom at this point. Such excursions, it is said, are unfair to the student who elected the course for its announced content. It may also be misleading to the public, which will, as like as not, indiscriminatingly associate the prestige of the teacher's official status with anything he may say. Others, however, would regret such a digression, but nevertheless would permit it. The harm that might result from misinforming students and public, they think, is outweighed by the heavier responsibilities which might arise from censorship. Once the latter is set up, there is an implicit institutional approval of anything the teacher does succeed in saying.

Even in the precincts of specialization, some think academic freedom is such a sharp tool that further safety devices should be installed against accidents in use. Most notable here is the instructor's classroom method. The Socratic privilege of freely following an argument whithersoever it may lead is not unaccompanied by certain proprieties. The chief propriety to observe is to remember that the freedom accorded the teacher is not a purely personal privilege, but that it is primarily for the benefit of his students.¹ His method, therefore, should not be to hand out ready-made conclusions but to encourage freedom on the part of his students. The German phrase for academic freedom, *Lehr-und-Lernfreiheit*, illustrates the point neatly. Opportunity should be afforded them for the independent exercise of their own intellectual equipment. On the one hand, this will involve training in logical patterns of thought which will enable them to approach new problems. On the other hand, it will entail making accessible the more important sources of information. In this latter, the teacher should be scrupulously careful to present without suppression or innuendo the divergent conclusions of competent investigators in the field. The instructor must steer a careful course between the Scylla of the "right answer" complex and the Charybdis of leaving the student's mind in a state of confusion.²

As to whether the teacher should include a statement of his own convictions among others, there seems some difference of opinion. Since the

¹ DEWEY, J., "The Social Significance of Academic Freedom," *Social Frontier*, 2: 165-166, March, 1936; WECHSLER, J., "Freedom to Learn," *Social Frontier*, 2: 176-178, March, 1936; and HAGGERTY, M. E., "The Paramount Service of Education to Society," *Annals of the American Political and Social Sciences*, 182: 10-20, November, 1935.

² Cf. Childs, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-9.

teaching function, especially in a public school, is representative rather than personal, some would carefully warn teachers against the injection of their own individual opinions into the discussion of controversial issues. They think it just as undesirable for the teacher to call his students' attention to his republican, democratic, or communistic sympathies as to his Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish faith. Some would not even have the pupils take sides, since there is no effective action which they can take until they grow older. For the interim, they recommend suspended judgment. Others think that the teacher's opinion should be thrown into the balance along with the rest. The only thing he must vigilantly guard against is that his position as teacher does not unduly influence his pupils in coming to their personal conclusions. This he can encompass by various artifices, such as delaying the presentation of his own views, encouraging students to be present where members of the teaching staff disagree, and when opponents are likely to be evenly matched in knowledge and persuasiveness, but above all by tempering both his written and oral statements with a certain dispassionateness and self-restraint—a professional and scholarly decorum.

But suppose, now, that teachers were to be successful in cultivating this even-tempered method of teaching, and suppose, further, that they were to succeed in getting their students to weigh controversial issues in the cool temperature of reason, is there danger that both will lose their ultimate effectiveness by sublimating their energizing emotions? Emotions may becloud reason, but they are also the dynamos of energy which can move mountains. Again, if children are taught to face a world of flux and contingency in which there are no ideals to cling to unwaveringly, where shall one look for the strength of conviction which makes martyrs? To these questions there are no immediate or easy answers. History records no society that has been managed on such rational democratic principles, from school to legislature. The chief hope in the future seems to lie in seeing whether the principle of the open mind can find nourishment in the soil of emotional zeal, as have other great faiths like nationalism and religion.¹

The further question arises in connection with academic freedom, as with all other delicate and finely wrought instruments: What age levels in the school population shall be permitted to wield it? Originally, academic freedom was associated with instruction of university grade. There are those who would still confine it to that level and hold it inapplicable to the work of the secondary and elementary levels. There is some doubt, however, about the adequacy of this view. So small a percentage of

¹ PRING, B., *Education, Capitalist and Socialist*, pp. 265-266, 269, Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 1937.

students attend higher institutions of learning, and the exactions of democracy from the average man are so great, that schools can hardly start early enough to train the citizenry in habits of free criticism. At the opposite pole are those who would extend complete freedom to all the teachers throughout the whole school system. Even though children of tender years cannot understand the complex issues of the modern politico-economic system, nevertheless it is felt by this pole of thought that it will be a grave misfortune for children to learn—as it is feared they too soon will—that their teachers believe one thing and teach another.

The majority of those who have given this problem thought would be inclined to graduate the amount of academic freedom.¹ Some would make the degree of academic freedom dependent upon the maturity of the learner. In the graduate school of the university, freedom would be greatest because it trains men to do research on the very boundaries between present knowledge and ignorance. The undergraduate college, not quite so close to the intellectual frontier, should have only slightly if any reduction in its academic freedom. Below that, there would be a further gradual reduction down to the earliest grades. Others, commencing in the same way, would make concessions further down the educational ladder in proportion to the pressure from local custom and prejudice, especially from the parents concerned. Still others would take into account what is all too frequently overlooked in defending the claims of academic freedom, the qualifications of the teacher. They would hold that if a teacher is to enjoy a special privilege, such as academic freedom, he must earn or deserve it by virtue of his training and experience. If the social order is to be criticized with the school as a sounding board, the community must have assurance of the competence of the educational leadership.²

Reference has just been made to the traditions and idiosyncracies of the community. Perhaps a further word is in order with regard to the way in which they condition academic freedom. If one takes the democratic point of view that the community is the ultimate judge of its own mores, then the predispositions of the community are an inescapable dimension of the problem of academic freedom. The most painstaking formulation of the principle of freedom will be of no avail, if parents and citizens will have none of it. Teachers must, therefore, practice the golden rule and treat the community even as they would be treated in return. If the teacher craves freedom to express his own individuality, so too does the community, he must remember. But if the teacher takes a tactless de-

¹ For a detailed consideration of freedom at the various levels of the educational ladder, see John Dewey Society, Second Yearbook, *Educational Freedom and Democracy*, Chaps. 4-7, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1938.

² BRUBACHER, A. R., "Public Schools and Political Purposes," *Harvard Educational Review*, 8: 179-190, March, 1938.

light in shocking and irritating local sympathies, he must not be surprised or provoked at any consequent alienation of public support. Such inconsiderate teachers do more harm to the cause of freedom than do many of its avowed enemies. Courteous persuasion, not insolent defiance, should be the teacher's manner.¹

Yet, even where freedom is hedged about by carefully thought-out precautions, there are still obstacles aplenty to surmount. Not infrequently the teacher himself stands in his own light. The inertia of the folkways is often strong upon him, and he complacently submits to restrictions which a little pluck on his part might have escaped. In spite of this probability, just where to stand one's ground and where to make a graceful retreat is a most difficult problem. Tact may be such an easy screen for lack of courage, and courage can so easily become foolhardiness. A few American folkways or habits of mind have particularly tended to put fear, rather than enterprise, in teachers' hearts and minds. Among these might be listed the survival of a certain authoritarianism from evangelical religion, the feeling that the school has a paternalistic responsibility for the beliefs of children, a corresponding blind spot to the fact that loyalty to institutions cannot be legislated but must be won by persuasion and conviction, and a confidence in majority rule in matters of intellectual investigation as well as those of politics. This latter is still manifest in some places where Jacksonian democracy makes the teacher's position a spoils of office.

In the foregoing treatment, academic freedom has been considered apart from any specification of a social time dimension. Nothing has been assumed as to the contemporary state of law and order. Suppose, now that there is either the external threat of foreign war or the internal menace of insurrection. Should these conditions lead to any compromise on the principles of academic freedom? Some think that these circumstances more than ever imperatively demand every variety of intellectual resource for meeting the common danger. Others fear that too great variety will lead to disunity, and disunion to weakness. Doubtless, in the end, this is an issue of fact. However that may be, communities pretty generally take the more conservative view and, at least temporarily, curtail the guarantees of academic freedom.²

Civil Liberty of the Teacher

Up to this point, we have discussed freedom as a perquisite of the teacher. Freedom, however, also belongs to the citizen. And let no one forget the

¹ KNIGHT, E. W., "Academic Freedom and Noblesse Oblige," *Teachers College Record*, 37: 186, December, 1935; and BRIGGS, T. H., "Protaganda and the Curriculum," *Teachers College Record*, 34: 471-472, March, 1934.

² STOKES, H. W., "Freedom Is Not Academic," *Journal of Higher Education*, 20: 346-347, October, 1949.

teacher is a citizen as well as a teacher. He would like to be as free as other citizens in deciding to join a church or a political party, to wear a style of clothes, to dance, and to drink or smoke. So long as he exercises freedom in these matters in conformity with the mores of his community, no trouble will arise. But let him depart from the norm or stereotype of his community and alas, if anything, he is likely to find his fellow citizens more critical of his exercise of civil liberties than of his exercise of academic freedom.

On the side of the right of the community to prescribe the way in which the teacher is to exercise his civil liberties, it may be said that the teacher teaches by example as well as by precept. Not only that, but he teaches by example out of school hours and off the school grounds just as well as during the time he is officially at school. Since a democratic community has the right to prescribe the curriculum it wants taught, it is only proper that the teacher should conform to their dictates in exercising his liberties as a citizen. If it seems hard for the teacher to make this sacrifice, he should remember that high office in any community carries with it responsibilities as well as rights. On elevation to the bench a lawyer must forego strong partisanship in controversial matters open to the average citizenry so that no possible reflection can be cast on the judicial temper of his mind. So too any man or woman on becoming a teacher should feel honored to ascend any pedestal of civic virtue on which the community wishes to place him. If he is unwilling to do this, then he should resign and seek a position in some other community or perhaps in some other profession.

There are many laymen as well as teachers who do not side with the community in dominating the private life of the teacher as a citizen. They do not think that being a teacher should in any way handicap a person as citizen. How, they inquire, can a teacher produce good citizenship through teaching, unless he himself can participate to the full in the duties of being a citizen and make these experiences available for his students? For them, the question answers itself. For them, the citizen-schoolmaster must be an incarnation of the better self of the populace. They would have no restrictions placed on teachers, as teachers, to which other citizens are not subjected as citizens.

Particularly would they press this point in the matter of teacher loyalty oaths. They see no reason why they should be selected out, as teachers, to be compelled to avow their loyalty to state and national constitutions, when other citizens are not required to do so. If it be said that they should swear an oath like other officers of the state, the technical objection must be raised that teachers are not public officers. Certainly, to say that teachers as a class are peculiarly susceptible to disloyalty is contrary to fact. If it is the permanence of the *status quo* which is in danger, it

needs pointing out that these very constitutions generally not only guarantee free inquiry and discussion but, what is decisively significant, they contemplate their own amendment. Furthermore, when a pluralistic state engages the services of a teacher, it acts as the representative of society. The obligation of the teacher is to serve society, not to protect the existing state from change.

A number of administrative devices have found their way into practice to ensure teachers' independence of action in both their official and unofficial lives. Chief among these have been tenure laws, regulations for a larger share for teachers in the administration of the schools, stronger professional organizations, contractual provisions, and better training of teachers.¹ These devices have sought to protect teachers from dismissal for reasons irrelevant to their professional efficiency. While such enactments may reveal a certain outward form of independence, unfortunately they do not always result in encouraging the critical attitude inside the school. Perhaps this is because there is some doubt about their real defensive strength, were an aroused public opinion to beat upon them. Perhaps, too, this security has sometimes been purchased at the price of freedom. In the long run probably there is nothing so important as educating public opinion to the paramount significance of academic freedom and civil liberty.

Teachers, however, let alone the public, are not always able to distinguish clearly between their academic freedom and their civil liberty. Frequently when they have exercised their civil liberties in such a way as to offend the community and the community demands their dismissal, they claim that dismissal would be an infringement of their academic freedom. A professor speaking outside his chair or field of specialization is a good case in point. When the professor of chemistry puts himself on public record as to his views on communism he is really speaking as a citizen and not as a professor. On the topic of communism he is no more competent than any other layman. Therefore the only protection he can expect is the protection of his civil liberties, not his academic freedom.

What is the difference between the protection afforded the professor through academic freedom and the protection afforded him through his civil liberties? As a citizen the professor has the right to deliver himself of any opinion he wishes without fear of arrest, fine, or incarceration, provided that his opinion is short of incitement to violence or of palpable moral turpitude. But if he loses fame or fortune as a result of his utterance, it is just one of the risks attendant on the exercise of his civil liberties. On the other hand if the professor speaks *ex cathedra*, within his

¹ For a brief review of the pros and cons of these devices, see H. K. Beale, *Are American Teachers Free?* pp. 686-688, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1936.

field of specialization, then he can neither be arrested, fined, or imprisoned nor can he be made to suffer loss of his position. We do not protect the citizen against economic loss of position if he exercises his civil liberties in an unpopular fashion, but we do protect the professor. Why? Because the professor has made a life study of his field; he is an expert in it. What he says is much more likely to be true than what the lay citizen thinks. If we want to guarantee ourselves this probably superior insight into the most likely direction of future social progress, we must throw a cloak of economic security around him so that he will be able to continue his researches. Perhaps the citizen should have a similar immunity to economic loss so as to fulfill his office as a citizen more effectively, but to date the community has not yet reached this ethical level. Indeed the professor has a hard enough time maintaining his own unique privilege.

Whether the teacher be relying on his academic freedom or his liberty as a citizen, the question is bound to arise, sooner or later, who is to determine whether or not he has violated his trust. Some think that the lay representatives of the community, notably the board of education, should be the judges. This is frequently the case. On the other hand, if the teacher's privilege of freedom is predicated on his superior learning, it may be doubted that laymen are capable of judging whether a teacher has exceeded his authority or been unfaithful to his trust. Indeed, the profession is quite unanimous in insisting that such questions should be settled by a jury composed in whole, or at least in part, of the teacher's professional peers.

This leaves one final point. Is it ever ethical to deny academic freedom or civil liberty to a teacher who is a professed critic or even an enemy of freedom? Take someone who does not accept democracy as the political frame of reference in which education should operate. Suppose we know that if he were in a position of authority he would be the first to suppress independent thinking and judgment. When such a one outrages us with his criticism of our frame of reference, shall we envelop him with the protecting cloak of academic freedom or civil liberty? So long as he confines himself to the rational and orderly precedures of discussion and voting, it seems we should protect any sincere critic of our system. So long as he uses the relatively slow procedures of trying to educate the majority to his point of view, we need have no especial alarm. We have only to guard ourselves that no point of view be taught in an atmosphere where others are excluded. Even if one point of view seems to threaten violence, still we should insist on freedom to assert it so long as there is no clear and present danger of violence occurring.¹

¹ AXTELL, G. E., "Should Communists Teach in American Universities?" *Educational Forum*, 13: 425-432, May, 1949.

But what of the case where a teacher believes the truth lies in one direction but his teaching takes another because his political party or religious sect dictates the latter course? If he sincerely believes in subordinating his own individual convictions to party or sectarian discipline, there seems to be no way in which to criticize a teacher for his position.¹ But if, on the other hand, the teacher insincerely conforms his teaching to what he does not believe, or if he dishonestly conceals his membership in or obligation to a party or sect, then there is danger to academic freedom. Not being genuinely free himself, he is hardly entitled to the privileges of freedom.² The danger grows distinctly worse, of course, where the teacher is ready at any moment to execute a *coup d'état*, that is, take a sudden short cut to the overthrow of democracy through the use of force. If he is insincerely hiding in the folds of the mantle of academic freedom or civil liberty till such an opportune time, then there seems no ethical objection to denying him the protection of these privileges.³

Two Major Philosophies of Education

Throughout the consideration of the role of the school in social progress, two major trends of thinking have emerged. On the one hand are the sincere laymen and educators who think that the school should line up with the forces of the *status quo*, that teachers should indoctrinate the *status quo*, and that if they possess any freedom at all it is to be exercised consistent with the *status quo*. On the other hand are equally sincere laymen and educators who think that the school should be in the van of social progress, that the teacher should have freedom to deviate from traditional stereotypes, and that this freedom to deviate should extend to deviations in the frame of reference itself. There is possibly a third educational philosophy, that of revolution. But it is difficult to tell whether revolutionaries take education seriously. Committed to quick and even violent social changes they seem to regard the slower processes of education either as a temporary expedient to prepare the way for revolution or as a long-

¹ MEIKLEJOHN, A., "Should Communists Be Allowed to Teach?" *The New York Times* (Magazine), Mar. 27, 1949.

² HOOK, S., "Should Communists Be Permitted to Teach?" *The New York Times* (Magazine), Feb. 27, 1949; CHILDS, J. L., "Communists and the Right to Teach," *The Nation*, 168: 230-233, February, 1949; THAYER, V. T., "Should Communists and Fascists Teach in the Schools?" *Harvard Educational Review*, 12: 7-19, January, 1942; LOVEJOY, A. O., "Communism versus Academic Freedom," *American Scholar*, 18: 332-337, Summer, 1949; and STOKES, H. W., *op. cit.*, pp. 347-349.

³ SMITH, T. V., "Academic Expediency as Democratic Justice in re Communists," *American Scholar*, 18: 342-346. Holding much the same point of view but thinking it more important to encourage the friends of freedom than to discourage its communist enemies, is LERNER, M., "The Mandarins and the Pariahs," *ibid.*, pp. 337-342.

range means of entrenching successful revolution. Consequently they vacillate in their instructional method, favoring free procedures while they are attacking old social abuses but turning to techniques of indoctrination and propaganda when they are consolidating the new regime.

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CHAPTER XI

THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS

Centrality of Teaching-Learning Strategy

Ultimately, the focal point of any exposition of educational philosophy must center in some act of learning. The character and outcome of this act will naturally vary immediately with the curriculum and methods that are employed. More remotely but nonetheless powerfully, it will vary with such considerations as political and economic theory. Yet more distantly but even more fundamentally, it will vary with the arguments of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Up to this point, in the preceding philosophical exposition emphasis has been centrifugal from the immediate act of learning out toward these more remote ramifications. It is time now for this direction to be reversed and for the emphasis to be centripetal in toward the immediate workings of the educative process, toward a firsthand examination of the details of the teaching-learning strategy itself.

Whereas heretofore diverse schoolroom procedures have frequently furnished points of departure for excursions into underlying philosophies, they must now become themselves the main object of discussion. Formerly, a mere sampling of divergent practices was employed to anchor abstractions of theory to concrete reality. This will no longer suffice. It will now be necessary to cover all the major practices, to examine the main inventory of patterns for the teaching-learning process. There will be no attempt, however, to give a complete analysis of practical procedures. The treatment will be comprehensive only in point of the general theory of curriculum and method.

The sequence in which these problems might be taken up is various. The following is suggested here. Initial in importance is the matter of direction. How shall one conceive the nature of educational aims and objectives? Just how shall they be employed in guiding the educative process? More particularly, what bearing does the nature of aims have on the curriculum? Of course, much will hang here on the further question, How shall the nature of the curriculum itself be conceived? Again, just how shall the values inherent in aims and curriculums be utilized in motivating learning? What is the nature of interest, and when should it be em-

ployed? Should the educative process be based rather on effort and discipline? How do all these values enter into the evaluation or measurement of what has been learned? In fact, how can one be sure, at the conclusion of an episode in the educative process, that any learning has taken place? What are the appropriate roles of measurement and evaluation in education?

In organizing the curriculum, what should be the temporal order in which materials are studied? Should the sequence follow the logic of the mature scholar or the psychological order of the immature learner? In addition to the temporal, what sort of structural organization should the lesson have? What are the respective merits of dogmatic, authoritative exposition as over against problems requiring investigation? Finally, what of the social dimension in the organization of the educative process? How important is a social context for learning? To what extent should there be freedom for pupil individuality to express itself? Especially, how shall the social discipline of the school be managed?

Educational Aims

That educational aims are primarily a phase of educational values we have already pointed out.¹ In the earlier discussion, we approached aims and values from the twin angles of the psychologically desired and the ethically desirable. The present emphasis is not so much on which direction education should take as it is on the simple importance of taking some aim when learning or teaching.

To have an educational aim is to endeavor to anticipate and predispose the outcome of some present or projected educational activity. From this point of view, it is perhaps more graphic to speak of educational ends rather than educational aims. Not only does an aim try to foresee what the end or termination of present educative effort will or should be, but this vision, once gained, is an instrument in guiding both pupil and teacher to that end. In the first place it helps in sizing up the means which are available for reaching the end and, in the second place, it suggests the order in which steps should be taken to get there. To have an aim, to act purposefully, to consider future events in the light of the past, is all one with acting intelligently. In addition to organizing action in line with anticipated outcomes, educational aims, since they are values, should also furnish the drive or motivation to accomplish the task in hand² and provide the basis for evaluating the task when done.³

Before going further, it will probably be well to make two distinctions.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 105-111.

² *Supra*, pp. 104-105. *Infra*, p. 289.

³ *Infra*, pp. 244-245.

In the first place, an aim or purpose is something more than a native impulse. It originates in impulse, to be sure, but it does not become an aim or purpose till some endeavor has been made to trace out what will be the probable consequences of acting on the impulse. In the second place, educational outcomes will sometimes be a surprise, compared to what was anticipated or aimed at. For this reason, it is important to distinguish aims or objectives from outcomes or results. The former are a matter of foresight, while the latter are a matter of hindsight. The former are what one tries to learn to teach; the latter, what one actually succeeds in learning or teaching. Since time inexorably marches on, education is bound to have outcomes or results, whether or not they have been preceded by thought-out aims or objectives. This being the case, there should be little objection to the conclusion that a careful use of aims is the only intelligent way to manage the educative process.

So far, there will probably be general agreement. Beyond this point, differences crop out. One of the first points of conflict concerns whether educational aims should have a fixed, immutable quality or whether they should be flexible and subject to continual reconstruction.¹ There are many who favor the former sort of aim. The sort of metaphysic to which this group subscribes is obvious.² They feel no security or confidence in their educational endeavors unless they can strive toward a definite, unchanging ideal. If the ideal keeps constantly shifting, they feel a persistent, sidelong anxiety which saps their best efforts. Paradoxical though it may seem, an immutable goal liberates rather than inhibits their powers.

Others, adopting the opposite metaphysic, find fixed aims not only inadequate, but almost a menace.³ In a world composed of a mixture of the contingent and the recurrent, educational aims, to be realistic, must shift with the rest of the scenery. Instead of being final, they should be merely tentative. Thus, when an educational experience is evaluated at its conclusion, it may be found necessary to reconstruct its original aim as well as the procedure for gaining it. Not only does the environment change as one learns, but learning itself does something to the environment. On both these counts it would be unfortunate if aims did not keep pace with the transformation in attendant circumstances.

The flexibility or rigidity of educational aims involves the further problem, whether educational aims should arise out of an ongoing experience or whether they should be conceived as external to it. Scholastic educa-

¹ SANDERS, W. J., "Fallacies Underlying Curriculum Theory," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 25: 161-181, March, 1939; SANDERS, W. J., "Thomism, Instrumentalism, and Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, 10: 98-101, January, 1940.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 27-30.

³ *Ibid.*

tional philosophy favors the latter conception. It thinks experience fluctuates too much to be a satisfactory source of educational aims. Aims arising out of such a flux could hardly be steady enough to give effective guidance to the educative process. What is needed is an aim which lies outside and above experience. It must lie outside, so that it may be fixed; it must lie above it, so that it may be perfect as an educational ideal.

The opposite view, that educational aims should emerge from experience, is almost a forced conclusion from the position that aims should be constantly reshaped to meet the needs of a dynamic environment. The advantage of this sort of aim to the teacher or learner is that he directly appreciates its relation to what is going on. It is of crucial importance that he is seeking an answer to his *own* problem, not someone else's. Educational aims are thus not only purposeful, but personal. It is in this sense, then, that it has been said that education has no aims, that only such as parents, pupils, and teachers have them.

The crucial difference between these views seems to center on the mutual relation of ends and means.¹ The latter, or progressive, view holds that educational ends cannot be intelligently set forth without a consideration of the means that bring them within reach. Moreover, ends once achieved become resources or means in the quest for further ends. Stated differently, means refer to the immediate direction of learning while ends refer to its more remote direction. From the former, or essentialist, point of view ends may remain trusted and worthy no matter how inaccessible they are, no matter how difficult it is to improvise means for their realization. Restated, not all aims are instrumental; some aims are final, ultimate. They are ends in and of themselves. Furthermore, they are external to the educational process rather than internal as are means. Such a separation of ends and means seems to render remote the motivation ordinarily supplied by aims. But this is no necessary evil, for if interest is remote or even wanting, then the student must put forth effort to achieve his ends. In doing so, he incidentally gains the moral value of acting on principle without self-interest.

Sometimes, the externality of educational aims refers to their social origin rather than to their metaphysical character. The source of the aims which are to guide the learner is the teacher rather than the learner himself. Even the teacher's aims may not be his own but those of his superior administrative officer. Such a hierarchy of authority is generally based on the supposed incompetence of the one below, and the superior vision of the one above, to pick a suitable objective. Particularly is this the case where the objective itself is of the fixed external type and must therefore

¹ THOMAS, L. G., "The Meaning of Progress in Progressive Education," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 32: 385-400, October, 1946.

be insisted upon, in spite of the fact that its worth is not appreciated by those at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder. A number allege that the social philosophy which lies back of this view is undemocratic.¹ The few pick the aims of the many. Yet what would be democratic in this situation is a moot point. Some hold that it is better for the many to be assured of specific good aims, even at the expense of not being consulted on their selection. Others question whether the judgment of the few is so superior as to warrant such responsibility. But, even granting that, and granting that the many would choose more bad aims than would the few, these others would prefer to have the many choose and make mistakes, rather than never to choose at all.

The line of cleavage, which so far has divided opinions on the way educational aims are to serve the educative process, can be extended still further. In addition to the controversies over its other qualities, there also rages one on its temporal dimension.² Should pupil and teacher aims have a present reference, or a more remote one in the future? Should school be life or a preparation for life?

Perhaps the best approach to this phase of educational aims is to commence with what is fairly clearly agreed upon. There would probably be general assent to saying that the problem is not an either-or affair. Sober educational philosophy must take both periods into account. This is most easily done by recognizing no sharp razor-edged division between the present and the future, between childhood and adulthood. The future should be seen to grow imperceptibly out of the present, so that childhood and adulthood form one continuous development. With this point of departure it is obvious that education disregards either period at its peril. Education must, therefore, be a judicious mixture of participation in present life and preparation for subsequent events.

But what proportion of ingredients shall go into this formula? Probably the answer to this question turns on the relative importance in which childhood and adulthood are regarded. In many quarters the conviction has prevailed that the latter is the more important. They depreciate children because they are only candidates for society, rather than full-fledged members of it. To them reaching maturity is a matter of drawing even with the cultural level of the adult. The aim of education, therefore, should properly put more stress on preparation for adulthood than on the present interests of childhood. If a man's years be threescore and ten, then the first fifteen or twenty years of education should be primarily concerned with getting ready for the last fifty. For many, moreover, even

¹ Cf. *supra*, Chap. VII.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 36-37.

adulthood is but a stage on the way to life eternal. Hence, for them, education as preparation has an even more distant goal.

Over against this position can be pitted those who underscore the claims of childhood and the present.¹ They do not view the immaturity of childhood as a liability but rather as an asset, not as a void but rather as a power to grow. Yet, if education is growth, they recognize that it must necessarily be directed toward the future. The mistake is not in emphasizing the future, therefore, but in making it the mainspring of present effort. Since growth occurs in the present, the constant aim and function of education is to get out of the present the kind of growth that is inherent in it. On this account, supporters of this view emphasize childhood's present interests and capacities. Preparation for the future, then, is but a by-product. Growing well in the present will be the best preparation for growing in the future. Consequently they are fearful of aims or values which are so deferred in time that, however sound, they may fail to enlist the native energies of the child, because of their very remoteness. They do not mean to disregard long-standing values in the social heritage, but they would prefer to sacrifice a little steadiness of direction rather than a part of the efficiency with which the child's drives are geared to his present studies. Accordingly, school should aim at life, life here and now, not a preparation for it. In a contingent universe, the educator cannot bank too securely on deferred values, for they may be completely rescaled before achieving them. Consequently, it is urged that learning focus its energies where the changes are now occurring, the present—always, of course, defining the present, not as a razor-thin slice of time, but as a span of time which constantly emerges from the past and imperceptibly merges with the future.

Nature of the Curriculum

With the aim or direction of the educative process once determined, the next step is obviously one of ways and means. Among these, the curriculum demands first attention. According to its Latin origin, a curriculum is a "runway," a course which one runs to reach a goal, as in a race. This figure of a course has been carried over into educational parlance, where it is sometimes called a curriculum, sometimes a course of study. Whatever its name, it describes the ground which pupil and teacher cover to reach the goal or objective of education. For this reason, it almost goes without saying that one will run a different course for

¹ DEWEY, J., *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 270, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1922; DEWEY, J., *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, pp. 183-185, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1920.

different goals or aims. The curriculum being so dependent on the goal set, it is hardly surprising to find that learning the curriculum will be virtually equivalent to achieving one's objectives. In fact, so close is the relation between aim and curriculum that, as already mentioned, one may well say that the curriculum is nothing more than aims or values writ large in expanded form.¹ The curriculum, however, not only involves a theory of values, it also involves a theory of knowledge. In running through the curriculum the child may be merely running over a well-known course, or he may be blazing a trail over new terrain. What he actually learns will be quite different, as already seen,² depending on whether the curriculum is fixed in advance, representing knowledge already known and waiting to be learned, or whether only its general outlines are marked in advance, reducing later to precise knowledge only so much of the course as is actually run.

It is time now, however, to restate these aspects of curriculum theory in more conventional terms. Most obviously, the fundamental ingredients of the educative process consist of a learner and something to be learned. But, now, shall this second ingredient, the curriculum, be conceived from the point of view of the first, the learner? Or shall it be conceived to have a more or less objective, independent status? The latter alternative seems to establish a dualism between the terms. The former finds an essential continuity between them.

The traditional treatment of the curriculum has been definitely dualistic. The basic dualism has been that between mind and matter.³ This has been matched with another, that between mind and subject matter, child and curriculum. The child represents the particular, the curriculum the general or universal. The one represents the individual, the other society. Of the two, it is the universal or the social that is favored in determining the nature of the curriculum. Any resulting conflicts between child and curriculum therefore are generally resolved in favor of the curriculum. The curriculum, representing the social culture, becomes a sort of Procrustean bed for the child. Instead of fitting the curriculum to child need, the child is fitted to the curriculum. Since the child's nature is ordinarily impulsive and narrowly self-centered, since his experience is crude, vague, and uncertain, it follows that it is incumbent on the school to prescribe a curriculum which will broaden him out and introduce him to the law and order of the universe.

The alternative to such a curriculum theory is to conceive of the cur-

¹ *Supra*, p. 111.

² *Supra*, pp. 88-89.

³ *Supra*, pp. 43-49.

riculum more in terms of the nature of the learner. In order to do this, one must cease thinking of subject matter as something fixed and ready-made in advance. In like manner, one must give up thinking of the curriculum as something outside the child's experience, as something that can be poured into the child from without. On the contrary, it is necessary to see that the content of child experience and the content of race experience—the curriculum—differ in degree rather than in kind. The content of the former already contains elements of the same sort as those to be found in the latter. The child's experience and his studies in school are but the initial and terminal aspects of a single reality or process—education, life. The one flows into the other, is continuous with it. It is one of the functions of method to discover the steps which intervene between the child's present experiences and their richer maturity in the social heritage. The curriculum is the social stuff out of which the self realizes itself. To think of these two as opposed to each other would produce the unnatural result of putting the nature and destiny of the child at war with each other.

Our initial problem, whether to state the curriculum in terms of dualism or continuity, has yet a further angle, whether to state the curriculum in terms of subject matter or children's activities.¹ In the traditional view of the curriculum the basic units are facts or skills which have been homogeneously grouped into various subject fields, like arithmetic and history. Such a classification is not only inevitable but highly useful. The mind cannot grasp the race experience in its totality, so by analysis it breaks it up into different clusters of related interests. What makes the curriculum traditional is the fact that the particular organization and specialization of knowledge which obtains at present has been inherited largely from centuries past. Each epoch has organized its experiences as they would best serve its own characteristic struggles and interests. These patterns have come down through the schools almost like geological strata. Each new subject, representing new life interests, is added on without reorganizing what preceded. This being the case, it is not surprising that in the course of time the subdivisions, in which the curriculum is inherited, are studied as something final and unalterable.

As a consequence, the curriculum comes to be prescribed without much regard to the interests and point of view of the learner. It is enough that the curriculum is backed by the authority of the teacher, who is backed by the authority of the centuries. The subjects of the time-honored divisions are learned one by one. Portions of each constitute the assignment of facts and skills to be learned from day to day. Unless one is

¹ KILPATRICK, W. H., "Subject Matter and the Educative Process," *Educational Method*, 2: 94-101, 230-237, 367-376, November, February, May, 1923.

very careful to insist that subjects be correlated on the idealistic assumption of the wholeness of culture,¹ a certain atomism settles down on the curriculum. Facts and skills are learned one at a time. Credits—and the subjects they represent—are accumulated like coupons and presented for diplomas. Attitudes, if important at all, are also learned separately and their concomitant significance neglected or minimized. Finally, the curriculum so learned remains stored away in memory till one assembles enough to be able to use it or is asked to bring it forth on demand in the recitation or examination.

On the other hand, one has the more child-centered type of curriculum. Since the child is living now, the curriculum becomes all the child's life for which the school is responsible. It includes emotional attitudes and moral ideals, as well as the usual sorts of information. The curriculum concerns itself with the whole child. The teacher remembers that the verb "teach" takes a double accusative; it governs John and Mary as well as language and science. Indeed, in the modern grammar of pedagogy, John and Mary have become direct objectives of teaching rather than indirect ones as in the grammar of yesterday. The unit element in such a curriculum is neither facts and skills nor subjects of instruction, but a novelly developing life situation. Experience is central. The curriculum uses subject matter, but it does not wholly consist of it, nor are its conventional divisions allowed to become barriers against meeting new needs. Subject matter is called in to help in the recovery of the continuity of action which has been interrupted by some problematic situation.

This view rejects the idea that subject matter is something that can be put in cold storage against some contingent day of use. It refuses to treat the curriculum like a deposit which is to be handed down from one generation to another or as an object which can be wrapped up in package form to be handed to students. Such conceptions are too static. Rather is the curriculum to be thought of as dynamic. From this view, such things as facts, knowledge, information, subject matter all become plans of action, ways of responding or reacting. Consistent with this interpretation is the recommendation that the names of the different subjects be cast as participial nouns rather than substantive ones.² Thus, for instance, reading, writing, and reckoning, to mention but the three R's, more truly portray the character of the curriculum than do literature, penmanship, and arithmetic. All subjects are arts or skills, patterns of behavior.

Here a word must be interpolated with regard to conceiving the

¹ FLESHMAN, A. C., *The Educational Process*, pp. 76-77, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1908.

² MOORE, E. C., *What Is Education?* p. 344, Ginn & Company, Boston, 1915.

nature of the curriculum as composed of activities.¹ To many, activity tends to mean physical activity on the part of the child, such as field trips or construction work. Those who have accepted this view generally take this position in protest against the sort of curriculum which is learned at desks, where quietness is a school virtue. It would, however, probably be an unwarranted inference to think no physical activity at all is involved in the latter type of curriculum. Even so passive a type of learning as listening involves a very definite physical coordination for attentiveness. The significance of the activity curriculum, therefore, if any, lies in the kind of activity rather than in its contrast with no activity at all.

For purposes of curriculum theory two kinds of activity may be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the kind of activity inherited as a legacy from the empiricism of Locke and Pestalozzi. Here, learning is a matter of sense impression. The senses are supposed to be active in absorbing impressions of the world round about the learner. Education seems to be something that is done to the child from without. He undergoes it. Even if the content of the curriculum is made to appeal to the mind rather than the senses, any learning activity goes on chiefly inside the learner. The mind is preoccupied with mirroring the universe of knowledge and value. There is a minimum of overt behavior by way of trying to reconstruct it.

On the other hand, there is a more aggressive kind of activity. This sort does not wait for meanings to appear; it seeks them out. Such activity, ever reaching outward forms an active curiosity which constantly forces new meanings to appear. Here, instead of learning through passive response, the pupil learns from noting the results which occur when he takes the initiative in physically manipulating his environment. In this view, one gets better impressions coincident to active expression. In accepting this more vigorous and energetic conception of activity, one must beware of just activity in general or of activity for its own sake, as in the case of mere "busy work." In the abstract, activity may be boisterous and random as well as guided and purposeful. If the activity curriculum preferably is to be known by the more overt sort of activities, the justification therefor must be found in their greater promise of educational growth.

There are various educational activities which give this promise. Physical exercise for promoting health is one instance; emotional outlet through the dance is another. Of outstanding importance are work and play. Both of these afford unique opportunities for an activity curriculum since they initiate acquaintance with things and processes, and work, at least,

¹ *Supra*, pp. 86-87.

provides some terminal opportunity to test out one's knowledge of them.¹ While most people seem agreed on the educational significance of work activities, some think that play has no proper place in the curriculum. Children will have plenty of opportunity to play outside of school, they say, and therefore there is no use wasting schooltime with such a duplication of activity. This misgiving might have some point in a frontier society, but in the modern industrial community quite the opposite seems to carry weight. But more of this in a moment.

Selection of the Curriculum

The differences already noted between conceiving of the curriculum as opposed to or continuous with child nature can be pursued and restated in terms of another controversy, that is, whether the content of the curriculum should be selected for its intrinsic merit or its instrumental usefulness.² Holding to the former view are those who think that the arts and sciences constitute the intelligible content of the world, and since man is primarily an intelligent animal, it adds to his self-realization just to comprehend and cherish this content. Beyond this the study of the curriculum needs no ulterior justification. It is worth while in and of itself. Furthermore, it is supported by and itself reenforces the dualistic or Procrustean view of the curriculum just set forth. The merit of this position, however, must not be obscured by the abuse it suffers in some quarters. Some schools have assigned fact after fact to be learned merely because the task was something that could be learned. Too much learning, it may be confessed, is merely for school purposes, for marks and promotions. It is almost of the order of incantation. The curriculum as properly conceived here is to be learned, not because it can be learned, but because it contains truth and values which can be known for what they intrinsically are.

Paired against this theory of the curriculum is one wherein the curriculum has no independent footing but takes its character from the way in which it serves the purposes of the learner. On this basis, the past has no significance of its own which is worth studying. It is significant only as it enters into and illuminates the present. To study the past, as the past, makes the past a rival of the present and the present a futile imitation of what is past. Where such a curriculum theory obtains, culture is in danger of becoming an ornament and a solace, if not a refuge and an asylum as well. In contrast to such a result is a curriculum which, far from being indifferent to the past, draws heavily on it, but always as a resource for learning the way out of some contemporary perplexity.

¹ DEWEY, J., *Democracy and Education*, p. 229, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916.

² *Supra*, pp. 96-97.

In this theory, the culture of the past does not belong to another almost disconnected world—the dualistic view—but is continuous with the present. But, even accepting this instrumentalistic curricular hypothesis, there are some anxious educators who think that the question must still be raised whether some things are not so useful that they must be learned, even though no immediate occasion presents itself in which learning can occur through use. The probable answer to this question is that material so important will not long want an occasion for revealing itself. Failing such an opportune opening, the farseeing teacher will adroitly maneuver the children into a situation where they will themselves demand it.

This consideration of the element of time in curriculum construction naturally leads to another moot problem, whether the curriculum can be made out in advance. In time-honored practice, it has been customary to lay out the curriculum in advance of either the year or day of its use. The more sure the teacher is of his objectives, of the intrinsic worth of studies, of their enduring quality, the more assurance can he have in preparing his course in advance of meeting his class. Contrariwise, if subject matter is learned to meet the needs of the learner, and if educational aims represented by these needs constantly vary, then one's advance planning becomes by so much less precise. The curriculum then must be made as life and learning develop.

This, however, does not necessarily mean that the curriculum is always to be improvised extempore. Instead of rejecting planning, this theory requires an even more difficult kind of planning, the kind that is so broad and flexible that it is prepared for a variety of contingencies. When unexpected events occur, it will be well to depart from prior plans and to squeeze every educational advantage one can from the instant situation. But, in doing so, there is the ever-present danger that in retrospect the curriculum will appear fragmentary, discontinuous, and unrelated. The chief remedy for guarding against such a development is the selection of relatively large units of work requiring a relatively long time to accomplish. In that event there will have to be year-by-year cooperation among the different teachers. But, even then, unity is best found in the integrity of the pupil's purpose rather than in any external organization of the curriculum by the teacher.

Because of his more mature experience, the teacher should be able to do much to guide this continuity of experience, to anticipate within limits what problems are most likely to press for solution in the child's life. To this extent, surely, he must be prepared with information and sources for its further procurement. Some prefer to call this general plan the course of study, or program of studies, in contradistinction to the curriculum. The term curriculum they reserve for what actually occurs in

the specific ongoing process of the learning situation. The curriculum can thus vary with the needs of the moment and yet have as a steadying keel the course of instruction.

If the curriculum must be flexible in point of time, then, there are others who think that it must also be flexible enough to meet the individual differences of children. Not only is the nature of the curriculum to be conceived in terms of child nature but, since that nature is infinitely variegated, the curriculum must be individualized. Since individuality is of the ultimate nature of reality,¹ no educational authorities can make a uniform curriculum for a multitude of children. Accordingly, each child must have his own curriculum. Perhaps not going quite so far in their individualism are those who reserve an important place for it, nevertheless, through the elective curriculum. Here, chiefly for democratic reasons,² they would insist on a curriculum broad enough that some element in it will strike a sympathetic chord in the capacity of every youth. It must not be forgotten, however, that the elective system is akin to the policy of *laissez faire*.³ For educational authorities to hold back from prescribing curriculum values is to run much the same risks as when the state adopts a hands-off policy toward schools. The more the educational staff fails to take a hand, the more the children are left to the mercy of the opinions of their parents, the attitudes of fellow students, and the popularity of certain instructors.

The multiplication of studies whether encouraged by *laissez faire* or otherwise leads to the constant danger of congestion, confusion, superficiality, and dispersiveness unless, as some say, there is some unifying tendency. But how to obtain unity or integration in the curriculum?⁴ Many think that unity or integration is to be found in the inherent logical unity of knowledge. Accordingly though we find it necessary to break down the total scope of knowledge into subject-matter divisions like mathematics, language, and the various sciences, many of us believe that there is an essential relatedness of all these fields of knowledge. Thus, chemistry and biology are related through biochemistry, biology and psychology through psychobiology, psychology and sociology through social psychology, and so on. It would be a grave mistake, many feel, if students should complete their education without some appreciation of how all knowledge tends to hang together according to the logical nature of the universe. A number of other educators seek integration in a different

¹ *Supra*, pp. 33-36.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 131-143.

³ MONTAGUE, W. P., *Ways of Knowing*, p. 147, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1925; cf. *supra*, pp. 151-152.

⁴ *Supra*, pp. 35-36, 55-56.

direction. Instead of finding it ready-made in the logic of the universe, they form it around specific problems or centers of interest. Each new problem demands its own unique selection of subject matter which must receive its own unique organization or integration to ensure solution. The organization or integration achieved will be useful for the next problem, but to the extent which that problem has unique features there will have to be some reorganization, a new integration. Whichever way we approach integration of the curriculum, of course, leads ultimately to a fresh realization that unity or integration is the heart of the philosophic viewpoint in education.¹

It but remains to accord consideration to the proper parties to be entrusted with the selection of the curriculum. Not infrequently laymen through legislatures and boards of education like to think of themselves as competent to state which subjects should be included. No doubt it is quite proper for the lay public to set the general direction of the schools, but the task of determining the particular materials appropriate to moving in that direction should be left in charge of the professionally competent. But even when left in the hands of professional experts, philosophical difficulties pursue the educator. Should the superintendent of schools or some curriculum expert draw up the curriculum and then pass it on to the teacher to be passed on in turn to the children? Or should the teacher participate in the first instance with the superintendent or expert consultant in curriculum making, inviting the children later on to participate to the extent of their abilities? Obviously a question of social philosophy stands out here. Of the two suggested practices, the former is more autocratic and the latter more democratic.² The democratic practice, let it be noted in answer to some of its critics, does not expect the teacher to abdicate his responsibilities in curriculum formation in favor of immature children. Rather he consults the interests of children to see what they desire in the curriculum but later pools this data with what the adult group holds socially desirable in coming at the final statement of the curriculum.

Interest

The close interpenetration of aim and curriculum in the educative process is plain to see. Among other things, both are aspects of value theory. As already seen, educational aims not only indicate the values to be sought, but they should involve a personal commitment thereto which by its depth measures the interest or energies available for learning. Hence it is the "desired" rather than the "desirable" which unequivocally

¹ *Supra*, pp. 5-6.

² *Supra*, Chap. VII.

lies at the bottom of vital gripping interest.¹ How to make the desirable desired is the great pedagogical problem of interest. If this difficulty can be surmounted, there are few who would deny that learning, if preceded by the appetite of interest, will more likely be succeeded by the digestion and metabolism of achievement.

While aim and curriculum can be thought of as external to the learner, interest cannot be. Interest is peculiarly personal to the pupil. But just what it is and how it can be induced is variously stated. In the first place, it may be well to commence by consulting the etymology of the word. *Inter-est* is Latin for that which "is between." It is a word which establishes a relationship between things otherwise unrelated, as for instance, child and curriculum. But now, just what is it that lies between these poles of the educative process? From one quarter, it has been described as a kind of tension, a tension, however, which involves something more than is usually covered by attention. Indeed, one must be very much on his guard against the fallacy that attention bespeaks interest. To think that when a child accedes to the wishes of a teacher he necessarily does so for the same purpose that was in the mind of the teacher may often turn out to be a sad delusion. From another quarter, interest is characterized as an emotional attachment of fascination which is self-active and propulsive. Accompanying this emotion, it is generally agreed, is a feeling of worth and approval. Thus, human nature, being what it is, prefers to find its motivation in the agreeable rather than in the painful. Furthermore, interest, when felt, is spontaneous, wholeheartedly stirring;² it is freely willed.

In a sense this bipolar conception of interest means that the learner identifies himself with the kind of activity which his environment invites. It means that he wants to be that kind of self, that he "accepts" for himself the pattern of life presented. It literally becomes part of himself.³ He learns it all over and through and through. He lives it. In this sense, interest originates in individuality. Individuality is a kind of bias, and therefore to assert this bias, that is, to be oneself, is to be interested. In fact, the efficiency of learning increases directly in proportion to the extent to which the learner is wholly bound up in his task. If he is united in a singleness of purpose, if he is absorbed and engrossed in his occupation, there arises a mental integrity which is invaluable for learning.

¹ *Supra*, p. 95.

² COUNTS, G. S., in National Society for the Study of Education, Twenty-sixth Yearbook, Part II, pp. 78-79. The author distinguishes this sort of spontaneity of interest from spontaneity meaning unanticipated appearance of interest.

³ KILPATRICK, W. H., "Living and Learning," *Educational Trends*, 6: 3-5, October-November, 1937.

From yet another quarter, interest is essentially purposeful. The spontaneity of purpose, however, is more than just random spontaneity. In purpose interest and intent are closely akin. The pupil is under tension not only to act but to act toward some end. When the continuity of his present experience is interrupted by some perplexity, he sees a connection between his predicament and the way some object or activity will reduce the disturbance and restore the even tenor of his life again. While interest frequently begins with a question or problem, the teacher will do well to remember that it may also cease with too early an answer or solution. This turn of the discussion casts interest in the role of means or instrument. Given a child attracted toward some aim, those things which lie "between" him and his objective become middle conditions, things that have to be done before he can achieve the consummation of his quest. These intermediate conditions are of interest precisely because, without their fulfillment, present activities cannot develop into the pupil's foreseen and desired end. Thus, to be between the pupil and his goal, to be the means for achieving that goal, to be of interest, are all ways of saying the same thing.¹

Others, however, recognizing the importance of interest as a means, nevertheless think that interest should also be an end of the educative process.² Thus, the fascinating attraction of some activities does not arise out of their being mediate to some more remote aim or value. Rather does mere engagement in them suffice as the source of interest. Here, interest approaches an aesthetic quality.³ Moreover, interest begets interest. One cannot hope to get interest on the part of the pupil unless the latter already has an interest. This will be recognized as the old doctrine of apperception. Interest depends on knowledge, and knowledge is the outgrowth of prior instruction. The interesting teacher, therefore, is the one who can make new things seem old. It is notable, in this view, that the pupil is thought of as "having" interests rather than of "being" interested.

Perhaps these points with regard to the function of interest in the dynamics of learning can be further sharpened by approaching the problem from the side of instruction that is uninteresting. Instruction is usually dull and mechanical just in the proportion that the curriculum, as presented, lacks connection with present reservoirs of pupil energy, or the connection, if there is any, is not perceived by him. The loss in learning efficiency under such circumstances very much resembles the way in which a slipping clutch fails to deliver the full power of a motor to its

¹ See also *supra*, p. 96.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 95-97.

³ *Supra*, p. 97.

load of work. And let no one think that he can teach without tapping and applying the pupil's powers. No activity, no learning. Somehow, sometime, motive must be enlisted. It is merely a question of source. If it does not grow out of the natural continuity between child nature and the curriculum, then the lesson must be *made* interesting. But to have to *make* it interesting is at once a tacit admission that genuine interest is lacking. Consequently, resort must be had to external inducements. Artificial and fictitious stimuli must be applied, such as marks and examinations, or even rewards and punishments. This is virtually motivational bankruptcy.

If the handle to gaining interest is the child's present activities, then many think the obvious conclusion to be that curriculum materials should be taken from the real-life situations which surround the child. Indeed, they regard incentives drawn from local industry, agriculture, home, and community life so real and compelling that they almost make interest pale into an artificial doctrine employed only in schools. But there is real danger of a wrong emphasis here, too. It is quite possible for some people to be blasé when plunged into the very midst of some of the starkest realities of life. Or, sometimes, these realities themselves are altogether barren and colorless. And conversely, it is not at all infrequent that the fantastic—fairy tales, for instance—may stir to a high pitch of interest. Real as life situations may often be, then, they are only a starting point. Interest is not to be defined or guaranteed in terms of any particular curriculum. Interest and value, it is reiterated, depend on what has significance and worth to the child.¹

Discipline and Duty

Although the discussion so far has pretty largely centered on the nature of interest and how it is to be induced, there has been a strong implication that interest is a condition precedent to good instruction and learning. There are many, however, who take exception to this conclusion. On the one hand, they feel that this implication leads to distinctly soft pedagogy. If one teaches only at the level where he can obtain the interest of the child, they have a sizable fear that much of the social heritage will be neglected and that education will result in a sort of sentimental indulgence of child whims. Furthermore, they take added fear that the oncoming generation will form habits of selecting the path of least resistance and most comfort, that it will confuse the respective attitudes of work and

¹ REEDER, E., "What Are Life Situations?," *Teachers College Record*, 29: 409-416, February, 1928; RAUP, R. B., "Realistic Education," *Progressive Education*, 11: 40-44, January, 1934; BODE, B., "Education and Social Change," *Progressive Education*, 11: 45-48, January, 1934.

play to the detriment of solid industry.¹ The critics would not deny that at times work will be interesting, but neither would they have the teacher "humbug" himself into thinking that every time must be such a one. Such a thoroughgoing insistence on interest will make education wholly hedonistic.² To make everything bow to the doctrine of child need or interest reduces truth and goodness to the level of expediency. On the other hand, it also is felt to be bad policy to compromise with interest by sugar-coating the more exacting parts of the curriculum to make them palatable. To offer children prizes to stimulate learning effort is thought in some quarters to be no better than a bribe. Such an appeal to extraneous sources of motivation, however, does not totally lack apologists. Extraneous motivation operates, the apologists claim, like scaffolding in erecting a building: when the building is up, the scaffolding can be taken down. So too in school. Sugar-coating and prizes are a scaffolding to build genuine interest which, when—and if—built, can be withdrawn and discarded.

The antidote demanded to preserve education from such excuses and degeneracies is training in duty and discipline.³ The duty and discipline thought to be imperative here are such as result from controlling conduct in the light of relatively long-range interests and well-established standards. Learning prosecuted from this point of view will override immediate interest whenever it is inconsistent with the ideals in question. In consequence will come a renewed emphasis on hard work, doing things that are irksome under the duress of social pressure. To omit such a spirit from the school is to make the school unlike the social process and to work an unnecessary cruelty upon children. While the discipline projected here will probably have to be initiated through external control by teachers and parents, the ultimate objective will be to reach the point where the child will be free because he can discipline himself.⁴

Interestingly enough, the defenders of the doctrine of interest are also severe in their condemnation of the abuses of interest. They agree that it is spoiling a child to indulge him at his present level of interest. Their therapy, however, is not to discard interest but to treat it aright. The

¹ McMURRY, F. M., "Interest, Some Objections to It," *Educational Review*, 11: 146-156, February, 1896.

² HARRIS, W. T., "Professor John Dewey's Doctrine of Interest as Related to Will," *Educational Review*, 11: 486-493, May, 1896.

³ BAGLEY, W. C., *Education, Crime and Social Progress*, pp. 104-108, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1931; MCGUCKEN, W. J., *The Catholic Way in Education*, p. 55, The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1934; DEMIASHKEVICH, M., *Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, p. 308, American Book Company, New York, 1935.

⁴ *Infra*, p. 270.

value of interest, they insist, lies in the leverage it affords to gain the next level of experience. It is neither play, amusement, ease, nor following the line of least resistance. Rather is it the inviting activity of engrossing occupation and attractive work. They therefore concur that it is a mistake to think of children's interests as accomplishments, as something finally significant.

Similarly, the advocates of interest are insistent on the need for discipline, but they see no occasion for gaining it at the expense of interest. They define discipline much as do the disciplinarians, as the power to choose a course of action and to persist at it in the face of obstacles and distractions till its deferred values have been realized. What carries one through discouragement and distraction is not loyalty to duty or principle in the abstract, but interest in the personally accepted values of his job. The bare overcoming of difficulties has no more isolated value in and of itself than has the mere satisfaction of interest. In fact, it is possible to view duty as just another though probably deeper and more remote interest. Thus duty is not opposed to interest but is itself a competing interest which, when clearly seen, the child would not want to miss or fail to realize.¹

Interest and Effort

The discussion of discipline, whichever way its value be conceived, brings out the fact that solid learning is rarely going to be a push-over for the learner, even when armed with a driving interest. He must also put forth effort. The mention of effort, however, brings forward an old controversy, that between interest and effort. Several positions may be distinguished here.

One position holds to what is probably the popular notion of effort. It holds that effort is an exercise of the will. It represents the strain one feels in doing distasteful tasks.² At such moments, one seems to need to make an extra exertion of voluntary attention to keep steadfastly at his task. Viewed in this light, effort seems to be the antithesis of interest. The latter furnishes the motivation for the agreeable, while effort is relied upon when the going is disagreeable. If a child does not put forth effort in his studies, the strategy is to make a direct frontal appeal to his volition.

A variation of this view finds the foregoing opposition of interest and

¹ O'BRIEN, J. A., "Conflict of Duty and Interest in Education," *Catholic Educational Review*, 15: 289-298, April, 1918. For an interesting balance of the arguments on interest and discipline, see FEUERLICHT, I., "Discipline and Freedom," *Educational Forum*, 11: 359-365, March, 1947.

² J. M. Raby, in her *Critical Study of the New Education*, pp. 88-92, Catholic Education Press, Washington, 1932, specifically repudiates the opposition of interest and effort as the basis for asceticism in Catholic education.

effort a bit too rigid. It would probably recognize an area in which interest and effort overlap and mutually aid each other. It would reject both the extreme of exerting effort without interest, because that would make education wearisome, and the extreme of being interested without the need of putting forth effort, for that would merely make education entertaining. Yet, this view stops short of making interest and effort identical. Interest and effort can go a long way in tandem style, but it may still not be far enough. Situations arise in which duty and obligation are binding on conduct even though interest points in another direction. Here, effort must be on the side of the sense of oughtness. If it is, it will many times ultimately beget interest. In fact, the depth of interest so begotten is often in proportion to the difficulty of the challenge. But effort must be on this side, even without interest, where obedience to conscience or moral law is involved.

Yet a third view treats interest and effort as unopposed to each other at any point. Instead of interest being sometimes an outgrowth of effort, here effort is made the henchman of interest. When obstacles slow down the learner's progress and almost distract him from the accomplishment of his project, it is purpose or interest that recruits the necessary extra exertion or effort to remain steadfastly at his task. He does distasteful things because reference to his purpose shows that he cannot otherwise continue along his chosen line of self-development. So viewed, it is purpose or interest rather than a sense of the disagreeable that stimulates effort. Indeed, it is often claimed that children will put forth much more effort in proportion to interest than they will in proportion to irksomeness. Moreover, it is also claimed that greater moral value attaches where effort is put forth on the side of an accepted purpose than where effort is an isolated exertion of volition. We always run the risk of insincerity where we look for moral worth in the learner's assumption of some required external posture. A better gauge of the moral significance of effort is to be found in the inner spirit with which the agent acts.

Finally, suppose the child is uninterested in his studies in spite of the most artful maneuvering on the part of the teacher, or, suppose that he will not put forth effort in spite of the most challenging appeal to his will and self-respect. Is it justifiable, under these circumstances, to use compulsion to motivate learning? The usual answer seems to lend approval, but only as an emergency measure. Where objectives outside the school are vital and harm is otherwise likely to result, society itself will not hesitate to employ coercion as a last resort to gain its ends. Under similar circumstances, it seems that the school is justified in falling back on like expedients.

If it does so, however, it must be under no illusion as to the results

obtained. The mere fact that a child is obedient in doing what he is put under duress to do by no means should lead to the inference that he is moved by the same purpose that the teacher or parent is. As a matter of fact, the child may only be learning to respect superior might. Some people are doubtful that education even results from such a display of force.¹ Their point is that no one can be forced to be good, that one can be good only if he himself resolves to be good. But, even here, consent, while it may be an ultimate condition of learning, is not necessarily held to be a condition precedent thereto. While one may not be able to make a child drink from the fountain of knowledge, to paraphrase an old adage, it will often happen that after one gets him there he will be thirsty enough to drink.

Work and Play

Many who are apprehensive that too much attention is given to the doctrine of interest complain that catering to children's interest encourages children to take their studies too lightly. It introduces too much of a note of play into what should otherwise be undertaken in a spirit of work. If children learn to play at their studies, they will later on be inclined to play at their work, and it goes almost without saying that the adult world will not tolerate that. Play is all right on the playground at recess and after school, but it should not be imported into the regular curriculum. This does not mean that the academic curriculum should not be lightened with spontaneity, but it does warn the teacher not to forget that getting an education is serious business.

Implicit in this complaint is a dualistic theory of work and play. They are viewed as separate activities, as separate attitudes. The common view is that work is serious while play is fun, that work is wearisome while play relaxes. Indeed, play is a relief from work; it is a diversion from the tedium and strain which work engenders. In play, fortunately, there is an absence of the discipline so inherent in work. Of course, both work and play consume energy, but while work depletes the individual's energy, play seems to provide recreation and recuperation of his energy. With work and play so opposite to each other it is not surprising that some educators think that they should be kept separate in school.

Other educators think that a close examination of work and play reveals them as overlapping rather than as disparate categories. Thus they point out that it is quite possible to take one's play very seriously. Some take it so seriously, in fact, that they become professionals and earn their living

¹ HOCKING, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, pp. 258-259, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1923.

by it. Even amateurs "work" hard, as we say, at perfecting their form. They discipline themselves by rigid training. Furthermore cases are not unknown where play ceases to be fun, where men drill so steadily at a sport that it becomes drudgery. Work, conversely, is not without an aspect of play. Some people seek relief and diversion at the end of the day by working in their gardens, on their radios, or at their antiques. But others come home to "play around," as they say, with these same occupations. They find fun and recreation in doing what under other circumstances might well be boring and tiring.

The more one multiplies cases the more difficult it appears to be to classify activities as either work or play or even to tell when any given activity is work or when it is play. For educational purposes perhaps the best way to distinguish between work and play is in terms of the temporal length of one's purposes. The longer these purposes—the more remote the ends in view—the more likely an activity is to be considered work. Conversely, the shorter these purposes—the more immediate the ends—the more likely the activity is to be of the nature of play. If a boy engages in baseball after school and if when the game is over that is that, we clearly have an instance of play. But if this same boy engages in baseball with a long look beyond the end of the afternoon, possibly to steady employment in the sport, then the game begins to take on an aspect of work even though still doubtless retaining an aspect of play.

The case is no different with academic studies. Suppose teacher and pupil improvise a store as part of an activity program. If the arithmetic learned incidental to this activity is learned just to enjoy the project, then the educational aims are very short-run and the activity becomes little more than a game. If, on the other hand, the children see beyond playing store to the long-range usefulness of the arithmetic learned, then their endeavors take on the more serious character of work. With very young children, whose interest span is very short, it may be necessary to start serious instruction with a game and then withdraw this prop when they grow older. The teacher should feel free to form the daily program as either play or work, whichever circumstances seem to dictate. The chief pedagogical sins to avoid are activities with aims so short-lived as to be trivial and activities so shorn of purpose from the pupil point of view that their performance becomes drudgery.

Finally it needs pointing out that both work and play have a larger pedagogical significance than their mere relation to motivation. The educational significance of economic work has already received considerable attention.¹ But play and work also have epistemological significance.

¹ *Supra*, Chap. IX.

They are the two principal channels for the operation of an activity theory of learning.¹ Thus play and work offer unexcelled opportunities for manipulating and constructing materials, activities of the utmost importance if one holds to a pragmatic view of truth. As long as play was justified in the curriculum as an opportunity for working off surplus energy and thus of keeping out of worse mischief, play had but a tenuous hold on the curriculum. But given pragmatic significance, play has come to have a much more secure place in pedagogical theory.

Measurement

Value theory not only underlies the aim, content, and motivation of the educative process, but it also serves to measure and evaluate what learning has actually taken place. To both the individual and society, the amount and quality of learning is far from being a matter of indifference. Standards, therefore, are of first importance. The yardstick of value for these standards takes its character from the aims and values which underlie the educative process. In judging another's work, however, we must be very careful to distinguish whether we are judging his achievements or his aims. Thus in rating a teacher, for instance, we might rate him highly for accomplishing what he has set out to do but rate him very low for what he set out to do.

There have been various theories as to when learning may be said to have taken place. One of the most widely held views is that learning is the successful acquisition of material which has been set out to be learned. The teacher transmits the curriculum, and the pupil stores it away. His mind becomes a sort of warehouse. The logical test of such an objective is the ability to reproduce the material on demand, to re-cite it either orally or in a written examination. Sometimes, successful learning is measured by the pupil's ability to define the ideas involved. In practice, however, this does not change the essential nature of testing, for definitions are as easily stored away and brought forth for test purposes as other materials.

In either case, it is the storage or warehouse theory of learning which, on the whole, has been accepted as the basis of scientific measurement by its proponents. Their chief contribution has been to render the application of the theory more exact, for in spite of the rather external character of the curriculum implied by the storage concept, judgment of its mastery has usually been very subjective and hence unreliable. Consequently, the scientific-measurement movement has recommended itself to teachers chiefly because of the objectivity and reliability which it has introduced into assaying the educative process.

The initial introduction of scientific measuring devices into education

¹ *Supra*, pp. 85-82.

more or less aped the same measurement techniques which produced such brilliant results in the physical sciences. Particularly did it borrow from mathematics as an instrument for interpreting educational data. Pure mathematics is a form of logic. Its basic proposition can be stated as "if p , then q " or " p implies q ." The proposition merely states a relation between p and q . What p and q themselves stand for is immaterial. Their truth or falsity does not affect the proposition, nor does the proposition improve their truth or cure their falsity. This purely formal character of mathematics has led to the quip that in mathematics one never knows what he is talking about, or whether what he says is true. The point, however, is worth making, for it immediately appears that any data, even such human data as education, can be poured into the molds of its rigorous logic.

In measurement, the propositional relation between p and q must express an arithmetical proportion. The distinguishing feature of arithmetic is the fact that these ratios are expressed in cardinal numbers. The critical feature of cardinal numbers as compared with ordinal ones, it will be recollected, is the fact that they can be added, subtracted, multiplied, and divided. Any unit is equal to or interchangeable with any other. This is obviously impossible where one is dealing with ordinal numbers. For instance, the second in rank is not interchangeable with the seventh. But in the system of cardinal numbers any given unit may be added to either one or six in order to make two or seven. In either event, the increment is one. Being added to either one or six does not alter the character of the unit. It is interchangeable. Cardinal numbers, thus, have the formal character of p and q . They apply to any data. But, in addition, they express that data in terms of equal units.¹

If education can be interpreted by such a logic as mathematics offers, it appears as if an unequivocal judgment can at last be passed on learning achievement. The only question seems to arise whether the data of education can be reduced to such equal, interchangeable, homogenous units. The first step in this reduction rests on one of the most fundamental assumptions in educational measurement. This assumption is that everything that exists, exists in some amount, and what exists in amount can be measured.² This assumption even extends to subtle and refined kinds of learning such as growth in religion, although admittedly satisfactory results will be more difficult in this area.³ And, needless to add, the meas-

¹ MAY, M. A., "Ten Tests of Measurement," *Educational Record*, 20: 200-220, April, 1939.

² E. L. Thorndike, quoted in W. H. Kilpatrick, *Sourcebook in the Philosophy of Education*, No. 58, pp. 38-39, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934.

³ HARTSHORNE, H., "Can Growth in Religion Be Measured?" *Religious Education*, 17: 224-229, June, 1922.

urement of amount implies equal units and the use of cardinal numbers. It means furthermore an objective and reliable estimate, one in which results agree for other observers and when repeated on other occasions.

Such a theory of measurement taken as a whole may imply a metaphysic. Some think that the implication of measurement as described by cardinal numbers is that the world is ultimately made up of preexistent entities, independent reals, and their relations.¹ It is atomistic, and it is these atoms which are so interchangeable that they can be subjected to such mathematical processes as addition and subtraction. The educational implication from measurement is similar. It assumes that the learning process can be broken down into equal units of subject matter which are capable of measurement in cardinal numbers. Furthermore, it limits itself to test questions concerning which there can be little or no subjective variation of opinion. Of these, there are two sorts, those which deal with facts and those which deal with relations. In both instances, the correctness of answers depends on their correspondence to objective reality. Accuracy obviously involves the correspondence theory of truth.²

Considerable exception has been taken to this philosophy of measurement. To begin with, it has been pointed out that the application to education of the measurement techniques of the older, more established sciences does not necessarily constitute a science of education.³ The techniques are merely borrowed and not necessarily indigenous to the materials of education. Such quantification would be possible only if mental or psychological phenomena could be reduced to units of space, time, motion, or mass, a condition obviously unfulfilled at present. Furthermore, it needs pointing out to those with an undue confidence in mathematics that even in mathematics quantity is not the basic concept.⁴

As repeatedly hinted, the critical question in quantifying educational measurement is whether cardinal numbers applied to the products of learning actually do measure equal units of learning.⁵ Does the vaunted equality of educational units rest on experimental demonstration or on mere assumption? For the most part educational measurement has only assumed that the increment of difficulty from one problem of a test to another in history, geography, or even arithmetic is equal. As a matter of fact, it is doubtful whether, with the utmost exercise of care in this

¹ *Supra*, pp. 26-27.

² *Supra*, pp. 72-73.

³ DEWEY, J., *Sources of a Science of Education*, p. 26, Liveright Publishing Corp., New York, 1931

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁵ BLACKHURST, J. H., "Do We Measure in Education?" *Journal of Educational Research*, 27: 273-276, December, 1933.

direction, these increments could be rendered more than approximately equal. And if they actually are not equal by however small a difference, then they cannot logically be the subject of arithmetical processes.

Every child knows that he cannot add apples and potatoes together. But not many children, let alone many adults, stop to think that by the same reasoning they cannot even add apples and apples together if some are Baldwins and the rest are Greenings or if some apples are large and some are small. All they can add are apples in the abstract which are hypothetically equal or equal by definition. Arithmetic, hence, in the concrete is only true when we do not inquire too closely about the content with which we are dealing. Yet in all fairness it must be said that, if educators bear this limitation in mind, the arithmetic of measurement can still be of considerable use to them. They cannot rely on it with entire logical precision, but they can make very good pragmatic use of it.

But, even granting measurement's fundamental tenet that what exists in amount can be measured, by the same token it follows that what does not exist cannot be measured. And education is fundamentally interested in what does not yet exist, that is, in the child's potential development and growth. The judging of achievement where growth is incomplete and still going on is bound to be different from measurement where growth is finished, where its evidences already exist.¹ Besides, exact quantitative determination of educational results requires repetition and uniformity. Children, however, have individual differences. Not only are no two exactly alike, but no one is exactly the same from day to day. Even where overt performances or responses appear alike, the complexity of human nature and experience renders extremely unlikely that the underlying subjective processes will be the same. No two educational situations, hence, are equally interchangeable, as measurement by cardinal numbers requires. To disregard these differences generates no little suspicion that measurement could be a tool for maintaining the social *status quo*.

Doubtless, it is because of the dynamic variable quality of the educative process that criticisms also directed at the way measurement tends to fix its attention on the short- rather than the long-range objectives of education. Only so, it appears, can reliable results be anticipated. Yet, as a matter of fact, even the shortest range objectives cannot be made entirely dependable. By the time one gets to the end of measuring a child's achievement, one will find that the child has already changed in some aspects of what has already been measured. The one administering the test cannot measure fast enough, for the test itself seems to do something

¹ DEWEY, J., "Progressive Education and the Science of Education," *Progressive Education*, 5: 200, August, 1928.

to alter the very child being measured.¹ Furthermore, even if one could bid time stand still until the process of measurement is complete, one would yet have the insuperable task of putting all the various results together to make an adequately integrated picture of the whole child.

If it is necessary, furthermore, to call attention to the fact that quantitative measurement thrives best where factors of the educative process can be isolated, as in the case of learning specific skills or special bodies of facts. Isolation of variables is the very basis of scientific control. But the more numerous and interdependent these factors or variables become, the less possible it becomes to isolate and measure them validly.² Many measurement people recognize this limitation. They recognize that their tests must be valid, as well as objective and reliable.³ The tests must measure what they purport to measure. If they do not, no amount of statistical treatment of the test's data can improve the data's validity. The imminent danger where variables are complexly interdependent is that in the interest of validity one will only try to measure what can be measured and that teachers will therefore only teach that which can be measured, namely, the facts and skills which can be isolated. This situation, whenever it occurs, is lamentable indeed, for there is so much else that needs teaching.

Finally, the educational philosopher should not overlook the social significance of the movement to measure educational results scientifically. The rise of democracy has emphasized the unique worth of the individual and of the many rather than the few.⁴ But the many are so numerous that it taxes the ingenuity of educators to handle them with due regard to their individualities. Consequently the rise and development of statistics as a means of learning about large numbers of people through careful sampling is a virtual necessity and an educational value of the first magnitude.⁵

Evaluation

Realizing the limitations of arithmetic and cardinal numbers for measurement purposes and yet not abandoning them where appropriate, many educators have shifted from a quantitative to a more qualitative evaluation of learning results. To indicate this shift in emphasis, indeed, they have replaced the word "measurement" with the word "evaluation" in many

¹ National Education Association, Department of Superintendence, Tenth Year-book, p. 404.

² DEWEY, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

³ BAYLES, E. E., "The Philosophical Approach to Educational Measurement," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 26: 455-461, September, 1940.

⁴ *Supra*, pp. 131-134.

⁵ WALKER, H. M., "Democracy and Statistical Method," *Teachers College Record*, 32: 599-607, April, 1931.

cases. To a certain extent this shift in emphasis indicates a different theory of learning. Instead of regarding learning as putting one's achievements in storage, subject to delivery on demand at examination or recitation time, they regard learning more in the nature of a process of reconstruction of experience. At examination time they do not look to see whether the student can bring forth the exact goods that were deposited with him. Rather do they look to see whether he has been able to do anything with them, to see whether he realizes their consistency or inconsistency with other things he knows, or whether perchance he has even been capable of improving on them with some originality of his own. Hence the teacher watches for learning to arise not just out of an ongoing experience but also out of its tendency to reenter and reconstruct subsequent pupil experience.¹ But it will not be enough for learning to reenter experience for recitation purposes only; it must enter life outside of school as well, for one really learns only what he actually lives.

From such a viewpoint, obviously the total situation rather than isolated aspects of it is of first importance. But totality here is not just a matter of addition or multiplication. It is more than an arithmetical or algebraic sum of rights and wrongs. It is, rather, a matter of the reconstruction of old values in the light of new ones which have developed as the learner has pursued some accepted goal. Evaluation is an emergent and is therefore always more or less unique. Consequently, the goals in terms of which evaluation is made are themselves constantly undergoing redefinition. They do not stand still, as is required for measurement. Nor will adherents of this theory be dismayed if appraisal of such a process must needs be subjective. They refuse to abdicate personal judgment merely because it is difficult to make.

(This chapter will be summarized at the end of the next chapter.)

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¹ KILPATRICK, W. H., *A Reconstructed Theory of the Educative Process*, pp. 29-30, Teachers' College, Columbia University, New York, 1935.

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CHAPTER XII

THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS (CONTINUED)

Logical Order of the Lesson

Up to this point, value theory has received the major emphasis in the exposition of the educative process. The curriculum has been studied in conjunction with aim, motivation, and evaluation, all concepts which clearly direct attention to value phases. But different views on these matters imply different ways of organizing the educative process, although no separate treatment so far has been paid to organization itself. It is now in order to give major consideration to the logic and structure of method. And first, as to the temporal order in which any lesson is planned. Should the order in which materials are taken up vary with the present knowledge and interests of the student? Or should it conform to an external logical order, an order which is not subject to option and which, therefore, is "the" logical order, one that is appropriate for all occasions?

There are several ways of arriving at a conclusion favorable to this latter alternative. One way is to start with the basic premise that nature has a grain just like the grain of a piece of wood. This grain is just a stubborn fact of existence. In selecting curriculum material, the logical grain which it has by nature is an inexorable item which the teacher must incorporate into his lesson plan. Logical order, thus, is not simply the longing of the human mind for system but an invincible quality of the world about which the school endeavors to teach. The minds of both pupil and teacher must conform to and obey this objective order. On the whole, this is the view which modern science has encouraged.

Another approach to the conclusion that the logic of the lesson is relatively rigid is based on the assumption that mind itself has no predisposition toward logical form. This being the case, it becomes necessary to import logical order into the mind from without. The importer is naturally the teacher, who has the material already organized in systematic form. Being an expert in the field, he has been able to survey the whole area and give it its proper definition and classification. This done, it but remains to transfer this perfected order bodily into the child mind which, according to assumption, has no native organizing tendencies of its own. In this way, the learner can not only be saved time and energy, but he can be

protected from needless errors because he can start where previous investigators in the field have left off.

Both these approaches to the logic of the lesson have been the butt of considerable criticism. One criticism arises out of the social consequences of such a doctrine. Such a logic, some fear, would be too powerful a weapon in the hands of an authoritarian regime and would, indeed, invite such a regime. To assume that logical organization exists independently of and prior to the act of learning would enable an authoritarian state to indoctrinate a preconceived social order in the learner's mind, almost secure from the attack of criticism.

A further criticism takes exception to the idea that mind is alogical. Far from being indifferent to logical activity, many hold that mind's earliest manifestation is positively in that direction. The native curiosity of the child is obviously predisposed to exploration, inference, and testing. Yet, though of a logical turn of mind, the child fortunately is not necessarily predisposed to learn either in the chronological order of history or in the scientific order of proof.

Perhaps the most frequent objection, however, is that logic rigidly construed renders accommodation to the problem of motivation very difficult. The order of the lesson, based on the external grain of the universe or made up from the point of view of the person who already knows, neglects the point of view of the person who is about to learn. By failing to start with the present powers of the child, there is every possibility that there will be a lack of interest in study, that whatever is learned of the logical organization presented will be mechanically memorized with a minimum of understanding of what it is all about. Indeed, the teacher will be fortunate if the child does not develop a positive aversion to intellectual application.

Psychological Order of the Lesson

The cure proposed for these objections is to base the logical organization of the curriculum on a different premise. This premise is that there is no final order of experience, that order is always relative to aims or values. Logic, like one pragmatic conception of truth, is influenced by interest.¹ Instead of commencing with subject matter, organization should take its point of departure from the interests and purposes of the child. Because purposes are many and diverse, the logical order in which to learn will differ from child to child, depending on the present point of his knowledge and interests. There will be many logical orders. None will be "the" logical order. This may take longer, but, because it maintains continuity

¹ *Supra*, pp. 74-76. See also W. B. OWEN, "The Problem Method," *Educational Method*, 1: 178-182, January, 1922.

with child nature, there is greater earnest that what the child learns he will at least understand.

Some push these conclusions even a step further. Since the minds of individual children are not to be made to fit any single one logical order, they conclude that logical order is of slight importance in the education of the young. To them, mind is more than just lacking in a predisposition toward logical order; it is by nature positively averse to it. In schools based on this theory, one finds free rein given to individuality, spontaneity, uninhibited self-expression, and natural growth.

Such a management of the educative process may well be convicted on its own testimony of being illogical rather than logical. But those who think that the purpose of the student is irrelevant in the logical organization of subject matter more than likely would hold that a logic biased by purpose is also distorted and therefore, in the end, illogical. And those who follow the lead of purpose think that those who disregard it are illogical. What is logical and what is illogical at this point is on the way to becoming very confusing. This ambiguity can be dispelled only by being clear about one's initial definitions. Consequently, to avoid misunderstanding, some call the logic based on purpose the "psychological" organization of the educative process in contradistinction to the logic based on the grain of the universe.¹

It may be well to pause, at this point, and examine more in detail the exact order of events entailed by both the logical and psychological arrangements of the lesson. It is often said that the logical order in which to teach is from the simple to the complex. Here, too, everything turns on the definition of terms. "Simple to whom?" is the strategic question. If one takes the view of the teacher or research scholar, he will probably define the simple in terms of fundamental elements and proceed from the simple to the complex by building these elements up into wholes. Again, this invokes the order of nature, the grain of the universe. In teaching science, for example, one finds electrons, protons, and neutrons the basic units. Put together, these constitute atoms. Atoms in turn make up molecules, and so on into the most complex studies of physics and chemistry. Since this is the organization the child is bound to come to, in the end, it seems only sensible to economize by starting with it.

On the other hand, if one takes the point of view of the beginner, the

¹ Cf. ADLER, M. J., "The Order of Learning," *American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings of the Western Division*, pp. 117-122, 1941. The author refers to these two logics as "the order of learning" and "the order of knowledge." See also the same author's "Tradition and Communication," *American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings*, 1937, pp. 110-119.

foregoing may not commence with what is simple to the child at all. As a matter of fact, atomic structure to him might be exceedingly complex. To the child, the simplest thing is some present purpose he wishes to fulfill. In accomplishing purposes, the order of events may follow either the deductive or inductive order, but more likely it will be a combination of both. If the teacher takes off from where the child is—indeed, where this particular child with his unique background of heredity and environmental influences is situated historically and geographically—and if the teacher has a due regard for unexpected contingencies as they may arise during the pursuit of the child's initial purpose, the order of instruction may seem quite haphazard. But it really is not, not even where pupil and teacher need to modify their original purpose in the light of subsequent or intermediate events, for to keep purpose firmly in mind is to give integration and order to experience.

It is at the conclusion of the pursuit of a purpose that the psychological organization of a learning experience makes the closest approach to the logical. In reviewing the frequently tortuous, roundabout course which the psychological organization of learning takes, it is often possible to see short cuts that could have been made, also further interconnections not previously seen. The more one analyzes his experience this way and the more he generalizes and simplifies it, the more nearly he approaches the so-called logical organization of subject matter of the savant or scholar.

If this is the case, then the logical and psychological methods of organizing the educative process need not be opposed to each other at all. Rather, they will be seen to represent appropriate kinds of organization for different stages in the process. On the one hand, there is a logic of investigation for finding out, for learning. On the other hand, there is a logic for organizing matters which have already been found out, which have already been learned. Both will be necessary for any rounded approach to the educative process. Bearing this out, is the interesting note that those favoring psychological organization go out of their way to deny the impression that there is no place at all in their method for the logical organization of subject matter.

It is worth while to conclude this phase of educational philosophy by pointing out that considerable of the teacher's information must be organized in logical fashion. The more information he has and the more logically interrelated it is, the more flexible and sensitive he should be to perceive the uses for which it can be invoked in further developing the present interests of the child. The teacher must have logically organized subject matter at his fingertips, not as a show of scholarship, but so that he can free his immediate attention for observing the way in which the

curriculum is interacting with the child's present attitudes and needs. Yet he must constantly remind himself that this scholarly method of organization is not that of the beginner. The logic of teaching and of learning have notable differences, because the teacher represents in achievement and maturity what the pupil only potentially is in his immaturity.

Method of Instruction

The earlier mention of simplicity and complexity in the organization of the educative process suggests that this process has a structural organization as well as a temporal or ordinal one. The problem of structure primarily concerns the shape and form in which the curriculum should be cast in order to accomplish chosen educational aims most suitably. How one conceives structure, or more commonly method, borders immediately on, and perhaps even overlaps, the way in which one conceives the nature of the curriculum.¹ Indeed, it has not been uncommon at times to treat method as but a phase of the major curriculum problem. But with equal cogency it can be argued that the curriculum is subordinate to the primacy of method.² As a matter of fact, structure and material, method and curriculum are correlative words. Each can be transformed into the other. Thus the arts of reading and writing may be methods of communication or material for methods of communication, that is, methods of instruction. Which is which and when can be determined by reference to the two aspects of experience already mentioned, doing and undergoing.³ The active, contriving phase of experience corresponds to method, while experience as something undergone in consequence of striving is akin to the curriculum.

Even with this distinction we must be discriminating in the extent to which we pursue it. Some educators go so far as to contend that method exists separately from content. Such a separation is clearly implied in the remark that one can teach the identical subject matter by several different methods, or that the same principles of method prevail whether teaching a sinner or a saint. Setting method off from or even over against curriculum is a product of the ancient dualism supposed to exist between mind and the world it inhabits. If the dualism is sound, then the function of method is to see how subject matter is to be presented to the mind. Yet, since many teachers, especially university professors, have acquired and dispense their vast learning entirely innocent of pedagogical method,

¹ *Supra*, pp. 87-90, 223-228.

² CHARTERS, W. W., *Curriculum Construction*, pp. 74-75, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1929.

³ *Supra*, p. 80.

there exists a strong tendency to depreciate methods of instruction, if not the whole field of pedagogy.

Other educators claim that the educative process is not the interaction of two independent factors such as curriculum and method. They contend that method is never something outside the materials of instruction. The art or method of swimming cannot be learned outside the medium of water. For them, the distinction between method and curriculum is not a separation in existence but merely a distinction of thought within experience itself. Experience is a single process in which the individual perceives the connection between something he attempts to do and the consequences which flow from this attempt. Apart from the effort to control the course of this process, there is no noticeable difference between method and subject matter. The situation is one where to change the method alters the content and to change the latter inevitably results in the need for a readjustment in method.

Given, then, a child interacting with an environment, there are conceivably two ways in which this interaction might be organized or controlled for educative purposes. The first would be to operate in the field of eugenics and thus attempt directly to improve the stuff of which children are made, their heredity. The second would be to effect a control of the environment. Since the scientific exploration of eugenics is but in its infancy, and since social taboos prevent the use of what is known, it is with this second area of endeavor that educational method will be preoccupied. The teacher's method, therefore, will be to vary the environment with the hope that modification of the stimuli will produce modification of the pupil's intellectual and emotional responses.

This may immediately sound as if teaching is to be regarded as mechanistic. Such, however, is not the case. The intent is rather to locate the emphasis of teaching in the proper quarter. Indeed, the possibility of the external and mechanical direction of the child is gravely doubted.¹ The most that the teacher's method could possibly do is to redirect the child, for his existing instincts and habits are doubtless already holding him in tension in some direction or other well before the teacher starts to apply his art. And, even here, one must be careful to distinguish the physical and moral results of redirection. If in redirecting the child's activities the teacher fails to enlist the latter's voluntary participation, fails to get his will on the side of the new course, we may well question whether there has been any worthwhile educative effect of the teacher's method at all. A response cannot be compelled, it can only be educed.

¹ HOCKING, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, pp. 258-260, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1923. Cf. *supra*, pp. 62-66.

The main peril in the educative process, then, is not that the child's will may be overborne by the teacher's method, but that he will not be exposed to a sufficiently enriched environment of stimuli to suggest what is most noble and generous in his own responses.

If this be so, it is probably well, at this point, to canvass the scope of the environment, the medium in which the teacher plies his techniques. The chief thing to remember is that the environment is something more than the objective surroundings which encompass the student. More exactly, it is made up of everything which concerns him, which is continuous with his own interests and purposes. The advantage of such a definition of environment is that it can include things that are remote both in time and place, as for instance, history and geography. Hence the remark that the things with which a student varies constitute his most genuine environment. With the environment so broadly defined, the teacher should acutely realize how manifold are the resources which he can mobilize for gaining the aims of the educative process. The old environment consisted of pencils, paper, and books. Subsequently it expanded to include shops and laboratories. But, even so, it still remained a pretty academic environment. More recently it has expanded to include much of life outside the school as well, the home and the church, radio and the press, industry and recreation, to mention but a few general things.

The Method of Authoritative Exposition

In controlling the educative environment, there are a number of pedagogical structures or methods by which the teacher may organize the lesson. Perhaps the most familiar is some form of authoritative, more or less dogmatic, expository teaching. It may take the impersonal form of reliance on a textbook or the more personal form of oral instruction. In the latter instance the teacher may deliver a lecture or give a closely supervised exposition through recitation. In either event the Herbartian "five steps" will suggest themselves as the most effective way to organize instruction. Knowing precisely what he wants to teach during the lesson, the teacher's first step is one of "preparation," that is, he prepares the child's mind by helping him recollect familiar material he already knows which will make the new material more comprehensible. At the second step of "presentation," the teacher presents the new material which goes beyond the child's present ken. With the old and new material before him, the teacher proceeds through the third step of "comparison" or "assimilation" to point out differences and likenesses between the old and the new. After explaining the differences, the next step is one of "generalization" in which other instances of the new material are noted and a general rule of handling

is suggested. The last step is one of "assignment" or "testing" in which the child sees if he can apply the rule to still other instances of the novel material.¹

Where one person is in possession of authoritative knowledge which another lacks—whether the relation be one of teacher and pupil, lawyer and jury, or president and board of directors—there is probably no better method of exposition or teaching than the Herbartian. If the teacher knows precisely what he wants to teach, a more admirable method could hardly be designed to give the teacher effective control to direct the pupil unfalteringly step by step to the clearly seen end or aim of the lesson. The teacher controls the outcome by selecting the new material to be presented and by selecting the memory of familiar material to be revived. He further controls it by giving his own explanation and by reducing it to a general rule of his own formulation. There is much to commend this teacher-centered method.

Given sympathetic understanding between pupil and teacher such that the pupil gives direct personal obedience to the teacher, authoritative teaching puts the experience of the race at the disposition of the pupil quickly and without floundering experimentation. The teacher cites and the pupil recites. The experience of the child is utilized as deductive proof of the lesson taught rather than for inductive discovery. While the latter function of child experience is not to be ignored, neither should it be the preponderating emphasis in the arrangement of the educative environment. There is but a very slight amount of the social heritage that the child could possibly rediscover for himself and practically no chance at all that through an experimental method of teaching he will add to it. To be sure, the method here recommended is the method of authority, but if the authority is wholesome and reasonable, there are many who think it should have a first claim on the attention of the teacher.

This method fits in very consistently with other aspects of the philosophy of education already discussed. A method based on the authority of the teacher, backed by the authority of the social heritage, may imply relatively fixed educational aims.² It probably also assumes the kind of curriculum which is ready-made in advance and which, therefore, has a character independent of the learner.³ Not only that, but authority is at its best when the materials dealt with are part of a fixed undeviating truth⁴ and its values are thought to be intrinsic and ultimate.⁵ Such underlying theories,

¹ For a more complete reference to the Herbartian method, see J. S. Brubacher, *A History of the Problems of Education*, pp. 219-221, 240, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1947.

² *Supra*, pp. 27-30, 220.

³ *Supra*, pp. 88, 225-226.

⁴ *Supra*, pp. 72-73.

⁵ *Supra*, pp. 94, 96, 99-100, 103-104, 106-108.

in turn, find support in such metaphysical assumptions as the immutable and eternal character of reality.¹

Justification for this method can also be framed in more psychological and sociological terms. If one falls back on a philosophy of mind as relatively passive or, if active, a mind which is chiefly cognitive in function, the teacher finds himself confronted with the necessity of forming the pupil's mind from without.² He must instruct the child, that is, he must almost literally build structure into him. Naturally, such a method of instruction must rely heavily upon the authority of the teacher.

On the other hand, if one prefers the social approach, there seem to be several presuppositions which might well support the method of authority. One thing to mention is the way in which the social process may operate through social suggestion. In learning through this means, the mores are acquired by a process of habituation rather than ratiocination. The authority for the suggested mores may be vague, but it is nevertheless always omnipresent. Certainly, there can be little doubt of the momentum and efficiency with which people learn to conform under this method. Further social support for the theory of this method is also to be found in authoritarian political philosophies, such as fascism and communism, for instance. Both of these tend to favor indoctrination which is definitely authoritarian in the theory of its method.³

The Problem Method of Inquiry

Quite another method and quite another underlying theory obtains where the learning situation is more indefinite and where a large measure of contingency enters in. Here, the structural form of the lesson materials follows one of the various forms of a problem. To some, the perplexity implied here is problematical only to the student, the teacher already knowing the answer. So conceived, the problem method easily lends itself to authoritative uses and so requires no further theoretical exposition. Others conceive of this method as presenting something of the problematical to the teacher as well. Here, uncertainty is not merely something artificially injected into the educative process, but it arises out of the very nature of the universe itself.⁴ Problems are not just school problems, but the enigmatical riddles of life itself. Instead of studying subjects, the student puzzles over projects and life situations.⁵

It is Dewey who has given classic formulation to the structure of the problem method of teaching. The problem, Dewey says, should not start

¹ *Supra*, pp. 27-30, 36-37.

² *Supra*, pp. 60, 85.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 201-204.

⁴ *Supra*, pp. 30-33. See also *infra*, p. 291.

⁵ KILPATRICK, W. H., "The Project Method," *Teachers College Record*, 19: 319-335, September, 1918.

with some school subject like arithmetic or history but rather with some life experience, some handling of materials in either work or play which raises perplexities provocative of thinking on the part of the student. Preferably the problem should be the pupil's rather than simply the teacher's or the textbook's. After locating a problem or a "felt" difficulty, as some call it, the next step is to look around for data suggesting possible ways of solving the problem. To obtain the full benefit of this step the teacher will do well not to let the child depend too much on ready-made solutions for his problem, for only by personally contriving to adapt means to ends will he learn the discipline of hard thinking. The third stage, then, is one in which he finally constructs his own hypothetical solution to his problem, and the fourth stage one in which he tests it out in practice. In this fourth stage he sets in motion a chain of physical circumstances to see what the consequences will be and whether they corroborate his initial hypothesis. The outcome of this test will constitute what he learns. Learning thus is a product of the lesson rather than its main objective. In a fifth and last step the results of experience are integrated and generalized with earlier experiences.

There are several phases of the problem method which deserve comment. To commence, it is to be noted that the problem approach is based on a pragmatic epistemology.¹ Pupil and teacher make a joint investigation of the problem. Both attack its solution experimentally—even where moral and religious principles are involved. Learning the truth will be no different in school from in the laboratory. The same criteria will apply. A school employing this method, therefore, will naturally need a laboratory, field excursions, libraries, and shops whereby these consequences may be traced out.

To proceed further, the role which the problem method gives to thinking must be pointed out. There is a strong conviction here that thinking on the part of the student is only aroused by the dubious and contingent in experience.² So long as experience flows smoothly, habit will take the place of thought. The teacher, then, will most succeed in stimulating thinking by interrupting the pupil's complacency. The teacher's method will be to show that the possibility of continued complacency on the part of the pupil is doubtful, problematical. He will endeavor to show, for example, that this present interest is incompatible with other of the pupil's interests. The discrepancy between the two will challenge him to think. Instead of using thinking to apprehend ready-made subject matter, the problem method employs it as an instrument for trying to control the baffling in experience.

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 75-76, 80, 83, 86.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 30-33, 83.

In selecting problems the teacher should exercise caution as to the degree of difficulty. If reality is a mixture of the precarious and the familiar, the teacher must arrange the problem so that the mixture is neither too thin nor too heavy for the pupil. If it is weighted too predominantly toward the precarious and baffling, the pupil will be likely to fail and become discouraged. If it is weighted too heavily toward the familiar and habitual, the pupil's full powers will not be brought into play and he may fall to fooling or lose interest because of the vain repetition.

Another caution is in order for those instances where the teacher confronts the student with a problem and then tells him to figure it out for himself. This may be proper for developing initiative and self-reliance, but it is only fair that at the same time the student be supplied with the sort of environment necessary for initiating and guiding thought. Independent thinking is a very commendable outcome of education, but it is more than likely to be fruitless if unfertilized by, or done independently of, the social heritage or suggestions from the teacher.¹ Such an environment having been provided, however, the teacher's obligation should end. He should have no responsibility for a specific outcome. If the problem involves genuine novelty or risk so that even the teacher does not know the answer in advance, it should be attacked by pupil and teacher as a joint adventure. Faith in democracy requires at least this much.

Moreover, thinking should be carried on under the supervision of those who are more skilled in the art of thinking.² But this is one of the most difficult tasks in the whole theory of the problem of method. It is difficult because it presents parents and teachers with a delicate dilemma. On the one hand, there is the danger that if the pupil does all his own thinking he may make decisions seriously hurtful to himself. On the other hand, there is the risk that if the parent or teacher steps in on occasion and does the thinking for the child, the latter will come to depend on them instead of himself. Which horn of the dilemma to seize at the moment will depend on circumstances. As a general principle, it may be laid down that instead of trying, as formerly, to "break the child's will," compelling him to subordinate his thinking to adult patterns, parents and teachers will do well to make their help progressively less and less necessary as children grow up. This is the only way to prepare for the time when ultimately adults must unreservedly yield the sovereignty of thinking to the rising generation.

¹ DEWEY, J., "Progressive Education and the Science of Education," *Progressive Education*, 5: 197-202, August, 1928.

² The criticism of the problem approach in H. H. Horne, *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., p. 307, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927, seems misconceived. The teacher does not prefer impersonal relations with the pupil in confronting him with a problem. The teacher retires from the problem only to build self-reliance and independence in the pupil.

In emphasizing the habit of thinking in the problem-solving method, one often hears the advice that the child should be taught *how* to think rather than *what* to think. In a changing world, it is said, there can be no enduring subject matter, and therefore it is agility of method that is most important. A little reflection, however, should reveal that the *what* and the *how* are inextricably interwoven.¹ The *how* apart from the *what* becomes abstract and formal. Indeed, if one does not have a good store of previous facts and experience with which to supplement his techniques of thinking, he will have to proceed at once to get them before he can attack the problem in hand. If too much of this preliminary work has to be done, it will greatly retard the efficiency of thinking as the heart of the problem method.

It would be a great mistake to believe that thinking is all there is to the problem-solving method. It is important, also, that there be other experience as well. The child must not only be skillful in manipulation of the symbols of thought, but he must be directly exposed to the sorts of experience which they denote.² Language is only a pointer; it takes firsthand experience to clinch its meaning. But one must take care not to confuse this intuitive learning with the raw empiricism of sense impressions derived from Pestalozzian "object lessons."³ This gymnastic of the senses was carried on in relative isolation. Thinking was not coincidentally involved. That was something done later, after the sense impressions had been gathered together. And the thinking which did follow later was merely a matter of separating and arranging sensory units of experience. Or, if thinking did precede, sense impressions were employed merely to lend interest to learning its bare symbols.

Such a view, some assert, has severe limitations. In the first place, it overlooks the primary role of the motor organs, of active response. Because the child is an individual, he is from the start organically biased; he has preferences. When disturbances in the environment upset him, these preferences go to work to attempt the restoration of the previous equilibrium. In this striving and activity, mind is intimately involved in contriving to solve the problem presented by the disturbance. But note that mind responds to meanings, not just physical stimuli. So, in the second place, mere sensationalism would hardly be adequate for the constructive tasks of solving learning problems through experimentation. The experimentalist fails to learn about things adequately, merely through his sense impressions of them. He must also do something to the objects

¹ WOOD, B. D., and F. S. BEERS, "Knowledge vs. Thinking?" *Teachers College Record*, 37: 487-499 March, 1936.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 80, 86.

³ BRUBACHER, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-217.

about which he would learn.¹ He must alter their conditions and then note the consequences which flow therefrom. Knowledge cannot remain celibate; it must mate with action.

There are many teachers who recognize the educational significance of active experience in the thinking engendered by the problem method, but who, at the same time, think that such experience on the part of the student may be assumed. Once it is assumed, the tendency of such teachers is to concentrate on inner or mental activity with a minimum of overt action. Indeed, if one be an Aristotelian, he will aim at an educational activity which is exclusively mental as being the nearest approach to pure activity.² While the experimentalist would admit that there are occasions when learning through symbols requires little perceptible overt action, nevertheless he would still insist that physical activity cannot be omitted from the complete cycle of thought. Consequently, he will never be content merely to assume experience but will demand that some actual empirical situation be the initiating and the concluding phases of the educative process.

Not only is it important to mark the kinds of experience or activity which are used in conjunction with thinking in the educative process, but it is also significant to pay some added attention to the timing of the two. This may be well illustrated by those who compare learning to the building of a house.³ Just as one cannot commence to erect the latter till lumber and other building supplies have been brought together on the building site, just so, the analogy runs, one cannot commence to erect the house of knowledge till the student has amassed a store of facts and information. Till that is done, the sponsors of this view would postpone taking up problematic or controversial issues. Indeed, they inquire, how can problem solving by children be anything but wasteful of time and energy until these resources for mature and significant thinking have been mastered?

This method of teaching will be recognized as quite appropriate to the aim of education as preparation. Appropriate though it is, it runs several risks. For one thing, there is the risk that by the time the facts and information taught are taken out of storage they will be out of date. For another, having learned these things in isolation from a specific problem the pupil may not appreciate their relevancy when an actual problem does turn up. Consequently, the experimentalist would hold that thought and experience should go along hand in hand contemporaneously, each guiding the other.

Finally, there is one kind of activity which deserves special mention, and

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 86-87.

² *Supra*, pp. 107-108.

³ MOREHOUSE, F. M., *Historical Outlook*, 15: 157, April, 1924.

that is drill. The conventional view here is that the lesson must sometimes be organized for drill purposes because repetition is necessary to fix learning in the mind. Some hold that just mere repetition is all that is necessary. Others contend that to manage the lesson in this fashion reduces drill to so repellent a feature of school that it often becomes almost meaningless. The antidote for this situation, they contend, is to connect drill with thought. It is thinking, perceiving the connection between what one is doing and some accepted objective, which saves drill from so dreary a fate. If the pupil sees the significance of drill, if he sees how it will help him achieve his own ends, drill will be accepted and gladly practiced.

Organization of the learning environment in the form of problems is not without its critics. The main objection is that it unduly minimizes authoritative or expository instruction. It calls into question parts of the social heritage which should be taken as settled. Moreover its trial-and-error procedure is wasteful of the pupil's time, especially when in problematically approaching known truths he is allowed to repeat errors the race has long since learned to avoid. There is even danger in this process that the pupil will forego sound solutions in exchange for a mere problem-solving attitude of mind. All of which means that the school is neglecting its transmissive function of telling children authoritatively what the race knows beyond peradventure of a doubt.

These objections undoubtedly suggest valuable cautions for the teacher to bear in mind. Yet it would be a mistake to think that the methods of authoritative exposition and problematic inquiry necessarily stand in opposition to each other. As a matter of fact they should rather supplement each other. There is an appropriate time for each, and the teacher should be facile in recognizing both. In the very midst of a problem, for example, the pupil may ask to have some technique explained to him which he may need to complete the attack on his problem. Having acquired it on good authority he can return to his problem solving. Antagonism between the two methods only arises where the teacher invokes the wrong method for the wrong occasion, as, when engaged in teaching controversial social issues, he employs an authoritarian rather than a problem-solving approach.

Social Structure as Method

The structural organization of the learning environment has, in addition to the foregoing, a social dimension which now requires more than the inferential attention it has received so far. Most learning occurs in a social context. Of course a person can teach himself, but he would learn very little if he had to depend exclusively on his own resources. Without the social experience capitalized in libraries and artifacts those who take pride in being self-taught would have relatively little to show for their efforts.

The social context not only provides a content for learning but indicates a method of learning and instruction as well. If individuals are what they are largely by virtue of their social relationships,¹ it follows that a most effective method of instruction is to be found in the manipulation of social relationships. Change the social context, and change the individual. Moreover, where social problems of one sort or another pose the content of instruction, it may well be doubted whether an individual can learn their solution short of being involved in the actual process of social reconstruction which solutions suggest. Certainly the individual cannot solve these problems just within the academic walls of the school. To check his solution and to motivate his work he must have a sense of involvement in a vitally real social situation. Otherwise there is danger that the subject materials of his curriculum will become largely technical and abstract.

If we accept this social dimension of method, we may have to add some qualifications to our use of the problem method. We may have to distinguish whether our problem is descriptive or normative. In scientific method as a phase of problem solving there is generally agreement in advance on the criterion of what constitutes a solution of the problem, namely, standards of reliability and objectivity. In prosecuting the solution, therefore, the scientist aims to keep his personal values and preferences from influencing the results of investigation. Such a method, however, is not altogether appropriate where social norms are involved. There we cannot start off with an advance agreement on the norm or standard of evaluation, for that is usually the principal point at issue in a social problem. Consequently the investigator, whether he be student or teacher, can hardly withhold or inhibit his personal values because, if he did, there could be no adequate solution. This conclusion further documents our earlier conclusion that personal involvement in a social situation is a principal dimension of the social structure of method.²

Taken seriously on the economic side, the social dimension of method would require that every young person have an opportunity to participate in the production of wealth as an important part of his education.³ Obviously, this means something more than mere cooperative labor in the school. What is really meant is the kind of participation in economic endeavor which formerly was possible under the old domestic system of handicrafts. If it be said that this is impossible in an era of manufacture, then some stand ready to advocate the reorganization of industry to correct

¹ *Supra*, p. 54.

² Cf. SMITH, B. O., "What Is a Social Problem?" *Progressive Education*, 26: 165-168, April, 1949; and STANLEY, W. O., "What We Learn by Problem Solving," *ibid.*, pp. 173-179.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 175.

its distorted and narrow absorption in its own processes. Industry is part of a social whole. Viewed in its larger proportions, its educational significance must be recovered and a happy place for children found in it.

Much the same might be said in behalf of winning for children the unhampered opportunity to study and learn at firsthand the workings of the political institutions under which they live. Several obstacles impede the realization of this objective. Peculiarly enough, there is a fear shared by small minds that the condition of public affairs is such that their close inspection by the school would be healthy neither for the morals of children nor for the nerves of the body politic. But quite apart from such a consideration of expediency, the law itself presents an odd hurdle. Statutes and constitutions defining the franchise draw an arbitrary age line, on one side of which the young adult can exercise the rights of citizenship and on the other side of which he cannot. Achieving one's majority, thus, results in a rather abrupt induction into its rights and responsibilities. The failure of the fundamental law to recognize degrees of civic capacity is obviously out of harmony with educational theory, which definitely recognizes that the learning curve rises through graduated levels of difficulty. This being the case, it is a pertinent inquiry how rearing or ruling children automatically without representation on the one side of the age line can be considered a good preparation for self-government on the other. Perhaps it is this inefficient articulation of educational and political philosophy which all too frequently results in civic irresponsibility among the electorate.¹

To a certain extent, the disadvantages of this anomalous situation can be offset by organizing the social environment of the school so as to permit the students to participate with the faculty in forming and administering school policies. From one angle, this too is but an artificial school device and thus a poor substitute for what might be learned at firsthand in the community. But, from another angle, it partakes of genuine sovereign power. The authority exercised by teachers and administrators derives directly from the sovereign state. Consequently, it is possible for pupils to have preliminary training in citizenship if the principal and teachers will but share their sovereign power with them.²

Roughly, there are two philosophies of managing this. One is to set up a frame of student government where on the surface there is every appearance of responsible government by the pupils themselves but where, underneath, real and effective government is still in the hands of the faculty and administration. To be sure, the adult hand of power is to be kept gloved and out of sight as much as possible, but no doubt is left of its existence and

¹ COE, G. A., "The Nature of Discipline for Democracy," *Religious Education*, 14: 136-146, June, 1919.

² *Supra*, pp. 140-141.

the willingness of the school authorities to exercise it with irresistible force if necessary—both in the sphere of lessons and of school decorum.

The other philosophy of student government is to make the sharing of power the sort of enterprise which it actually purports to be. Here, it is fundamental principle that such an adventure be not undertaken in a spirit of play.¹ Children will soon tire of that. It is also fundamental principle that self-government cannot be effectively learned where power is dangled before the young as a toy or where it is given them merely on loan. Authority and responsibility must be real. Yet, they must not be thrust on children; they must be the expression of a common will. Moreover, their weight must be shifted to children's shoulders gradually, for it will take time to make over a child's caprice—his former sport of taunting the teacher's authority—into the law and order of society.

Yet, though real, should the total authority and responsibility of the school staff be shared with the students? Some seem to have the confidence to go far in this direction.² It no more worries them to put child and adult on a par in the government of a school than it does to contemplate the inequalities of ability which exist in any electorate. If democracy is applied seriously and wholeheartedly in the school, they feel every assurance that the children will rise worthily to their responsibilities. Others stop somewhere short of such an extension of authority and responsibility to children. There are some aspects of the sovereignty delegated to the school by the state which they think cannot be shifted to the children. This they would frankly admit at the earliest possible moment to the students themselves. After all, they point out, the schools are a part of the total social enterprise, in which adults have a stake as well as children, and a more important stake at that.

Learning citizenship, especially democratic principles of citizenship, need not be confined to student government or to civic projects in the economic and political life of the community. There are a number of teachers who advocate incorporating these principles into their classroom methods of teaching as well. Accordingly they would invite their children to share to the extent of their abilities in selecting the projects to be studied. They would consult them in regard to ways and means of prosecuting these projects to a successful conclusion. And in the end they would encourage their children to participate in the evaluation of their achievements.³

¹ PRING, B., *Education, Capitalist and Socialist*, pp. 237-238, Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 1937; PINEVITCH, A., *The New Education in the Soviet Republic*, pp. 213-214, The John Day Company, New York, 1929.

² PRING, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-241.

³ HORN, E., "Educating for Freedom and Responsibility," *Religious Education*, 25: 635-636, September, 1930.

Learning the ways of democracy, these teachers are confident, will be sterile and barren if restricted to learning the definitions and slogans of democracy. To learn democracy effectively, children must learn it operationally.

Individual Differences

Another direction, from which the social structure of the learning environment needs to be reorganized, is not so much concerned with securing a social context for learning as it is with the place of pupil individuality in that situation.¹ But first, as to the nature of individuality as a factor in the educative process. There are several aspects which are worthy of note. For one thing, it should be observed that individuality emphasizes a certain intuitive quality of learning.² Learning is privy to the individual who does the learning. Only he can do it; no one can do it for him. Instruction can be neither "given" nor "received." It must be experienced. It is just as personal an operation as the digestion of food. For another thing, individuality points to the respects in which any particular child is different from other children. It is such unique variations as these that generally make difficult the application of any uniform educative procedures.

The rigidity of these differences is a matter of some dispute. Some are inclined to organize the educative environment with these differences as a relatively fixed point of departure. Naturally, therefore, they accord pupil individuality a preeminent position.³ To them, individuality represents nature as over against the school, which at its best is but an artificial development of a social convention. They pride themselves on following nature. Not what should child nature be, but what is it, is the question which guides their research and practice. Since science reveals child nature as diverse rather than uniform, the child's individuality should be respected, even revered.

From such an exaltation of individuality, not a few vigorously dissent. The realization that nature is often ugly as well as beautiful puts them on their guard against a blanket endorsement of all its variations. Going further, some of these dissenters incline to think that social demands are about as rigid as their opponents hold individuality to be. Some, taking a

¹ For a further consideration of individual differences, see *supra*, pp. 33-36.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 80.

³ KELLY, G. B., "Some Socialist and Anarchist Views of Education," *Educational Review*, 15: 13-16, January, 1898; TUCKER, B. R., "Some Socialist and Anarchist Views of Education," *Educational Review*, 15: 8-9, January, 1898; TOLSTOY, L. N., quoted in Pinkevitch, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

supernatural point of view, decry the pedagogical naturalism of individualism as an undesirable weakening of the social prerogatives of the teacher, to say nothing of divine law itself.¹ Without appealing to authority so high, others say that reason, not man, is the measure of all things, that universality and not individuality, therefore, should be the norm of the educative process.² If so, it follows that civilization cannot be transmitted by an overfaithful following of the individual in nature.

Yet another view finds the two foregoing views on individuality standing in false antithesis to each other. The falsity of this antithesis, so it is claimed, arises out of a misconception of the nature of individuality itself. The opposed camps seem to subscribe to a notion of individuality as something relatively fixed and rigid. On the contrary, the idea is advanced here that individuality is much more elastic and flexible. It is, in fact, merely a direction of movement, rather than something unvaryingly preformed. Similarly, there is probably an exaggerated notion of the fixity of social demands too. The universal in the social heritage should be subject to amendment in the light of individual experience. If flexibility rather than fixity be the case, the educational problem is to discover within the individual's present experience the interests which are akin to what the community prizes. By cultivating these, a long step will have been taken in the direction of harmonizing individual and social interest in the classroom.

The question further arises, at this point, which individuals should be collected together in a given classroom. Should children be grouped according to their likenesses or their differences, homogeneously or heterogeneously? Both qualities have their advantages. The more heterogenous the group, the greater variety of experience its members will have to share with each other, thus enriching the common experience of the whole group. A certain homogeneity of the group, however, is also necessary and desirable, in order to ensure communication, to economize the teacher's effort, and to expedite the progress of the pupils. Yet, since individuality is unique, it is at once obvious that there can be no such thing as a strictly homogeneous group. Furthermore, there is a considerable unevenness in the distribution of any single individual's abilities and aptitudes. Consequently, a group that might be relatively homogeneous as to one trait will more than likely be very heterogenous as to some other. The ethical import of this situation is very great. Fairness to the individual requires that groups formed on one basis should not necessarily hold for all other pur-

¹ PIUS XI, "The Christian Education of Youth," *Catholic Educational Review*, 28: 149, March, 1930.

² FLESHMAN, A. C., *The Educational Process*, pp. 47-48, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1908.

poses as well. Especially is this the case in so-called ability grouping.¹ A child placed in a low group for one purpose may belong in a much higher one for some other. The membership of a group, therefore, should be reconsidered and probably reformed almost every time there is a change in the area of instruction.

Whether the educator underwrites homogeneous or heterogeneous grouping of pupils, he must not overlook the importance of individuality as a source of originality or creativity.² Social progress as well as progressive education has a large stake here. But just what the teacher is justified in expecting in this connection needs careful delineation. If he judges originality or creativity in terms of a contribution to the world's stock of ideas, needless to say, there is perhaps little use to which pupil individuality can be put in the teacher's method, at least at the lower levels of the educational ladder. But, if the teacher determines the novelty of a response from the standpoint of the student, the teacher's method can very profitably be organized about this point. Indeed, from this point of view, all learning is necessarily creative. Whatever a unique individual learns in the time continuum of a contingent world must be the first occasion of that learning for him. Not only that, but there is a well-authenticated joy attendant upon such discovery and invention. If the teacher can organize the social environment of the class to capture this feeling for each individual as he learns, he can count his work well done.

It has been customary in some circles to associate creativity with a limited range of studies, particularly music, literature, and the fine arts. Obviously, in the light of the foregoing, this is too narrow a classification. There is no reason why creative learning should not occur in the shop, on the farm, and in the laboratory as well.³ Nevertheless, it is a good caution to remember that in none of these fields is any learning entirely original or creative. In each new act of learning a large proportion of elements of the process are bound to be drawn from habits and past experience. This well-established conclusion should betray no one into thinking that learning the group culture and being creative are contradictory to each other. Learning the past is not just an appropriation of what already exists. Each individual, because he is an individual, creates his own response to the past. He reconstructs it as he uses it in the present. In this manner the future is the creative product of the present and the past.

¹ KELIHER, A. V., *A Critical Study of Homogeneous Grouping*, pp. 147-154, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1931.

² HOPKINS, L. T., "Creative Education," *Educational Method*, 11: 1-8, October, 1931.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 97-98.

Freedom and Authority

If the values resident in individuality are found acceptable and desirable, there is yet one indispensable condition precedent to their realization and that is freedom. The teacher's method must so organize the social environment of the school that pupil individuality will have an opportunity to be and express itself. Many definitions of freedom have accrued to the educative process.¹ Their essence, however, seems to simmer down to freedom's being a function of individuality. If pupils had no individual differences, there would be no demand for freedom. Everyone would act alike. No one could even want to be different, to be free. But in identifying freedom with difference, there is an implied social reference. Children not only differ from each other, but they are sufficiently like each other to enable them to live together with adults. Homogeneity, therefore, is as important as heterogeneity. A sound social group needs both these qualities. But just how much homogeneity and heterogeneity should there be? How much freedom and how much control should there be in the classroom? Obviously, to anyone who stops to think, there is no single answer to this question. Any position is a matter of emphasis, based on one's attitude to a multiplicity of other phases of educational philosophy.

However widespread the notion of freedom in democracy—even in fascism and communism—it is often surprising how little it is countenanced toward the young in the classroom. Long-standing tradition rather supports the notion that the child should early learn unquestioning obedience to the authority of the parent or to the teacher *in loco parentis*. Since the mature adult unquestionably knows better what to do than the immature child, implicit trust in the authority of the parent or teacher promises the quickest and most direct route to solid knowledge and sound morals. So confident were our forebears of this pedagogical economy that they claimed it was better for a child to go right in chains than wrong in freedom.

The educators who lean farthest in the opposite direction of pupil freedom in the classroom are the more romantic of the progressive educators. They lean so far in this direction because they regard individual differences among children as fixed features on the face of nature. Worshipping nature in reverend awe they obdurately defend the freedom of the individual to assert the unique differences which mark his individuality.

¹ MCCALLISTER, W. J., *The Growth of Freedom in Education*, p. 543, Richard R. Smith, New York, 1931; HORN, "Educating for Freedom and Responsibility," *op. cit.*, 25: 631.

Consequently they enjoin parents, teachers, and adults generally to adopt a laissez-faire attitude toward children.¹ Their rule is to keep out of nature's way so that it may fulfill itself according to its own inherent laws.

Other educators do not find the reason for freedom in a romantic adoration of nature at all. Far from basing freedom on the inherent goodness of child nature, they favor it because of the evil consequences which they observe flowing from its opposite, authoritarianism. Vesting absolute authority in the teacher, they contend, is bad for both the teacher and the pupil. It more than likely will corrupt the teacher into becoming a tyrant, and it will more than likely make children either too rebellious or too submissive. The danger in making them rebellious is that they come to think that opposition to any authority is meritorious, and the danger in making them submissive is that they lose all sense of initiative. Worse yet, constant frustration of the pupil's self-assertiveness may well render him a bully in his own relations with still younger and weaker children and thus perpetuate the vice of tyranny in the next generation of teachers and parents.²

There are still other educators who, in rejecting the extravagant claims of a romantic, laissez-faire conception of freedom, do not at the same time take a hostile view of authority.³ Instead of looking on freedom and authority as antagonistic to each other, they make a synthesis of them such that freedom becomes the legitimate offspring of authority. To let a child act without restriction in the classroom as his individuality dictates is to invite chaos. When chaos reigns there can be no genuine freedom because everybody will be getting in everybody else's way and the resulting confusion will deprive all but the most powerful of freedom to accomplish anything. To secure freedom there must be some rule of law according to which children and adults regulate their conduct and to the authority of which they submit. Genuine freedom, then, must mean freedom to do what the rule of authority states we ought to do, in other words, to do what the law permits.⁴ Thus the child learns freedom under the discipline of the law; he does not learn discipline through exercise of freedom. The parent or teacher, of course, is the personification of this authority. To

¹ *Supra*, pp. 151-152.

² RUSSELL, B., "Education and Civilization," *The New Statesman and Nation*, 7: 667, May, 1934.

³ Cf. KILPATRICK, W. H., "Social Factors Influencing Educational Method in 1930," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 4: 485-486, April, 1931; and BREED, F. S., "Good-bye Laissez-faire in Education," *Elementary School Journal*, 38: 365-372, January, 1938.

⁴ ADLER, M. J., "Freedom through Discipline," *Vital Speeches*, 10: 380-382, April, 1944. See also Hook, S., "Thirteen Arrows against Progressive Liberal Education," *Humanist*, 4: 1-10, Spring, 1944.

avoid abuses of authority and to ensure that it results in freedom rather than tyranny, the teacher will do well not to carry his mantle of authority in an imperious manner but to carry it with a tempered dignity and humanity.¹

Recognizing the indispensable role of authority in freedom are yet other educators who insist that freedom must also mean freedom from the law as well as freedom within or under the law, especially where the law is anachronistic, worn out, and out of date.² The child must be free to assert his individuality against benumbing restrictings of convention, from enslavement to routine, prejudice, and fear. The purpose of such freedom is not the romantic one of capitalizing on the natural goodness of individual child nature as an end in itself but to capitalize on the individual differences of children as a means of progressively reforming the social culture. This view, of course, implies that the social culture is not a chain to bind the younger generation but a ladder on which it may climb. In other words, that child is learning freedom who can see more than one alternative in a problem confronting him and who, after dramatizing these alternatives in imagination, intelligently selects one to act upon.³

With this conception of educational freedom freshly in mind, the moment is appropriate to glance at the position of those who think of freedom chiefly in terms of freedom of physical movement for the child. To such an identification there is some objection. Physical freedom, to elaborate the objection, must not be isolated from the inner freedom of the mind. Physical freedom which is in no way connected with, or guided by, the intellect becomes irresponsible. It tends to become destructive of shared cooperative activities, which are the usual source of order. Conversely, freedom of thought must have an opportunity to test its own consequences through overt behavior. The proper place of physical freedom, therefore, is as a means and not as an end.

But even an instructional method which incorporates freedom as intelligent choosing between conventional and unconventional alternatives is not without its difficulties. How can the pupil or teacher tell whether the case at hand is one where it is better to follow the tried experience of convention or one where some innovation would be an improvement on convention? It is perhaps a good principle to lay down here that command of

¹ MICHEL, V. M., "The Rule of Authority," *Catholic Educational Review*, 22: 267-271, May, 1924.

² MURPHY, A. E., "Education for Freedom: Which Way?" *Humanist*, 5: 26-29, April, 1945.

³ CHILDS, J. L., "A Way of Dealing with Experience," *Progressive Education*, 8: 695-698, December, 1931; and HARRIS, P. E., "What Is the Newer Meaning of School Discipline?" *Education*, 52: 466-471, April, 1932.

race experience is an indispensable condition precedent to freedom to experiment with that race experience.¹ No child should be free, for instance, to enter the chemistry laboratory of his school who does not know some chemistry. The same is true of departures from time-tested standards of moral education. Even if the child knows his social culture pretty well, there still should be some advance assurance that any deviation or non-conformity on his part will not risk irreparable harm either to himself or to his social group. Indeed there should be some prospect that his unconventional conduct will redound to their mutual benefit. Yet, in weighing the risk the parent and teacher must bear in mind that there can be neither freedom nor progress without some jeopardy both individual and social.

The intimate relation between freedom and authority will perhaps help to explain the kind of freedom known as training in self-control. As already seen, some kind of control or regulation is a prerequisite to effective freedom. During a child's younger years the locus of this control is usually in some agent external to the child such as the parent, policeman, or teacher. The aim of most ethical systems in educational philosophy is to transform this external control into internal control, that is, to transfer it gradually from the external agent to the child himself so that he may learn to exercise the moral autonomy of self-control. Ascetic educational philosophies regard the inhibitions incident to self-control as worthy ends in themselves. Other educational philosophies usually justify such inhibitions merely as means to ends. They are a moral warning to "stop and think." Thinking is a stoppage of activity in its impulsive stage until its probable consequences have been connected up with other meanings and a more comprehensive plan of action is formed. The larger the store of meanings and the more disposed the child is to think of them before he acts, the less external restraint he need be under and the more internal freedom or self-control he is entitled to.

So far, the focus of the discussion has been on freedom for the pupil. What of freedom for the teacher? What of his individuality? Some would make a colossus out of it, while others would reduce it to near the vanishing point. The former would constitute the teacher a final authority and require direct personal obedience from the pupil. The latter would have a social situation in the school bordering on anarchism, wherein the pupil's individuality would never be subordinated to that of the teacher. Both of these extremes seem predicated on the theory that the total amount of freedom in the school situation is so limited that the more the pupil or the teacher enjoys, the less the other possesses. As a matter of fact, this is

¹ FREEMAN, F. N., "Education as a Prerequisite to Freedom," *School and Society*, 45: 593-596, May, 1937.

not necessarily the case. It may well be that the more freedom the teacher has, the more the child will enjoy also.

Indeed, there can be no genuine freedom for the pupil unless the teacher is free to make his greater experience available for his pupils. Since education is a social process, a process of sharing, nothing could be more absurd than to exclude from the group or reduce the significance in the group of the person who has the most to share, the teacher. On the contrary, children can grow in freedom only if the teacher is free to advise how the capacities of individuals can be brought to richer fruition. But it is equally absurd that the teacher is the only one who has anything to share. Children too have significant experience. The teacher will exercise his freedom preferably, therefore, not as an overbearing dictator but rather as a sympathetic counselor.

Proceeding on such principles, the wise teacher will not allow himself to be maneuvered into a social relation with his class where the sole initiative for planning the work of the school has passed over to the children. He will adroitly avoid being committed in advance to such answers as he may get from directly putting the question to children, "What do you want to do today?" The reason for this is that the child, more than likely unacquainted with what are the enduring phases of his own underlying interests, will respond by snatching at some passing trifle or purely accidental affair. The teacher can best avoid this artificial consulting of interest by being so close a student of children's interests that he will often know them better than the children do themselves. Children will then not so much do what they want to, as want to do what they do. Instead of leading to freedom, to do as one pleases may actually lead into a new bondage, the bondage of impulse or ignorance.

Schoolroom Discipline

Finally, there is a special instance of the social structure of the teacher's method which deserves separate mention. That is discipline. Whether one's educational philosophy calls for much or little freedom, there are certain optimum social conditions which must obtain in the school if effective learning is to take place. These are the conditions of law and order. Law and order are as necessary for the carrying on of instruction as they are for the ordinary pursuits of everyday life outside school. This much may be taken for granted. The main question, however, is how discipline, this law and order, is to be maintained in the school.

One method makes discipline a condition precedent to instruction. There must be a certain amount of order and quiet before instruction can begin. Indeed, maintaining order and giving instruction are almost two different functions of the teacher. Under such conditions, codes of disci-

pline usually state the rules. In these, prompt obedience to the will of the teacher is the first and great commandment.¹ The parent or teacher may give reasons for his request, but he need not. Children should obey simply because the parent—or the teacher *in loco parentis*—wills it. In doing so, they are really obedient to the moral law itself. If anything, the discipline of the school should be even more strict than that of the home.

A second method makes discipline coincident to interesting instruction. Here the teacher, whose enthusiasm for his field of specialization should be so contagious that it spreads to his pupils, need not bother about discipline as a separate concern. Children will be so engrossed in the curriculum that their interest will afford a self-discipline. According to this theory, there is such a spiritual unity between pupil and teacher that the docility of the former as a condition precedent to instruction never arises. The happy schoolroom is like the happy society. Children, as well as adults, who have significant work to do are seldom the source of disciplinary problems for either the teacher or the policeman.

A third method goes even beyond utilizing interest to transfer the locus of authority for maintaining discipline from the teacher alone to the class as a whole. Here rule by the one gives way to rule by the many. Social order in the school becomes a function of a group purpose. If children are cooperatively engaged with the teacher in a joint project, pursuit of the common end will enforce its own order.² The children will discipline themselves in order to gain their accepted objective. Here, each member of the group exercises compulsion on every other and in turn submits to compulsion from him. Under such a regime, there may not be the same kind of quiet and order as where the teacher alone "keeps order," but it will be nonetheless effective.

Whatever one's basis for maintaining discipline, suppose, now, that after the teacher has done the best he can within the limits of his capacities, some individual child still remains recalcitrant. Should the parent or teacher ever punish such a child? Some are frankly skeptical whether punishment should ever be resorted to. And if there are such occasions, they are very skeptical of the results that are achieved. Others are by no means prepared to eschew punishment entirely.³ As a last resort, they

¹ PARTRIDGE, G., *Genetic Philosophy of Education*, p. 168, Sturgis and Walton, New York, 1912; PÉCAUT, F., "The Philosophy Underlying the National System of Education in France," *International Institute, Educational Yearbook*, 1929, pp. 169-171.

² DEWEY, J., *School and Society*, pp. 30-31, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1916.

³ HYDE, W. D., *The Teacher's Philosophy*, pp. 10-11, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1910; PIUS XI, "The Christian Education of Youth," *Catholic Mind*, 28: 78, February, 1930; COURTIS, S. A., "The Problem of Immaturity," *Progressive Education*, 8: 703-705, June, 1931; BRYAN, R. C., and L. FOLEY, "Some False Notions

would probably employ some form of coercion proportioned to the circumstances of the case in order to achieve the ends of the family or the class. Certainly they would not have the teacher's authority completely shorn of the weapon of coercion.

Where punishment is necessary, the theory on which it is meted out may be variously stated. We may first pay attention to the theory of retribution or retaliation. According to this view, punishment is a sort of revenge. Harm done to others can be wiped out or compensated only by a harm done to the offender. It is the age-old law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Added support for this theory is found where it can be proved that infractions are "willfully" perpetuated.¹ The child knew his intended act was wrong, but did it in spite of his knowledge; he did it with malice aforethought. For such a flaunting of the moral law, many think, nothing less than punishment will suffice as expiation.

Another theory is that punishment is administered to protect the class by making an example of the offender. The emphasis, in this instance, is not on cleansing the individual of his fault so much as ensuring the group against similar infractions of its peace and security. Antisocial behavior is a threat to the very existence of the power and prestige of the classroom group and through it of the school or even society itself. The social group must therefore be protected. The chief danger in this motive for punishment is that it may be too severe and therefore create a feeling of resentment rather than warning.

A final theory of punishment is educative.² The shortcomings of the previous theories of punishment are that they are so largely negative and that they do not positively point the way to rehabilitate the recalcitrant child. The point of this third theory is that no punishment should be administered which does not reconstruct or reeducate him. In this sense, punishment is an expression of social hope. The offender is given a chance to see himself as others see him. But if he fails to see and accept the principle at stake, then even punishment has failed. We can then only commend him to our prayers.

Two Major Philosophies of Education

At long last we are in a position to summarize philosophies of classroom instruction. In its practical aspect the pedagogy of the classroom presents

about School Discipline," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 29: 16-22, January, 1943.

¹ Cf. RAGSDALE, C. E., *Modern Psychologies of Education*, pp. 39-40, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1932.

² BODE, B., *Democracy as a Way of Life*, pp. 80-82, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1937; HOCKING, *op. cit.* pp. 284-285; FLESHMAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43; RAGSDALE, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

a more or less unified whole. It is only in its theoretical or philosophical aspect that pedagogy can be analyzed into the constituent elements of the last two chapters such as aim, curriculum, and method. Having accomplished this analysis now we must reintegrate the parts into some philosophical synthesis. As on the occasion of previous summaries, two major educational philosophies emerge.

On the one hand is the well-recognized traditional theory and practice of the classroom. On the whole this theory tends to be dualistic. It sets the child on the one hand over against the whole paraphernalia of instruction on the other. Each is external to the other. The aims of education, to commence with them, are set for the child by the teacher, his parents, and the adult community. The curriculum, too, represents adult interests and is set before him in the form of subject matter to be learned. The order of the lesson, that is, the order of presentation of subject matter, is organized logically to conform to the external and ingrained order of the universe itself. Backed by such an invariable order the teacher will hardly behave amiss in adopting a rather authoritarian manner in his exposition of the portion of the curriculum chosen for the lesson. The emphasis which this philosophy of education places on adult authority is not meant to crush the pupil's freedom but rather to give it its proper emphasis as an end rather than as a means of the educative process. If the child is interested in learning a curriculum organized into this sort of lesson and in achieving the aims it represents, well and good. But if not, external pressure from the teacher backed by adults generally will be brought to bear on him to get him to learn it anyhow. Indeed he will be reminded that valuable moral discipline results from learning to do things he does not like to do. If he balks at his manifest educational duties and becomes a disturbing social element in the classroom, it may be necessary to vindicate the authority of the school by punishing him. In any event the successful outcome of the educative process will be measured by standards whose enduring validity is quite independent of the educative process.

On the other hand is the equally well-recognized theory of progressive education. On the whole this theory posits a continuum rather than a dualism between the child and the paraphernalia of instruction. It regards the aims of education as emerging out of the educative process and being continuous with it. Consequently the child may have something to say in formulating them as well as the teacher. Extending this continuity, the wise teacher will be careful to state the curriculum, this epitome of the social heritage, in terms of child nature. He will conceive it in terms of child activities instead of formal subject matter. If the teacher conceives of an underlying continuity between child and curriculum or child experience and the aims of education, he can hardly avoid an order of the

lesson which takes its cue from the present level of child experience. It will be the problems arising in child experience, again, which set the structure of the lesson. Starting with problems the teacher will pattern his method after the method of conducting inquiry. And, expecting considerable trial and error, he will democratically accord his pupils proportionate freedom as a means of seeking answers to their problems. If the problem is genuinely a pupil's own problem, his interest in its solution will be almost a foregone conclusion, thus practically obviating the need for external pressure. Interest will be the parent of effort which in turn will be disciplined by the inherent difficulties of the problem. Children with genuine personal problems to solve are not likely to become disciplinary cases, but if they do they will be punished as a last resort and then only if punishment can be expected to have an educational effect. Finally in passing judgment on the outcomes of the educative process the standards themselves will be continuous with the process; they will help in evaluation and will themselves be evaluated in the light of the outcomes of learning.

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CHAPTER XIII

RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION

Secular and Religious Philosophy of Education

So far we have discussed the philosophical principles underlying education as if they were the same for all subjects in the curriculum. We have assumed that theories of knowledge and value were the same whether the teacher was teaching science, history, or geography. We have taken for granted that principles of motivation and organization of the lesson would hold irrespective of whether the teacher was teaching grammar or mathematics. The question now arises whether we can continue to hold this point of view as we pass from secular to religious and moral education. Will principles of educational philosophy worked out for a secular and profane curriculum hold equally for a religious and moral one?

If the same philosophy of education were to hold for religious and moral instruction as for secular instruction, for the Sunday school as well as for the weekday school, there would be no need for this further exposition. As a matter of fact, however, there is a sharp difference of opinion on this very point. While some educators make no change in their philosophical habits of mind as they pass from secular to religious and moral education or in the reverse direction, other educators, particularly among some sections of the clergy, find it necessary to make a clear distinction between these two fields. Since they insist on making this distinction, it will be necessary now to examine their position and compare it with what has preceded.¹

Anyone will recognize at the outset that the area of religion and morals offers a peculiarly fertile field to stimulate the growth of diverse theories of truth, reality, and value. Certainly secular subjects like the three R's would fall far behind in proliferating the philosophic subtleties of which religion and morals are capable. Yet, in undertaking this exposition of the philosophy of religious and moral education, we must constantly remember that our primary concern is not with these philosophic subtleties as such but with their educational implications. We are not interested in unraveling the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical snarls in which

¹ KILPATRICK, W. H., "Religion in Education: The Issues," *Progressive Education*, 26: 96-102, February, 1949.

religion and morals become involved. Rather do we want to pay attention to what complications in educational theory and practice these snarls lead.¹

Concrete evidence of educational difficulties, only hinted at so far, lie about on every hand. Most obvious, perhaps, is the fact that the secular public school offers no direct instruction in religion. As everyone knows, this glaring omission has resulted from an inability of the friends of religion to compose their differences sufficiently to agree on either a prescribed or an elective course of study in religion. In spite of this exclusion the public school continues to be solicitous over the moral education of its charges. If it does not teach morals directly, it does give much attention to teaching them indirectly and incidentally. Yet even so, a sharp difference of opinion arises whether morals can be satisfactorily taught apart from religion. Those who think it cannot and who want religion taught over and beyond morals, are forced to provide religion and moral instruction privately either in the home, at the church, or in a private or parochial school. And even among this select group marked differences of opinion remain on the nature of religion and morals. Like different theories in politics² and economics,³ different theories of religion and morals lead to distinctly different educational practices. Some think of religion in broad humanistic terms, while others can understand it only in terms of the supernatural. The one group motivates children to be moral because it leads to more satisfactory social adjustments. The other group enjoins the moral life on its children because the moral law is the will of God to whom all mankind owes strict obedience.

Secularism

Perhaps the whole problem of the philosophy of religious and moral education will stand out most clearly if silhouetted not against just a philosophy of secular education but against a philosophy of education which limits itself to secularism, which even exalts secularism as an all-inclusive view of life. There is no gainsaying the fact that the omission of religion

¹ It will not be possible to note the educational philosophy of each religious sect. For some of this detail, see G. A. Coe, *A Social Theory of Religious Education*, Chaps. 20-24, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1917; P. H. Lotz and L. W. Crawford, *Studies in Religious Education*, Chaps. 20-22, Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, Nashville, Tennessee, 1931; W. C. Bower, "The Church as Educator," *Religious Education*, 22: 368-416, April, 1927; L. G. Janes, "Religious Instruction in State Schools, an Agnostic View," *Educational Review*, 4: 117-128, September, 1892; and W. W. Brickman, "Education for Eternal Existence, The Philosophy of Jewish Education," *School and Society*, 57: 554-560, May, 1943.

² *Supra*, Chap. VII.

³ *Supra*, Chap. IX.

from the curriculum of the public school has encouraged or at least coincided with the rise of a strongly secular temper of mind. Unreminded of religious ties many people have learned to get along with few or no religious observances at all. In fact when their attention is called to religion, they are inclined to turn deliberately away from it. They seem to regard their children as well adjusted when they have learned to meet the principal social and scientific demands of the everyday world about them.

In confining his attention to the world here and now the secularist frankly admits and boldly faces the fact that his continued adjustment is contingent on an uncertain and precarious future. However, though he is as anxious as the religious person for security, he is inclined to seek it, not in the worship of supernatural or what he gravely suspects are superstitious powers, but in obedience to natural law. Instead of bringing up his children in liturgical exercises, he instructs them in scientific method. Concerning any meaning of the world beyond what the natural and social sciences reveal he is agnostic or at least holds himself in a state of suspended judgment. If the secularist has any religion at all, it is likely that scientific doctrines constitute the presuppositions of that religion and scientists its high priests. Moreover democracy, if it is to give full scope to its emphasis on the common man, demands a secular religion and morals which rest on the self-sufficiency of man's own natural powers to direct his own destiny.¹

Because the secularist confines himself to the world of natural forces should not mislead anyone into thinking that the secularist does not believe the school should dispense spiritual values. Far from it. As a matter of fact he is quite convinced that the school is and should be deeply spiritual. In addition to teaching respect for and emotional attachment to scientific methods he would, among other spiritual values, have high regard for teaching loyalty to academic freedom and its cousin, civil liberty, for recognizing the dignity of utilitarian occupations in the school's curriculum, and for placing ultimate confidence in the ability of man to be captain of his social destiny. Indeed he feels that such a secular approach to spiritual values is peculiarly akin to the spiritual values represented by democracy. If democracy stands for the essential dignity and equality of man, whatever his race, sex, or cultural origin, and for government by the free consent of the governed, then all should have equal access to spiritual values. Since the churches are in disagreement on their own values, the only spiritual values which the public school, democracy's principal

¹ BODE, B., "Religion and the Public Schools," *School and Society*, 67: 225-229, March, 1948. Directly criticizing this view is RAYMOND, S., "The Principles of Pragmatism and the Teaching of Religion in the Public School," *Catholic Educational Review*, 47: 365-379, June, 1949.

educational agency, can bring within reach of all are secular views.¹ This is not a total loss for religion for, it has been said, the public schools are performing an infinitely significant religious work in bringing together children of diverse racial, national, and creedal backgrounds and, in promoting their assimilation into some sort of social unity, they are laying the basis on which any ultimate brotherhood of man must rest.²

If the secular public school can hold forth such promise of religious unity, it may not be beyond imagination that education itself has some characteristics of being a secular religion.³ In religion's long history many things have been declared to be god. At a time when race, nationality, and the state have each been raised up as objects of worship, one could certainly do worse than to make education a religion. The fundamental principle of faith of such a religion would be belief in the possibility of human achievement. Education would then become at once the symbol of humanity's as yet unrealized potentialities and the means of its salvation. Such a religion, however, would have the drawback of the political religions already mentioned. It would only be fragmentary; it would be worshipping the part for the whole. This might be a misdirection of religious endeavor if religion be taken, as it generally is, to denote inclusiveness of viewpoint. On the other hand, at least one outstanding advantage could be claimed for such a religion. It would not be in conflict with science. On the contrary, it would be based on science. Indeed without the invigorating vitality of science, such a religion would be in danger of lapsing into the dogmas of pedagogy and the rituals of educational administration. At all events in view of man's innumerable previous mistakes and discouraging backslidings, it takes courage, if nothing else, to hold to a faith in education as a religion.

Humanistic Religious Education

Many teachers, though profoundly influenced by a philosophy of the secular or profane branches of education, would be quite unwilling to erect secularism into a philosophy of life or, what is more to the point here, a philosophy of religious education. They go a long way with the secular point of view in secular education, but they do not stop there; they do not say that secularism is all there is, that it is the whole story. To them, religious education builds on the base of secular education, but it adds a certain "plus." While science has enabled them to see that this "plus"

¹ For an attempt to state values held in common by all religions but letting each sect supply its own supporting reasons for them, see W. C. Trow, "A Valuistic Approach to Religious Education," *Religious Education*, 43: 169-174, May-June, 1948.

² DEWEY, J., "Religion and Our Schools," *Hibbert Journal*, 6: 806-807, July, 1908.

³ DEWEY, J., "Education as a Religion," *The New Republic*, 32: 64-65, August, 1922.

no longer consists of demons, witches, sorcery, or magic, they nonetheless still find that scientific progress has made the world more rather than less mysterious. The "why" of life is still the top mystery question for them. Consequently they do not shrink from speculating on a meaning of life and education which lies beyond purely secular explanations.

For most educators this quest for "plus" values beyond secularism centers in some conception of God. In giving further direction to this quest, the question immediately arises, does God lie beyond human experience; does he transcend it? Or is God to be found within human experience, is He immanent? Both ways seem beset with difficulties. If God is transcendent, then how is the child to learn about Him, how is he to communicate with Him through prayer and worship and have fellowship with Him? If God is immanent in human experience, then how is religious education to be distinguished from mere ethical education, indeed, from a secularist point of view?¹ In either event the "plus" values of religious education stem from something more than the fact that it is given on a separate day of the week, Sunday, or that it is based on a unique book, the Bible.²

The humanistic religious educator is inclined to make his approach to God through the agency of human experience. A firm believer in God he tests his knowledge and understanding of Him by his own experiences of Him. While formerly men recognized only a narrow range of experience as constituting God's revelation of Himself, the humanist has now quite enlarged the scope of such experience. Formerly finding God only through mystical visions and reading of His holy scriptures, the humanist now makes His acquaintance through science³ and social relationships⁴ as well. Indeed, so confident is he now of his newer resources of knowledge that he is frequently skeptical of any knowledge based on a faith which leaps beyond the evidence of human experience.⁵ Furthermore, he regards the church as a community and religious education as participation therein. Since he believes that the community having the highest regard

¹ HARNER, N. C., "Three Ways to Think of God," *Religious Education*, 34: 216-221, October-December, 1939. Cf. WEIGLE, L. A., "What Makes Education Religious?" *Religious Education*, 18: 90-92, April, 1923.

² BETTS, G., "What Makes Education Religious?" *Religious Education*, 18: 84-87, April, 1923.

³ BOWER, W. C., "The Significance for Religious Education of Trends in the Psychology of Religion," *Religious Education*, 23: 7-19, January, 1928.

⁴ AMES, E. S., "Can Religion Be Taught?" *Religious Education*, 25: 42-50, January, 1930.

⁵ CARMICHAEL, A. M., "Are Church and Public School Indispensable for Character Education?" *Religious Education*, 27: 408-412, May, 1932; and MORTON, I. A., "Religious Motive in Education," *Religious Education*, 40: 23-26, January-February, 1945.

for human personality is the democratic one, he fosters having children learn to think of the Christian community in modern democratic rather than in traditional monarchistic terms.¹ They may still learn to pray "Thy kingdom come," but the content of contemporary social experience will lead them to think of God more as a kind father and loving guide than as an austere lord and forbidding monarch.

The educational corollaries of the humanist's conception of God and religion are not far to seek. Clearly the humanist believes in a social theory of religious education. Learning the two great commandments—to love God and to love one's neighbor—turn out to be pretty much one and the same thing. Both are learned not so much directly as incidentally to a social situation.² To learn these two commandments of religion the humanist depends more on education than on evangelism, more on human initiative than on divine initiative.

Placing dependence on human initiative and human experience happily coincides with the tendency of the progressive philosophy of education to emphasize the importance of pupil activity in learning. But it is significant that this dependence of the humanist on experience runs well beyond its usefulness as an improved method of instruction. As a matter of fact, this dependence on experience affords a critique of religion itself. The child not only comes to a religious understanding of God through experience, but he constantly reconstructs his notions about God and religion in the light of the consequences of this experience.³ In other words, to teach and to learn religion is a creative experience.

To trust human experience this far indicates that the humanistic educator's tests of religious and secular truth differ little if at all. Indeed he is inclined to regard the division of the curriculum into sacred and secular truth as a grave misfortune since it distracts attention from the religious character of much of the secular curriculum. Properly conceived, he would argue, all education has religious overtones and implications. Since religion is nothing if it is not an all-inclusive, all-commanding attitude, it follows that religious education is simply education in the most complete sense of the term. On this account, the humanistic religious educator claims that progressive education with its emphasis on the "whole" child and on learning by "wholes" has much that is implicitly if not intentionally religious in emphasis.

At this point, a possibly suppressed question may come to the surface.

¹ Cf. WILLIAMS, J. P., "The Schoolman and Religion," *School and Society*, 70: 97-100, August, 1949.

² MARRIOTT, V. E., "New Flowers of the Spirit," *Religious Education*, 24: 250-262, March, 1929.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 86-87.

Is the humanist's confidence in man and his experience warranted? Is human nature sound and strong enough to carry the educational burden the humanist places on it? Is it not unbridled pride and an abysmal want of humility on the part of man to assume that God is what pupil and teacher creatively learn Him to be? Does not their anthropomorphism cause them to forget that it is God who made them and not they themselves? To all these questions the humanistic religious educator has but one answer and that is that the only learning he knows anything about is human learning and that the only approach that he has to religion, therefore, is through human experience. Until something more dependable than human experience appears, it would be folly for religious education to depreciate it, much less discard it.

Supernatural Religious Education

Step that humanistic religious education is beyond secularism, it is still short of what many think religion properly demands of education. The failure of humanism to go further beyond secularism they suspect is due, if anything, to the fact that humanism is infected with the virus of secularism. The dependence of humanism on human experience and its reluctance to distinguish between secular and sacred truth in the curriculum confirms their suspicion. To them, religion is nothing if its object, God, does not transcend human experience. Religion is inadequate for them if it does not involve a metaphysic, if it does not have a cosmic point of reference.¹ Taking off from the historical authenticity of the Judeo-Christian tradition or permitting themselves to speculate freely, they found their religious conceptions on a supernatural personal God who is not only author and sustainer of the universe but its supreme law giver as well.

Author of the universe, God is naturally Father of mankind. In view of such august lineage it becomes man to order himself lowly and humbly before his God and Maker. If he does, he will hardly be inclined to put too great reliance on the powers of human experience to penetrate the mysteries of religious truth. Born with only natural gifts of mind and these weakened by the loss of such added gifts of understanding as Adam may have had and lost through his disobedience, man is desperately in need of divine assistance and guidance in his religious education.² Without God as Redeemer as well as Creator of mankind, man's educational plight is not a happy one. To forget this fact, to think that man by his

¹ HOMRIGHAUSEN, E. G., "The Real Problem of Religious Education," *Religious Education*, 34: 10-17, January-March, 1939.

² SHIELDS, T. E., "Principles in the Teaching of Religion," *Catholic Educational Review*, 1: 341, April, 1911. For a further discussion of human nature, see *supra*, pp. 66-68.

human experience can possess himself of the divine content of religion, is a pretension which leads to a false pedagogical naturalism.¹

In his educational thinking, therefore, the supernaturalistic religious educator starts, not with autonomous man, but with divine thought about man. To see what this may mean, take the educational principle that man should grow and develop according to the laws of his own being.² The question may arise, How do we know what the laws of his being are? Can we determine the nature of human nature by what man thinks about himself? Or must the educator's estimate of man come from beyond man, that is, from God himself. For the supernaturalist it is God, of course, that is the light which, too bright to see, is nonetheless the light by which all else is seen. It is necessary, therefore, to supplement the child's natural reason with divine revelation and in the school to distinguish between secular and sacred truth though teaching them together at the same time in the same curriculum. In dealing with such dazzling and unimpeachable truth as revelation it will not be surprising if an infallible church claims to be the principal sponsor of education.³ Backed by such unerring sponsorship, the teacher's method can well afford to be dogmatic and authoritarian.

It is the supernaturalist's view of religion which, much more than the humanist's, introduces educational implications not hitherto met in a philosophy of secular education. Before following out these implications in greater detail, however, it may be well to pause briefly to recapitulate by comparing the supernatural and humanistic approaches to religious education. The supernatural approach seems based on a political analogy, while the humanistic seems based on a biological one.⁴ The former expresses itself in terms of the sovereignty of God, while the latter expresses itself in terms of growth and interaction of organisms. Human nature, according to the supernatural point of view, enters the world morally handicapped, while according to the humanistic view the weakness of human nature is not so much a handicap as the positive promise of growth which immaturity holds forth. If God is sovereign and mankind perversely rebels against His law, the courts of heaven must mete out punishment just as in any case where a subject disobeys his king. This punishment can be mitigated only if a Savior can be found to intercede on behalf of mankind and redeem it. Reverting to the more naturalistic

¹ PIUS XI, "The Christian Education of Youth," *Catholic Educational Review*, 28: 149, March, 1930.

² For a further discussion of this aim of education, see *supra*, p. 107.

³ For further discussion of this point, see *supra*, pp. 82, 159.

⁴ COLE, S. G., "Where Religious Education and Theology Meet," *Religious Education*, 35: 18-25, January-March, 1940.

biological analogy, the humanist is not so likely to regard deviations from the law as rebellion but as the natural outcome of encouraging initiative and responsibility in the development of individuality. From this angle the role of Jesus is not so much that of Savior and Redeemer as peerless idealist and reformer. Finally, in the case of supernaturalism, the religious educator stands in need of an unequivocal guide to determining God's law or will. Some supernaturalists find this in the church as a divinely appointed teaching agency, others in the Bible as a divinely inspired text for the curriculum. In the case of humanism, on the other hand, while church and Bible are highly esteemed, no social agency and no book hold unique command over the approaches to religious education.

Sin, Regeneration, and Grace

These three terms as well as any, perhaps, illustrate the salient differences which supernaturalism introduces into a philosophy of education. They describe the principal facets of learning where the curriculum is religious rather than secular.¹ The need for changing the terms in which one describes learning when the curriculum shifts from secular to religious materials grows out of the supernaturalist's theory of man and his relation to God. Since human nature still suffers from the punishment visited on Adam as a result of his defiance of God's command, the question initially arises whether there is anything that can be done to improve the disposition of human nature to learn what is necessary for its salvation.

The first step to be taken in this direction is the religious rite of baptism. The purpose of this sacrament is to repair the damage done to human nature by the head of the human line, its first progenitor, Adam. Neither parent nor teacher, however, should confuse the sacrament of baptism with the process of education nor think that the consummation of this sacrament renders further education unnecessary. Baptism does not completely purge human nature of its weaknesses; it merely marks a point at which a new effort begins. There will still be a lifelong struggle between the child's good and bad inclinations for which he will need every resource which divine authority and the wisdom of the race can supply him. Obviously the secularist would put baptism in the garret as outworn hocus-focus, but for the supernaturalist who accepts Holy Writ as his guide, it is an indispensable aspect of a religious philosophy of education.

At best, as indicated, baptism merely disposes human nature to the right educational influences. As an act of free will² the child may still choose to turn his back on the road to his salvation. He may still sin and sin repeatedly. Now what is the educational nature of sin? Is it

¹ For a statement of secular theories of learning, see *supra*, pp. 59-61.

² For extended discussion of this concept, see *supra*, pp. 61-66.

essentially different from error, its counterpart in secular educational theory? Error is generally the outgrowth of ignorance. The secular educator assumes like Socrates that if the child had known better he would not have erred. To know better in this instance, moreover, means more than intellectually cognizing the better; it means having the better issue forth in motor conduct.¹ If it does not, then more learning is still in order. Is sin any different? It seems so. It seems in the case of sin that the child knows better but does the worse. Knowing and doing, intellect and will, are set over against each other. If man's will remains insubordinate to his intellect or reason, he will have to do penance.²

At this point it may be well to note that some philosophers think that the conventional learning curve in secular education, to which psychologists have introduced us, does not apply to cases of learning religious and moral education.³ The reason for this is rather subtle. In secular subjects like the three R's there is a clearly defined subject matter to be learned. The target to be aimed at is unmistakable. But, in spite of the best of intent to strike it, a degree of failure is almost certain to attend the beginner's efforts. Obstacles of imperfect organization and control will interfere. He will have to practice to become perfect. In the moral situation, all this is declared to be different. One's effort to do the right does not fall short for want of habits of organization and control, for it is of the very nature of right always to be within reach. If it were not within reach, it could exert no moral obligation on the individual. Failure to do what is within reach, therefore, must be due to a lack of will to reach for the right. Thus sin results, not from falling short of a morality organically beyond the learner's reach, but out of a defection from what was admittedly definitely within the pupil's power. If the individual is under obligation to do right, then he ought to do it the first time. There should be no need of practice. Hence, there is no law or curve of learning for morality, as in the secular branches.

When child or adult is committed to the life of sin, how does he break away from it; how does he find his way to the straight and narrow path? If the religious educator follows the Bible—and the supernaturalist generally does—he will hold it necessary for the wayward one to undergo a certain regeneration. As Jesus said to Nicodemus, we must be born again

¹ For a discussion of the activity theory of learning, see *supra*, pp. 85-87.

² For a psychiatric redefinition of sin as social maladaptation, see A. T. Boisen, "Religious Education and Human Nature," *Religious Education*, 35: 13-18, January-March, 1940.

³ Hocking, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, pp. 151-152, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1923. But see HARTSHORNE, H., "A Few Principles of Character Education," *Religious Education*, 24: 808-815, November, 1929, who says one learns to resist temptation by grading and increasing the difficulty of it.

if we expect to be admitted to the kingdom of God in good standing. Naturally the Christian conception of regeneration here is not a physical rebirth but a spiritual one. But how does spiritual reorientation come about? Does a person learn it as in secular education he might learn to adopt a new political train of thought? Or is spiritual rebirth in a class by itself?

Some, especially those who take a dogmatic or evangelical point of view, seem to look upon regeneration as a unique experience. They think it the function of the Sunday school, for instance, first to lead children to religion and *then* to train them in their new way of life.¹ Education appears to be something which follows regeneration but is not involved in it. Perhaps a more familiar term for the about-face wrought in individuals by regeneration is conversion. We frequently speak of a person as being converted to religion or from one religious sect to another. But the same question still arises—Is conversion an educational experience or something other? Again, most people regard it as something other. Conversion seems to be associated with mystical flashes of insight. The experience of St. Paul on the road to Damascus sets the pattern. The core of this experience is obviously mystical rather than educational.

The mysticism already mentioned has also led to another type of learning experience, which may distinguish religious instruction from that in lay subjects.² This is learning through worship. The theory underlying this sort of learning is that, by putting the learner in an attitude of contemplation in a fitting environment, the windows of his soul will be opened to divine truths which otherwise he might never learn to know. Public religious worship may even have the effect of creating a spiritual bond in the school and community of considerable social significance. Learning, in such instances, is peculiarly direct, intuitive, aesthetic. As a type, however, it is not altogether unlike the approach to art and music in the lay curriculum.

It needs pointing out that some religious educators have come to regard regeneration and conversion as in no way different from conventional or secular descriptions of the learning process. Becoming convinced of the worthwhileness of the religious point of view for them is composed of not one but many turning points. Thus there will be many decisions for the child to make as the countless situations of life roll up. It is even possible that one of these decisions may overtop and influence all the rest as *the* decision. But what appears to be an instantaneous conversion, a mystical rebirth, they would prefer to interpret as the accumulated effect

¹ COE, *op. cit.* p. 310. Cf. HOMRIGHAUSEN, E. O., "Christian Theology and Christian Education," *Religious Education*, 44: 360-362, November-December, 1949.

² For a further discussion of mysticism in learning, see *supra*, p. 80.

of prior, if perhaps submerged and unnoted, decisions. Learning to dedicate one's life to God's way becomes a matter of process rather than crisis. With this comes the full realization that it takes duration rather than just an instant of time to build stable religious character.

Furthermore, there seems to be definite objection to any theory that religious experience comes by way of an inner illumination, independent from the ordinary channels of learning. The prime difficulty with this theory is that it may render religion incapable of being taught to some people. According to such a pattern, there may be emotionally stolid people who can no more sense a religious experience than color-blind people can recognize color, or tone-deaf ones, music. It seems preferable to many, therefore, to state the curriculum in psychological terms, that is, as a mode of child-experience and growth, for only so can its significance for religious conduct be realized.

Of course, not every wayward child or adult finds his way to the straight and narrow path or stays on it when he has found it. Not everyone is converted; not everyone sees the need for reorienting his life. Why are some more fortunate than others in coming on a reorienting or regenerating experience such as being blessed with an understanding parent, studying under a sympathetic teacher, playing for a great coach, or reading an inspiring book at just the right time? In part it is a matter of God's grace, as the supernaturalist religious educator would put it. Changes in a person's life are not always the result of his own efforts. There is also a divine initiative operating on occasion. As St. Paul wrote to the Ephesians, "By grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God."¹ The secularist, too, recognizes that education occurs under contingent and precarious circumstances.² Sometimes these circumstances hinder a child's education, and sometimes they further it. But, like "breaks of the game" in sports, they seem to defy planned anticipation. The supernaturalist, however, is unwilling to view these unusual circumstances as merely chance affairs. Where an omniscient and omnipotent deity rules the universe, it is unlikely that anything happens by chance. Hence God's grace is not, as some Christians seem to have thought, like the wind which "bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth."³ While it is a gift to which man has no right, it does not altogether baffle expectation. Man can put himself in the way of grace by participation in the sacraments and thus, as already seen in the case of baptism, improve his educational prospects. Conversely, education, if

¹ Ephesians 2:8.

² *Supra*, pp. 30-33.

³ John 3:8.

properly directed, can be an excellent preparation for receiving grace should it come the student's way.

Moral and Character Education

So far the principal focus of our attention has been on philosophical problems of religious education to the relative neglect of similar problems in moral and character education. This relative emphasis has been quite proper because the philosophical problems in moral and character education take their coloration from those in religious education. Thus, the three-cornered contrast between secularism, humanism, and supernaturalism in religion finds its counterpart in moral and character education. No educator can go far in planning a program of moral or character education before running on to the basic problem of a theory of morals or character. The primary question here is whether the school can teach morals successfully without placing them in a religious context. The secular public school has long taught moral character without mention of religion. The theoretical implication of this practice is that morals have a naturalistic origin in the folkways and mores of the community. The social and moral are one and the same. While the humanist tends to coincide with the secularist on this point, the supernaturalist differs quite fundamentally. To him the moral law is not just customary but divinely ordained. It is God, not man, who legislates the moral law. Consequently the endeavor to teach morals apart from religion, good as far as it goes, is doomed to fall far short of its objective.

Obviously it makes a profound difference which of these two theories of morals underlies the motivation employed in the formation of moral character. In the case of secular moral education the pressure to lead the good life comes from the social group—the class, the school, the home, and the like. These groups conform to or remold codes for very practical considerations. Motivation is quite pragmatic.¹ In the case of the supernaturalist social pressure and the individual habituation it represents is good but insufficient by itself alone. There must be in addition a religious sanction.² The supernaturalist has no confidence in moral education unless the oughtness of moral duty is taught to rest in the child's obligation to obey divine command. It is God as supreme lawgiver and perhaps even more as eternal judge, therefore, which ultimately guarantees moral conduct.

Those who look upon conversion and regeneration in mystical rather than educational terms tend to reflect the subjectivity of their mysticism

¹ For a more complete discussion of educational motivation, see *supra*, pp. 103-105.

² CANEVIN, R., "Religion First in Catholic Schools," *Catholic Educational Review*, 4: 97-109, September, 1912.

in their absorption with inner motivation in moral education. In character education they are more concerned with what a child is than with what he does. In a sense morality becomes an internal affair depending on good intention. If a child does wrong but has a good will, if he means well, then they relieve him in a measure from responsibility for the consequences of his conduct. They calculate the goodness of his act, not by its results, but by the quality of the impulse which prompted it.

Those who regard conversion and regeneration as aspects of education are likely to find fault with moral and character education so dependent on the child's internal disposition to do good because then character becomes too inaccessible to methods of the teacher or parent. The antidote they recommend is to look for the development of a child's character in what he does more than in what he is. What they seek is not only inner character but force of character, that is, efficiency in the active and overt execution of ideals. This same emphasis on active conduct is also a good antidote for those who tend to seek the motivation for moral education too exclusively in rational or intellectual education. Mere knowledge of the moral law as set down in the decalogue or the catechism is no sufficient guarantee that it will inspire moral conduct.

Much this same question appears in another form in determining the proper content for the curriculum in moral and character education. Some would teach children morals but not ethics. To them morals emphasize performance; ethics stress knowledge. What they prize in children is prompt and sure moral responses. If children stop to be rationally ethical, there is reason to fear that their goodness will become demoralized into a calculated expediency. Teaching ethics prematurely can hinder moral development just as premature emphasis on grammar by the teacher may impede rather than accelerate good habits of speech. If ethical instruction is to be given—and of course it cannot be postponed indefinitely—it should be reserved for the pupil's more mature years.

The intellectualization of moral education raises the allied question of how closely to relate moral education with other intellectual studies. Some are inclined to look on moral knowledge as essentially different from other kinds of knowledge. Particularly is this the case where morality needs the support of supernatural religion. Others take the view that intellectual and moral studies should go along hand in hand. Atomic fission is a case in point. Before its discovery many thought that physics and politics were separate courses in the curriculum. With the construction of the superdestructive atomic bomb, however, this is no longer the case. Atomic fission now has not only scientific but moral significance. Intellectual and moral studies, therefore, should be taught in conjunction

with each other.¹ Short of this correlation moral education runs the imminent risk of being no more than instruction about morals in which pupils learn abstract virtues without learning to be virtuous in the affairs of life.

Some educators have never stopped to realize how they can include a list of the finest virtues in the curriculum and yet fail to have the pupil become virtuous. Take from the moral catalogue such virtues as industry, patience, courage, perseverance, fidelity. A person could learn to excel in all these and yet not be moral or virtuous. The reason is that criminals as well as law-abiding citizens cultivate these virtues. Really the virtues listed are the marks of an efficient rather than a good will. That is, the child can practice these virtues while pursuing bad ends. Consequently it is not so much specific virtues which should govern the curriculum in moral education as it is some central ethical purpose.² The essence of moral education, therefore, is not to learn loyal obedience to a roll of virtues but to act intelligently in the light of social aims and their consequences.

The basic difference which has divided moral and character education so far continues to divide it in the matter of method. If moral duty binds the conscience of man because it is the obligation he owes to obey the will of a sovereign Lord, then the teacher's method may well take on the authoritarian manner of indoctrination. If, on the other hand, the moral law is just the outgrowth of social custom which is constantly being remade in the light of further social experience, then an experimental, problem-solving method is more apropos. We often think of the moral situation as represented by a forked road. Which fork to take, that is the moral dilemma. If God's will has been vouchsafed to us, the teacher can tell his class in advance the right fork from the wrong one. If, on the contrary, the forked road represents a genuinely novel situation in which it is not clear in advance which is the better fork, then teacher and class will have to approach the matter problematically.³ Instead of presenting his pupils with a choice between right and wrong he will have to present them with a choice between two possible rights in which the wrong becomes the alternative that is ultimately rejected in the light of the consequences of experience.

Such moral instruction more or less contemplates a direct attack on the

¹ SHIELDS, T. E., "Correlation in the Teaching of Religion," *Catholic Educational Review*, 1: 420-429, May, 1911.

² COE, G. A., "Virtue and the Virtues," *Religious Education*, 6: 485-492, January, 1912.

³ For a further discussion of this method, see *supra*, pp. 255-260. For a caution in its employment, see W. A. Squires, "Idealism, Mechanism and the Project Principle," *Religious Education*, 21: 458-466, October, 1926.

problem of educating for moral character. There are not a few who think this the best way of handling the matter.¹ There are others, however, who favor an indirect approach.² They see children all the time learning moral attitudes incidental to whatever activities are mainly occupying their attention. Incidental to work, study, and play, they see children constantly and inescapably learning attitudes of perseverance, kindness, frankness, loyalty, and the like. Recognizing that all learning has this multiple character, the wise teacher, they think, will have a constant eye out for calling attention to moral values though seldom making them the main object of the lesson.

Whether moral education should be the direct or the indirect object of any lesson, no doubt most educators of whatever philosophy would agree that efforts at moral education will prove abortive unless there is opportunity for the child to practice what the school or church preaches. We cannot teach children to be good simply by teaching them to be wise.³ They must have plenty of opportunity to habituate themselves in moral ideals. In other words, the only way to learn fair play is to play fair. Instead of learning lessons in school apart from life, school must incorporate into itself a social context of shops, laboratories, and playgrounds. Not only that; but moral learning in school must be continuous with moral learning outside through field trips, community activities, and the like. If school fulfills this larger function, we may be assured that anything learned in an undertaking having an aim and in cooperation with others will be inescapably moral.

Three Major Philosophies of Education

Ultimately, it may be, there are only two major philosophies of religious and moral education, but for present purposes three will be summarized. In the first place there is the philosophy of secularism which, while it has a theory of moral education, has no religious point of view at all unless paradoxically secularism itself be regarded as a religion. The secularist philosophy limits itself to the here and now, to nature, and to the judgments of human experience—especially the judgments of physical and social science. Morals are simply the conduct patterns which men in association with other men over the centuries have found most productive of human happiness and welfare. Hence in a school dominated by secularism, children learn to find the warrant for moral character in their own and adult ex-

¹ For example, BREED, F. S., "A Preface to Moral Training," *School and Society*, 32: 275, August, 1930.

² For example, SEARCH, P. W., "The Ethics of the Public Schools," *Educational Review*, 11: 134-145, February, 1896.

³ Cf. HUTCHINS, R. M., *Morals, Religion, and Higher Education*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950.

perience. Taught that anything which lies beyond human experience is purely speculative, they must be on their guard against a failure of nerve. They must have supreme self-confidence moderated by a humble regard for their own limitations.

In the second place there is the religious philosophy of humanism. Taking as inclusive a point of view as possible, the humanist is unsatisfied that secularism gives as complete an account of education as it is possible to give. There is so much of which man remains ignorant and is likely to remain ignorant, even after the best education has been given to the best intellect, that the humanist turns to a search for God for the inclusive and ultimate meaning of his educational efforts. Yet, though he orients himself to God, he is skeptical of the traditional supernatural approach to God. Humanist that he is, he puts his confidence in man and man's experience. In this respect, the humanist seems a secularist at heart, and perhaps, therefore, secularism and humanism are merely aspects of a single major philosophical point of view. In any event, the humanist approaches moral education much as does the secularist. It is chiefly in not stopping there that he distinguishes himself from the secularist. From a preoccupation with moral education the humanist constructs a social theory of religious education. He hunts for God in social relationships; in fact he conceives of God as the great valuer of persons.

In the third and last place there is the religious philosophy of supernaturalism. The supernaturalist religious educator recognizes the role of man in nature but is convinced on reason and revelation that there is more to human education than can be learned from human experience. Instead of a God who is merely immanent in the educational process he worships a God who transcends it as well. Regarding God as creator and man as creature the supernaturalist makes his whole philosophy of religious and moral education center around this relationship. The chief end of education is for man to fulfill God's purpose in making him, that is, to worship Him and obey His commands so as to earn eternal life with Him. It would seem as if learning to make the choice between such an eternal reward and its opposite, eternal damnation, would be a comparatively simple one. Unfortunately, however, the educator's task has been greatly complicated by man's first ancestor, Adam. Because Adam chose of his own free will to disobey a divine command, God punished him by visiting on him and all his earthly descendents diminished powers of reason and will. Under such a handicap man's own unaided powers are insufficient to learn the unerring way to salvation. Thanks, however, to a supernatural revelation confided to a divinely ordained teaching church, to the grace of God, and to the intercession of His only Son who died to redeem the sins of others, the educational means of regeneration are at hand to repair the damage originally done by Adam.

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CHAPTER XIV

SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION

Problematic and Systematic Organization of Philosophy

Up to this point the exposition of philosophy has been organized to shed light on specific problems which arise in the study and practice of education. Each problem has served as a nucleus for organizing the different theories or philosophies on which its solution has been based. So far, however, no attempt has been made to maintain continuity in the discourse, in terms of particular philosophies of education themselves. It is time now to assemble the like segments of these various educational philosophies into their respective systems of thought. As important as it is to see the wider ramifications of each of the numerous problems already discussed, it is of no less importance to test each position one has taken so far against every other for which he has stood. It is chiefly in the light of some total harmony that the strength of any individual stand can be assured. If any stand contradicts others, then one must be on his guard against weakness somewhere. But the search for this larger comprehensive statement is just what the purpose of philosophy is. Indeed, one would fail to be true to the spirit of philosophy if he did not essay to reduce his manifold convictions to some single, inclusive, consistent scheme of thought.

There are two ways in which this summation of viewpoints might be undertaken. On the one hand, they might be subsumed under categories which are already the familiar stock in trade of school people, and even the lay public. On this basis, there are two more or less clearly defined schools of educational philosophy. One, composed of followers of Dewey, is known largely under the title of "progressive education," but has an offshoot known as "reconstructionism." The other, not so easily named, consists of the defenders of more conservative practices. Among other titles they have been variously styled as "perennialists," "traditionalists," or "essentialists."¹ The lack of a commonly recognized name, however,

¹ For example, HALL-QUEST, A. L., "Three Educational Theories: Traditionalism, Progressivism, Essentialism," *School and Society*, 56: 452-459, November, 1942; DONOHUE, F. J., "Education Needs a Philosophy," *Educational Administration and*

is unimportant and certainly confesses to no weakness of conviction. The other way to classify educational philosophies is according to schools of thought long familiar to philosophers. The schools of thought which have had the most significance for modern education have been pragmatism, romantic naturalism, idealism, naturalistic realism, rational humanism, and Catholic supernaturalism.¹ Other philosophies have also had parts to play, but their educational implications have never been so systematically worked out as have those of the six mentioned. But for that matter, no school has worked out an entirely complete philosophy of education.

Different as are these two ways for putting together the strands of philosophical position dispersed throughout the preceding exposition, they are not mutually exclusive or unrelated to each other. The point at which an overlapping can most easily be established is the identity of outlook shared by progressive education and pragmatism. Indeed, so close is this identity that progressive education would probably cease to be a distinctive educational movement without pragmatic support. The next clearest point at which these two sorts of classification overlap is found in the support which perennialism or essentialism steadily draws from naturalistic realism, rational humanism, and Catholic supernaturalism. The direction of support which other schools of philosophy offer is not so unequivocal. Perhaps romantic naturalism points fairly definitely in the direction of progressive education, but idealism is more ambiguous. Its strains are obvious in its offspring, pragmatism, but at the same time idealism has not hesitated to chide and even disown its progeny. Yet, however these and remaining schools of philosophy are grouped, the best plan for recapitulating and systematizing the various philosophies of education now seems clear. There are two main themes around which to weave the continuity of the succeeding exposition: (1) progressivism, where pains must be taken to show its genesis in (a) pragmatism and (b) romantic naturalism; and (2) essentialism wherein separate attention must be given to its defense by (a) idealism, (b) naturalistic realism, (c) rational humanism, and (d) Catholic supernaturalism.

Supervision, 26: 462-466, September, 1940; and BRAMELD, T., "Philosophies of Education in an Age of Crisis," *School and Society*, 65: 449-452, June, 1947.

¹ For example, CHILDS, J. L., et al., "Experimentalism and American Education," *Teachers College Record*, 44: 539-571, May, 1943; SANDERS, W. J., "Thomism, Instrumentalism and Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, 10: 95-113, January, 1940; THOMPSON, M. M., "Personalism in the Present Day Philosophy of Education," *Personalist*, 25: 40-53, Winter, 1944; SISTER MARIE THERESA, "Two Moderns and Aquinas," *Catholic Educational Review*, 43: 159-169, March, 1945; HORNE, H. H., "Three Competing Philosophies of Education," *Educational Forum*, 9: 133-138, January, 1945.

PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION

Since progressive education has largely carried the initiative in the reconstruction of modern education, it may be well to commence with a summary and integration of its position. There are various aspects of progressive education which most readily leap to the eye as the representative features of the system. Notable at once is the emphasis which progressive schools put on pupil freedom. The child is encouraged not only to exercise physical freedom but to do his own independent thinking. Initiative and self-reliance are cardinal virtues which the progressively educated child is encouraged to develop. Freedom such as this is predicated on an acceptance of the fact of individual differences and a disposition to capitalize upon them.

Individuality in capacity and aptitude lays an inescapable imperative on curriculum and methods. What interests the individual is made the basis for the motivation of instruction. This interest, however, is not whimsical but definitely guided by the pupil's own purposes. The fact that his purposes in and out of school are constantly being balked by the uncertainties of everyday living affords an excellent point of departure for the life of the school. Herein lies the challenge to learn, to apply one's intelligence to the control of precarious factors in his environment. Out of this will come a felt need for the aid of the social heritage and help or instruction from the teacher. Restoration of the continuity of the interrupted purposes will need to be tested in appropriate activities. Emotional as well as intellectual activities, selected with a view to the development of the whole child, will have an opportunity for expression. The outcome of these activities will be measured or evaluated by the extent to which they accomplish the purposes entertained.

Finally, it is not overlooked that such a scheme of education has definite social implications.¹ Membership in society is recognized as the surest access to the social treasures necessary for the development of the pupil's personality. Of the various forms of social organization, democracy takes priority as most consonant with the progressive principles just laid down. Not only does a democracy have the highest regard for individual freedom, but it also is more inclined toward a progressive reconstruction of the social order.

One cannot stop, however, with such a running summary of progressive educational practices. The educational philosopher must inquire what is the warrant for such a scheme of education. The moment one probes beneath the surface to examine the underpinning of this position, he will

¹ *Progressive Education, Its Philosophy and Challenge*, Yearbook Supplement, Progressive Education, Vol. 18, 1941.

find himself confronted with a very intricate intellectual structure. This must now be inspected systematically.

Pragmatism, Instrumentalism, Experimentalism

Examined from the angle of pragmatism, the wider implications of progressive education become quite clear.¹ The fact that such practices as those epitomized are called "progressive" gives the first clue. Progress implies change. Change implies novelty. And novelty lays claim to being genuine rather than the revelation of an antecedently complete reality. Since all things neither change at the same time nor at the same rate, novelty is relative to the familiar. In fact, the world which confronts the pupil is a peculiar mixture of these two characteristics. Given such a metaphysic, it is small wonder that progressive education should emphasize the problem-solving attitude of mind, or that it should try to develop initiative and self-reliance in its devotees. The challenge to the intellect calls for employment of the familiar as a means of exploring the novel and bringing it under control in order to meet future novel situations.

One of the chief channels through which an emergent evolution works is that of individual differences. Both biological and social reproduction always occur with variations. Each variation, each species, however, is not necessarily a new genus. Yet, on the other hand, neither does subsuming the species under a genus exhaust the unique individuality of the species. Its individuality is still incomparably precious. Without it, there could be no progress at all. Consequently, the stress laid by progressive education on a cultivation of individual differences of pupils is

¹ The best single statement of this point of view is to be found in J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916, already a classic in the field of educational philosophy. Good, but less important treatments are E. C. Moore, *What Is Education?* Ginn & Company, Boston, 1915; I. Doughton, *Modern Public Education*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1935; J. L. Childs, *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1931; B. Bode, *Fundamentals of Education*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1931; D. B. Leary, *Living and Learning*, Richard R. Smith, New York, 1931; S. Hook, *Education for Modern Man*, Dial Press, Inc., New York, 1946; and I. B. Berkson, *Preface to a Philosophy of Education*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1940. For systematic criticisms, see H. H. Horne, *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1935; H. H. Horne, *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., Chap. 9, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927; A. Meiklejohn, *Education between Two Worlds*, Chaps. 10-14, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1942; J. H. O'Hara, *The Limitations of the Educational Philosophy of John Dewey*, Catholic University Press, Washington, D. C., 1929; J. M. Raby, *A Critical Study of the New Education*, Catholic Education Press, Washington, D. C., 1932; G. E. Mueller, *Education Limited*, Chaps. 2-3, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 1949; and T. Brameld, *Patterns of Educational Philosophy—A Democratic Interpretation*, Chaps. 4-6, World Book Company, Yonkers, New York, 1950.

easily understood. Their development is not only indispensable to self-realization but of inestimable value as a social resource.

But the question arises, how is one to know when change and individual variation will lead to progress? Progress is, after all, a value word. From the pragmatic point of view values are instrumental. They implement a person to gain ends. Progress occurs if these ends are achieved. But, of course, the inquiring mind will still want to know whether the ends were worthy or good. The pragmatist can only answer this question by asking another, good for what? In other words, the value of any particular ends must themselves be instrumentally judged against yet other ends. But, of course, such a process is endless unless one is willing to start with some simple desire as the given or accepted invaluable of that situation. Which of several lines of conduct is most likely to lead to progress will then be *judged* in terms of that specific situation. The criterion of the progressive, then, is always specific. He has no general formula for net progress because he has no final or fixed values. Indeed, how could he, in a world in which he sees a constantly emerging novelty.

From this, it is easy to see why the progressive educator gives so much attention to pupil interest. It is, after all, the core of educational value theory. It is one guide to the selection of curriculum materials and the single best dynamo by which to motivate them. Of course, the danger with this theory is that interest, like progress, will have a very limited application or duration. Children's interests are, for instance, notorious for their vacillation and lack of sustained drive. The defect, however, is not fatal, but something against which to guard. Some interests as they novelly emerge are, to be sure, only ephemeral. Others, of course, are much more intense, grip attention longer, and even change little, if any, over long periods of time. The pragmatist senses no contradiction in his position in entertaining such long-range interests. The point at which he wants to save his integrity is in being able to adhere to these values tentatively or experimentally. Consequently, the pragmatist or progressive would count it very shortsighted if children were not taught persistence and stick-to-it-iveness. The distinctive merit which he ascribes to his position is the fact that the child is driven to persevere by values which he himself sees and voluntarily accepts as his own.

The progressive's or pragmatist's theory of value not only lends importance to the role of interest in learning, but it also adds significance to several aspects of educational aims. Most readily deducible is the fact that the progressive has no fixed aims or values in advance. Educational aims, no matter how well authenticated by the past, are not to be projected indefinitely into the future. In a world rendered precarious and contingent by a compounding of the novel and the customary, educational aims

must be held subject to revision as one advances into the future. If education has any general aim in the light of which these successive revisions can take place, it is only that of pupil growth. But growth itself has no end beyond further growth. In other words, education is its own end. Progressive education is not progressive because it is making steady advance toward some definite goal but because it is growing in whatever direction a novelly emerging future promises most development.

From the foregoing, it must further be evident by now that educational ends are not termini to the road of education, but that they are, paradoxically enough, employed as means or instruments for finding the way. As such, they are used experimentally. No way to education is the true way. Rather it becomes true. To the pragmatist, truth is to be conceived dynamically. Verification is not just figuratively, but literally, truth-making. Education is creative. This does not mean, however, that pupil or teacher makes or creates external reality. Yet, while the pragmatist accepts the existence of an external objective world, nevertheless he does aim to manipulate it to see what the consequences will be. These consequences, in so far as they corroborate anticipated fact, become the truth.

This pragmatic theory of truth implies a very distinctive role for intelligence in the world order. It is to be thought of as an instrument of verification. In a precariously shifting environment, intelligence implements one to make satisfactory adaptations, to use the old and familiar as a tool for subjugating the novel and contingent. It is the chief means of survival. This is its biological evolution and its epistemological significance. Again, this background of pragmatism sheds light on the emphasis which progressive education places on the experimental way of both learning and teaching. When pupil and teacher enter on a project, there are no preconceived ends at which they must come out. The mutual challenge is to think their way out.

Crucial in the pragmatic or experimental way of gaining truth is its methodology. As already noted several times, a precarious universe sets the problem. After defining the difficulty as precisely as possible and surveying the resources available for its solution, an hypothesis is proposed. After this has been dramatically acted out in imagination, it is put to the test. Activities are overtly initiated in the precarious environment to see whether their consequences will square with those anticipated. The importance of the "activity" curriculum centers right here. Activities are necessary both to make education lifelike and to make life yield the truth.

The pragmatic theory of knowledge is further strategic in the progressive's conception of the curriculum. For the pragmatist, knowledge is

something which is wrought out in action. Before it is used, it is merely information. Information becomes knowledge when it is judged to be relevant to the solution of a particular problem, and that judgment is tested in the crucible of experience. It is for reasons such as these that the progressive educator tends to distinguish between the curriculum drawn up in advance and the curriculum which the child actually learns in action. For him, knowledge does not antedate learning but is forged as the pupil and teacher adapt means to ends as their project develops.

Because the pragmatist approaches both value and truth through the concrete experience of some individual, it must not be thought that he is overlooking the experience of others. As a matter of fact, he rates the social very highly. Simply stated, society is a mode of shared experience. Participation in society is one of the most important ways in which education takes place. The way in which society is organized for sharing is, of course, the critical point. The more free and unimpeded this sharing is, the more democratic the society is said to be, and certainly the greater is the educational opportunity. Herein one can see at a glance the great dependency of a democracy on education. All this is very pragmatic, because the free flow of social intercourse makes more experience available for judging what is true and good in the individual's experience.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the progressive educator is warmly attached to the democratic process. The two have much in common because both encourage the individual to specialize in cultivating his unique talents. Happily, the more different individuals get to be, the more things they have to share and the more socially interdependent they necessarily become. Consequently, progressive education is opposed to any barriers which inhibit the easy interchange of diverse cultural viewpoints, such as the segregation of the sexes or separate high schools for vocational and college preparation. Besides, in the classroom the progressive teacher democratically shares with the children as many decisions as to objectives, curriculum, and discipline as possible. What he expects between pupil and teacher he also recommends between teacher and administrative or supervisory staff.

Of course, all this means a larger measure of freedom in the progressive school. Freedom will be predicated upon the importance of individuality. Its effectiveness, however, will be enhanced in proportion to the richness of the culture that is appropriated through democratic sharing. Furthermore, freedom is not just for the pupil, but for the teacher as well. The progressive will especially value his academic freedom, for without it the school is powerless to be an effective instrument of social progress. But, on the question whether the school should lead the way to building a new social order, progressives themselves disagree. Suffice it to say that

the efficiency of the democratic school in meeting social change lies in its insistence on a free flow of social intercourse. In this way it is able to mobilize the maximum resources at any given point of the front of social progress.

Further to ensure a maximum of freedom for each individual the pragmatic progressive favors a pluralistic view of society, that is, a society in which the state is but one among many different forms of social organization providing educational opportunities. By preventing any one agency, such as the state or the church, from obtaining a monopoly over education a variety of different educational aims, methods, and curriculums ensures the individual freedom to choose one to his liking. Yet, although betraying a deep commitment to the idea of freedom, the pragmatic progressive does not think he contradicts himself in yielding to greater and greater participation by the state in the educational enterprise. Indeed only if the state expands such services as free transportation to and from school, free medical examinations, and free texts and supplies will the child be free to make the most of his capacities.

This social orientation is, finally, the characteristic feature of the progressive's religious and moral education. Moral education is education in the mores. But, like a good pragmatist, he wants the child to be intelligent about the mores. The mores, in other words, are to be applied tentatively and experimentally. Their sanction is to depend on their consequences, not on religion. Indeed, religious education is not essentially different from moral or even secular education. It, too, consists in a zealous participation in the enterprises of the community. If it has a distinguishing feature, it is an endeavor to direct the child's attention to a certain inclusiveness of point of view.

Reconstructionism

Reared in the progressive philosophy of education and still largely adhering to the pragmatism which undergirds it is a group of "reconstructionists" who are impatient with the pace and scope of the educational reform characteristic of progressivism.¹ Progressive education, the reconstructionist thinks, is all right in a fairly stable society where, to be sure, changes do occur, but the adjustments they require to maintain stability are rather limited. If the pursuit of academic freedom or civil liberty leaves one undecided as to alternative adjustments or at least with-

¹ The principal reconstructionist is Theodore Brameld who first gave a synopsis of his views in *Ends and Means in Education—A Mid-century Appraisal*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1950, and later expounded them at full length in *Patterns of Educational Philosophy—A Democratic Interpretation*, World Book Company, Yonkers, New York, 1950.

out strong commitment to one of them, no great harm results. Such uncertainty is the normal expectancy in a society which is in transition. But those who call themselves reconstructionists do not think they are living during a mild period of smooth social transition. Quite the contrary, they think the conditions resulting from world war, from the continuing strife between communism and capitalism, and from the peacetime as well as military significance of atomic fission are volcanic, even revolutionary, with possibilities. Minor and retail adjustments will no longer suffice. The times demand major and wholesale "reconstruction." Progressive education may have been adequate for an era of laissez-faire liberalism, but it is high time now to take a bold step beyond it.

Nothing reveals the radical boldness of the reconstructionists better than the importance they attach to taking a utopian view of education. They favor criticizing and guiding contemporary educational efforts from the point of view of the finest idealization of education they can possibly form. Because they are utopian, however, they are not unrealistic. They expect to put their utopia to work and not to retreat to it as to some ivory tower in the dim past or remote future. In main outline their utopian conception of education calls for the maximum possible self-realization of the great mass of the people. Since the great mass of the people are workers—farm workers, wage earners, salaried employees—education will have an undoubted labor orientation. Such an education will only be possible in an economy of abundance and under the aegis of a positive or welfare state from both of which human exploitation is excluded and under both of which there is thoroughgoing democratic control.

On the whole the reconstructionist leans heavily on pragmatic philosophy for strategy and tactics to achieve his utopia. Yet his utopianism is sufficiently different to require some amendments and some different emphases. Perhaps first is the orientation toward the future which his utopianism gives him. If the pragmatist is accused of presentism, the reconstructionist must be accused of futurism. However, there is nothing merely fanciful about the reconstructionist's preoccupation with the future. To him the future is a proper part of his ontology, a generic trait of existence, as he sees it. If we speculate on what the future might be like and then take these future possibilities into account in planning the present, the future becomes a force in the present and takes on genuine reality.

It is perhaps next in order to note the emphasis which the reconstructionist places on goal seeking. Not only does he regard goal seeking as basic to the nature of human nature, but he also regards it as central in a theory of learning. Obviously goal-seeking behavior is future oriented. Hence it is ideally suited to supporting a utopian philosophy of education.

But in addition, goal seeking makes another emphasis which the reconstructionist regards as highly important. Goals or values are immediately known unmediated by reason. They have a nonrational quality which the reconstructionist thinks has been much neglected in knowledge and value theory. Because of this immediacy these goals are prehended rather than apprehended. On this account they tap human powers of tremendous force. Hence if a social consensus on utopia and the means thereto can be achieved, powerful energies are at hand to bring utopia into being.

Such a consensus is already to be found in a people's ideology—the system of beliefs, habits, prejudices on which it joins in acting. To the reconstructionist this ideology is a kind of group mind and as a social structure forms one of the generic traits of existence which a philosophy of education must take into account. In pointing to a group mind the reconstructionist is not invoking any mystical entity different from or other than the individual mind. He is merely describing the fact that groups of people do remember their common experiences, criticize them, and use them as norms for future experience. But groups are at odds on their ideological norms. In fact intergroup struggle with its contraction and expansion of freedom seems to be as much a part of the reconstructionist's ontology as social structure itself. The possibility of achieving utopia through education can only be as effective as there is social consensus on utopia. Yet the reconstructionist insists that this consensus must be voluntary; it must wait on the voluntary testimony of individuals and groups approving the goals it sets forth. Consequently the reconstructionist does not believe that the school should indoctrinate his utopia, although he does believe it defensible partiality for the pupil or teacher to propagandize for it once he has considered all the evidence pro and con and made a commitment to it.

Romantic Naturalism

Not a few progressives find philosophical support for their educational convictions, not so much in pragmatism as in a romantic naturalism.¹ For them the main tenets of progressive education take root, not in Dewey and his followers, but in Rousseau and his adherents. Pragmatists like Dewey ground the main progressive tenets of interest and freedom in a theory of knowledge. The activity program which embodies these tenets

¹ The classical exposition of this educational philosophy is to be found in J. J. Rousseau, *Emile*, and in F. W. A. Froebel, *Menschenziehung*. While not a few modern educators practice this philosophy, no modern educational philosophers write in this vein. But see A. S. Neill, *The Problem Family*, Hermitage Press Inc., New York, 1949, which, though not written in philosophical form, nonetheless has broad philosophical implications not unlike those of Rousseau.

is basically a method of testing the truth. The romantic followers of Rousseau, on the other hand, ground the tenets of progressive education principally in a theory of human nature. Since the child is spontaneously self-active, interest and freedom follow as the chief vehicle of self-expression.

The romantic naturalist has a profound reverence for nature as witness that famous assumption of Rousseau's that child nature is good, rather than fallen, as was the habit of his contemporaries. The implication here is that human nature develops according to laws as inexorable as those which heavenly bodies obey in their orbits. The duty of educators is to learn what these laws are. Once found out, it is their further duty to invoke, rather than interfere with, their operation. From this origin, then, stems the whole child-study movement. Child nature becomes the norm.

From these premises, the conclusion has been drawn that what is, is right. Whatever the child is striving to do must be because of some basic urge that is trying to assert itself. The attention, therefore, paid to children's interests is entirely proper and natural. Indeed, one must be very careful not to thwart these native drives any more than can possibly be avoided. If one would fashion a list of the objectives of the school, he should have immediate recourse to child psychology. From its inventory of the instincts which are seeking expression, one can make up a catalogue of child needs. These, then, become the objectives which education should try to liberate and satisfy.

The romantic naturalist not only has a high regard for nature as represented in child needs, but he has an especially high regard for nature as represented in individual child needs. He reverences the unique as well as the universal in human nature. Consequently he is ready to organize the school program around the individual interests of the child. He gives high priority to what the individual child thinks and feels, to what he desires and values. If this seems like undue attention to the subjective moods of the child, it is because we fail to attach sufficient worth to the rich diversities of nature.

This romantic regard for the unique and subjective has even infected the pragmatism of some progressives. After defining the true as what works, they proceed to define "works" as achieving what they set out to do. What turns out to be true thus depends in part, at least, on the aims or values with which they started. That is, there is a certain wishful quality about the truth. If what they will to believe turns out well, then they are inclined to regard it as the truth in so far forth. With such premises it is easy to comprehend why learning in the progressive school must be purposeful, why in the project method the child should have a dominating

purpose or inner urge which fixes the aim, guides the process, and furnishes the motivation.

The modern romantic naturalist probably accords the social process a more natural status in the education of the child than did its famous earlier advocate, Rousseau. But even so, the center of gravity of the educational process is still quite heavily weighted toward the independence and autonomy of the individual. The natural rights of man are matched with a bill of rights of childhood. Indeed, these rights often seem to crowd his duties off to the back or side of the educational stage. The inhibitions of social taboos are sometimes rejected as unnatural. The natural state of man is supposed to be freedom. While discipline and self-restraint are worthy objectives, they are incidental to the more positive virtues of a school program emphasizing self-expression.

This thinly veiled injunction laid on parents and teachers not to interfere with the natural development of children blossoms into the doctrine of *laissez faire* on the larger social scale. A governmental hands-off policy toward education has more than once been advocated on naturalistic grounds. In place of the artificial promptings of government, the natural self-interest of people is relied on to provide schools when needed. Where the natural instincts of parenthood fail, those of philanthropy will come forward. If the government steps in at all, it should only be as a last resort in order to see that no injustice is done to any child. Such a philosophy of education, of course, accentuates opportunities for the self-assertiveness of the strong and capable. But even in this, there is a sort of natural justice. It seems to be a social application of natural selection and survival of the fittest.

Underlying both pragmatism and romantic naturalism is a certain presentism or temporalism which finds an easy lodgment in a naturalistic philosophy of education. In a novelly developing universe, one can hardly afford to take his eye off the point at which the new emergents are constantly coming into view. That point, of course, is the ever-moving present. If he averts his gaze too long to the past or future, the rush of oncoming events may run him down. This being the case, it is small wonder that progressives advocate that education be life now rather than a preparation for adulthood or life at some contingent future date. If the child lives well in the present, then as the future imperceptibly grows out of the present, he will be as well prepared as he can be for whatever the future has in store.

ESSENTIALISM, TRADITIONALISM, PERENNIALISM

Over against the philosophy of progressive education supported by pragmatism and romantic naturalism stands that of essentialism or tradi-

tionalism. The spirit of this educational philosophy can, perhaps, best be caught from the word essentialism.¹ In the midst of the welter of change and diversity, the essentialist believes that there are some points of the educational compass which are relatively fixed. He will recognize that there are many educational values by which one might steer but that there are some by which he must steer. Convinced of what are the essentials of education, he firmly and resolutely insists that the child learn them. If he does not believe that the whole curriculum should be prescribed, he at least believes that a considerable part of it should be. In the traditional curriculum he finds certain classics in literature, mathematics, religion, history, science, and others whose value is independent of the place and time they are studied. These, educated men must know. They are essentials. They must be learned even though their significance is not made clear in the fulfillment of some present purpose. Till such occasion arises later, they are to be learned and stored away.

Variations in pupil interest are to be expected, but these chance variations should seldom, if ever, take precedence over the essentials. If a child has a genuine interest in the essentials, well and good. If not, pressure must be brought to bear to incline him in that direction. In learning to put forth effort where interest may lag or even be wanting, a certain moral stamina will result. Education will possess a vertebrate oughtness which should afford the child a much-needed discipline. In this process, there need be no fear that educational freedom is denied. Instead of being employed as a means, it will be made an end, or an outcome, of the educative process. Freedom will be regarded as a well-deserved reward for the youth who has learned to discipline himself through a mastery of the social experience of the ages.

Deriving the essentials of education from tradition has strong social implications for a philosophy of education. Its main strength lies in the trust which is placed in the experience of other people and other times. Experience refined and generalized in the mill of preceding generations must have an authority which surpasses that of any individual child and his epoch. The more confidence one has in this authority, the more authoritarian is the structure of society likely to be. The latitude for discretion for the common run of people is correspondingly narrowed and restricted. This is the acknowledged trend in dictatorial states, and its influence is even to be detected in democratic ones as well. The educational corollary is clear. As the classroom is dominated by the teacher, so the school is by the principal and the system by the superintendent.

Adult society, however, is not the final seat of authority for many

¹ BAGLEY, W. C., "An Essentialist's Platform for the Advancement of American Education," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 24: 241-256, April, 1938.

essentialists. For them, the essential values in education are ultimately sanctioned and consecrated by religion. Hence, religious education must necessarily be pitched at a higher level than the naturalism of participation in social institutions. Its concern is with an unassailable authority, an authority which is above and beyond nature, the supernatural. Its main inspiration is a divine being, God, the author of all values, educational and otherwise. With such backing, there can be no misgiving about the essentials of either sacred or secular learning.

In passing from the philosophy of progressive education to that of the essentialists or traditionalists, one should not necessarily regard the transition as an abrupt one. Both philosophies have right and left wings, and there are eclectic philosophies which incorporate elements of both schools of thought. This overlapping is particularly clear in the case of a group of educational philosophers which is impressed with Darwinian concepts. This group is progressive in that it recognizes the social value of individuality in the pupil or teacher and the freedom that is demanded for its realization. But, at the same time, this group is essentialist in being fully aware of the relentless pressure with which society enforces the customs which are basic or essential for maintaining its unique character. Consequently, this group bears down almost unsparingly on conformity to certain social demands on education.

Idealism

Somewhat on the border line is idealism as a philosophy of education.¹ It was parent to much of the educational innovation of the nineteenth

¹ The idealistic school of educational philosophy has been represented by several writers, most notable of whom is probably H. H. Horne. See his *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927; *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1935; and *Idealism in Education*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1923. Good but more limited are W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1923; A. Meiklejohn, *Education between Two Worlds*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1942; and S. V. Henderson, *Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1947. Less important are the expositions of A. C. Fleshman, *The Educational Process*, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1908; A. Tompkins, *The Philosophy of Teaching*, Ginn & Company, Boston, 1898; and R. M. Shreves, *The Philosophical Basis of Education*, Richard G. Badger, The Gorham Press, Boston, 1918. For a treatment of fascist philosophy of education as a phase of idealism, see G. Gentile, *The Reform of Education*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., New York, 1922; and M. M. Thompson, *The Educational Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile*, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1934. For idealism as the backbone of Protestant educational philosophy, see C. Jaarsma, "The Philosophy of Education," *Christian Home and School Magazine*, November, 1943, to February, 1944; G. H. Clark, *A Christian Philosophy of Education*, W. B. Erdman Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1946; and R. L. Cooke, *Philosophy, Education*,

century. Yet it has been unwilling to sponsor the second generation of its intellectual offspring in the twentieth century. Idealism is to be credited with a high regard for individuality and freedom in education. Moreover, its activity program has been voluntaristic and developmental. Yet, in spite of even a tinge of romanticism, there is a measure of absolutism in idealistic philosophy of education which seems more properly to align it with the essentialists.

This classification seems clearly justified where the idealistic pattern of modern educational philosophy is Platonic. Here ideas are of ultimate cosmic significance. But by ideas much more is meant than mere mental states. Ideas are rather the essences of archetypes which give form to the cosmos. They are the immaterial molds into which all matter is cast. They are the ideals or standards by which the things of sense are to be judged. While matter is known through the senses, its idea or principle is grasped by the mind. But most important for the educational philosophy of essentialism is the fact that these ideas or forms are eternal, unchanging. The objects of sense, on the other hand, seem to be in a continual state of flux. Archetypal ideas do not become; they simply are.

If the ideas conditioning the very pattern of the world in which the child lives are in fixed and final form, they must necessarily constitute the essentials of his education. There can be no avoiding them as the backbone of the curriculum. They become a "must" program for the school. This does not mean that education of the senses, and particularly physical and vocational education, is to be neglected. But in any hierarchy of educational values it will not be surprising if they occupy a lower status. Formal intellectual studies and methods will rank highest.

Moreover, there seems to be a definite organismic bearing to the idealistic essentialist's educational philosophy. It appears to side with Aristotle in declaring that what a developing organism is to become the organism already latently is. The idea or ideal toward which his mind matures must potentially exist within the child before he starts to learn. Learning merely makes definite what formerly was inchoate. This position, clearly, is cousin to the account of learning given by Gestalt psychology.

and *Certainty*, Zondervan Publishing House, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1940. Although not so easily classified, probably M. Demiashevich, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, American Book Company, New York, 1935, and R. Ulich, *Fundamentals of Democratic Education*, American Book Company, New York, 1940, belong with the idealists. The chief criticisms of the idealistic philosophy of education are to be found scattered throughout J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916, and in T. Brameld, *Patterns of Educational Philosophy—A Democratic Interpretation*, Chaps. 7-9, World Book Company, Yonkers, New York, 1950. For a more limited assessment, see H. E. Langan, *The Philosophy of Personalism and Its Educational Applications*, Catholic University Press, Washington, D.C., 1935.

Modern idealism has given a somewhat different turn to educational philosophy. In its modern meaning, idealism has more to do with ideas as mental states. In this sense idealism might more properly be called a philosophy of idea-ism—the “I” of idealism being inserted for euphony. On careful analysis, it has occurred to some that the only knowledge one has of his environment is his idea of it. The environment in itself can never be known directly. It can only be known through the intermediary ideas of a human knower. The form which the learner’s knowledge takes, therefore, is bound to be in part the product of his human way of apprehending it. The space or time occupied by a learning activity affords a good illustration. Whether space or time has an external objective existence is beyond human proof. Nonetheless, men do have definite ideas of space and time. The conclusion, therefore, is that such concepts are supplied by the mind of the human learner. They are a priori categories of thought.

If such a theory of knowledge be sound, some idealists have gone a step further to argue that reality itself must be idea-istic. What the more exact nature of reality as idea happens to be, is answered by a variety of idealisms. The one which has most found its way into educational philosophy is that of absolute idealism. According to this view the heart of reality is to be found in thought or reason. Reason is absolute; in fact it is *the* Absolute. Being absolute, it is also One, monistic. In it, everything is interrelated, all contradictions reconciled. Furthermore, the complete cause of any single occurrence involves the whole of reality. The cosmos, then, is a great thought process and the Absolute is God thinking. Whatever has happened or whatever will happen, is the result of the self-willed idea of the Absolute. Yet, at the same time, the Absolute is already complete, self-realized. Nature, not to forget it, is the medium through which the Absolute progressively reveals itself in external form. Mind in man partakes of the nature of this absolute Mind. The mind of man, however, is but a part of this absolute whole. It is, therefore, finite and incomplete. Consequently, its objective is to strive to realize itself, to become what it was meant to be.

On the whole, the essentialist’s philosophy of education is quite appropriately enclosed in this frame of reference. Obviously, what is absolute is essential. This unmistakably sets the end of the educational process. It is the ever-increasing realization of the absolute idea. This statement of objectives also determines the function and purpose of educational philosophy. Its quest is an understanding of ultimate reality. The Absolute being the whole and education being a part thereof, it may be that study of the fragment may reveal important facets of the totality.

The absolute idea, of course, is never fully learned because the Absolute is infinite. Hence, each learning achievement of the educator but reveals

that his goal is farther off. At this point, the idealistic philosophy of education not only seems to satisfy essentialism but to be progressive as well. It seems at once to be both stable and flexible. But the weight of this philosophy rests more heavily on the one foot than on the other. Its Absolute is only infinite, limitless, in the sense of being all-inclusive. This means that absolute Mind requires no further development. It is already complete and fully self-realized. Development or learning is only for the mind of the child, of finite man. And even he becomes, in time, what he eternally is. Nothing evolves which was not already involved. Thus, in the end, essentialism prevails over progressivism.

Since the Absolute is all-inclusive of everything that ever has been or ever will be, truth and goodness must be an open book to the mind of the Absolute. This extension of the idealist position further increases the gap between essentialism and progressivism. It at once determines a different and distinct pattern for the educative process. Truth and goodness set the models to which the child's learning should conform. They set the bounds of what is essential. Learning is not a creation, but a realization, of the absolute idea of truth and goodness. In the idealistic school, ideas do not become true because of the value they have for accomplishing some pupil project. Rather, ideas work well there because they are true. Their worth is intrinsic, not instrumental. They are representative of ultimate reality and are, therefore, worth learning as ends in and of themselves. Truth has always been true; it does not become true. Hence, the essentialist's curriculum, in so far as it is constituted of knowledge that is consistently true, can be made up and learned in advance of its use.

Exact and direct correspondence of the child's efforts with objective truth of course is impossible for the idealistic essentialist. For him, the test of truth is better derived from the logical consistency among his various ideas about truth. From this and the foregoing, one can deduce the role of mind in both the educative and world process. Mind is not merely a recent biological acquisition. Rather is it a primordial stuff which is the very essence of reality itself. Since the world is the child's idea, education is a sort of world-building in which the child tries to construct an inner world view which as nearly as possible approximates outer reality, the Absolute. He endeavors to form a *Weltanschauung*, to use the German word which has so precisely and popularly expressed the philosophy of idealism.

The mentalistic approach to idealism on the whole has committed this educational philosophy to the preeminent importance of consciousness. Mind is ultimately spiritual, not materialistic. Partaking of the nature of the absolute, it could not be otherwise. A body and an environment there are, to be sure, but ultimately these are reducible to mind. Conse-

quently, any educational psychology which overlooks the data revealed by introspection must necessarily be untrustworthy. Human nature is to be viewed as more than a behaving organism responding to the stimuli of his environment. This is too atomistic. Idealism stresses a certain wholeness. Nothing happens in any part of the system that does not affect all the rest. Herein lies theoretical support both for education of the whole child and, to a degree, organismic educational psychology.

Some idealists are inclined to exalt will rather than intellect or reason to the position of Absolute. On analysis, they find that primacy must be awarded to a certain activity or striving as the heart of reality. This theory is notably different from the pragmatic in accounting for the activity principle in education. It puts an education squarely up to the individual. Neither teacher nor parent, school nor church can educate him. Only through a voluntary effort of his will can he educate himself. He will be particularly called upon to make this effort when interest fails to motivate his learning activities. This assures the essentialist that essentials will be learned despite the failure of easier approaches.

Whether idea or will be made the absolute, each is peculiarly private to the individual. The idealist must therefore be at especial pains to avoid the egocentric predicament of solipsism. His educational theory must avoid the uncompromising insistence of the pupil or teacher that reality exists exclusively as he views it. Otherwise, the operation of mind on mind would be impossible, and both the social and educational processes would be without meaning. The idealist escapes this predicament by objectifying mind, that is, he reduces everything to mind but admits that there are other minds than his. Most important here, of course, is absolute mind. All individual minds are encompassed in the absolute mind. Out of this grows a conception of the social mind. In addition to individual minds is the over-mind of society in which all share. It is the whole, of which the rest are parts.

The educational significance of this rather abstruse and compact statement is tremendous. On the one hand, it projects individuality to front-rank importance. Much is made of the spiritual autonomy of the individual. In this respect, idealism can lay definite claim to favoring a democracy as the social soil in which its educational theory is to grow. On the other hand, the individual seems subordinated to the social whole. About this whole there is a definite oneness; it is monistic. This has led to invoking idealism as the underpinning for totalitarian theories of education, especially that of fascism. Of course not all essentialists are fascists, but there is an undeniable essentialism about fascism.

Little need be said, in conclusion, about the idealistic point of view on religious and moral education. Its definition of the Absolute has unmis-

takable theistic characteristics. Since the aim of education is the increasing realization of the absolute, all education appears tinged with religious significance. This includes moral education as well. Reason being absolute, the universe is one of law and order. So, too, there is a moral law in the universe backed by the authority of the Absolute. This lays an inescapable moral imperative on education.

Naturalistic Realism

So far, the stability and firmness on which the essentialist philosophy of education prides itself has been rooted in a reality that has been idealistic. Ideas rather than external objects have constituted ultimate reality. Some essentialists, however, think that a more solid foundation can be built for their philosophy of education in a theory that these objects have a reality independent of mental phenomena. This philosophy is known as realism.¹ In its more materialistic phases, it even reduces mind itself to an aspect of matter. Possibly excepting this last statement, realism seems a very common-sense point of view. It seems essentialist in that it bluntly recognizes the uncompromising limits within which human educational endeavors must be undertaken.

Education, for the naturalistic realist, is primarily concerned with the world as it is here and now. The universe, for him, is not only external to him, but it is governed by inexorable law. If this seems less true in the social as compared with the natural sciences, it is only because man has not yet perfected techniques for ascertaining and stating the laws of social phenomena. In any event, man has only his intelligence to depend on to survive in his struggle with external nature. Fortunately for him, his intelligence is thoroughly at home in the natural order because its

¹ The most general theoretical statement of the naturalistic or scientific realist position is that of F. S. Breed, *Education and the New Realism*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1939. Much less able is J. F. Dame, *Naturalism in Education—Its Meaning and Influence*, Temple University, Philadelphia, 1938. More specific statements are those of W. C. Bagley, *Educational and Emergent Man*, Thomas Nelson & Sons, New York, 1934; and I. W. Howerth, *Theory of Education*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1929, who make biological evolution the core of frankly avowed naturalistic realistic philosophies of education. R. Finney, *Sociological Philosophy of Education*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1928, does the same from the point of view of educational sociology. H. C. Morrison, rests his *Basic Principles of Education*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934, on a combination of scientific principles drawn from physiology, psychology, and sociology. The chief criticisms of the naturalistic position have been offered by G. O'Connell, *Naturalism in American Education*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1936, and W. L. Patty, *A Study of Mechanism in Education*, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1938, but especially by T. Brameld, *Patterns of Educational Philosophy—A Democratic Interpretation*, Chaps. 7-9, World Book Company, Yonkers, New York, 1950.

pedigree shows its evolution as an instrument of adaptation to a changing environment.

This reference to mind indicates a further affirmation of a naturalistic realism. Instead of standing outside nature, mind is a naturalized product of nature. Mind is biological in origin and developed as a way of adjusting to a precarious and contingent nature. Furthermore the mind of *Homo sapiens* is a comparative recent addition to nature. It appeared late in evolutionary history and is not some primordial stuff which has antedated nature herself. In place of merely contemplating the glory of God's handiwork, mind is in and of nature, reconstructing it as well as comprehending it. The natural classroom method, therefore, is the problem-solving one.

One very important group of educational realists are the scientific realists. The fundamental assumption lying back of most educational science is that the object of research has a definite external physical reality. The educational scientist may fail to describe it accurately, but he never doubts the objective existence of what he is trying to study. This is true whether he is studying the material or the social environment. In either case their external existence sets an undeniably common point of reference for the educational enterprise. It is here that subjective differences of opinion must ultimately come for arbitration. Not even the fact that the objective reality so revered may be subject to evolutionary processes alters this conclusion. Under such conditions education, especially its scientific study, should endeavor to approximate the laws according to which these changes take place. Clearly, the realism depicted in these rugged and unyielding terms has a strong essentialist flavor.

Reality so defined is to be distinguished from truth. Reality simply is; truth is what reality is reported to be. The test of truth, hence, is its correspondence to reality. If ideas work, it is because they are true to reality and not vice versa. Truth may be the product of the human mind but not so reality. A creative intelligence, which creates reality, is discounted in advance. Consequently the theory of education as a reconstruction of the universe around us must give way to a theory of education as conformity to it. The curriculum, therefore, is composed of the best data on reality to date. Because this must be determined by the most competent investigators, the realist's curriculum tends to be sponsored in an authoritarian manner. For the same reason, it can readily be required as essential. Indeed there is an inherent and welcome discipline in letting the learner know that his education is conditioned by the inexorable quality of an external reality.

This point of view is, furthermore, the attitude of much scientific study of educational psychology. Particularly is it true of behaviorism. Here,

the investigator contents himself only with what he sees in the way of overt behavior. The idea that the psyche of the child has a supnature, a soul, finds no place in his account. Pretty much the same comment is in order for the neurological and physiological approaches to educational psychology. There is often a materialism and mechanism inherent here which is congenial with a naturalistic realism.

Given such premises, the educational realist is quite naturally committed to a stimulus-response type of learning and human nature. In the strictest sense stimuli are objective. On this account each stimulus and its response is capable of objective study. This in turn paves the way to the theory underlying scientific measurement in education. Tests are found to measure the qualities objectively observable in pupil reactions. The quality most frequently measured is that of accuracy, and it hardly needs mention what the standard of accuracy is where the correspondence theory of truth is assumed.

The same philosophy is implied in the movement to make a scientific determination of educational objectives. What a community values is held to be an objective fact. As such it should be as susceptible to investigation and definition as any other object of scientific research. And once given the authenticity of science—to most minds incontestable—it becomes invested with the spirit of essentialism. The social or cultural tradition stands for external reality as it is best known to date.

By confining educational aims within the bounds of the here and now, one but fits his educational philosophy to the dimensions of nature. He omits the eternal, the timeless, from his space-time frame of reference. Man does this because he feels at home in nature. He may not have a complete list of answers to all his problems, but he takes comfort and gains confidence in thinking that none of them is hidden in mysterious riddles of a superhuman or supernatural character. If religion enters his philosophy of education, it is only as a deified nature. God is immanent in nature, and nature is His temple of worship.

Moral education likewise is put on a naturalistic basis. Morals originate in the folkways or mores. These are either enforced by social pressures or are self-enforcing through their natural consequences. Character education, therefore, has no need of an appeal to an authority external to nature. Conscience becomes an echo of social custom rather than divine command.

*Rational Humanism*¹

Essentialism probably finds its sturdiest prop among those who refer to their philosophy as the *philosophia perennis*. Aristotle was the principal

¹ The reader should distinguish between rational humanism and the humanism of

author of this philosophy and St. Thomas Aquinas its chief subsequent modifier. So soundly did these men lay the basis of this philosophy that it has remained substantially unchanged since the Middle Ages. In spite of the rise and fall of rival systems it has continued to appeal to generation after generation down through the centuries. It is indeed, consequently, the perennial philosophy.

Aristotle developed the *philosophia perennis* about as far as one can go on human reason alone. St. Thomas made such modifications in Aristotle's position as the advent of Christianity seemed to demand. Some modern perennialists think they can maintain the perennial philosophy by leaning on Aristotle alone. Others, probably the majority, think this philosophy a more hardy perennial when it draws strength from St. Thomas as well. We will here refer to the educational philosophy of the former as rational humanism and to that of the latter as Catholic supernaturalism.¹

The major premise of rational humanism is an assertion that the essence of human nature is its rational character.² His vegetative and animal

the "religious educators," *supra*, pp. 280-283. Humanism emphasizes human nature and the human point of view. Some humanists think man's humanity lies in a rationality with which he was invested from the beginning of time. Other more recent humanists think man's rationality the natural product of evolution according to Darwin. The former humanists tend to think of the character and quality of rationality as fixed from the beginning, while the latter regard it as subject to further modification. The older humanists are concerned with an educational role for mind as knowing the world as it is constituted, while the newer ones formulate the role of mind as not only adapting to the world as it is but adapting the world so far as possible to suit themselves.

¹ Cf. BECK, R. H., "Neo-Thomism and Rational Humanism in Educational Philosophy," *Harvard Educational Review*, 19: 16-29, Winter, 1949.

² No one has yet set forth a full-length comprehensive exposition of the educational philosophy of rational humanism. The reader must depend, therefore, on a number of short brochures stating various aspects of it. Chief exponent of this position is M. J. Adler who has principally expounded his position in "The Crisis in Contemporary Education," *Social Frontier*, 5: 140-145, February, 1939; "Are There Absolute and Universal Principles on Which Education Should Be Founded?" *Educational Trends*, 9: 11-18, July-August, 1941; "The Order of Learning," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, Western Division, 1941, pp. 103-125; and "In Defense of Philosophy of Education," National Society for the Study of Education, Forty-first Yearbook, *Philosophies of Education*, Chap. 5. R. M. Hutchins, another capable exponent of rational humanism has stated his position most explicitly in "The Philosophy of Education," *William Rainey Harper Memorial Conference*, R. N. Montgomery, ed., pp. 35-50, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1938. Major criticisms of the position of these men occur in S. Hook, *Education for Modern Man*, Dial Press, Inc., New York, 1946, and in the published papers of the Second Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith, *The Authoritarian Attempt to Capture Education*, Kings Crown Press, New York, 1945, as well as T. Brameld, *Patterns of Educational Philosophy—A Democratic Interpretation*, Chaps.

nature man shares with other animate forms of life. Like plants and animals he takes nourishment, and like the brute he is sentient and capable of feelings. But unlike the plant or the brute he can reason, judge, discriminate. In respect of reason man has not his like anywhere. In this he is unique, *sui generis*. If reason is the essence of man's nature—the quintessence, we might even add—then wherever and whenever we find man we will expect him to be possessed of the faculty of reason. Changing the emphasis somewhat, we will expect human nature to be the same everywhere and always. We will invariably expect rational humanism, therefore, to weigh educational policy and practice by the standard of rational man.

Equipped with the unique faculty of reason, man's main business is to use this faculty, to know the world in which he lives. Happily the world is intelligible so that it can be known by the proper exercise of reason. Starting with self-evident principles like the principle of identity or self-contradiction man can reach absolute and universal truth. Truth, of course, is everywhere the same. Reason distills truth from its study of nature by distinguishing between what is essential and what is accidental in nature. The essential is concerned with the uniform, while the accidental is concerned with the variable. The variable is an indication of change but, change as things will, they never change as to their essential nature. This does not mean that the accidental and variable are unimportant but merely that they are less important for the educational philosophy of the rational humanist than are the essential and uniform.

Obviously a philosophy which is so preoccupied with the essence, whether of human nature or nature in general, is bound to offer staunch support to essentialism in education. Since rationality is the essence of man's nature, the principal aim of his education must necessarily be intellectual. Moreover, since human nature is everywhere the same and always, it follows that this aim of education must be the same for all men in all times and in all places. This does not mean that the humanistic rationalist overlooks or disregards the individual differences psychological research has so convincingly revealed. Sex and vocational differences, to mention but two, are important also, but they are accidental. They are not of the essence. Furthermore cultivation of the intellect is important not just as a means to an end, as in problem solving, but more significantly as an end in itself. It is the educational *summum bonum*.

10-12, World Book Company, Yonkers, New York, 1950. But cf. H. S. Broudy, "Implications of Classical Realism for Philosophy of Education," *Association for Realistic Philosophy Proceedings*, 1949, where the author starts with the same classical philosophical origins as Hutchins and Adler but arrives at a more nearly naturalistic realist position.

In selecting his materials for the curriculum the rational humanist is again interested in choosing the essentials. The essentials, of course, consist in what is uniform and recurrent in human experience. But the school day is not long enough to include everything which meets this criterion. There must be a further hierarchy of value. This is found in the rational nature of man. The larger the rational content of subject matter, the greater its claim to preference in the curriculum. This is as it should be if the universal aim of education is the cultivation of intelligence. The subjects with the greatest rational content, of course, are the liberal arts, and among the liberal arts, the humanities. These are best exemplified in the "Great Books" of our culture.

A curriculum so composed is likely to admit of little election by the student. The fact, however, that conversely such a curriculum is likely to be largely prescribed does not deprive the student of freedom but rather gains it for him. "Education for freedom," a popular phrase and principal objective of rational humanists, is achieved by conformity to the truth and not by a laissez-faire attitude toward the student's election of it or by the license to deviate from it.

As a matter of pedagogy it will be well for the teacher to recognize two orders of knowledge or learning. One is the inherent, essential order of subject matter itself as logically descriptive of the part of nature with which it deals. The objective of teaching and learning is to discover this order. Some essentialists conform the order of the lesson directly to this essential order of subject matter. Much like the progressives, however, the leading rational humanists recognize a second order of learning which takes its cue from the nature of the learner himself. They recognize that learning is a historical process which is relative to the point which the child has presently reached in his education. Consequently, still aiming to reach the essence of the subject matter under consideration, the teacher makes concessions to the temporary and accidental by starting with child experience. Instead of ordering the lesson according to the abstract and universal he commences with the concrete and particular.

Catholic Supernaturalism

Just as St. Thomas Aquinas absorbed much of Aristotle's philosophy into his own, so too the perennialists adhering to Catholic supernaturalism tend to find much in common with the perennialists professing rational humanism. In fact the Catholic supernaturalists agree with the rational humanists as far as they go but declare that they do not go far enough. The latter go as far as natural reason and metaphysics permit, but they stop short of the further vista which revelation and theology open up.

Down this further vista the Catholic supernaturalist seeks deeper meanings for his educational philosophy.¹

The educational philosophy of Catholic supernaturalism is fundamentally dualistic. It recognizes both an order of nature and a supernatural order. Central in the latter is the divine being of God, the Author of all. While change and time characterize the former, God Himself is changeless and eternal. Novelty, so evident in the natural order, turns out to be only apparent when viewed from the standpoint of an immutable eternity. Individuality, likewise, is accidental and merely an instance of an already complete reality. Indeed, God could not be omniscient and omnipotent if He were to grow or learn, if He did not both antedate and postdate time, and if there were anything that could be novel to Him.

With such premises granted, it is easy to understand why many educators insist on essentialism. What is fixed and unalterable through all time is undeniably essential. It is so essential that failure to insist on it would be folly indeed. It justifies any educator in holding to certain unwavering educational objectives. Furthermore, it is sufficient warrant for a prescribed curriculum. Educational values which partake of an immutable character remove any difficulty from selecting a program of minimum essentials.

Of course, change is not completely eliminated from this scholastic system. If there were no change, there could be no learning. But learning is a necessity of finite man in the natural order. Education is the process by which he lifts himself up to the eternal. Progress is measured by advance toward this goal. This progress, however, is primarily a matter

¹ The single most comprehensive treatment of the educational philosophy of Catholic supernaturalism is that of J. D. Redden, and F. A. Ryan, *A Catholic Philosophy of Education*, The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1942. More elementary but still very good are W. F. Cunningham, *Pivotal Problems of Education*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1940, and P. S. Marique, *The Philosophy of Christian Education*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1939. For a good brief account, following the *De Magistro* of St. Thomas Aquinas, see J. Maritain, *Education at the Crossroads*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1943. Less satisfactory, however, are two volumes by F. DeHovre, *Philosophy and Education*, Benziger Bros., New York, 1931, and *Catholicism in Education*, Benziger Bros., New York, 1934. Older but still valuable is T. E. Shields, *Philosophy of Education*, Catholic Education Press, Washington, D. C., 1921. To these books should be added one very good set of essays, *The Philosophy of Christian Education*, being the Proceedings of the Western Division of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1941. The nearest approach to a systematic criticism of Scholastic or Catholic educational philosophy is to be found in the published papers of the Second Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith, *The Authoritarian Attempt to Capture Education*, Kings Crown Press, New York, 1945, and in T. Brameld, *Patterns of Educational Philosophy—A Democratic Interpretation*, Chaps. 10-12, World Book Company, Yonkers, New York, 1950.

of improving the means of gaining the final objective. It takes place within nature. There is no progress in the ultimate end or supernatural destiny of man. This is final, unchangeable, eternal. The supernatural essentialist, thus, is progressive only within very definite and fixed boundaries. He rejects the radical philosophy of progressive education in which there are no limits or ends that are not subject to further evolution. Indeed, without the eternal verities as a fixed point of reference, the supernatural essentialist finds it impossible to calculate progress at all.

Among these verities, the nature of truth and goodness has peculiar significance for the philosophy of education. To commence with the former, it is obvious that knowledge, the chief commerce of the school, should be true. But when is knowledge true? If truth is an eternal verity to be regarded as forever the same, an objective external reality is imputed to truth. Truth is not the victim of subjective personal opinion or mental states. Rather, is it universal. This characteristic of truth is especially congenial to the essentialist. Learning it does not alter its character. Learning experimentally involves verification, but verification is not literally truth-making. Truth is not made—much less is it manufactured by a child learning. Verification is merely testing the correspondence of what is learned with objective truth. But learning is more than just copying or mirroring the truth as in the case of idealism and realism. It is a direct apprehension of reality; it is an entering into or laying hold on the very essence or being of the subject matter under study.

Of course, the entire truth has never been vouchsafed to man's keeping, not even to that of the essentialist. Much of man's knowledge is only an approximation to truth itself. Nevertheless, the assumption that there is a prototype of truth leaves its mark on the way the curriculum is conceived. The fact that truth is ever the same enables the teacher to make the curriculum up in advance of any learning activity. Essentials can be determined before school opens. Moreover, the knowledge of truth to be imbibed can be set out to be learned. The formal knowledge of the school is rarely something to be learned incidentally or indirectly as the outcome of fulfilling pupil purpose. It antedates any project he may wish to carry out. It is waiting to be learned. Consequently, it is something which can be appropriated directly. Being objectively conceived, it can, when learned, be stored away till called up on demand.

Accordingly, the primary role of mind in the world order is that of cognition. Its primordial business is to know. Since the truth is not always clear, it may first have to find out, to judge, what corresponds to the truth. But ultimately, its function is to record what is true. So school becomes the place where mind masters the essentials of culture. With training acquired from the sciences and humanities in the curriculum,

mind can accurately penetrate much that is profoundly true. But, suffering finite limitations, it will fail to grasp some of the profoundest truths of all, those of religion. Fortunately, however, aided by supernatural revelation, the human mind can penetrate the truth of even some of these divine mysteries.

The nature of mind further bears out the essential dualism in the Catholic philosophy of education. Mind is to be carefully distinguished from the body or matter. One must be especially on his guard in identifying mind with the brain or any other part of the neural system of physiology. The dualism of mind and body consists chiefly in that the latter is a material, while the former is an immaterial, substance. This difference should not lead one to think that there is a schism in the learner's personality. The oneness of the learner is fundamental in spite of the fact that that oneness is compounded of an immaterial mind with a material body. Just how an immaterial substance can interact with a material one or vice versa is a mystery of the dualism. But, in any event, the difference between mind and body is sufficiently great to warn the teacher not to place too great confidence in the conclusions of behavioristic psychology.

It is, of course, not enough for the educator to know what is true. He must also know what is good. Truth and goodness are separate categories. Much that is true is not good. Happily for the essentialist, values are to be regarded just as externally and objectively as truth. They inhere in the form of objects or studies even though unrecognized by pupils or teachers. Values are convertible with being. If they originated solely in bodily states, they would be too vacillating, for the instability of feelings is notorious. Besides, man's original nature is fallen, not wholly in order, thus undermining any assumption that what he desires is *ipso facto* good. What is good must also be judged good. Through reason, one will be able to apprehend what it is in any object or study that endows it with inherent and abiding value. Of course, it is this objectivity of value, it is the fact that the good is eternally good, that recommends it to the perennial essentialist of Catholic persuasion.

This philosophy of educational values has an important bearing on the employment of interest in learning. Interest is an assertion by the learner of a recognition of value in the object of his studies. As such, it is entirely normal and should be capitalized on if possible. But if the learner manifests no interest in the eternal verities presented to him in the curriculum, which should take precedence, interest or curriculum? The Catholic supernaturalist definitely aligns himself with the latter. In this, he is consistent with the rest of the scholastic position. The permanent obviously is to be preferred to the transient. Because it is permanent and enduring, it generates an obligation. It must, or ought to, be learned

even in the absence of interest. Effort must be summoned up so that duty may be discharged.

The immutability of truth and goodness lays yet a further imperative upon the teacher. If he is imparting what is unmistakable and eternal truth, or what are well-known essentials, it will be legitimate for him to indoctrinate. He will even be inclined to this procedure where there is uncertainty as to the final form of truth or goodness, for then his duty will be to pass on the most approved view to date. To let the child arrive at his own conclusions independently may result in an extravagant waste of time, to say nothing of his running the risk of failing to put in at the proper port in the end. If this method of instruction seems to disregard minority or contrary opinions, suffice it to say that the truth, if it really is *the* truth, must be intolerant of error.

At first glance, it may appear as if there were no room for freedom in the Catholic philosophy of education. However, there are two important points at which it is quite marked. In the first place, there is individual freedom of the will. The will of the pupil is free to accept or reject the authority of the teacher. To have to choose between the true and the false, or between the good and the bad, may not seem to be much of an option, but its exercise is nonetheless a fateful decision. In the second place, freedom is a social privilege. It is awarded to pupils in proportion to their command of the accumulated wisdom of social ages past. In this sense, freedom is an outcome or end of education. It is predicated on a knowledge of, and respect for, the essentials of tradition. Academic freedom thus is not absolute, but limited.

The importance of individuality in the Catholic philosophy of education may be inferred from its position on freedom. Individuality is obviously recognized. Indeed, individuals are of supreme worth. Individual differences in school children, however, are accidental, to use the word in its technical meaning. These differences are cultivated, to be sure, but they are not of the essence of childhood or humanity. It is the pupil's immortal soul that is most important to save through education. There is no difference in the quality of immortality. Salvation through education is accomplished by enabling the child to perceive and act on what is universal in truth and goodness, not what is accidental or transient. It is the universal that is essential, not the particular.

The sort of social structure in which the Catholic philosophy of education most readily roots may be either aristocratic or democratic. Its dependence on authority and the people who know best ordinarily enables it to work well with states where political power is rather narrowly and autocratically held. At the same time, the fact that it opens the highest careers to talent, in whatever social strata it is born, has a sound demo-

eratic ring. But in the relation of state and church the Catholic philosophy of education maintains its fundamental dualism between the natural and the supernatural, the temporal and the spiritual. The state's interest in education being of the natural order, therefore, is of a lower estate than that of the church. The educational philosophy of essentialism reaches its most extreme point in the supreme sureness of the Catholic church in the infallibility of its mandate to teach.

The Catholic philosophy of education comes to a final focus in religious and moral education. Although religion and morals are to be included right along with the secular or lay subjects, nonetheless the fundamental dualism of scholasticism is recognized in the distinction between profane and sacred studies. The approach to the latter, as might be expected, is from the supernatural side. The lay teaching of morals independent of religious instruction is thought woefully inadequate. Goodness is commended to children as a divine command. Religious education is orienting the child toward his Creator and final destiny.

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CHAPTER XV

CONSENSUS AMONG PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION

Importance of Consensus

By far the greater part of the foregoing exposition sets forth the differences in philosophic approach to educational problems. This great emphasis on differences could easily obscure the fact that there are also many genuine agreements. Moreover it could easily obscure the tremendous importance of continually searching for more and more agreement. Indeed it might be said that the attention paid to differences or disagreements so far has been occasioned by trying to understand why there is not more agreement or consensus among educators and by trying to find some common denominator of their differences as a means of enlarging the areas of professional cooperation.

The endeavor to resolve differences in political, economic, scientific, and religious points of view in order to arrive at a common line of action in the schools has an importance which runs beyond local or even national boundaries. It is truly world-wide in significance. If world order is ever to arise from the ashes of current nationalistic rivalries, any permanence it may have must root in the ability of men to think alike to a greater degree than has been their wont to date. Or, as the preamble to UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) puts it, since wars arise in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that we shall have to lay the foundations of peace. To undergird world order with enduring peace will require more than an international police force, important as that may be. It will require emotional attitudes of peace incorporated into the habit patterns of boys and girls, men and women, the world over. Of course many agencies like the church, labor unions, movies, radio, and the press can help build these habits, but the major portion of this undertaking must fall to the schools. Educators will not be able to fulfill this great function if they are preoccupied with stressing the divisions among their philosophies of education. They must rise above these divisions and achieve some consensus if they are to become molders of the new world order.¹

¹ BRUBACHER, J. S., "Frontiers of Educational Philosophy," *Educational Forum*, 12: 53-56, November, 1947.

Greater agreement or consensus among warring educational philosophies is not only greatly to be desired, it is also indispensable to any sort of social cohesion. Indeed we may lay down the fundamental proposition that educators cannot successfully disagree with each other unless they start with some agreements. Paradoxical though it may seem, we must agree in order to disagree, that is, we must agree in order to disagree significantly.¹ The administration of justice in our courts furnishes a good example. However sharply plaintiff and defendant disagree, they at least agree to accept the jurisdiction of the court to which they carry their quarrel. In accepting the jurisdiction of the court, they accept its rules of procedure and its precedents as a basis for handing down a verdict or decision in their own controversy. If they did not accept so much in common, there would be no way to terminate their quarrel except by an appeal to physical force and that would disturb the peace of the community and in the long run conceivably lead to an enduring quarrel or feud. A civilized community is one where people learn to disagree without being disagreeable.

The same proposition holds in the schools. An interscholastic debate would be quite meaningless if the affirmative and negative did not define the issue between them the same way. However they differ on resolving the issue, they must at least agree what the issue is. Similarly in interscholastic athletic rivalry, however keen the strife, the rival teams must agree on the interpretation of the rules. The case is no different in the management of the academic program. If teachers did not predicate their policies on some common philosophic principles, promotion through the various grades would lose all sense of continuity. The unity of the child's experience of the curriculum would be seriously interrupted.

Important as enlarging the area of common agreement is, whether establishing the community of debate, sport, justice, school, or what have you, it hardly needs saying that our objective is not a community of complete agreement. Impossible as that probably is, it is probably also undesirable. If all differences were to be eliminated there could be no growing edge to our agreements. What we seek is simply an orderly basis of agreement in order that we may reap the creative product of our differences and disagreements. And of course we would prefer that the orderly basis of any underlying unity should well up from the voluntary consent of those involved rather than be thrust on us from above or from without by liquidating dissenters.

¹ ADLER, M. J., in *Forty-first Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I, Philosophies of Education*, p. 201, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1942.

Practical Agreements

In searching for some consensus among competing philosophies of education it seems best to start where right now as a matter of fact we find the greatest number of agreements. This place is the concrete field of educational practice rather than the abstract field of educational theory, the area of educational tactics rather than the field of educational strategy. Since we differ on the theoretical implications of educational practice the agreements on practice may be more apparent than real. Nevertheless, even if that is the case, it seems best to start with practice where the greatest area of apparent agreement lies. At best it will only be possible to describe areas of agreement. Almost as certainly as we try to expand single areas of agreement we are likely to find that they border on other areas of disagreement. Moreover, we are unlikely to find clear-cut boundary lines precisely dividing black and white areas of agreement and disagreement. These lines, instead, are more likely to be wide bands of mixed agreement and disagreement.

Without attempting to be exhaustive we might mention the following areas of significant agreement in the everyday practice of the schools. At the very outset there is wide agreement on such obvious matters as making school buildings safe against fire hazards, protecting children against traffic hazards on the way to school, and providing children with glasses if they need them. There is general agreement on compulsory attendance up to a minimum level. There is also quite general agreement that children should be vaccinated before they come to school. Moreover there is wide assent to the fact that only teachers who can meet certification requirements by virtue of professional preparation should be allowed to teach.

Beyond such practical matters of common agreement, there is an area where agreement might least be expected, the area of educational aims.¹ Restricting ourselves to the proximate aims of education we find that nearly every educational philosophy accepts such objectives as the Seven Cardinal Principles of Education—command of the fundamental processes of communication and computation; health; competency in family, civic, and vocational relations; worthy use of leisure; and ethical sensitivity. If not this exact list, then some modification of it or some similar list usually offers unexceptionable educational objectives to nearly every one. Educators will differ on how these aims serve realization of the ultimate aims of education, and they will also differ on what any one of these aims demands when broken down into more specific detail.

Although educators differ on how the specific or proximate aims of education are to be broken down into the detail which constitutes the cur-

¹ *Supra*, pp. 110-111.

riculum, there is, nevertheless, a considerable area of agreement on the curriculum itself. There is pretty general agreement, for instance, that there is a sizable portion of the race experience which should be the common heritage of all. This is most clear in the case of the elementary school. But if less clear at the secondary and higher levels of education there is nonetheless a common patrimony there too which educators insist upon. The three R's at the lower level and the trivium—grammar, logic, and rhetoric—at the upper ones are generally agreed to be indispensable for all. There is wide consensus, too, that to these essentials must be added a basic knowledge of history and of social and physical science. And, very promising for future consensus, there is a growing unanimity of sentiment to include in the curriculum some of the sharper controversial social issues which divide the body politic. We should not be surprised, however, if after agreeing that all should learn to write, for instance, we should disagree on what they should write, or after agreeing to include controversial issues, we find that it is inappropriate to include religion as such an issue.

To be added to these important agreements in the areas of aims and curriculum happily are further agreements on the matter of methods of instruction. Perhaps the principal agreement here is that there are several methods and that their selection and use depend upon circumstance. Nearly everyone is agreed there is a proper time and place for drill. Beyond that there seems to be a notable common endorsement of the problem method. Life is undeniably problematical in many of its aspects; what could be more appropriate, therefore, than to pose this part of life to children in problematical form? Indeed so important is training in problem solving that many advocate the problem method where answers are already well known in advance. Where certain answers are almost universally accepted throughout the population, as in the case of arithmetic, grammar, or health, there is considerable consensus that it is proper to make the efficient short cut of indoctrinating such answers. But whether any answers are to be regarded as final or indisputable, there consensus begins to wear thin.

Where problems are genuinely precarious in outcome the problem method, of course, presupposes or perhaps even demands a certain amount of freedom for the individual in arriving at his solution of the problem. Fortunately again we can say that most philosophies of education concede the preeminent importance of freedom both as an end of the educative process and as a method of achieving that end. Probably there is more agreement on freedom as an end than there is on freedom as a means. But even on freedom as a method, notably in the form of academic freedom, there is wide consensus—at least in democratic nations. Few educators have confidence in any assent won from students under coercion.

Yet, whether or not freedom has reasonable limits and just where these limits lie states an issue which indicates that we are getting beyond the area of common agreement.

A further cardinal point of agreement in the realm of method or technique of instruction is the general acceptance of need for motivating instruction. Indeed there is much more agreement than ordinarily thought that the most effective learning occurs where children are interested in their studies. Furthermore it is generally conceded that children are more likely stirred to interest where the curriculum grows out of their present experiences. This amount of agreement is tremendously hopeful. But of course there are all degrees of enthusiasm and conviction with which the theory of interest is endorsed. Faced with lack of interest or difficulty in obtaining it, some educators are much quicker to abandon it than others. At just what point to abandon child interest and what to substitute in its place again indicates that we have reached the fringe between an area of agreement and one of disagreement.

Just as nearly everyone recognizes the practical importance of interest, so nearly everyone, too, recognizes that interest varies with individuals. Indeed, individual differences are so well authenticated now that educational philosophy would have to fly in the face of science to disregard them in the practical administration of the classroom. Yet, widespread as is the willingness to be guided by this obvious fact, the point of disagreement is not far off. Ask the question whether it is more important to educate a man in respect to his individuality or in respect to his common humanity, and a sizable disturbance develops. No little of the disturbance arises over failing to distinguish between an education which cultivates individuality and one which cultivates individualism.

It is perhaps well at this point to observe that most educational philosophies have come to terms with the science of education. There is a general willingness to admit that, where variables can be isolated and controlled, science can do a commendable job of describing reliably and objectively what the consequences are of engaging in certain practices. Thus educational philosophers are quite in concert in accepting the pragmatic results of intelligence testing although they differ quite severely on the nature of intelligence and what its function is in the world order. Disagreements multiply when we must decide whether or not scientific techniques of measurement can be extended to cover religious and moral education as well as secular.

To carry the matter of individual differences a point further we must note the general acceptance of the practice of trying to equalize educational opportunities, of trying to prevent accidental inequalities in the geographical distribution of economic resources from becoming insuperable

obstacles to a child's realizing and developing the unique talents of his individual heredity. This acceptance, however, points to neither an identity of educational opportunity nor to a race in which the hindmost drop out. Nor is this attempt to share economic resources more equitably the only way in which educators try to practice the democratic philosophy of education. There is also a growing tendency to share practical decisions of classroom management with children in so far as they are mature enough to do so. Thus the teacher may consult children as to problems to include in the curriculum, and the superintendent may invite his staff to help form important educational policies for the whole system of schools. The basic item in this sort of democratic practice which commands such wide endorsement is the fact that neither children nor adults like to be pushed around against their consent. They like to be consulted, to have their interests respected. But even so it is surprising how often teachers and administrators think their own unaided judgment better than conforming to a shared decision at variance with it.

A final sample area of agreement might be the approval given to the role of the school in conserving the social order. There is virtually no disagreement that the school should conserve the social heritage of race experience. Unless each generation knows the successes and failures of preceding generations, it will be at an unnecessary disadvantage in the struggle for existence. But of course it is impractical for everyone to learn the whole long record of these successes and failures. Consequently there is also wide agreement that the school must exercise a normative as well as a conservative function in selecting the curriculum of the schools. But at this point agreement begins to fade out, for, what shall that norm be? And how rapidly shall we expect to achieve the norm educationally?

Philosophical agreements

Happily, in addition to the foregoing agreements at the level of educational practice, there are also a number of points of agreement at the level of theory or philosophy as well. Where there is indication of so much agreement of a practical nature, it would be surprising indeed if there were not a corresponding degree of consensus in theory or philosophy as well. Some indication of the concurrence of philosophies can first be seen in the way in which they conceive the nature of education itself. Following are statements of a pragmatist, an idealist, a rational humanist, and a scholastic supernaturalist. Which is which?

Education should be thought of as the process of man's reciprocal adjustment to nature, to his fellows, and to the ultimate nature of the cosmos.

Education is the organized development and equipment of all the powers of a human being, moral, intellectual, and physical, by and for their individual and

social uses, directed toward the union of these activities with their creator as their final end.

Education is the process in which these powers (abilities, capacities) of men which are susceptible to habituation are perfected by *good* habits, by *means artistically contrived*, and employed by a man to help another or himself achieve the end in view (i.e., good habits).

Any adequate educational program will thus be concerned to help each individual child grow up from his state of initial dependence into full participation in the richest available group life, including in a democratic country a full share in the active management of group affairs. Such an adequate program will besides go on further to an active effort to improve the group culture.¹

Of course a close analysis of these statements will betray different schools of thought. Yet in spite of these differences there is a striking similarity of expression. Doubtless much of the consensus that appears is due to the generality of each statement. If the statement were less broad, the differences would doubtless be accentuated. Yet, stated broadly, these generalizations seem to approach a common denominator into which each is divisible.

It is particularly easy for philosophies to tend toward agreement on the nature of education when they confine themselves to the natural order. The proximate aims of education, for instance, rest on an analysis of life and culture here and now. The employment of interest for motivation rests on an understanding of the basic drives of human nature. There is a public quality about examining educational aims and motivation in the natural order. The presence or absence of uniformity in the facts are there for anyone to see. Anyone can test his conclusions against those of others. In fact the ultimate test of any conclusion is its success in getting itself accepted by competent students in the field. Although the natural order is very matter of fact, it nevertheless is not wanting in a certain sublimity. Plato and his *Republic*, St. Thomas and his *De Magistro*, Dewey and his *Democracy and Education* were all products of nature, perennially stimulating gifts to unnumbered generations of teachers yet to come.

When confining ourselves to knowledge in the natural order there is a rather significant agreement possible on the theory of knowledge underlying the curriculum. Two principal theories of the way of knowing, the morphological and the operational or experimental, have already been described at some length.² The former tries to get at the essential form of the material undergoing learning so that it can be described or defined

¹ National Society for the Study of Education, Forty-first Yearbook, Part I, *Philosophies of Education*, p. 320, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1942.

² *Supra*, pp. 77-78, 81.

in the most precise and unambiguous way. The latter is concerned with successfully adapting means to ends in the solution of some problem which is obstructing action. Happily these two ways of learning or knowing are not mutually exclusive or antagonistic to each other. Consequently as long as we are dealing with learning the secular curriculum there should be a growing area of philosophical consensus. Particularly is this the case where the resulting knowledge is held to be tentatively true rather than a genuinely true copy of antecedent reality.

Again, restricting ourselves to the natural order we can find a significant area of agreement in the field of educational values. This area of agreement lies principally in the field of instrumental or utilitarian values. Nearly every educational philosophy holds that the value of studies in the curriculum or of equipment in the schoolroom very often depends on the use to which these items are put. Whether they have an intrinsic value in addition to and independent of use is another matter. Disagreement on this point, however, need be no bar to extended agreement about values at the level of use. Similarly, irrespective of whether or not some educational values are intrinsic, all educational philosophies seem agreed that some educational values are aesthetic and consummatory and are enjoyable on their own account.

Even more gratifying is the degree of consensus that has been reached in the difficult to define area of spiritual values which are and can be taught in the public schools.¹ Not least among these spiritual values is knowledge itself. This is true whether knowledge is pursued in the form of science, philosophy, or art. Indeed, naturalists and supernaturalists may find to their surprise that their ultimate aims of education may tend to coincide in this area of knowledge as its own end. Thus Catholic supernaturalists often think of the highest end of man as union with God and this union as a glimpse of the beatific vision. This vision is an essentially intellectual vision since to look upon God is to behold perfect reason or understanding. The pragmatic naturalist, in stating that education is subordinate to nothing save more education, seems to be formulating an ultimate aim of education which is not unlike that of the supernaturalist. Since education can be pursued indefinitely as its own end, the search for education becomes an infinite quest. But since God is infinite, the beatific vision too is without limit. Hence naturalism and supernaturalism do not seem far apart in their ultimate aims of education when these are projected indefinitely into the future.

¹ John Dewey Society, Seventh Yearbook, *The Public School and Spiritual Values*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1944. See also American Council on Education, "The Relation of Religion to Public Education," *Religious Education*, 42: 129-190, May-June, 1947.

Of course the principal object of value in the whole educational program is the pupil himself. On this point—the dignity of the individual, respect for human personality—there is as wide agreement among philosophies of education as it is possible to get. Certainly democratic philosophies of education are unanimous in identifying themselves with this concept. It is easy to see why democracy should do this since it is the form of social organization in which individuals freely manage their own affairs. It is the form of social organization which is most consonant with the autonomy of human nature. An important corollary of this agreement is an endorsement of a theory of freedom, a theory in which freedom comes with understanding but in which the pupil is still free to experiment with deviations from common understanding.

Because of its commitment to the worth of the individual as an end democratic philosophies of education are generally united in favoring a pluralistic theory of the state. Accordingly the state is but one among other social agencies interested in providing educational opportunities for the child. This leads to the further commonly accepted theory of approving private as well as public schools because, in having a choice of schools to attend, the individual is able to guard himself to an important degree against any tyranny of the mind. The communist philosophy of education also professes an interest in the dignity of the individual but, professing a totalitarian rather than a pluralistic state, the freedom it guarantees is only the freedom to do what the state thinks best for him.

Philosophical disagreements

With such an extensive basis laid for consensus among philosophies of education it is time to remind ourselves that there are still profound points of disagreement between them which prevent their adherents from achieving even more unified cooperation in the conduct of the schools. The purpose of recalling our differences, however, is not to strike a note of discord. On the contrary, perhaps it will be in the ultimate interests of consensus to narrow down the major points which stand in the way of even greater consensus. Indeed to be able to agree on no more than a definition of our disagreements proves at least that the parties thereto are still in communication, a point of tremendous importance for, without communication, there can be no hope at all for consensus.

The foregoing philosophical concert of opinion has been largely in the nature of working or practical agreements. No doubt such agreements are better than none at all. And perhaps they are better than theoretic agreements which oddly enough find conflicting practical expression.¹ At any rate the extended area of agreement seems to come to an end when we

¹ National Society for the Study of Education, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-37.

try to reach agreements of more than a working nature. When we ask whether the warrant for our agreements is to be found in this working consensus itself or whether it rests on more certain ground, we ask the question which generally starts the great schism between educational philosophies.¹

So long as they confine themselves to the order of nature there are a number of educational philosophers who feel insecure in their conclusions about educational policy even though others are in consensus with them this far. To them the temporal order of nature is characterized by change and contingency. Conclusions about the aims of education or a suitable curriculum to fulfill these aims, therefore, must be constantly subject to amendment in the light of changes wrought by the passage of time. This precarious quality of life and education at the level of nature makes them uneasy. For good and sufficient reasons they are confident that the world of apparent change and contingency is undergirded by another which is changeless and eternal. The proof of such a world is speculative at best, logical rather than empirical, claim those who are content to rest their educational philosophies on the natural order alone. The quest for certainty beyond what is known in the natural order can therefore lead but to uncertain pretensions to certainty and to divisiveness among educational philosophers.

The schism in metaphysics between educational philosophies emphasizing change and those emphasizing the changeless widens and becomes more unbridgeable when reenforced by theological considerations. Those who seek to overcome the uncertainties of education in the natural order by an appeal to certainty in the supernatural order almost put themselves out of communication with those who insist on restricting the universe of educational discourse to the natural order. Yet in all sincerity the supernaturalist does not see, for instance, how consensus on the dignity of man can hold any secure place at the center of educational philosophy unless it has a divine authorship. Similarly moral education is precarious at best unless the child learns that in conforming to moral values he is obeying divine ordinance. Yet the naturalist in all sincerity does not see any more warrant for the theologically supernatural than he does for the metaphysically changeless. It may be supreme egotism on his part to trust his natural capacities in their struggle with the uncertainties of the natural order, but he sees no other resource if he is to be honest with himself. He must himself bear his cosmic anxieties; he cannot shift them to supernatural shoulders.

The critical question in these metaphysical and theological disagree-

¹ Cf. O'CONNELL, L. J., *Are Catholic Schools Progressive?* B. Herder Book Company, St. Louis, 1946.

ments is how do we know? Obviously the naturalist trusts his own experience; he cannot transcend it. Since his experience is the product of interacting with a more or less changing environment, he accepts no truths as fixed or final. All truths are subject to amendment in the light of further consequences. The supernaturalist, on the other hand, accepts some truths as fixed, even self-evident. But more than that he supports his human experience with divine revelation which he believes to be factually verifiable. Indeed it is principally through revelation that he has knowledge of the supernatural. Because of his confidence in the supernatural he believes that human learning results from more than human initiative, that there is also a divine initiative through grace.

Intransigent differences in educational philosophy take root in other soil than just that of metaphysics, theology, and epistemology. They also take root in racial and economic differences as well. To some educators the fact that there are children black of skin constitutes as inalterable a reason for a different sort of educational program as metaphysics constitutes for others. Similarly other educators gear their policies so closely with an economic system like capitalism or communism or with a theory of government like *laissez faire* or the welfare state that they find it utterly impossible to achieve any basic consensus with their adversaries.

Whatever the basic reason for taking a rigid or intransigent stand in one's educational philosophy, the ultimate and deplorable result is to break down communication between the adherents of conflicting philosophies of education. Each group seems to have its own universe of discourse. Consequently they do not speak the same educational language. Community breaks down into several communities each with its own separate system of schools. The danger here is that separate school systems will breed suspicion and misunderstanding. Yet deplorable and dangerous as this situation is, what can be done about it? How can we endeavor to reconcile the irreconcilable?

Methods for Consensus

So far we have chiefly noted substantive agreements. We must now try to enlarge the area of agreement to include the method of determining agreement and disagreement as well. First let us note that consensus presents us with a problem in learning. The philosophical differences like experimentalism, rational humanism, and the rest, which divide and separate us, are not biologically inherent. For the most part they are learned. Consensus, therefore, may also be a matter of learning or perhaps better, relearning. Second let us remark that we have learned our divisions in a social setting and that much of the rigidity of these differences may derive in part from the satisfaction we derive in sharing them

with others. If these divisions were strictly a matter of individual personal differences, they might be more readily reduced. But it is the social reenforcement of sharing them with others which provides the most effective resistance to their modification. Learning consensus, therefore, may primarily be a matter of forming and emphasizing the importance of a new and different set of group relations.

Again, in trying to set up new social relations conducive to consensus we will do well to be as sensitive as possible to any and all barriers to communication. For instance, we should be careful about setting up straw men for purposes of knocking them down. In directing the shafts of our criticism at straw men we are aiming at the wrong target; we are, in fact, preventing ourselves from seeing the real men opposite us. Perhaps nothing corrects such distortions or so reveals the real opposition as does face to face discussion of issues. Yet even in direct communication educational philosophers will do well if they would not take themselves or their philosophies too seriously. This may seem strange advice in such a serious discipline as philosophy. Yet it may be a necessary prelude to being able to understand what some other philosopher is saying.

Two noneducational illustrations may help to make the point. A notable poster during the Second World War showed a fallen soldier with a member of the Red Cross unit rushing up to his side. The question raised by the poster was whether it made any difference to the member of the Red Cross whether the fallen soldier was a Catholic, Protestant, or Jew? Of course it did not. A person's philosophy is important but not that important. So too in another illustration, again taken from court procedure. When a person takes the witness stand, does it matter what are his philosophical reasons for telling the truth so long as he is committed to telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? Again, of course not. Naturally we feel more confidence in someone who thinks as we do, but we are far from making that a condition precedent to hearing his testimony.

The significance of these illustrations will serve to point out that conduct is as important if not more important than the theory which undergirds it. Theory, the verbalization of conduct, is undoubtedly very important, especially to its formulator, but it should not overshadow conduct. If we can manage to act in concert on the battlefield, in the courts, or in the classroom, should that not induce us to minimize the significance of verbal or theoretical disagreements from which the action may have sprung? May not theoretical differences, which do not make a noticeable difference in action or conduct, be trivial or purely verbal at best? Doubtless such theoretical differences stem from temperamental differences and do have important aesthetic consequences for the individual. But if so,

should we not take these differences for what they are and not stake the issue of "one world" and its social cohesion and stability on their acceptance?

On the other hand, suppose we insist that our theoretic disagreements are as important as we think they are, that we cannot sacrifice or compromise them for practical agreement, just how far are we prepared to carry this insistence? Are we ready, for instance, to insist that our peculiar theoretical formulation of life or education prevail over others though to do so will bring on civil or international war in which civilization comes tumbling into ruins about us? Is it better that libraries, laboratories, schools, and museums—to say nothing of factories, governmental buildings, and homes—should come crashing down rather than that we should give up one iota of principle in our educational philosophies in order to compromise on some common line of conduct? Is it humanly possible for one of us to be so unquestionably sure of his position that he would be warranted in paying such a price? And the price could be terrible to pay because in an atomic age another holocaust of war might very well reduce the material basis of civilization to such a low level that it might be centuries or even millenia before we would have the surplus wealth and consequent leisure to cultivate education in high principle as we do at present. Certainly these are questions which any of us must answer before he is ready to be rigidly uncompromising to the bitter end of philosophical controversy.

Proceeding now on the assumption that educational philosophers will be willing to be at least a little tractable in negotiating their diverse viewpoints, we may inquire as to the probable directions of improving consensus. The most promising seems to lie in the direction of resolving disputes of fact. Here we have the method of science to aid us. In the indicative mood of fact science offers a tribunal and a method of procedure for resolving disputes which has wide and long-standing recognition. Scientists may not always agree on specific facts, but they do not disagree on the ultimate way to arbitrate these differences. Furthermore scientists continue to make brilliant scientific advances in spite of the fact that philosophers are not agreed on the theory of scientific knowledge because they cannot agree on the nature of man as a knower. The fact that scientists are in consensus on conquest after conquest of their discipline despite the philosopher should be a challenge to the latter to achieve a similar consensus in knowledge theory or epistemology.¹

The same might be said for disputes over educational values as well. Most educators think it easier to resolve disputes of fact than it is disputes

¹ Cf. the attempt of F. C. S. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1946.

of practical judgment, that is, disputes of practical value. This need not be the case if they would treat their values as empirically as they do their facts. Then they might achieve consensus on values in practice, leaving it to the philosopher to worry over the theory of values as it depends on a theory of human nature.

While it should be relatively easy to resolve disputes of fact, it is much less easy to resolve disputes of practical judgment, that is, conflicting judgments of value. In the optative or imperative mood of values till recently there has been no long-standing well-recognized method for settling differences as there is in the indicative mood of fact. However, an elaborate attempt has now been made to work out a discipline of practical judgment which would compare favorably with the discipline of scientific judgment.¹ Given a "community of persuasion," a community of people voluntarily disposed to overcoming personal rigidities of viewpoint, much can be done. But given optative rigidity the outlook is not so hopeful for a discipline of practical judgment.²

In an educational impasse brought on by optative rigidity, about the best that can be done is to compromise or submit the issue to majority vote. Of course compromise does not offer a real consensus. However, where a dispute resolves itself into optative rigidity on each side, perhaps the best that can be expected is negotiation of an educational *modus vivendi*. In sincere search for some sort of practical working conditions, there is bound to be a modicum of reconstructed theory. Negotiation, if carried on by equals who are mutually interdependent, comes as near as anything to bringing about some lessening of rigidity. In compromise a rigid educational philosophy may be just bending to spring back into position when the tension is released, but to bend at all is something; and if the tension is kept up long enough, the structure of an otherwise rigid position may be enduringly warped.

If no compromise is possible, then perhaps the only way to break the impasse is through majority vote. It is necessary here to appreciate the role of majority rule. To make a majority determination does not resolve the merits of a dispute over values in coming to a practical decision. It rather recognizes the rigidities involved, but instead of letting them stall

¹ National Society of College Teachers of Education, Twenty-eighth Yearbook, *The Discipline of Practical Judgment in a Democratic Society*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942. A revised edition of this book has been published as R. B. Raup, G. Axtelle, K. A. Benne, and B. O. Smith, *The Improvement of Practical Intelligence*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1949. See also R. B. Raup, "Frontiers of Human Values," *Progressive Education*, 26: 1-7, October, 1948.

² Observe the note of caution against overoptimism on achieving consensus in C. F. Donovan, "Anti-intellectualism in America's Schools," *Catholic Educational Review*, 48: 150-151, March, 1950.

or stalemate the course of instruction indefinitely, it provides a way of releasing some action. It does not say that the majority is right; it merely says let the majority rule the action. But even so majority action should be taken in the interests of the whole group and not just for the majority because only so will the minority be able to acquiesce in it. And even then the majority must realize that there are some things, like religious instruction, on which it is better not to take action for fear of stirring up implacable rigidity in the minority.

Finally we must remember that no worthwhile consensus is possible which violates the integrity of any party thereto. In seeking for consensus we must have entire respect for the personality of those who differ from us, even where our differences stiffen into rigidity. If a consensus of educational philosophies is to be forthcoming in the twentieth century, as was a medieval synthesis in the thirteenth century, it will likely have to be the cooperative product of many minds. Some one man, like St. Thomas, may succeed in summing it all up, but the groundwork will have to be laid by many lesser minds. With appropriate humility by all and appropriate charity to all the success of such a consensus or synthesis does not appear impossible.

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